Theory and Doctrines

Theory and Doctrines (1)

The article focuses on information and psychological operations as a challenge for the security and defence establishments of NATO member states. A conceptualisation of the terms ‘information operations’ and ‘psychological operations’ is discussed in the contexts of reshaping the war-and-peace dichotomy, and of resilience and deterrence. It is suggested that these terms suffer from a normative approach to the paradigm of war and peace, and to the use of non-military means. This may lead to the greater vulnerability of security and defence systems in confrontation with an adversary. Also, special attention is paid to the vulnerabilities of security and armed forces, being overlooked in concepts of resilience.
Personnel Recovery intervenes to almost all areas of planning, preparation and implementation of military operations. One of the important areas of the personnel recovery system is the intelligence area. This article describes on the operational level the reasons and basic methods of intelligence support of Personnel Recovery during joint military operations.  It introduces selected intelligence disciplines and explains the suitability of their use in the various Personnel Recovery phases. It also describes the intelligence activities related to post-reintegration phase and outlines the basic issues associated with the intelligence support of Personnel Recovery.
Structured analysis is a systematic approach to solving intelligence analytic problems. Methodology and analytical techniques in the intelligence analysis include the selection of structured techniques from the point of view of the analytical task and the use of the analytical spectrum. Basic structured analytical techniques ensure transparency and reduce personality bias. Taxonomy is the basis for quality analysis. There are 55 types of techniques that complement expert judgment and intuition. A properly structured analysis contains twelve questions supplemented by a number of analytical techniques. The method of analytical spectrum in strategy leads to the split of the process into the phase of analysis, synthesis, selection of information and argumentation, and the analysis itself consists of four sub-stages. The basic parameters that negatively affect the use of structured analytical techniques by intelligence analysts are the analytical and collective approach, the patterns and the level of education.
The article examines the different approaches of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United States Armed Forces towards Electronic Warfare, the military activity in the Electromagnetic Environment. All reference materials used for this analysis, including the specifics of the Army of the Czech Republic’s approach toward the subject area, were obtained from unclassified military sources. It describes, explains and visualizes the individual approaches, and by their comparison it identifies and subsequently emphasizes cases of divergence, including non-compliance in established Czech terms, definitions and abbreviations. It highlights the obsolescence of the still valid military publication Electronic Warfare in the Army of the Czech Republic, the use of which, in its current form, has already been deemed as unfounded and counterproductive. It presents proposals and recommendations for unification of approach towards the Electronic Warfare issues within the Army of the Czech Republic, in order to ensure consistency with the current North Atlantic Treaty Organization policy related to activities in the Electromagnetic Environment. It contributes to better understanding of doctrinal views on the role of Electronic Warfare in execution of combat support tasks in contemporary military operations, thus creating preconditions for elimination of associated misunderstandings in terms of the Army of the Czech Republic.
This paper is derived from “Exploring the Future Operating Environment”, published in Joint Force Quarterly, April 2018. The article was presented at the Defense & Strategy 2018 conference, which took place at the University of Defense in Brno on 4-6 June 2018.
Cílem článku je připomenout myšlenky válečných (vojenských) stratégů o způsobu vedení vojenských operací v době studené války a představit problematiku operačně manévrujících skupin. Jejich použití představovalo nové koncepční pojetí útočných operací, vedených vysoce mobilními uskupeními vojsk Varšavské smlouvy v období sedmdesátých a osmdesátých let minulého století. Na základě analýzy a komparace historických pramenů je zde předložen soubor informací a poznatků ze sféry vojenského umění a rovněž poskytnut komplexnější pohled na taktické, operační a strategické souvislosti vedení útočných operací na evropském bojišti. Jejich dopady měly zásadní význam i pro způsob přípravy vojsk a vzdělávání vojenských důstojníků v bývalém režimu.
The aim of the article is to recall the thoughts of war strategists on how to conduct military operations during the Cold War and to present the issue of operational maneuvering groups. Their use was a new conceptual framework of offensive operations led by the highly mobile military units of the Warsaw Pact in the 1970s and 1980s. Based on the analysis and comparison of historical sources, a set of information and knowledge from the field of military art is presented here as well as a more comprehensive view on the tactical, operational and strategic context of the offensive operations on the European battlefield. Their impacts were also essential in the way of training of troops and education of military officers in the former regime.
The article deals with the experimentation in the military domain. It is anchored by the experiment explanation in the NATO context paying special attention to the capability development. Basic principles and terminology of design, execution and analysis is discussed in the following part employing 5W approach. The main focus is aimed at the experiments’ examples from the NATO and Nations environment. The article is closed by the explanation of the role of the experiment in the decision making process under the uncertainty in the complex environment.
Personnel Recovery is currently an inseparable part of all NATO military operations. This article is focused on the development of the Personnel Recovery in military operations from the Second World War to the 2003 Iraq War. It describes the meaning of the concept of Personnel Recovery, introduces its basic aims including the clarification of its importance in military operations. It focuses on the identification of conditions that determine the existence of the rescue system. In the historical context, it describes the circumstances of development of the recovery of isolated personnel, including its incorporation into a functional system. It identifies and analyzes events that, in terms of their importance and ability to influence subsequent development, represents milestones in the organization of Personnel Recovery and from them describes the measures taken.
This article deals with one of the approaches to command - Mission Command – which can be seen as a dominant command philosophy in NATO nations and especially in the United States. This approach is considered as a very important in terms of possible responses to the challenges having impact on current and future security environment. Respective parts of this article describe the military causes and related historical consequences based on which the mentioned command philosophy had been constructed. The relevant parts describe basic principles of Auftragstaktik, developed and implemented by Prussian and later on by German military leaders which aim is to emphasize centralized intent and dispersed execution through disciplined initiative.