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The center of gravity in military affairs represents a dominant element of military art, used in the planning and conduct of military operations. The doctrine defines it as the main source of power that provides the actor with his strength, freedom of action and/or the will to fight. This article examines Clausewitz’s concept of center of gravity through selected philosophical perspectives and clarifies its significance in military theory and practice. It presents the doctrinal development of the concept, discusses its context, and concludes that the concept of the center of gravity remains a key doctrinal and practical element of operational art.

The proponents of Revolution in Military Affairs claim that modern military technology will lift a "fog of war". In this article the term "fog of war" is described and illustrated in a work of Carl von Clausewitz who is supposed to introduce this term, used also in the famous novel War and Peace by Leo Tolstoy. These classics show us that uncertainty and chance, in other words fogs of war, are essential to human mentality. They will be present as long as war remains within a scope human endeavour. Emphasizing that military technology is equal to lifting the "fog of war" can lead to situation in which only trained commanders are supposed be able perfectly address problems in "chessboard" of war or computer simulators, but they will unable to manage a real world full of chaos, as they not used to count with uncertainties.

This article examines whether Turkey is ready for a full-scale military conflict with Bashar Al-Assad's Syria. It draws from an adaptation of Clausewitz's concept of three resources that a state must possess to be able to win a war: the fighting forces proper, popular support, and its allies. Turkey is at a significant disadvantage when it comes to its air force and air defense capabilities. Should a major confrontation erupt, Turkey would not be guaranteed to be able to control the relevant air space. Turkish citizens do not favor seeing their country in a foreign quagmire. Despite myriad differences, Turkey it is still deeply embedded within NATO, and its strategic interests do not differ from those of its strategic allies. Turkey also cannot afford to risk an open military conflict with Russia. The article concludes that Turkey is politically and militarily not capable of fighting a full-scale war in Syria.

This article presents a formal economic framework for assessing the sustainability of prolonged attritional warfare. Using the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine as a case study, the paper models the interaction between military production and consumption (losses) to evaluate the limits of state endurance under sustained conflict. The core of the analysis is a differential function of the war economy, defined as the net capacity to sustain operations over time, which is the difference between production and losses. This function is embedded within a theoretical construct that distinguishes between sustainable and unsustainable operational regimes, marked by critical thresholds of system exhaustion. Through a combination of regression analysis and symbolic modelling, the paper demonstrates how Russia’s current attritional strategy may be approaching a structural breaking point. The findings offer a conceptual and empirical basis for evaluating wartime industrial resilience and may inform strategic policy and conflict forecasting.

This paper examines the role of strategic communication in military operations, with a focus on its impact during the first year of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Using a process-tracing methodology, the study explores whether Ukrainian strategic communication was decisive in resisting Russian attacks. Our findings indicate that strategic communication functioned as a central component of Ukraine’s defence. Effective messaging mobilized broad support from diverse actors, including state entities with no regional stakes and non-state contributors such as civilians, volunteer fighters, and organizations, driven by motivations beyond self-interest. Ukraine’s resilience stemmed not from a deceptive Russian strategy (i.e., a lack of genuine intent to engage in a full-scale war), but from its bold counter-offensive, bolstered by international aid - support amplified and sustained by the strategic communication efforts that shaped global perceptions and secured critical assistance.

The article is based on a study carried out as part of the Long-Term Organizational Development Plan project by the Center for Security and Military-Strategic Studies of the University of Defense entitled "Armed Conflict". As part of the study, the issue of strategic surprise was analyzed and assessed, the aim of which was to find causal mechanisms and connections between the security of state defense and the phenomenon of surprise in the conditions of the 21st century. The article deals with the issue of surprise and its impact on state defense security. It describes strategic surprise as a principled aspect with implications and impacts on state defense. It examines the issue of surprise as a principle of military art in the context of contemporary strategic thinking.

Most experts believe that urban operations will gain importance in the future, but even though we have sufficient examples and experience at hand, we still struggle with the development of the necessary skills and capabilities. The resulting gaps are a combination of different tasking and shrinking resources in the past decades, the difficulty of training for and a mere misunderstanding of the urban environment and harmful innovations - we seem to find ourselves always in the beginning. Fighting in isolated "prisms of responsibility" requires flexible task forces with all necessary enablers at hand and well-trained commanders exercising mission command and understanding their role, task, and the purpose of action. Mastering the urban environment on all three levels of movement is a very challenging task and requires focused attention on various aspects, inter-actor interaction and interdisciplinary research and development. The development of a methodology suitable for looking into the hidden aspects and contextualizing them with current activities and future developments is key to capability development.

No military operation is conceivable without logistics. It is widely known, however, the origin of the term logistics is not unambiguously stated in publications and sometimes refers to ancient Greek. There is no doubt that the term "logistique" was first used by the general of Napoleonic army Antoine-Henri Jomini and Lieutenant Colonel George C. Thorpe, U. S. Marines, anglicized Jomini's term to "logistics". Among many distinguished authors that paved the way to the current theory of military logistics cannot be omitted Rear Admiral Henry Eccles. It is also worth to mention Austrian-American economist Oskar Morgenstern and his attempt to outline a consistent language between military and business logistics and to formulate a general theory of logistics.

The study presents a meritorious view of the traditional operational factors of space, time and force. On the background of the first and second phases of the War in Ukraine, it examines how the relevant factors shape the use of military force in operations, clarifies their mutual correlation, interference, application connections and also causality. The results of the study demonstrate the necessity of a correct and holistic perception of operational factors for effective deployment and employment of military forces in the contemporary operating environment. The main benefit of the study, applying the heuristic and inventive function of analogy from the open sources of available identified knowledge from the deployment of military forces in the War in Ukraine, is the mediation of model examples of a comprehensive vision of the effects of how operational factors shape the use of military force in contemporary high-intensity warfare operations.

Based on the content analysis method, this study analyzes the first ever published security strategy of the Israel Defense Forces, which was published in 2015. The main objective of the paper is not only to present the circumstances of its creation and discuss the main objectives of this strategic security document, but also to outline the broader geopolitical context from which it emerged. The authors argue that the document primarily emphasized two areas - the use of force and capacity building of the Israeli military. Among other things, the publication of the strategy was intended to have a deterrent effect. In the conclusion, the authors compare the Gideon Plan and its follow-up, the Tnufa Plan, and point to the considerable importance that consensus among political and military elites has in the implementation of such a document and reflect on what lessons and inspiration can be drawn from this case in our geographic space in the process of formulating or reformulating strategic security documents.

This article delves into multi-domain operations in the context of future warfighting. A multi-domain approach to operations is being progressively implemented in allied nations and within NATO, as well. It should also become a core interest for the Czech Republic, even if the sea and space domains do not represent the crucial area of potential operational engagement of the Army of the Czech Republic. The complexity of operations in a complex operating environment requires mutual interaction across all operational domains. The integration of the physical and virtual spheres of operations suggests that operations planning cannot be strictly oriented to individual operational domains. The interaction between operational domains must be perceived as a sine qua non for effective planning and conducting military operations. This is also a fundamental prerequisite for the successful activity of forces in a complex operating environment.

This paper assesses the information war in Ukraine in the context of the military strategy. An influence of the information operation (disinformation and deception) presents the strategic tool. The author pragmatically analyses the information war from the military art perspectives and as a part of the strategy used for support of the combat operations. He identifies phases of the information war in the context of the war. The author expects and confirms the opinion that the information war is led by both external actors (the USA and the Russian Federation). Their top representatives are involving in the information war because they support their own interests. This paper has been written as a neo-realist case study. The balance of power concept is in accordance with the used theory, as well as with the key interests of the external actors.

The basic orientation in the field of military art demands at least elementary knowledge of military history and understanding to military strategy influence on the art of war. The questions tied to understanding military strategy and its influence on the preparation and conducting military operations are part of study programmes of all life education at the Defence University. The purpose of this article, dedicated to military strategy problems, is deeper understanding to its basic connections, understanding a direction the strategy took in a designated period and its development. I ought to explain in short its role and attitude towards the nature of military operations.

The war in Ukraine has become a global issue that has been closely monitored and evaluated by military experts and the media since its beginning. The aim of this article is to point out some specific aspects of the development of the conflict in Ukraine in its initial stages. In the beginning of the article, the author deals with the surprising development of the so-called "special military operation", leading to a change in Russia's original plans. In the following parts, he discusses the way the forces of the warring parties are used in individual domains, applies the principles of warfare and discusses the possible causes of the operational failure of the Russian military forces. The article mainly uses data from open sources. Analysis, comparison, deduction and synthesis were used in its compilation. The overall intention of the author is to offer readers one possible view of the ongoing conflict and to motivate them to think about the nature and character of war.

The book Paradigms of Military Tactics, compiled by Pavel Zůna, deals with the principles of fighting at the tactical level on more than 300 pages.

The term "new wars" is often used to describe how terrorist groups achieve objectives in addition to the "classic" means of intervention by states. Terrorist organizations use asymmetric methods of warfare to target the weaknesses of Western states. Consequently, conventional wars have also changed into hybrid wars. The legal status of terrorist organizations is a major problem for the rule of law. In responding to terrorist attacks, the distinction between crime and terrorism is difficult. The "war on terror" is governed by different rules and principles and is extremely difficult to wage. Conflicts last a long time and victory against terrorism is rarely possible due to the networked structure of terrorist organizations and the way they intermingle with the population. In addition to an alliance-wide approach, there is a national solution to answer these new threats in form of the comprehensive national defense in Austria.

This paper aims to explain the tension between the phenomenon of whistle-blowing and military values, embodied in core martial virtues of loyalty and courage, which are integral in all armies. By defining these virtues in the military context, the author demonstrates how expressing dissent in the military is not necessarily opposed to loyalty and courage, but rather that it is necessary if conflict of different loyalties is properly managed and if courage is properly understood. Only by ensuring that armed forces are led by those who truly understand military values and martial virtues, and that whistle-blowing can be both patriotic and heroic, can we strive for a lasting peace. By courageously expressing loyalty to his nation, institution and profession, a soldier may act heroically by blowing the proverbial whistle.

The goal of this review article is to briefly describe the development trends in the conceptualization of the phenomenon of hybrid warfare and to try a basic comparison of the key features of twenty important concepts with emphasis on selected Western, Russian and Chinese theoretical concepts. A substantial part of the article also deals with a closer characterization of hybrid warfare with the intention of clarifying the possible relationship of this type of warfare to the activities of the Czech Armed Forces. In connection with the importance of hybrid warfare and hybrid threats, the article is supplemented with essential recommendations that the Czech Republic and the Czech Armed Forces should reflect. The emphasis on content and the above arguments confirm that looking at the phenomenon of hybrid action and warfare as a novelty is very debatable. Rather than a new concept of warfare, it is a newly accentuated term "hybrid" describing long-known combinations of power tools used.

Hybrid threats are considered among the most serious risks that Western societies currently face. The aim of actors using such threats is to influence decision-making processes, and in order to do so they use a rich spectrum of methods to instigate conflict in society, seeking to undermine trust in institutions, abet radicalisation, and so on. Activities aimed at creating internal conflict, and the prevention of such activities, are not, of course, a new phenomenon; they differ only in their extent, intensity and the techniques used. The aim of this paper is to investigate how classic strategists - Thucydides and Machiavelli - described in their works how internal conflict is fomented among the enemy and how it can be prevented. The paper describes and analyses various ways of instigating and mitigating internal conflict as noted in their works, and assesses their relevance for the current debate.

Is Georgia's integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) security structures leading to assured full membership? Ever since gaining independence in 1990, Georgia has tried to free itself from Russian influence, focusing on becoming a member of NATO. However, the Georgian journey to NATO is complicated by the country's internal political situation and external relations with Russia. Georgian internal conflicts with breakaway territories supported by Russia led to the Russian invasion into Georgian territory in 2008. Russia suppresses Georgian efforts to join NATO, considers the South Caucasus to be a strategic sphere of interest, and intends to exercise its influence there. Nevertheless, the current Georgian government continues to pursue NATO membership. Key determinants for any invitation to new members are whether their admission to NATO will strengthen the alliance, further the basic objective of NATO enlargement , and increase security and stability across Europe.

Uncertainty is a constant in war. Militaries regularly go into conflicts with operational concepts that are not relevant in the face of the enemy and his plans. The authors propose a way to reduce uncertainty and rapidly check, then adapt, the operational concept - designed learning operations at the beginning of campaigns. These relatively small operations will create friction with the enemy, giving learning teams crucial information to assess their operational concepts. Learning operations offer conventional militaries a way to maximize their advantages over sub-state enemies, by concentrating learning at the outset of the fight and adapting first.

This paper is derived from "Exploring the Future Operating Environment", published in Joint Force Quarterly, April 2018. The article was presented at the Defense & Strategy 2018 conference, which took place at the University of Defense in Brno on 4-6 June 2018.

This article deals with one of the approaches to command - Mission Command - which can be seen as a dominant command philosophy in NATO nations and especially in the United States. This approach is considered as a very important in terms of possible responses to the challenges having impact on current and future security environment. Respective parts of this article describe the military causes and related historical consequences based on which the mentioned command philosophy had been constructed. The relevant parts describe basic principles of Auftragstaktik, developed and implemented by Prussian and later on by German military leaders which aim is to emphasize centralized intent and dispersed execution through disciplined initiative.

The research described in this paper was conducted in the framework of institutional research project Strategic Alternatives (STRATAL) within the Centre for Security and Military Strategic Studies of University of Defence in Brno, the Czech Republic. The main objective of this contribution is to assess the evolution of the Czech defence policy (CDP) since the last summer 2016. The main impetuses for the CDP evolution were provided by the NATO Summit in Warsaw, new European Global Strategy including the ambition to enhance defence cooperation among the EU member states and the pattern of dynamics in our security environment. The authors analysed the key change drivers (KCDs) and measures taken in political, military, administrative, economical and societal domain in order to evaluate the overall effectiveness of the defence policy. Finally, the authors offer several recommendations to enhance the responsiveness and preparedness of the Czech defence system and the Armed Forces both in short- and long-term time span.

The process of the Lessons Learned in the Czech Armed Forces is not ideal for several reasons. One of them is the underestimation of the process by top management. Another one is the low level of awareness of the process, institutions, possibilities and importance of the Lessons Learned Process as a whole. The aim of this article is to clarify the Lessons Learned Process as a tool to support the organization. The first part of the article deals with the process of the Lessons Learned in the Czech Armed Forces including terminology. The second part of the article describes the factual implementation of the Lessons Learned in the Czech Armed Forces. It points out achievements as well as drawbacks during its implementation. In addition to that, it introduces the current Czech military publications dealing with this topic. The conclusion presents the description of some suggestions and recommendations for further development of this process.

The paper assesses the conceptual framework for Czech defence policy formulation in the wake of a rapid change in its security environment after Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the subsequent Russian support for separatists in Ukraine's eastern provinces and growing instability in the Middle East and North Africa. The article examines key measures taken in the political, military, administrative, economical and societal domains in order to evaluate the overall effectiveness of Czech defence policy. Finally, the authors offer several strategic level recommendations to enhance responsiveness and preparedness of the Czech defence system and Armed Forces as one of its most significant components both in short- and long-term perspective.

The following thesis focuses on the issues regarding deployment of medical forces within the shifting operational environment. It analyzes its development stages and considers their meaning and influence on current and forecasted developments of military health capabilities in the long run. The authors' fundamental research question is to be whether the changes to the operational environment's dynamics and scope will substantiate as the defining factors for ensuring interoperability with Alliance partners, for the purposes of developing new type of medical capabilities needed. Moreover, the importance of a rarely emphasized role of operational art in military medicine is discussed. Such tool seems to be a key element for the harmonization of strategic objectives with long-term tactical activities.

There are two great interpreters of the Napoleonic experience, Jomini and Clausewitz. Both were interested in the application of military force to achieve political goals. The article familiarizes readers with Jomini's theoretical fundamentals of operational design elements, namely the lines of operations. Jomini left a great mark on the details of strategic planning: campaign planning, the selection of the theatre of operation, the base of operation, the line of operation, and decisive points. At the end of this process of selection was the final deployment for the decisive battle. Jomini's major contribution, then, was to provide the geometry of the battle space. In his investigation of the nature of war he developed several key operational concepts. As an operational art tools they help the commander and staff to visualize the arrangement of military capabilities in time, space, and purpose to accomplish the mission. The concept of operational lines is evolved in all operational functions in terms of ongoing military missions.