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The article addresses the use of social media intelligence (SOCMINT) as a tool for recruiting and selecting souces by foreign intelligence services, with an emphasis on the risks it poses to students in military studies at national military universitiy. It analyzes the specific ways in which SOCMINT enables foreign intelligence agencies to effectively gather personal data and profile potential collaborators from both public and private information shared online. Research conducted among students of the University of Defense and other institutions revealed that military students share comparable types of information on social networks as their civilian peers, making them equally vulnerable to the activities of foreign intelligence services. However, military students are preparing for careers in defense and security, making them a significantly more attractive target for foreign intelligence agencies than other categories of employees.

The article focuses on the concept of crowdsourcing in the social networking environment as a new phenomenon involving civilians in the intelligence process, enabling the use of their intelligence potential during armed conflict. Crowdsourcing of the civilian population is introduced by the example of NATO intervention during the first civil war in Libya. The article presents its use during the intelligence process at the strategic-operational level of command and control of the armed forces. It establishes its possible definition as a collection method of the intelligence process, and as a collection method which is disjunctively separable from similar intelligence collection methods.

This study aimed to explore the media’s perception of the military and militant activities, focusing on journalists’ professional conduct and their commitment to the national cause. In-depth interviews were conducted with Pakistani journalists reporting from conflict zones. The findings suggest that Pakistan is engaged in a war on terror and that the media plays a key role in glorifying the security forces in their fight against militants who challenge the authority of the state. Journalists expressed the view that the government and military should take realistic measures to combat this threat. While journalists described militants as terrorists, they also noted that their professionalism is often influenced by patriotism and a national duty to serve the country. However, objectivity remained a key element of their reporting. The media, considered the fourth pillar of the state, should have the necessary freedom to report on conflicts. At the same time, self-censorship was considered necessary to prevent content that could lead to radicalization.

In 2007 and 2010, this Czech Military Review Vojenské rozhledy published several articles, discussing analytical thinking and analytical methodologies in the field of military intelligence. The authors among others mentioned the methodology ACH, Analysis of Competing Hypotheses. The methodology is not suitable only for intelligence, but it can be used further for solving a variety of military decision-making problems. The article in its first part describes ACH philosophy, including some academic considerations both by supporters and critics to this methodology. The second part demonstrates an example of its implementation and usage during support other problems tied with decision-making in defence planning process. The method is simple to explain, but difficult to introduce to real practice. The article explains both the theory and modifications of ACH and underlines some pitfalls connected with putting methodology into practice.

In May 2017, Islamists of the South-Philippine Separate Groups of Abu Sajyaf and Maute occupied Marawi City in Mindanao. Five-month fighting was attended by more than 3,000 armed forces against about 1,000 jihadists. Dozens of foreign fighters took part in the fighting on the Islamists side and confirming the pan-Islamic ethos of the Islamic state's ideology in this part of the world. Philippine troops were not prepared for the character of fighting in urbanized environment against motivated and experienced militants. The shortcomings were manifested in the conducting of operations in a heavily built-up area, but also in low-level coordination and limits of capabilities of the technical intelligence. It was decided to create Special Operations Command to which all Philippine special purpose forces are subordinated. The conflict experience has initiated a change of doctrinal approach that focuses on air support to reduce losses due to inaccurate bombing and acquisitions of high-tech reconnaissance and weapon systems.

Personnel Recovery intervenes to almost all areas of planning, preparation and implementation of military operations. One of the important areas of the personnel recovery system is the intelligence area. This article describes on the operational level the reasons and basic methods of intelligence support of Personnel Recovery during joint military operations. It introduces selected intelligence disciplines and explains the suitability of their use in the various Personnel Recovery phases. It also describes the intelligence activities related to post-reintegration phase and outlines the basic issues associated with the intelligence support of Personnel Recovery.

comprehensive cooperation within reliable security partnerships. Thus, regional tailored military cooperation has gained more importance than ever before in order to tackle various threats and challenges and to strengthen crisis management capabilities. Therefore, Austria launched the Central European Defence Cooperation (CEDC) in 2010 to foster regional security cooperation and to promote modernisation of military resources. Two years later, Austria co-founded the EU Mountain Training Initiative, which closely coordinates training and education with the NATO Mountain Warfare Centre of Excellence in Slovenia. This paper aims at analysing and discussing current initiatives and possible ways of improving Central European security cooperation between NATO member states and Austria.

The article discusses the operational adaptability, which will be needed, in accordance with US, in future armed conflicts. The capability of operational adaptability has a significant impact particularly on the operations of land forces, which are still considered as a paramount military power. One of the prerequisites for achieving operational adaptability is effective influencing the dynamics of the human environment in armed conflict. Current development and emphasizing technology over the course of armed conflict detached too fare the War from its intangible political, cultural and psychological context. Human, psychological, political and cultural dimensions of armed conflict create a lot of uncertainty, which land forces should deal with in the future military operations. A partial solution applicable for Czech Armed Forces also outlines this article.

This article describes the doctrinal determination and definitions of the term Actionable Intelligence and the impact of this specific intelligence concepton commander's decision-making process. The part of this report deals with the position of Actionable Intelligence in intelligence branch, concretely in connection with the intelligence disciplines and particular stages within intelligence cycle. There is also the accentuation of interconnection to the importance of intelligence information sharing, early warning systems and force protection on tactical level. The next part of this article is focused on the impact of intelligence support on commander's decision-making processes.

On the introduction, the article focuses on clarifying the place and role of counterinsurgency in current military operations. It also deals with the principles of counterinsurgency and their doctrinal comparison within some advanced armies and the NATO. The aim is to highlight some findings related to principles that should be changed,added in doctrine and incorporated into the training of the ACR troops. The result of the analysis and comparison of individual principles with own experience of the author from the mission in Afghanistan are recommendations given for the troop training in the theatre. The implementation of the proposed measures in preparation of the Czech Army units may improve the effectivenessof counterinsurgency in military operations.

The main goal of this article is to depict the issue of intelligence information sharing within the so called principle "need to share" and highlight the differences of this current trend, which was to replace the "need to know" principle. The first chapter in reference to current global threats depicts the extent of the present national and international interrest in the intelligence field which is followed by the issue of "need to share" principle. The aim of the following chapter is briefly analyse the sfaring of intelligence information within NATO and the EU. This chapter also includes the possible sharing of SIGINT information obtained by national tactical element embedded in Task force during current day operations. The final part evaluates the intelligence information sharing and outlines certain prediction of future development in this field.

Protection of the civilian population against the Gaddafi regime, it was a clear UN mandate for military intervention in Libya in 2011. Not only a new approach to leading the fight against terrorism after 11 September 2001, but also requires a change in approaches to conducting combat operations coalition forces, as shown by the recent armed conflict in Libya, inevitably required a new perspective on the concept and approach to the process of targeting as the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and responding to them in accordance with operational requirements and capabilities of units, synchronization of NATO forces, particularly with regard to collateral damage with an impact on the protection of civilians. And Unified Protector operation is a clear example.

Intelligence services collect data from various sources: SIGINT (intelligence obtained by listening to the enemy's radio transmissions), HUMINT (information about the enemy obtained from people, e.g. friendly forces, agents, civilians, prisons of war), and the very latest it is the so-called OSINT - Open Sources Intelligence. Its description is not unequivocal. In the intelligence community, the term "open" refers to overt, publicly available sources, as opposed to covert or classified sources. OSINT includes a wide variety of information and sources: media, public data, observation and reporting. It is defined as produced from publicly available information that is collected, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner to an appropriate audience for the purpose of addressing a specific intelligence requirement.

The purpose of this article is to inform on elements of military deception in NATO armies and overarching principles that make military deception successful. Deception Planning is an iterative process that should be considered as an inextricable part of the operational planning. The knowledge in the field of military deception in the Czech military is low; no operational deception plan has been prepared for foreign operations or any military exercise. Deception is widely appreciated as a powerful instrument of military operations, yet it is surprisingly neglected by both the Czech Army and Military Educational System. The author tries to encourage officers and members of higher staffs to study this subject.

The overall purpose of this paper is to describe the way the Alliance and the also the Czech Army is going to apply the leverage of powers while conducting operations in the future. The article shows in details that the relative combat power analysis requires an assessment of factors either directly or indirectly affecting the potential outcome of the operation. In order to improve military knowledge and operational thinking within the Czech Army it is recommended to improve the quality of officers' military training and personnel preparation in accordance with Czech MoD White Paper on Defence. The views expressed in this assessment are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of Alliance or the Czech Ministry of Defence.

This article aims at building a bridge upon a gap, which separates academic sphere and intelligence community in the issue of predictive methodology. The author tries to accomplish this objective by presenting intelligence predictive methods based on open-source literature research. First, the question of uncertainty and probability in prediction is introduced (Cynefin template). Then follows basic introduction to predictive methods in civil and military intelligences, so that the reader might grasp the fundamentals of early warning systems. The academics and above all journalists should know the risks and perils in forming intelligence forecasts, estimates, foresight and warning scenarios, e.g. the so-called Black Swan scenario, the author explains potentials failures of the Delphi method. This study ought to be regarded as an introductory to predictive intelligence concurrently done by governmental agencies for purposes of national security and defence.

Military Intelligence plays important part in national defence, indicating particular kinds of potential threats to the Republic or Allied partners. Its effectiveness mainly consists in evaluating the security situation continuously and in exchanging of intelligence information between our services and the Allies, with the aim to detect any potential threats and to eliminate a possibility of surprise in time. According to Act No. 153/1994, concerning the intelligence services, its activities are strictly limited by law. It gains information from open sources (OSINT), by means of signal intelligence (SIGINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), and by using intelligence equipment and tools (IMINT, imagery intelligence). The author proposes to establish central organizational unit, in order to organize, assess, and evaluate individual intelligence branches, their intelligence support to individual target addressees. It should be allowed to reallocate both material and financial sources in form of proposals, reflecting developments of individual intelligence branches.

This operation was led by Germany, and made up of elements contributed by twenty EU nations; as well as Turkey and Switzerland. The EU deployed FHQ in Kinshasa and simultaneously kept the over-the-horizon force in Gabon, in order to ensure a deterrent capacity and to avoid unnecessary heavy military presence in Kinshasa. After Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EUFOR RD Congo was a second EU largest military operation, involving a total of almost 3,000 soldiers and officers). The co-operation with MONUC was decisive in containing the potential spread of violence at a particularly sensitive moment in the election process. The operation demonstrated the EU ability to successfully conduct medium scale autonomous multinational operations within a planned time frame under the UN mandate. The views expressed in this assessment are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of EU Military Structure or the Czech Ministry of Defence. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.

Armed Forces by František Kříž. After September 2001, in operations both in Afghanistan and Iraq, great attention is paid to terrorism throughout the war. In fact, new generation of warfare came in existence. War on terrorism is a large-scale low intensity conflict, without classical confrontations between states, without massive bulk of soldiers. For such type of warfare we can't use weapons of mass destruction, or classical types of warfare. At level of US Army brigade there were some changes in structure and scope of forces. Several new formations were established: Heavy Brigade Combat Teams, Infantry Brigade, Infantry Brigade Combat Teams, and Future Combat System Brigade Combat Teams. In operations, brigade S2 section is reinforced by an analysis and integration platoon, MI Company. The idea of augmentations and reorganizations of S2 groups is to elevate potential in the brigade system of Intelligence Battlefield Operating System. Article is based on articles form Military News, Military Intelligence, Global Security, etc.

Even though many activities related to intelligence and intelligence network after the end of Cold War were released and have become commonplace, classified matters are still in the centre of public's interest. In discussions, experts use various terms tied with espionage or counter-intelligence, but real differences are not too high. In the armed forces (in the frame of NATO) this question was solved by issuing the manual AJP-2, Allied Joint Intelligence, CounterIntelligence and Security Doctrine (NATO 2003). This article summarises key and basic terms used in intelligence services, including new theoretical concepts from this field. As the author writes in the introductory chapter, many experts, namely in civilian and academic fields use the same terminology, but their explanation differs. They use different definitions reflecting diverse circumstances under which they came into existence. The article was written namely as a contribution to interagency communication, among civilian and professional experts, in time when the overall security concept is changing, when military power is not the only tool to avert wide spectrum of security threats of 21st century.