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The article deals with the issue of identifying required material reserves, also referred to as strategic or emergency reserves. These reserves are managed by state authority as part of national crisis preparedness. The article explores how scenarios can be used as a method for planning, i.e. determining adequate, realistic, and affordable material reserves. A scenario-based analysis, well proven in the defence planning domain, is identified as a method offering a high degree of analytical rigor and traceability of resulting requirements. Selected planning scenarios clearly must reflect national threat/hazard and risk assessments. They also have to reflect other important national policies, such as those governing economy, industry, health care, or environment. The illustrative conduct of the initial steps of the proposed method is demonstrated using Latvia's security policy circumstances.

Participation of experts form NATO member and partner countries in security situation development trends together with related military implications is meanwhile the newest mean of member states engagement onto NATO Defence Planning. In one hand this possibility is a way to gain findings from national experts and in other hand an opportunity enabling countries to enlarge knowledge and experience of national participants in order to development of similar activities at national level. Moreover there is an opportunity to present activities of nations´ institutions working in the similar field as well as national findings linked to security trends and defence planning. The author concludes that the Czech Republic has not yet formulated its own defence planning process, and suggests the possible effects of this condition

The aim of the article is to bring out results of the comparative analysis of NATO and EU defence planning processes. The comparative analysis was focused on identification of those findings which are identical for both NATO and the EU and which might be also beneficial for optimising the national defence planning process within the Czech Ministry of Defence. From this perspective, the key analysis outcome is identification of similar phases which were found out while comparing respective NATO´s and EU´s planning tools, i.e. J-DARTS and SAEP Process. Even if NATO and the EU are using a different terminology and different approaches to achieve expected results, the substance of respective phases is almost identical. A course of action how to implement the analysis outcomes into the national defence planning process might be the subject of a follow on research.

The paper deals with the issue of the purpose, creation and practical use of scenarios during operational concepts development. The scenar- ios reflect the fundamental characteristics of the environment in which the military missions will be conducted in the next 15-20 years. The paper defines the type of scenarios useful for creation of operational concepts and requirements that must be met for a successful process of scenarios development. Further, it describes the process of scenarios development, the main risks associated with this process while suggesting the possibility of reducing the rate of those risks.

The purpose of this article is to inform on elements of military deception in NATO armies and overarching principles that make military deception successful. Deception Planning is an iterative process that should be considered as an inextricable part of the operational planning. The knowledge in the field of military deception in the Czech military is low; no operational deception plan has been prepared for foreign operations or any military exercise. Deception is widely appreciated as a powerful instrument of military operations, yet it is surprisingly neglected by both the Czech Army and Military Educational System. The author tries to encourage officers and members of higher staffs to study this subject.

The article shows that Czech armed forces are supposed to develop planning mechanism according to the Alliance Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) to be fully interoperable in operation planning process (OPP), namely in field operations planning in the framework of the multinational missions abroad. However, some problems persist at the operational level of crisis management, such as institutional arrangements for planning and commanding crisis operations, procedures pertaining to force generation, synchronization and activities coordination. The Czech Army Operational Planning Doctrine is still being developed. The purpose of this article is to inform on current state of affairs in operational planning with subsequent consequences to the results and reform recommendations by the White Paper on Defence.

In the past, the Common Funding played only marginal role in the NATO strategic decision-making. However, this situation changed significantly when the global economic crisis challenged the national public expenditures and NATO defence policy became a matter of serious reflections. NATO should balance its requirements with limited resources and adjust its future activities within shrinking budgets. NATO must make hard decisions and implement reforms in order to ensure its ability to fulfil its mission and priority tasks in the long run. The reconfiguration of Common Funding is an inherent part of this process. The aim of this article is to introduce Common Funding as a management-supporting tool of the international organisation under currently mounting resource constrains.

The purpose of this article is to deal with Course of Actions development (COA). Attention is paid to ensure a common understanding of COA process. The article broadens the vision and offers deep insights for its readers. Moreover, the war game was described as a method of refining or modifying the COA. It has also been emphasized the commander and staff consider each COA advantages and disadvantages. The Czech Army personnel training and preparation should steadily and deliberately bring improvements into the field of operational planning capability within forces´ command levels. In order to improve operational planning knowledge, it is recommended to study AJP-5 Operational Planning Doctrine and ACO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive.

The article continues explanation basic operational terms, familiarizes readers with true theoretical fundamentals of the key element of operational design - the decisive point. Basic doctrinal interpretations are described and explained. Its introduction and utilization is visible during the operational planning process and elaboration of operational design. The concept of decisive point has a close connection to the other concepts, namely lines of operations, the centre of gravity and the end state. The concept is further evolved via example of peace support military operation planning process. Key words: decisive points, decisive conditions, lines of operations, centre of gravity, effect, kinetic, nonkinetic operations, doctrine.

The article explains defence planning of armed forces deployment that ought to by the base for all long haul visions and concept texts for army development and its operational employment. Operational scenarios and concepts form together key elements of defence planning process, both factors enable to military organizations not only to identify future security challenges but also to react to challenges in being. It is not contrary to the so-called capability planning process as this is a manly armed force potential backing our ability to face threads and risks in the future. The example of the United States involved in three asymmetric conflicts is a warning example showing the necessity of the complex and coordinated strategical approaches.

All-inclusive attitude of NATO forces assumes that conflict can't be solved only by military means. This shift from purely soldierly level to political brought around numbers of Alliance activities at Strategical and Operational Commands. The common denominator was the philosophy of complex approach in operational thinking, planning, and implementing NATO activities. As a result the operational SACEUR's directive GOP was substituted by its revised successor-the so-called Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD). It is going to be introduced in 2011 and will influence groups and military persons at all levels of warfare, dealing with operational planning and operational art for art's sake. The article familiarizes readers with this directive (COPD) as a tool for comprehensive approach to operations. The COPD offers more deliberate and inclusive planning procedures that allow for both military and non-military actors broader understanding of operational environment and better cooperation in their common effort.

The article is involved in the problems of providing humanitarian aid. The authors analyze legislative and social surroundings upon which the humanitarian assistance is rendered by the Army of the Czech Republic. They characterize various forms of non-governmental organizations in our country and the conditions under which the Czech Army is allowed to cooperate with them. There are many special features in providing assistance, namely as far as members of various church denominations in the Czech Republic are concerned. The list of selected denominations with their short profiles is enclosed.

The autor responds to several articles published in our Military Review, namely by Prof. František Ochrana, Prof. František Božek, Brigadier Rudolf Urban, Prof. Miroslav Krč, in No. 4/2008, with special appreciation to critical articles by Ing. Jiří Dušek and Lt.Col. Ing František Růžička in the same issue. He tries to find out common denominators of those essays. There are three of them: economization tied with rationalization, risk management, and information compatibility. As necessary he regards to unite those denominators both at the level of decision making officials and at the level of their subordinated elements, by means of e.g. working teams as a guarantee of coordination, so that the adopted Long-term Vision of Defence Department could be actually realized.

It is a point at which attacking forces are unable to continue their attack or even defend themselves, because do casualties, shortages of fuel, ammunition and rations, and sheer physical exhaustion. This sequel article deals with the theory of the operational art focusing on the culminating point operational concept. The article emanates from Carl von Clausewitz's ideas and concepts described in his book "On War", doctrinal publications analysis and study projects of the operational art theorists. It treats conditions influencing achievement of the culminating point on single levels of war-strategic, operational and tactical and highlights coherences and factors having fundamental influences on culmination. The article is accompanied by several graphs describing this theory in detail. Key words: Culmination, Culminating Point, Zeroing, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, Campaign Planning and Developing Operations.

Operations by Lt.Col. Ing. Jaroslav Moravčík. NATO's current operational experience and that from other operations indicates that purely military actions cannot resolve a complex emergency of crisis. The requirement for the military to interact with non-military actors shows a new, more comprehensive approach. In response, NATO's Effect-Based Approach to Operations was highlighted. The four functions of EBAO and their related activities are mutually supportive. The functions are carried out in a continuous, interactive, parallel process and should not be regarded as sequential steps. They are as follows: Knowledge development; Effect-based planning; Effect-based execution; and Engagement space assessment. EBAO recognizes the importance of applying the various instruments available to the Alliance to create overall effects that will lead to crisis resolution. Achieving synergies amongst NATO and non-NATO actors will enable to identify better how it may best harmonize its contribution with other actors involved in a crisis.

This book written by Alain C. Enthoven, and K. Wayne Smith, was published some forty years ago, but its leading ideas do not grow old. It is a work of enduring value and listing relevance, this book is both a classic account of the application of powerful ideas to the problem of managing the U.S. Ministry of Defence (DoD) and a cautionary history of the controversies inspired by that successful effort ...206 Defence secretary Robert S. Namara's device was a new system for allocation defence resources, the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). Most of those decisions are taken as bedrock defence policy today, and the methods have become embedded ad the DoD's approach to defining and resolving issues. According to the author of this article, this book ought to be the inspiration even for our Ministry of Defence in its effort to save restricted means and at the same time to increase Czech military capabilities.

The second part of this short serial deals with the theory of the operational art focusing on the centre of gravity (COG). The article emanates from Carl von Clausewitz's ideas, doctrinal publications analysis and many study projects of the operational art theorists. The author especially aims on disunity and heterogeneity of comprehension of the centre of gravity theory in confrontation of contemporary doctrinal publications and original Clausewitz's theory. He compares operational manuals (those of U.S. and NATO), and finds similarities concerning characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a military force, nation or alliance, derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. Finally, he himself defines enemy's centre of gravity and highlights coherences that can affect fulfilling political and military objectives in current and future military operations.

This article covers the EUFOR RD Congo operation preparation phase and provides information on Military Strategic Planning Process, Military Operational Planning, Collaborative Planning, EU OHQ Potsdam activation and Force Generation Process. It describes planning period to highlight a pivotal role of training and education. Operation EUFOR RD CONGO was the EU second military intervention in the RDC, following Operation Artemis in 2003. The EUFOR RD CONGO mission was to support MONUC during running election process, in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1671, authorizing the temporary deployment of an EU force in the RDC. The views expressed in this assessment are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of EU Military Structure or the Czech MoD. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.

Some of the published critiques dealing with midterm planning are not true, as they were created without detailed knowledge of practice and methods how our midterm plan was created. Nevertheless, there are some real faults in midterm planning. According to the author, they are divided into two groups: external-they depend on quality of assignment; and internal-they are connected to the application of theory. Main external fault is the absence of long-term plan. In fact, it was introduced by the Order of Defence Minister, but it has not been worked up thoroughly. We lack adjusting main goals, tasks and priorities for MoD. Next problem are unstable and lacking financial sources. Internal mistakes are as follows: absence of mechanism for balanced changes between cycles of planning; implementation of life cycle cost and level of education of staff preparing data for planning.

The Centres of Gravity (COG) are characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. The COG belongs among the most important operational concepts. It is the main source of power and strength. Without dermining enemy's COG we are not able to carry out any quick and resolute action, to reach ordered tasks, desired objectives. The primary purpose of this article is to offer basic information about this subject. This first part is concentrated predominantly to Carl von Clausewitz's ideas. The article especially aims on disunity and heterogeneity of comprehension of the COG theory in confrontation with contemporary doctrinal publications and original Clausewitz's theory. It highlights coherences that can affect fulfilling political and military objectives in current and future military operations.

The author of this article considers the prospective changes in the development, character, missions and tasks of the Army of the Czech Republic, Those changes are deduced from the changing security environment and long-term development trends. To meet new demands, we must continue in building interoperability and compatibility. The battlefield operations will be planned and controlled by the systems of "Network Centric Warfare" and "Reach Back Operations". It will not be necessary for a commander to be in physical contact with operational theatre. Electronical high speed intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, reconnaissance will enable the high pace of military operations (together with common analyses, integration of collected data, evaluation of enemy's intents and activities). This will enable to build a credible defence, in the frame of collective security system, hand in hand with other NATO allies.

This article deals with the problem of pursuing 3E policy in Czech MoD. The article shows how helpful it can be for the management of MoD to systemize activities under MoD control to shape the defence programmes as a 3Eprogram. In our forces, even though we have introduced PPBS (Planning, Programming and Budgeting System), still we need other means to shape effectively state defence. The author recommends to organize activities and related elements into seven groups in order that we can judge the impact of functionality of those programmes and its respective 3E, taking into account specific activities realized e.g. by outsourcing or by some other kind of personal substitution. He underlines the importance of proper defence programmes for decisionmaking process in MoD.

The planning is a general term with many meanings, all of which imply an ability to scheme or arrange beforehand. In practice, planning is a highly formalized and disciplined activity through which we can induce changes, procedures for a decision-making unit, including the establishment of goals. Planning in the forces therefore involves two levels: i. operational planning (intentions and goals of forces, feedback information for setting up operational capabilities); ii. defence planning (development of armed forces, military potential). Long-term planning for 10-15 years or more ahead covers strategic analysis, strategic goals, implementation of strategic goals that are mutually connected, depended on each other, and implemented in particular surroundings which also influences the whole process. This article is based on papers presented at workshops held at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Defence University Brno and is accompanied by several schemes drawn among others from the Handbook on Long Term Defence Planning, published by NATO Research and Technology Organization, 2003.

The core of this article is lying in general delimitation of objectives, aims, and tools of state economy principles within defence department. It is the question of optimalization, leading doctrines and tools of economy of economy support of defence. The authoress proposes the system of optimalization of economy support of defence and economy and defence policy of state, its introducing into methods and practice.

The Czech Republic is developing professional, highly mobile forces, with up-to-date arms, weapons, capable to take part in wide scope of Alliance or other multinational operations, even abroad, outside European territory. But this capacity depends on defence budget, on the percentage from our GDP allocated for military. From the part of the ACR, it will depend on effective spending, usefulness of used resources.