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To fulfil Czech obligation as an EU Battle Group Framework Nation according to the regulating document EU BG Training and Certification, the Czech Army is to certify that the CZE/SVK Battle Group EU meet the standards and criteria stated in Standards and Criteria for EU BG. It is recommended that the CZE/SVK Battle Group EU certification process should be analogous with NATO Response Force (NRF) certification procedure and practical methods. Further it is suggested that the CZE/SVK Battle Group EU certification procedure is divided into several evaluation procedures: preparation planning evaluation, war-fighting evaluation, and technical evaluation. Each procedure will be developed by specialized teams with representatives in the sub-working group to ensure that the different procedures harmonize. The views expressed in this assessment are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of EU Military Structure or the Czech Ministry of Defence. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources. The written sources are listed in the matrix above.

This article presents the findings of the survey being done during the evaluation and assessment of EU Battle Groups, their missions, roles, tasks, stemming from the requirements set by the EU Crisis Management Concept. The paper does not discuss in detail variants EU Battle Groups, but concentrates on their historical background, basic characteristics, structure, EU political-military ambitions, scenarios, reaction time, tasks, standards, training and certification, Battle Groups commitments, concept and implementation, achievements. The article also includes recommendations for the Czech Armed Forces that are currently involved in the formation of the EU Battle Group CZE/SVK. This article aims to record progress to date and to indicate challenges ahead. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.

The CPX Battle Group 2007 was the Strategic and Operational Studies Institute key exercise in the field of CZe/sVK Battle Group EU. It was aimed at increasing operational capability of the Higher Officers Courses attendants in conducting integrated expeditionary and network centric operations in asymmetric environment, in a rapid, mobile, flexible and versatile manner. The exercise was held in May and June, 2007, at the University of Defence Campus, Brno. The aim of this article is to present the latest developments of the rapidly deployable EU Battle Groups and provide better understanding to the complexities of setting up a multinational high-readiness unit for peace-support and crisis management. The author discusses some issues and problem of the concept, similarities and differences between the Battle Group Concept and the NRF, Headline Goal 2010, and some tactical issues related to the operations. Some alternative options on how to further develop this Battle Group Concept are proposed at the end of the study.

EU Battle Group CZE/SVK was formed as the part of a long-term strategy to turn the Czech Army from static defence, garrison force, to mobile, expeditionary formations capable to participate in EU common security and defence policy operations. In June 2003, the first EU autonomous military crisis management operation Artermis was launched. It successfully demonstrated EU ability to operate with quite a small Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) in a highly hostile environment. The IEMF, dispatched 6,500 km from Brussels, operated under the UNSC mandate, in cooperation with UN forces (MONUC) in the Ituri District, Democratic Republic of the Congo. Operation Artermis demonstrated the need for further development of rapid response capabilities. Subsequently, it has become a reference model for the development of Battle Groups, with rapid response capability. Lessons learned are valuable for Czech army planners being involved in force planning, or building the first EU Battle Group CZE/SVK. All information and sources for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.

Factors such as distance, destination, deployment demands, duration, represent key elements to determine logistics requirements. The EU BG concept necessitates considerable strategic air/sea lift and combat support capabilities, since EU battle groups are to be able to be deployed almost anywhere in the world, primarily in Africa. They have to deploy both troops and materiel simultaneously to its mission areas. Strategic airlift is the fastest way of deploying troops over long distance. The main challenge for the EU is therefore availability giant airplanes. A lack of suitable European transport crafts in EBalabáuropean airlift fleet is the Achilles heel to the EU BG Concept. The problem is that all aircraft available have only limited payload capacities and flying range. Although deploying by sea is more time consuming than deploying by air, EU member states have more ships available for strategic sea transport. The strict deployment deadline set down in the EU BG Concept means that ships and crews will have to be held at very high readiness.

Africa has became synonymous with conflict, increasingly violent and protracted. The continent is facing huge difficulties today and the EU is more and more involved in peace enforcement and expeditionary operations. Therefore the purpose of this article is to inform and pass knowledge of operational environment to those Czech soldiers designated to deploy overseas and abroad. It covers topics such as operational areas, understanding EU Battle Group operational Environment and Africa's operational environment. It is necessary for Czech soldiers to understand African operational environment very quickly and profoundly to avoid unfortunate misunderstanding of the local culture, customs, believes, religions, regional official and customary laws. It is a new challenge for the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic to be prepared for the CZE/SVK Battle Group. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.

This article deals with objectives of EU BGs, required abilities and possible employment, namely from the legal point of view. Last but not least, there are mentioned relations between NATO and EU BG. Military capabilities of the EU are closely tied not only with the second pillar of the ?Maastricht Temple? (Common Foreign And Security Policy), but they are united with the activities of the EU as a whole (with all three pillars). The EU should have the potential to carry out independent military actions to solve international crises. The Battle Group is the smallest independent military unit (group) capable of being deployed in the area of operation. It is a combined arms grouping, the exact composition will vary according to the tactical requirement at the time. One of new BG?s tasks will be separation of parties by force. The ACR has earmarked the same units both for NATO and the EU led operations. This future deployment is specified in the current Czech Military Strategy and related documents. Now we are preparing the documents for building up common Czech and Slovak Battle Group (EU CZE/SVK BG).

The assessment of force ratios and battle casualties is a crucial aspect of the military decision-making process. This article evaluates three different tools used by the Army of the Czech Republic at the tactical level: a calculator based on Lanchester's laws, a module within the Battle Information System, and a constructive simulation system. The results indicate that while all tools produce similar outputs, the constructive simulation system offers more accurate estimates of combat losses for both equipment and personnel. Additionally, this system enhances the ability of commanders and staff to adapt to changing scenarios during planning. The primary conclusion is that the constructive simulation system provides a practical and flexible solution for supporting the military decision-making process at the brigade and battalion levels.

The aim of the article is to recall the thoughts of war strategists on how to conduct military operations during the Cold War and to present the issue of operational maneuvering groups. Their use was a new conceptual framework of offensive operations led by the highly mobile military units of the Warsaw Pact in the 1970s and 1980s. Based on the analysis and comparison of historical sources, a set of information and knowledge from the field of military art is presented here as well as a more comprehensive view on the tactical, operational and strategic context of the offensive operations on the European battlefield. Their impacts were also essential in the way of training of troops and education of military officers in the former regime.

An important part of NATO's deterrence and defence role is its military presence in the eastern part of the Alliance's territory, represented by the Bucharest Nine (B9). The ability of this group to fulfil its strategic mission depends on the condition of the military equipment at its disposal. The number of pieces of military equipment and their combat capability are determined by the investment in military equipment. In the context of the pledge to spend at least 20 % of total defence expenditure on military equipment, it appears that between 2004 and 2022 there is a steep increase of defence investment gap, followed by a partial absorption of the investment gap after 2014. The investment gap is reflected in the volume and condition of military equipment. Rising spending in recent years is positively reflected in the increasing volume of acquisitions for new military equipment in all B9 countries. However, due to the delay, these investments are and will only be reflected in defence capabilities in the future.

This article covers the EUFOR RD Congo operation preparation phase and provides information on Military Strategic Planning Process, Military Operational Planning, Collaborative Planning, EU OHQ Potsdam activation and Force Generation Process. It describes planning period to highlight a pivotal role of training and education. Operation EUFOR RD CONGO was the EU second military intervention in the RDC, following Operation Artemis in 2003. The EUFOR RD CONGO mission was to support MONUC during running election process, in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1671, authorizing the temporary deployment of an EU force in the RDC. The views expressed in this assessment are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of EU Military Structure or the Czech MoD. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.

The article deals with the system of joint doctrine development in the Czech Armed Forces (CAF) focused on the operational level of command and control, including the implementation of the NATO doctrines into national conditions. Among others, it was found that the structure and content of the Czech doctrines are not systematically set. Allied doctrines are introduced either by rewriting them into the Czech version or by introducing them in the full English version. In both cases, it might cause inconsistency in military terminology. The Coordinating Committee as the only supervisory body does not have the authority to streamline the process of producing military publications. The most important paper recommendations include alignment of the Czech doctrinal framework with the NATO architecture, adoption of Allied doctrines in the English version including the national specifics, or redistribution of competencies within the processing group. Notwithstanding, the above-mentioned proposals, which indicated high impact, require crucial steps to be taken to implement them.

This article examines the needs and problems of the modern war veterans and identifies factors that may contribute to making them a  high-risk group. It uses data from two questionnaire surveys. The respondents were war veterans leaving active service and war veterans who left active service less than ten years ago. The analysis shows that participation in the mission has a negative impact mainly on the family and relationships, and that the most common problems on leaving active service are related to finances and finding a new job. Further, few factors have been identified that may contribute to a high-risky group: less than nineteen years of service, age under forty, having health restrictions due to active service and leaving service as a decision of the employer.

In military operations, there is increasing emphasis on multi-domain operations (MDO) across land, sea, air, space and cyberspace, with technology and cognitive domain operations playing key roles. However, it remains unclear how NATO can optimally prepare officers for MDO. We applied a military design thinking method in an international setting, involving participants from diverse professional backgrounds (government, academia, industry, and military), all experts in Command and Control, to design a blueprint for an operational-level MDO training program. This blueprint outlines the tasks, knowledge, skills and attitudes required for MDO, and describes the conditions for such a training program. Our findings provide valuable insights for developing MDO training programs for NATO officers.

Most experts believe that urban operations will gain importance in the future, but even though we have sufficient examples and experience at hand, we still struggle with the development of the necessary skills and capabilities. The resulting gaps are a combination of different tasking and shrinking resources in the past decades, the difficulty of training for and a mere misunderstanding of the urban environment and harmful innovations - we seem to find ourselves always in the beginning. Fighting in isolated "prisms of responsibility" requires flexible task forces with all necessary enablers at hand and well-trained commanders exercising mission command and understanding their role, task, and the purpose of action. Mastering the urban environment on all three levels of movement is a very challenging task and requires focused attention on various aspects, inter-actor interaction and interdisciplinary research and development. The development of a methodology suitable for looking into the hidden aspects and contextualizing them with current activities and future developments is key to capability development.

Dear readers,
We would like to present to you an article published in our journal in No. 1/1924. It is the contribution by CPT GS Františka Coufala "Battle of Tannenberg 1914".
You can read or download the continuation of this article on the website of our journal www.vojenskerozhledy.cz in the Archive menu.

The effective leadership and the effectiveness of a leader reflect, as the strongest factor, the degree of his transformational approach, which influences the objectively measured performance of the led group. The main goal of the pilot research study was to identify personality and psychophysiological factors that could be monitored in the prevention and elimination of undesirable forms of impulsive behavior in the context of solving difficult situations in real conditions for professional leadership students according to the Big Five theory. The chosen research design made it possible to effectively combine the advantages of a behavioral and personalized approach to the study of impulsivity. The results of the study carried out on the final sample of subjects N=63, aged 21 to 26 years (r=21.7 years; 34.9% women and 65.1% men) are currently being processed. However, it can already be stated that the degree of impulsivity in military leadership students is related to the level of conscientiousness.

In May 2017, Islamists of the South-Philippine Separate Groups of Abu Sajyaf and Maute occupied Marawi City in Mindanao. Five-month fighting was attended by more than 3,000 armed forces against about 1,000 jihadists. Dozens of foreign fighters took part in the fighting on the Islamists side and confirming the pan-Islamic ethos of the Islamic state's ideology in this part of the world. Philippine troops were not prepared for the character of fighting in urbanized environment against motivated and experienced militants. The shortcomings were manifested in the conducting of operations in a heavily built-up area, but also in low-level coordination and limits of capabilities of the technical intelligence. It was decided to create Special Operations Command to which all Philippine special purpose forces are subordinated. The conflict experience has initiated a change of doctrinal approach that focuses on air support to reduce losses due to inaccurate bombing and acquisitions of high-tech reconnaissance and weapon systems.

The article is a thematic sequel of a previous work addressing the concept of Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) in the context of modern warfare. It highlights the differences in the conceptual approaches to MDO as applied by the U.S. Armed Forces and NATO in response to current security challenges. The study outlines the shift by NATO and the U.S. from traditional joint operations to integrated strategies within respective operational domains. Based on a literature review and content analysis of doctrinal documents, it identifies a fundamental difference in the conceptual approaches of NATO and the U.S. to MDO. While the U.S. approach emphasizes a military-oriented model that generates synergistic effects through coordinated operations and technologically driven dominance, NATO’s framework favours a comprehensive civil-military model of strategic integration.

Current War in Ukraine represents conventional conflict of high intensity unparallel in contemporary European history. Using a qualitative method, authors present character of the war and identify its key specifics through multi-domain optics. A preliminary set of recommendations is derived from these results for the national defense capability of Czech Republic. Authors conclude that both State and the Armed Forces must increase their readiness for the large-scale conflict.

The purpose of this paper is to present some particularities of mission command during the conflict in Ukraine. Intended as a  framework of analysis, it describes the ways in which the involved parties manage warfighting from the perspective of practicing mission command as a method to enhance military effectiveness. Using qualitative methods, combining literature review, critical analysis of relevant resources, comparative analysis and indirect observation, the findings are related to aspects of mission command that are critical for enhancing operational and decision-making resilience, through identifying and examining various situations involving Ukrainian and Russian military forces. At the same time, the results of the study highlight some potential ways of innovating the principle

This article presents a formal economic framework for assessing the sustainability of prolonged attritional warfare. Using the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine as a case study, the paper models the interaction between military production and consumption (losses) to evaluate the limits of state endurance under sustained conflict. The core of the analysis is a differential function of the war economy, defined as the net capacity to sustain operations over time, which is the difference between production and losses. This function is embedded within a theoretical construct that distinguishes between sustainable and unsustainable operational regimes, marked by critical thresholds of system exhaustion. Through a combination of regression analysis and symbolic modelling, the paper demonstrates how Russia’s current attritional strategy may be approaching a structural breaking point. The findings offer a conceptual and empirical basis for evaluating wartime industrial resilience and may inform strategic policy and conflict forecasting.

This article describes the basic terms used in prognostics (future studies, forecasting the future, prognosis, prediction, expert) and introduces selected prognostic methods and techniques which could be applied in security area (brainstorming, focus group, trend extrapolation, Delphi method, scenarios etc.). The basic classifications and prognosis typologies are mentioned as well. Particular phases of prognosis making are described too. For the Czech security community the prognosis making has an important potential whose outcomes (of particular surveys) should be manifest in following years. This text has only tried to outline selected methods and techniques for their potential application.

The paper is focused on research of military operations planning with the purpose of defining an efficient decision-making model at the tactical level for brigade-level offensive operation. Suggested model applies methods of multi-criteria decision-making – DIBR II (Defining Interrelationships Between Ranked Criteria II) and EDAS (Evaluation based on Distance from Average Solution) in order to decrease subjectivity while evaluating and ranking criteria, but also to select the most optimal course of action (COA). DIBR II method is used for the evaluation and determination of criteria coefficients, while the EDAS method enables choice between the most optimal COA. Application of simple and effective methods of multi - criteria decision - making accelerates the planning process and enables commanding officer to make optimal troop employment decision in a given operation.

The manner of conducting modern large-scale combat operations (LSCOs) is characterized by the increasingly frequent and diverse use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) integrated into the Command, Control, Computers, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4IRS) system. These aircraft are one of the most important types of weapons in modern LSCOs. Anyone that has the technology can process the latest information from the field and safely passes that information to the command center has a great advantage and a chance to cause great damage to units whose goal is to prevent further operational work. What is important is that UAVs must have some degree of self-protection through site selection action to reconnaissance and retreat routes. The paper presents the possibility of using UAVs for various missions in LSCOs, as well as a case study of their use in previous modern armed conflicts.

The article deals with the possibilities of protecting the outer perimeter of static military facilities using ground-based unmanned systems that can complement the already existing protective elements. The conclusions reached and theoretical assumptions were experimentally verified in the field during the protection of a small base, using UGS Taros Furbo and Tactical Decision Support System calculations. The protection routes calculated by the system were then practically implemented by dismounted patrols and autonomous UGS Taros Furbo, focusing on terrain traversability and time of overcoming. The main objective of the paper is to present to the military public the current possibilities of deploying UGS Taros Furbo in the protection of static military facilities such as command posts or bases. Their use can significantly reduce the requirements for the deployment of dismounted patrols to protect the outer perimeter.

The article describes attributes will influence character of modern warfighting and presents the basic approach to prepare commanders and leaders of "new generation". The operational environment describes determinants and characteristic of today's and future warfighting. Technological development as booster, change the tools and the procedures but not the nature of war. Level of training and leadership quality multiplies combat power. The key findings and recommendations support fundamental idea of ability to lead and manage hybrid systems in volatile multi-dimensional environment, using various tools and sources, appropriate to specific environment and specific tactical level mission, stressed in last chapter as result of this study. The article´s aim is support discussion, which directions we will adapt currently ongoing or newly creating study programs, preparing new generation of warriors - leaders.

Cognitive warfare is a new phenomenon that differs from any forms of action previously used in the information space aiming to affect the thinking of target groups. The main difference consists in the targeted and sophisticated use of scientific knowledge from neuroscience, with special attention on consciousness and perception of reality. This deeper understanding of how the human mind works has impacted distributed narratives and the choice of the most suitable technological platforms for their distribution to the target audience. This article presents a conceptual classification of cognitive warfare and defines its three core segments: neuroscience, technology and aspects of social science.

The article discusses the possibilities of joint deployment of combat unmanned ground vehicles with combat infantry units. It summarizes the deployment of these assets in past and present military operations, including the presentation of deployment experiences available from public sources, and examines the joint deployment of an infantry squad with an unmanned ground combat platform during an attack operation. Using a constructive simulation, it presents the results of the deployment of an infantry squad during an attack operation with and without the support of a combat unmanned ground vehicle. As part of the discussion, he develops the ideas necessary for the cooperation of the unit with an unmanned vehicle. The aim of the article is, among other things, to open a debate in the professional community about the possibilities of effective use of unmanned ground systems to support the activity of combat units in military operations.

The civil war in Myanmar has been going on for more than seven decades. After the military coup in February 2021, it has undergone significant structural changes and gained new momentum. The causes of the conflict lie in the inability of different ethnic and political groups to find a way to coexist within a single state entity and the autonomisation of the military. The main actors in the war in Myanmar today are the military junta and its supporters, the democratic opposition and ethnic organisations. After the coup, the strength of the resistance movement and its operational capabilities are growing. However, this growth has its limits, given the continued disunity of opposition forces, the technical superiority of the Myanmar army and the strengthening of its numbers through compulsory conscription.