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Partisan and paramilitary groups operating on Colombian soil have been representing a serious regional security threat for the last fifty years. The most successful attempt to conclude a peace treaty between the government and the insurgents is represented by the peace process that took place between 2012-2016. This process resulted in the agreement between the colombian government and the guerilla group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - Ejército del Pueblo. This paper deals with the dynamics of the of the peace processes between the government and guerilla groups and analyzes the factors contributing to the escalation and deescalation of the conflict and factors that enabled or on the contrary disabled a successful demobilization of the insurgents. The analysis of the demobilization uncovered a number of factors indicating a contradictory acting of both sides of the conflict. While the adversaries were negotiating the peace agreement, in the same time they were violating the previous agreements. Such behaviour was caused mainly due to the absence of a strong sponsor.

One of the longest conflicts in Latin-American history ended in 2016 when then Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos signed a peace agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the largest guerrilla movement in Colombia. His predecessor, the current senator Álvaro Uribe, opposed the peace agreement, believing that an offensive against the guerrillas was the right approach. This article shows how these two Colombian presidents framed guerillas and what strategies and expressions were used in their presidential speeches. The main argument is that the conciliatory discourse of President Santos helped to finally achieve peace. The research paper uses a comparative method and the concept of framing.

States should avoid arbitrability in decision-making processes concerning foreign fighters by amending their current legislature including criminal prosecution of foreign fighters. Authorization regime similar to the one in Poland may offer higher guarantees, control and monitoring of medium to high-threat individuals whilst offering states direct targeting of prevention and mitigation policies. States should create a transparent and clear framework for evaluation of applications to travel abroad for the purpose of fighting with lawfully set discretion for state organs that will enable them to deny applications for political, social or even economic reasons.

The issue of terrorism is becoming increasingly important on the level of social, economic, political and security. The threat of terrorism affects at the same time, societal and cultural events. Professional and academic discussion addresses the causes and possible consequences of this phenomenon. To understand the implications of terrorism, it is necessary to look at this issue from the perspective of terms of its financing. This review study aims to define the term financing of terrorism on the one hand, but also to identify possible sources of financing of terrorism, including the most used payment methods by terrorist organizations. This study also leads a discussion on the efforts and effectiveness of the various authorities in the fight for detecting terrorism, especially in relation to the detection of its financial flows. The study also defines the possible pitfalls in the fight against terrorism and detecting its sources of financing and attempts to outline possible alternatives while increasing success in this fight.

The article is focused on issue of hybridisation of Al Qai'da in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), in North Africa, and its implications for European countries. The process of hybridisation is being conceived as growing nexus and convergence between violent non-state actors, while these processes could be in this case identified mainly in issues of use of kidnappings and secondary also reported involvement of AQIM in regional smuggling, mainly drugs, activities through Sahel and Saharan region to Europe. Regarding GSPC background, AQIM could be in long term theoretically able to re-establish its financial and supporting networks in Europe via cooperation with organized crime, which were largely disrupted after major crackdowns by security forces between 2004-2007. Event though a direct Al Qai'da attack in Europe is-according to the author-excluded, the purpose of this article to draw our attention to an eventuality of rebirth of European operation network of AQIM operational predecessor, i.e. GSPC.