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This article examines whether Turkey is ready for a full-scale military conflict with Bashar Al-Assad's Syria. It draws from an adaptation of Clausewitz's concept of three resources that a state must possess to be able to win a war: the fighting forces proper, popular support, and its allies. Turkey is at a significant disadvantage when it comes to its air force and air defense capabilities. Should a major confrontation erupt, Turkey would not be guaranteed to be able to control the relevant air space. Turkish citizens do not favor seeing their country in a foreign quagmire. Despite myriad differences, Turkey it is still deeply embedded within NATO, and its strategic interests do not differ from those of its strategic allies. Turkey also cannot afford to risk an open military conflict with Russia. The article concludes that Turkey is politically and militarily not capable of fighting a full-scale war in Syria.

The Russia has presented the ongoing war in Ukraine by the term special military operation, whose goals were declared by Russian President Putin in terms of demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine. In the wider context, there is an imperial effort of Russia to enforce its power and influence in the region by an offensive and aggressive war. The authors define the fundamental difference between a special operation and the so-called special military operation in the context of contemporary interpretation of the Kremlin. They further argue the way in which Russia is trying to justify the war and discuss its reality in terms of international law.

This paper examines the role of strategic communication in military operations, with a focus on its impact during the first year of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Using a process-tracing methodology, the study explores whether Ukrainian strategic communication was decisive in resisting Russian attacks. Our findings indicate that strategic communication functioned as a central component of Ukraine’s defence. Effective messaging mobilized broad support from diverse actors, including state entities with no regional stakes and non-state contributors such as civilians, volunteer fighters, and organizations, driven by motivations beyond self-interest. Ukraine’s resilience stemmed not from a deceptive Russian strategy (i.e., a lack of genuine intent to engage in a full-scale war), but from its bold counter-offensive, bolstered by international aid - support amplified and sustained by the strategic communication efforts that shaped global perceptions and secured critical assistance.

This study deconstructs the concept of active measures through the prism of information influence. It understands it as sophisticated methods of influencing public opinion and political decisions, originally used by the Soviet Union and now adapted to cyberspace by the Russian Federation. In the analysis, the concept is contrasted with the general abstraction of information influence. This helps to better understand the proximity of active measures to similar concepts. We conclude that abstractions of information influence are also valid for conceptual understanding and practical examples of contemporary Russian active measures. Active measures are subsidiary to information influence, serving as tactical means to achieve the latter's strategic goals. Furthermore, the author states that the information environment is the operational theatre for active operations, cyber operations can be its manifestation, information operations support as a key component of a broader information operations strategy, and psychological operations are its critical element.

The article deals with Turkey's trust in the USA as its most important ally in NATO. Semi-structured interviews with Turkish academics and international relations experts during field research identified three main areas of Turkish mistrust in the USA - the Cyprus question, USA support for the PYD/YPG in Syria, and USA intervention in Turkish politics. The research results presented in the causal network show that the main cause of Turkish mistrust towards the USA is the factors leading to the phenomenon of fear of abandonment. That causes Turkey's increased need for independence from strategic partners and the subsequent increase in the application of a balance policy. The study concludes that one of the main reasons for Turkey's current attitude towards NATO is the need to ensure its security, and this need stems from Turkey's mistrust of the USA.

The Bucha massacre raises the question of whether the Russian army predisposes its soldiers to unlawful violence against civilians. This article assumes that regardless of superior orders, perpetrators of violence must overcome the psychological barriers developed during socialisation. The psychological mechanism of "moral disengagement" allows soldiers to kill in combat and act violently on civilians. The duty of the armed forces is not only to prepare soldiers to fight and kill but also to prevent illegal violence. The case of the Russian army demonstrates how formal activities to prevent moral disengagement and violations of the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) face insurmountable obstacles in the form of institutional culture and insufficient human capital.

This study analyzes the involvement of external actors in Ethiopia's civil war between 2020 and 2022, categorizing their behaviors and discourses based on the dominance of instrumental and affective motives. It argues that the convergence of objectives between instrumental motive-dominant actors, who seek to protect the stability and survival of the Ethiopian government, and affective motive-dominant actors, who address humanitarian crises, reached a point of overlap and consent which led the war to end in relatively short duration.

The article holistically analyses current strategies for the use and development of nuclear forces of the USA and Russia and analytically reflects their mutual doctrinal interactions. It deals with the conditions under which the U.S. and Russia may opt for using their nuclear weapons and reflects also related issues of modernization and development of their actual nuclear forces. The author argues that both superpowers did not manage to abandon the Cold War logic or avoid erroneous, distorted or exaggerated assumptions about the intentions of the other side. The text concludes with a summary of possible changes and adaptations of the American nuclear strategy under the Biden administration as part of the assumed strategy update expected for 2022.

The study presents a meritorious view of the traditional operational factors of space, time and force. On the background of the first and second phases of the War in Ukraine, it examines how the relevant factors shape the use of military force in operations, clarifies their mutual correlation, interference, application connections and also causality. The results of the study demonstrate the necessity of a correct and holistic perception of operational factors for effective deployment and employment of military forces in the contemporary operating environment. The main benefit of the study, applying the heuristic and inventive function of analogy from the open sources of available identified knowledge from the deployment of military forces in the War in Ukraine, is the mediation of model examples of a comprehensive vision of the effects of how operational factors shape the use of military force in contemporary high-intensity warfare operations.

The article deals with the some legal aspects of Western military aid to Ukraine. The first part briefly analyzes the Russian Federation's attack on Ukraine from a "just war" perspective. The following part is devoted to individual perspectives of different branches of international law on military aid to Ukraine - the law of neutrality, ius ad bellum, ius in bello, issues of co-belligerency and state responsibility for complicity in internationally illegal actions. The conclusion summarizes the findings and gives an answer to the question why Western aid to Ukraine mostly does not violate the norms of international law.

The article deals with the evaluation of current possibilities of medical support capabilities in the area of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence. The evaluation of national strategic documents shows that the area of providing care in the event of chemical and biological hazards is significantly more developed than in the area of radiation, while the security threats associated with radiation are constantly growing. Analysis of NATO standardization documents in the field of medical support and relevant Czech doctrinal documents was carried out, based on which the diagnostics and triage of irradiated persons, called biological dosimetry, was identified as a potential capability. Using the capability planning methodology and based on the evaluation of the functional areas, a conceptual approach to the development of biological dosimetry capabilities was defined. The presented recommendations also include a proposal for the organizational structure of the Czech Armed Forces biodosimetric network.

Russia has always had a keen interest in the Western Balkans. It was historically realised in the context of geopolitical continuities of the expansion of its territory and influence. Russia has tried to gain influence in this region for political, economic, identity and strategic reasons. However, after the start of military aggression against Ukraine in 2014, Russia opted for a confrontation in the Western Balkans where it opposes the EU and NATO expansion policies and influence of the West in this region. Key Russian leverage for spreading its influence in the region is the Serbian geopolitical design of military neutrality and the convergence of strategic interests of the two countries. Russia wants to exert a strong influence on the Western Balkans, and thus on the security of the EU. On the other hand, Serbia wants to position itself as the main actor of power in the region with simultaneous support from both Russia and the West.

The article analyses the process of the NATO enlargement after 1990. It starts by a detailed analysis of the secret negotiations which have been started just after the end of the Cold War. In the light of the institutional liberalism, the NATO enlargement is a positive process which satisfied especially new member states. But in the light of the American neorealism, this process resulted into profound changes in the balance of the security threats and into a large militarisation and tension at the new Eastern frontier of NATO in a direct neighbourhood with the Russia. New military units with the modern arms systems are deployed over there and we are witnessing a growing number of dangerous military incidents. As a result, the contemporary situation needs new political negotiations between two competitors and a shift from the contemporary negative Peace towards the positive Peace.

The article follows the author's comparative analysis of American and Russian nuclear doctrines and armaments from the fall of 2021. It presents the current nuclear strategy of the United States of America based on a content analysis of three specific areas of the updated version of the Nuclear Posture Review. Applying interpretive analysis and a rich secondary sources apparatus, the author also reflects on his 2021-formulated assumptions and expectations about the further development of American nuclear strategy under President Joe Biden. The author analyzes the influence of the presidential administration's ideological and political ambitions together with the decisive geopolitical events of 2022 and concludes that mainly due to the second factor, the current shape of American nuclear strategy has not undergone any revolutionary changes and continues to maintain a long-standing continuity and consensus about its basic principles.

Voices about the need to build a joint European Union army have been appearing on the European scene for several years, but recently these voices have become stronger, especially after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Therefore, in the article, the authors deal with the issue of the possibility of creating a common European army. They draw on from socio-scientific political science approaches to current security frameworks, examine the current state, and at the same time point out that, despite the threats Europe is facing, there is still no clear plan for how such an army should be created. Considering the facts mentioned in the article, the authors state that the creation of a common European army, at least for now, seems unlikely, as a supranational model of the European army would require the transfer of sensitive national competences from the member states to the EU level.

Current War in Ukraine represents conventional conflict of high intensity unparallel in contemporary European history. Using a qualitative method, authors present character of the war and identify its key specifics through multi-domain optics. A preliminary set of recommendations is derived from these results for the national defense capability of Czech Republic. Authors conclude that both State and the Armed Forces must increase their readiness for the large-scale conflict.

The war in Ukraine has become a global issue that has been closely monitored and evaluated by military experts and the media since its beginning. The aim of this article is to point out some specific aspects of the development of the conflict in Ukraine in its initial stages. In the beginning of the article, the author deals with the surprising development of the so-called "special military operation", leading to a change in Russia's original plans. In the following parts, he discusses the way the forces of the warring parties are used in individual domains, applies the principles of warfare and discusses the possible causes of the operational failure of the Russian military forces. The article mainly uses data from open sources. Analysis, comparison, deduction and synthesis were used in its compilation. The overall intention of the author is to offer readers one possible view of the ongoing conflict and to motivate them to think about the nature and character of war.

This paper assesses the information war in Ukraine in the context of the military strategy. An influence of the information operation (disinformation and deception) presents the strategic tool. The author pragmatically analyses the information war from the military art perspectives and as a part of the strategy used for support of the combat operations. He identifies phases of the information war in the context of the war. The author expects and confirms the opinion that the information war is led by both external actors (the USA and the Russian Federation). Their top representatives are involving in the information war because they support their own interests. This paper has been written as a neo-realist case study. The balance of power concept is in accordance with the used theory, as well as with the key interests of the external actors.

The paper argues that proxy war is an increasingly often used tool in the Middle East, in the already conflicted territories where international involvement is not only enabled, but also attracted and encouraged by the international law for the purpose of region's securitization. Thus, the paper's aim is to increase awareness on the fact that the Middle Eastern countries passing through civil war periods and accepting external actors to deal with their crises do not only become fertile territories for proxy wars, but the intervening actors start pursuing their own interests beyond the host country's interest in resolving the conflict.

Government expenditures allocated for defence are one of the categories comparable between countries to observe and analyse long-term trends. The paper compares the defence budgets of the USA and the Russian Federation between 2000 to 2019 with the aim to analyse potential causes of fluctuations in defence spending. The purpose of the paper is to demonstrate that military budgets are dependent on a combination of various factors such as current domestic policy, the economic cycle and global security and economic issues. The work uses significant as historical milestones to analyses their impacts on the dependent variable of military budget. As these, Operation Enduring Freedom (2001), Iraq war (2003), the inauguration of the US Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump, the economic crisis (2007-2008), the Russian currency crisis (2014) and the Russian annexation of Crimea (2014) were identified.

Is Georgia's integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) security structures leading to assured full membership? Ever since gaining independence in 1990, Georgia has tried to free itself from Russian influence, focusing on becoming a member of NATO. However, the Georgian journey to NATO is complicated by the country's internal political situation and external relations with Russia. Georgian internal conflicts with breakaway territories supported by Russia led to the Russian invasion into Georgian territory in 2008. Russia suppresses Georgian efforts to join NATO, considers the South Caucasus to be a strategic sphere of interest, and intends to exercise its influence there. Nevertheless, the current Georgian government continues to pursue NATO membership. Key determinants for any invitation to new members are whether their admission to NATO will strengthen the alliance, further the basic objective of NATO enlargement , and increase security and stability across Europe.

In 2018, it has been already ten years since one of the major wars of the post-Cold War period, namely, the war between Georgia and the Russian Federation. This war lasted only for five days, but it also became an important milestone in the development of the international security relations as well as the military science at the beginning of the 21^st century. The article evaluates its geopolitical framework on the basis of the neorealist theory of the balance of security threats and it also deals with its impact on the development of the Russian military.

The aim of the text is to present the approach to assessing the military potential of the state as well as the will or possibilities to be used to achieve national strategic interests or power objectives. This approach is methodologically based on the sectoral analysis of the state's power potential and its possible projections in the construction and use of armed forces. The described and used approach in the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic is applied to the current Russian Federation and its military or power activities

This article analyzes strategic engagement of the Russian Federation and the United States of America in the South Caucasus in four phases of development from the end of the Cold War until present day. The first phase covers early nineties, the second is from mid-nineties to 2003, the third from 2004 to 2008 and the fourth from 2009 to 2016/2017. There are three key trends during the examined period. First, Russia has permanent strategic interests in the South Caucasus due to maintaining its own state security and securing the position of the most prominent external actor in the region. Second, Russia's weakness and active engagement of the US/NATO are barriers to realizing Russia's state interests. Third, the South Caucasus is strategically more significant to Russia than the US/NATO.

The article explores the energy security relations between Russia and the EU. The aims of this article are two. The first is to analyze the content and basic themes of the Russian security discourse on energy relations with the EU in 2012-2017. The second is to interpret the influence of norms and values in the energy security discourse on identity and interests of Russia in the studied period. Security discourse of the Russian Federation focuses on defending Russian diversification projects to strengthen EU energy security. In the security discourse, Russia in relations with the EU de-securitizes the issue of energy when it presents itself as the main and reliable partner and supplier of oil and gas to the EU.

The research described in this paper was conducted in the framework of institutional research project Strategic Alternatives (STRATAL) within the Centre for Security and Military Strategic Studies of University of Defence, The Czech Republic. Article assesses the development of Czech Defence policy in 2017 and first half of 2018. Authors analyse key change drivers in external environment (security threats, EU strategic autonomy, transatlantic link). In second step authors evaluate measures taken in political, military, administrative, economical and societal domain in response to key change drivers and highlight related risks to effective defence policy formulation and implementation.

In the light of neorealist theory, the Eastern enlargement of NATO satisfies basic feature of expansion: 9 former countries of the Warsaw Pact become members of NATO. USA as a Sea power reinforced its superiority at the detriment of the RF as a continental power. The annexation of Crimea, as a Russian answer, had intensified security fears of post - Soviet countries and of Poland and enlarged the space for external balancing of the USA. Author warns that a confrontational structure had become typical for the area or the Western part of the Post - Soviet space. It increases the number of military incidents, and, even, the threat of a direct military confrontation including a Russian use of tactical nuclear arms, being inspired by the Rogers plan from 1980´s.

This study deals with selected aspects of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine in Luhansk and Donetsk region in period of April 2014 - to February 2015. Study is divided in two subsequent articles. The first article consists of introduction, theoretic-methodological part, analytical part and short summary, which defines main features of Russians engagement in the conflict. Theoretic-methodological part deals with terminological, theoretical and methodological background of analysis, including generally approach of Russian federation to security policy. Analytical part is divided in to the two partial chapters. The first deals with main Russian objective in the conflict. The second deals with the phases of Russian engagement.