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Management by objectives (MBO), first outlined by Peter Drucker in the 1950s, is a systematic and organized approach that allows management to focus on achievable goals and to attain the best possible results from available resources. The tasks are delegated to subordinates without dictating a detailed roadmap for implementation. Everybody within the organization has a clear understanding of the aims, or objectives, as well as awareness of their own roles and responsibilities in achieving those aims. In the U. S. Army, MBO was implemented into The Army Plan FY 2000-2015, with 789 operational capabilities, divided into 1,248 operational standards, but without demonstrable success, as the system worked rather formally; it was too complicated. The same was true in the Czech Army, where e.g. The Set of Objectives till 2005 came into existence in 1991. The author tries to explain why. He concludes that MBO can be a useful management tool in the army environment, but it should not be realized without proper understanding this process.

Officially Israel kept quiet about the 5 September 2007 air raid in northeast Syria. Reports indicated that the Israeli operation was triggered by the arrival of a North Korean cargo ship carrying suspected nuclear materials. Israel used electronic attack in air strike against Syrian mystery target. Syrian air defence infrastructure is based on for the most part aging Soviet missiles and radars. This air attack means that Israel is beginning to win cyber war battles. For several decades Israel has maintained a policy of preventing any nation in the Middle East from acquiring nuclear weapons, e.g. in 1981 Israel destroyed the nuclear reactor and thus crippled Iraq's nuclear programme. The destruction of a Syrian nuclear site is a continuation of that policy and a strong message to Iran that Israel is willing to take serious risks to maintain its stance. Based upon Jane's Defence Weekly No 39, 44/2007, Aviation Week No. 17/2007 (nas).

The academic year 2006-2007 is an important milestone for the Defence University, as the freshmen are asked to have relatively high entry knowledge of English language. The concept of English entry tests had to be changed, i.e. entry tests are at the level STANAG 6001 SLP 2. For practical purposes, speaking and writing knowledge of all applicants can't by tested, therefore new test patterns cover only listening and reading (level SLP 2). This represents an extra burden for the staff of the Centre of Language Preparation, influencing language training and testing. The new curriculum was formed, accredited in UNIcert system. It has been implemented for students in the first grade of the Faculty of Military Technologies. This curriculum reflects speaking knowledge at the level STANAG 6001 SLP 3333 and opens the road to European Certificate of English Language.

The author follows the mainstream economics, i.e. leading economics of defence policy, ranging from economics of defence in the nuclear age, via economics of Iraq conflict, to current fight against terrorism. New paradigm must be drawn, taking into account source management, the distribution of economics weight of individual national economies of all countries participating in the fight against global terrorism.

The main theme of this extensive paper is ethical evaluation of the state of affairs in Iraq that would play greater role - directly or indirectly - in the decision-making of foremost politicians, more role then we might think. Although the author quotes various positive or negative attitudes towards the war, he does not intend to prove or refute presented theses. He broadly treats e.g. the so-called just-war, events when imminent threat might be a case for war, moral clarity in a time of war, situations when we consider that our aims might be achieved by peaceful means. Last but not least, he writes about attitudes of church leaders, the Holy See, lines of their reasoning. The armed forces are called upon to do their duty. The greater the threat, the grater is the risk of inaction, the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory actions. In such case, the governments make their final decisions. It is not the responsibility of church-leaders or military commanders. To obey it, it would not be in conflict with the churches teaching. In these circumstances, the troops could regard an order to go to battle as morally decent, in pursuit of a moral good purpose.

The basic change in world's security situation after the September 11, 2001, Attacks is accompanied by raising numbers of security studies, dealing namely with the subject of terrorism. The monograph written by three authors of Defence University Brno defines categories of terrorism, its historical development, psychology, methods of attacks, their forms, consequences. The special part is consecrated to the fight against individual types of terrorism. We must value highly the general summary of literature dealing with theme of terrorism, including electronic sources. Last but not least, we must also appreciate the chronological list of the worst terrorist attacks, starting with assassinated Francis Ferdinand in Sarajevo, Bosnia (1914); short characteristics of representative terrorist groups: Action Directe (France), a Basque separatist group known as the ETA, Irish Republican Army (IRA), Aum Shinrikyo (Supreme Truth) in Japan, Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement), Hezbollah guerrillas, or al-Qaeda, etc. Selected Aspects of Contemporary Terrorism, MoD CR-AVIS 2008.

This new generation war could be characterized by an emphasis on nonstate actors, by political and psychological forms of attacks that directly influence opponents. Other characteristics are as follows: extensive refugee flows, violence, transnational criminal aspects. Several factors will impact the nature, frequency and character of "small wars" in the 21st century. Failed/failing states, urbanization, diffusion of actors, communications technology, technological diffusion, religion, and ultra-terrorism. Clausewitz's fundamental appreciation for the primacy of political objectives as the guiding object in war remains relevant to "small wars" as does to interstate conflicts. The problem for today's strategist or policy maker is determining exactly what has changed, how the various means of stratecraft need to be adapted to the specific contingency at hand (according to The Journal of Strategic Studies, 6/2005).

The article deals with the state of English e-learning on the premises of the University of Defence. The authoress introduces some pages of the electronic materials used for the General Staff Course as an example of modern methods of learning English. She explains the basic principles of the work with these exercises. There is also mentioned the military English interactive CD-Rom that was published last year and is used as the electronic support for learning military English; and also a new CD-Rom that is being developed now is mentioned because it will be used for the General Staff Course participants as well. Because of the fact that Czech military personnel are expected to serve in multinational operations, this interactive CD-Rom will make their language training easier. In the last part of the article, the opinions of the General Staff Course participants on using e-learning materials are given on the basis of questionnaires.

Those three E are much in use both in official documents and mass media. Dozens of defence officials use them every day, but actual outputs present that they do not know the key essence of 3E, or they are not aware of how to put them into practice. This article would like to help them to make understand the practical application of basic principles of 3E in practise. The reason of this gap, according to the author, lies in insufficient ties between theoretical and executive spheres of defence sector.

UAV specialists predict that within ten years, half the aircraft flying will be unmanned. They also foresee conflicts where a few soldiers will dominate stateside battlefields. The UAV Center of Excellence is going to draw the unmanned part of the Air Force, to study the best ways to use UAVs. The Air Warfare Centre at Nellis, Nevada, develops tactics for the use of aircraft and directs combat training. The UAV center would take on a whole range of issues from airspace control to various kinds of systems. Unmanned aircraft are to expect to play a key role in delivering directed-energy weapons to battlefields. Stealth will become a standard in UAV fleets just as it is in manned combat aircraft today. A number of additional improvements are expected to increase the capability of Predator squadrons. UAVs may have to specialize in strike or intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. Source: articles by David A. Fulghum, Aviation Week and Space Technology No 12, 2005.

The professional base for tactical and operational levels of US ground forces and German Federal Armed Forces are the following manuals: US Army Field Manual 100/5 "Operations", since 2001 being labelled as "Field Manual 3-0", and German HDv 100/100 "Truppenfuhrung 2000". Both manuals were drafted in a closed cooperation. The basic principles of German manual Truppenfuhrung 2000 were imitated and copied by the Netherlands armed forces and partly, to a certain measure, also by other NATO nations. Rules of Field Manual 3-0 were tested in peace operations, in the fight against international terrorism in Afghanistan and during the first phase of Second War in Iraq. In fact, the operations of US forces indirectly proved practicability and effectiveness of nearly identical German field rules and manuals, consequently command principles, including those of the so-called nation building. Based upon an article by MG Christian E.O. Millotat in 3/2006 Osterreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, No 3/2006.

Thispaperdealswiththeareaof organization values or to say it better, by organisation culture, including its importance for overall efficiency and effectivity. It is a set of values, norms, beliefs, attitudes, assumptions. The authoresses explain those terms, cite their definitions. They underline the fact that highly motivated servicemen are the real assets for our forces. We have to do our best to recruit them, to set up such quality of military life, so that they would like to serve for longer periods.

China's premier intelligence services are as follows: the Ministry of Public Security (MBS), the Ministry of State Security (MSS), and the Military Intelligence Department (MDI) of the People's Liberation Army/General Staff Department. Last but not least, the central institution of the Chinese intelligence community is the Communist Party of China (CPC) having its own intelligence and security bodies. The operational methods of the China's intelligence services are nothing new to espionage. They run aggressive surveillance and recruitment programs against visiting foreign businessmen, scholars, government officials, and scientists. It is a normal to debrief the returning Chinese delegates to determine whether useful information was acquired by simple observation. However, the MSS and military intelligence services further exploit these opportunities by co-opting a number of these travellers to carry out specific operational activities. Chinese intelligence services can count on state ministries, people's friendship societies, academic institutions, and the militaryindustrial complex to support activities such as agent recruitment and information collection as well as to provide cover jobs to their operatives. Main source: Alain Rodier, Raids, No. 234/2005 (nas).

Even though many activities related to intelligence and intelligence network after the end of Cold War were released and have become commonplace, classified matters are still in the centre of public's interest. In discussions, experts use various terms tied with espionage or counter-intelligence, but real differences are not too high. In the armed forces (in the frame of NATO) this question was solved by issuing the manual AJP-2, Allied Joint Intelligence, CounterIntelligence and Security Doctrine (NATO 2003). This article summarises key and basic terms used in intelligence services, including new theoretical concepts from this field. As the author writes in the introductory chapter, many experts, namely in civilian and academic fields use the same terminology, but their explanation differs. They use different definitions reflecting diverse circumstances under which they came into existence. The article was written namely as a contribution to interagency communication, among civilian and professional experts, in time when the overall security concept is changing, when military power is not the only tool to avert wide spectrum of security threats of 21st century.

Established methods of warfare are out of use in urbanized regions, western technological and arms potential must be amended by new equipments, materials and weapons of XXIst Century WarriorCity Guerrilla Fighter. Urbanized areas are divided into separated sectors with changed dimensions: dominating tall buildings, impenetrable barriers. Reinforced concrete, narrow streets, fight inside buildings prevent us from using global position systems. So, dismounted infantry are being equipped by inertial movement units, portable lasers, noctovisors, and bolometers (i.e. instruments used to measure tiny amounts of radiant energy). Bolometers in combination with low light level videos enable to identify friends of foes, to set risky targets. The socalled reconnaissance hand grenade to get image and sounds of enemy soldiers are being developed, it is anticipated the wide employment of unmanned aerial and ground vehicles. Many arrangements are done to prevent "collateral damages", unintentional killing of civilians as a result of military action.

This article examines depth in the nonlinear battlefield and how planners might develop operational effects to defeat insurgencies. The former field manual stated that depth was the extension of operations in time, space and resources. This is a decidedly linear construction of the battlefield based on industrialized warfare between conventional enemies. The Global War on Terrorism operating environment is both nonlinear and non-contiguous. The enemy has no national borders or traditional infrastructure. If we understand cognitive depth, we can develop ways to paralyze the insurgent system or produce operational shock. Colonel John A. Warden III, an architect of the Persian Gulf War air campaign, introduced Five Rings Model as a methodology for successfully attacking and paralyzing a conventional enemy system in depth. An adaptation of this model depicts tangible targets that together constitute depth in the insurgent battle space. Source: Is There a Deep Fight in a Counterinsurgency by Lee K. Grubbs and Michael J. Forsyth, Military Review, July-August 2005.