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The process of the Lessons Learned in the Czech Armed Forces is not ideal for several reasons. One of them is the underestimation of the process by top management. Another one is the low level of awareness of the process, institutions, possibilities and importance of the Lessons Learned Process as a whole. The aim of this article is to clarify the Lessons Learned Process as a tool to support the organization. The first part of the article deals with the process of the Lessons Learned in the Czech Armed Forces including terminology. The second part of the article describes the factual implementation of the Lessons Learned in the Czech Armed Forces. It points out achievements as well as drawbacks during its implementation. In addition to that, it introduces the current Czech military publications dealing with this topic. The conclusion presents the description of some suggestions and recommendations for further development of this process.

After several years of reducing of the Czech defence budget there is a reversal and the Czech MoD begins to manage the increased budget especially for Czech Armed Forces capability development. The Czech Armed Forces is for many years actively involved in the process sharing multi-national capabilities of NATO. Among the former activities such as Smart Defence and Connected Forces Initiative, is also initiative Framework Nations Concept. This article analyzes the overall framework of this initiative, direction and development of this concept.

A major challenge in defence planning is to establish a clear audit trail between security challenges, political ambitions and the recommended force structure. This paper describes a capability- and scenario-based methodology combined with a software toolset called JDARTS that gives long term defence planners a systematic approach to create links from high level security challenges to force structure recommendations. The security challenges are represented by mission types exemplified by scenarios which give concrete requirements. These requirements are represented by capabilities which are matched against the capabilities of force structure elements. The matching is a selection process where the outcome is the cheapest set of the force structure elements that fulfil the requirements. The JDARTS-software supports this method. Even though the future is uncertain, the defence planner's job is to help decision makers prioritize between economic constraints, national preparedness and international commitment.

This text focuses on process of armament policy of the Armed Forces of Georgia and how it was influenced by country's effort to join NATO. Authors argue that Georgia's proclaimed pro-western ambitions should have also been reflected in the process of materiel procurement. Authors investigate the time period from 2003 to 2008 when growing military expenditures reached it's top. Text shows that only few major acquisitions in that period were focused on western military equipment and that Georgia's military acquisitions did not reflect countrys inclination towards west and NATO.

Although the EU global security strategy has to offer orientation on multiple levels and domains, the present paper approaches the challenges emerging from the Union's eastern neighbourhood. The argumentation includes theoretical aspects of strategy, main characteristics of the Black Sea security environment, trends of frozen conflict evolution, and the EU's approach in this entire context. The study concludes that the serious challenges the EU faces nowadays in its eastern vicinity are the result of phenomena with a consistent history and deficient management by the EU. In our opinion, this train of events¨makes the project of a new EU security strategy so challenging that it could become a new document of an over-general character, with little practical value.

The article identifies specific attributes which have influenced duality of training for urban area operations. There are mentioned only the crucial ones. The author was inspired his own experience as infantry unit commander. He used his knowledge gained from military assignments. The article could be considered as topic for future discussion not only on academic but also on specialized level.

The article is based on the positions of neo-realism, namely in the works by S. Walt and J. Mearsheimer. It characterizes the key actors of the war in Ukraine, which is a result of a long-term geopolitical competition between the USA and RF in the Black Sea region. The NATO enlargement in the area is classified as a non-coercive Expansion by Invitation (articulated by the elites of the former member states of the USSR and Warsaw Pact), which has provoked growing irritation of Russian political and military elites and the following hybrid war with dramatic international consequences. Last but not least, the article analyses military incidents and resulting security threats and challenges.

This article deals with transformation of several categories of subcultural groupings to real or potential actors of hybrid warfare. It is based on trends and events related to the Ukrainian crisis and to the new Russian power projection in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as on the reaction of governments and societies which are threatened by this way of warfare and politics. Research on subcultures and research on strategy and conflict form the conceptual framework of the article. The author analyses the role of military re-enactment groups, bikers, football hooligans and other youth subcultural groups. The risk analysis serves for an assessment of the current impact and a possible future development of the researched phenomenon.

Long-term cuts in military expenditures of European allied countries caused growing differences within the Alliance which can be seen in uneven sharing of military burden and in behaviour called free-riding. The aim of this contribution is to define possible approaches to the freeriding identification and to analyse military expenditure development in relation to conclusions and recommendations declared at the NATO Summit in 2014. The results of military expenditure analysis identify only a small group of countries which, from a long-term point of view, follow the recommendations of the Alliance in the form of allocating a corresponding amount as percentage of GDP and in the form of a recommended structure of military expenditures.

This article describes the doctrinal determination and definitions of the term Actionable Intelligence and the impact of this specific intelligence concepton commander's decision-making process. The part of this report deals with the position of Actionable Intelligence in intelligence branch, concretely in connection with the intelligence disciplines and particular stages within intelligence cycle. There is also the accentuation of interconnection to the importance of intelligence information sharing, early warning systems and force protection on tactical level. The next part of this article is focused on the impact of intelligence support on commander's decision-making processes.

The French "Centre de Doctrine d'Emploi des Forces" (CDEF) has published new doctrine FT-05 The Tactical Commander's Guide to Command and Control in Operations. The global action of land forces is now carried out within a strategic environment that has dramatically changed for 15 years. In this new environment, the French Army asserts and implements a double requirement: that of power and the control of force. The article presents the fundamental conclusions of this doctrine and compares them with the Czech national doctrinal documents. Author concludes that in comparison with the French doctrine, Czech doctrines are much more focused on the procedural and technological part of the Command and Control Systems than the ability of commanders to command.

Recent developments in security environment in the last two years re-opened crucial European debates such as the reform of the NATO architecture to address resurgent Russia to the East and as finding common European solution to migratory pressures that test both national capabilities and European solidarity. Even through the Visegrád countries do not always share common interests, the V4 manifests that it can play indispensable role in reaction to these developments. However, V4 still lacks actually proactive regional approach that would accommodate polish interests in order to keep informal leader Poland invested in this cooperation format. Polish elections mean one more challenging test for the V4 to coordinate positions before the crucial NATO Warsaw summit. Should this endeavor be unsuccessful, Poland could look to other formats that mirror its interests and threat perception more closely meaning that V4 would take a back seat with regard to NATO agenda. The task for the Czech V4 presidency is to produce practical results in ongoing ambitious project in defence cooperation so that is demonstrates the cooperation's 'added value.'

This article deals with challenges for the defence policy and strategy of the Czech Republic and their further adaptation and. It outlines set of recommendations for ensuring its armed forces relevance and their long term sustainability. The article reflects debate during the international conference Defence and Strategy organised by the Centre of Security and Military Strategic Studies of the Defence University and held on 15-16 June 2015 in Brno.

Protection of the civilian population against the Gaddafi regime, it was a clear UN mandate for military intervention in Libya in 2011. Not only a new approach to leading the fight against terrorism after 11 September 2001, but also requires a change in approaches to conducting combat operations coalition forces, as shown by the recent armed conflict in Libya, inevitably required a new perspective on the concept and approach to the process of targeting as the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and responding to them in accordance with operational requirements and capabilities of units, synchronization of NATO forces, particularly with regard to collateral damage with an impact on the protection of civilians. And Unified Protector operation is a clear example.

From research reports cited in this article, the period of six months seems to be suitable time for the deployment abroad. A soldier should not be redeployed for at least one year, following his previous mission. The majority of soldiers cope with deployments well and without any psychopathology. Most reported mental problems are alcohol misuse, followed by posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and by the depression. Alcohol seems be even the higher risk for soldiers less exposed to combat stressors (e.g. fire), but more to chronic stressors (boredom, isolation, helplessness) than PTSD for a soldier in action. Therefore pre-deployment training of our soldiers should be more devoted to mental health aspects, starting with alcohol overuse.

The exercise was a continuation of series of exercises that were conducted in previous years. Among others, participants of the CPX were representatives of Defence University Brno, National Defence Academy Vienna, Austria, and the Armed Forces Academy, Liptovský Mikuláš, Slovakia. During the exercise, in imaginary region POPRADLAND, there were practiced various basis aspects of forces preparations and engagement that focus on EU Battle Group in Area of Responsibility, explaining forming commander and staff's decision-making process at the level of Battalion Task Force, during operational planning and its engagement in action. At the end the Officer Conducting the Exercise certified that participants in the CPX fulfilled set goals and aims of this exercise sucessfully. The exercise was designated maily for members of Higher and Basic Command and Staff Courses.

At present, it can be seen a tangible progress in the NATO-EU common approach to deal with challenging security issues. Paradoxically, it has been economic recession in combination with growing danger of arising armed conflicts, specifically on the European continent territory, to start up the closer cooperation between NATO and the EU. Logically, the current security situation ended in conclusions that the complementarity between NATO and the EU became a real necessity and only interaction between the Alliance and Union?s security and defence policies could bring required effects, while upholding global and local security stability. The article is available only in the Czech language. For more information please contact editors.

The consequences of economic recession and their impact on national defence budgets can indeed heavily hamper the credibility of both NATO and the EU. A need for coping with budget restrictions and ongoing security crisis in the Ukraine re-opens the issue of common European armed forces as an effective tool for keeping security stability not only in Europe, but also around the world. However, the key issue is to what extent it is feasible to develop autonomous European armed forces operating independently of transatlantic allies, while there is a very strong NATO-EU interconnection in the area of military capability development.

The accession of the Czech Republic to NATO is reflected in the Czech security system, especially in the political, institutional, organizational and legislative areas. The article describes the ways to achieve the NATO key requirements: political, institutional, legislative, defence, resources, as well as information security and public support. In order to become fully capable to consume benefits of NATO membership and fulfil its obligations, appropriate legislative changes must be adopted. Four North Atlantic Treaty Organization pillars had to be integrated: Washington Treaty, defence planning, information security, mutual solidarity.

The Command and Control process may be defined as an ability to determine what to do and implement effective actions. With the use of the Standard Operating Procedures, the commander must be able to realize set tasks in defined time. The C2 system must be able to monitor and collect data on the situation, to develop an understanding of the situation, to develop a course(s) of action and select one, to develop a plan to execute the selected course of action, to execute the plan, to include providing direction and leadership to subordinates, to monitor execution of the plan and adapt as necessary. The commander draws the picture of situation on the base of surveillance and data collection from various sources, classified and unclassified. The context of information is formed by means of paradigm of personal experiences of commander and his intuition.

War game is a simulation of military operations intended to train military commanders or to test a proposed strategy. It is a game in which model soldiers are used to create battles, in order to study tactics. This article illustrates the importance of War Game COAs (course of action). It was tested against opposing force COAs. Such exercise will help to identify advantages and disadvantages and the key elements of execution planning for each COA. The lesson learned during OHQ CZE/SVK BG EU Staff Exercises that took place in Olomouc from January 19th, to January 23rd, and from February 16th, to February 20th, 2009 is that war-gaming (although time consuming) is something closer to "reality" than the "theory" in doctrines. The war-gaming practices teamwork, facilitates team-building and enables to share mental model COA. Commanders and their staff ought to be engaged in simulations and war games more frequently. All information and sources for this paper were drawn from unclassified materials.

The purpose of this paper is to define cyberterrorism phenomenon with the use of available documents, reports, and expert texts, and to evaluate its role and occurrence in contemporary world's events. The cyberterrorism is very often discussed nowadays, but there is a total lack of any consensus as far as a precision definition is concerned. The critique of current state is summarized at the end of the final chapter, describing leading causes of present situation, i.e. a situation when the cyberterrorism is discussed, politicised, all repeatedly underline its dangerousness, but in practice no cyber attract has occurred.

Space applications and use of satellite data became an important tool for production and development of many companies and institutions, as well as indispensable part of our daily lives, when using e.g. satellite navigation or TV broadcasting. Proper functioning of those services, however, requires the security of space assets at the orbits, their ground stations and the transmition links. The basic threat for space assets is the growing number of debris at the orbits. Space Situation Awareness has a growing importance and sharing information among all main space actors becomes a pre-requisite. Efforts to agree on common guidelines to mitigate possible risks related to outer space activities are made both within the UN and the EU as well as among all space agencies.

The conversion of military ranks poses an enormous difficulty due to great differences in hierarchical structures between different national armies. This article written by the Director of Defence Language Institute Vyškov will give a short overview of most common troubles. The problem here is that national armies mostly represent national cultures as well. Translations of titles of high-rank military personnel are not too complicated. More problematic is finding equivalents for less-known, more specific ranks or those of other national Armed Forces. NATO has agreed upon a common standard for their translation, the norm STANAG 2116, based on NATO codes representing levels of ranks according to their duties, responsibilities, and career requirements.

The basic change in world's security situation after the September 11, 2001, Attacks is accompanied by raising numbers of security studies, dealing namely with the subject of terrorism. The monograph written by three authors of Defence University Brno defines categories of terrorism, its historical development, psychology, methods of attacks, their forms, consequences. The special part is consecrated to the fight against individual types of terrorism. We must value highly the general summary of literature dealing with theme of terrorism, including electronic sources. Last but not least, we must also appreciate the chronological list of the worst terrorist attacks, starting with assassinated Francis Ferdinand in Sarajevo, Bosnia (1914); short characteristics of representative terrorist groups: Action Directe (France), a Basque separatist group known as the ETA, Irish Republican Army (IRA), Aum Shinrikyo (Supreme Truth) in Japan, Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement), Hezbollah guerrillas, or al-Qaeda, etc. Selected Aspects of Contemporary Terrorism, MoD CR-AVIS 2008.

The second part of this short serial deals with the theory of the operational art focusing on the centre of gravity (COG). The article emanates from Carl von Clausewitz's ideas, doctrinal publications analysis and many study projects of the operational art theorists. The author especially aims on disunity and heterogeneity of comprehension of the centre of gravity theory in confrontation of contemporary doctrinal publications and original Clausewitz's theory. He compares operational manuals (those of U.S. and NATO), and finds similarities concerning characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a military force, nation or alliance, derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. Finally, he himself defines enemy's centre of gravity and highlights coherences that can affect fulfilling political and military objectives in current and future military operations.

The problem of forming military decisions lies in the very core of this article. Among others, there are a lot of highly unpredictable impact factors; there are many assessment criteria for individual variants of solving problems. Criteria of qualitative characters, and various interpretations of data information demand quality decisions; they are sometimes difficult to understand and even contradictory. The commanders and their staffs must be well educated, trained and experienced. To meet this precondition we must ensure quality of career training, supported by practical experiences. The staff work must be practiced regularly, with the use of various scenarios, supplemented by historical studies of past or recent fi ghts and battles.

There are two great interpreters of the Napoleonic experience, Jomini and Clausewitz. Both were interested in the application of military force to achieve political goals. The article familiarizes readers with Jomini's theoretical fundamentals of operational design elements, namely the lines of operations. Jomini left a great mark on the details of strategic planning: campaign planning, the selection of the theatre of operation, the base of operation, the line of operation, and decisive points. At the end of this process of selection was the final deployment for the decisive battle. Jomini's major contribution, then, was to provide the geometry of the battle space. In his investigation of the nature of war he developed several key operational concepts. As an operational art tools they help the commander and staff to visualize the arrangement of military capabilities in time, space, and purpose to accomplish the mission. The concept of operational lines is evolved in all operational functions in terms of ongoing military missions.

The NATO Washington Summit in 1999 discussed Defence Capability Initiatives to increase Alliance defence potential together with capacities for accelerated deployability and mobility of NATO forces. This fact was underlined during Prague Summit 2002. One of Prague Capabilities Commitments is the requirement of deployability and sustainability in operations. Among others, this requirement is met by Memorandum of Understanding and bilateral agreements. The Czech Republic is involved in activities of international organizations, enumerated in this article. We support a principle of specialization, the concentration to limited, part-time scale of transport capacities operating for Czech peacekeeping missions. Active participation in the Movement Coordination Centre Europe could be the leading pattern for synergic cooperation in the field of strategic transport.

The Centres of Gravity (COG) are characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. The COG belongs among the most important operational concepts. It is the main source of power and strength. Without dermining enemy's COG we are not able to carry out any quick and resolute action, to reach ordered tasks, desired objectives. The primary purpose of this article is to offer basic information about this subject. This first part is concentrated predominantly to Carl von Clausewitz's ideas. The article especially aims on disunity and heterogeneity of comprehension of the COG theory in confrontation with contemporary doctrinal publications and original Clausewitz's theory. It highlights coherences that can affect fulfilling political and military objectives in current and future military operations.