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Official objectives of war on terrorism are as follows: we must face theorist threats, prevent terrorist strikes; suppress the power of terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda. War on terrorism is not a classical or conventional warfare; the term is wide-ranging, covering longterm strategies of national importance. The war on terrorism and employed means are also a source of controversy. It is a question of adequacy of used tools. It is necessary to implement the new strategy of improving conditions in Muslim countries to eliminate their background supporting negative religious and political attitudes towards democracy. Outlined ways of "smoothing edges" in economical, social spheres can noticeably change hateful attitudes of Muslim population towards values of Western democratic society.

People commonly imagine terrorist attack as hijacking or improvised explosive device hidden in crowded place. However terrorists can also attack against food, cattle, farm crops or water resources. These kinds of attacks can be ranked among agroterrorism or food terrorism, whereas agroterrorists attack against cattle, farm crops or water resources; food terrorists attack against foodstuffs. This paper is intended to provide information about agroterrorism and food terrorism as possible forms of wilful violence. Food security became discussed issue especially after anthrax incidents in 2001. There are many authorities that deal with these issues, for example EU, NATO or World Health Organization.

This article aims at building a bridge upon a gap, which separates academic sphere and intelligence community in the issue of predictive methodology. The author tries to accomplish this objective by presenting intelligence predictive methods based on open-source literature research. First, the question of uncertainty and probability in prediction is introduced (Cynefin template). Then follows basic introduction to predictive methods in civil and military intelligences, so that the reader might grasp the fundamentals of early warning systems. The academics and above all journalists should know the risks and perils in forming intelligence forecasts, estimates, foresight and warning scenarios, e.g. the so-called Black Swan scenario, the author explains potentials failures of the Delphi method. This study ought to be regarded as an introductory to predictive intelligence concurrently done by governmental agencies for purposes of national security and defence.

The defence of country is demanded, but as far as monetary resources are concerned (the effectiveness of which is mostly not transparent), the civilian public takes them as a mistake, as superfluous expenditures. The military economy is an interdisciplinary branch of knowledge, it is a broad subject that can?t be reduced for mere controlling expenses. Still, it is very difficult to assess its recoverability, in comparison with its importance for state defence.

The purpose of this report is to imagine the unthinkable of the worst case scenario for the global future post-modern society. The analysis addresses the main features of global risk society, human suffering, and loss of life from natural catastrophes, man-made catastrophes, economic losses, peak-oilcrises impacts, threat of terrorism, radical Islam, fragile states, etc. Important are the consequences of the end of the Vestfal system and global climate change. There is substantial evidence to indicate that significant global warming will occur during the 21st century. The research suggests that once temperature rises above some threshold, adverse weather conditions could develop relatively abruptly. Drought persists for most of the decade in critical agricultural regions and in the water resource regions for major population centres in Europe. As fertility shrivels, societies get older-and much of Europe are set to get older than any functioning societies have ever been. To avoid collapse, European nations will need to take immigrants at a rate no stable society ever attempted. Europe will be significantly more Islamic.

As the military's current fight against terrorists and insurgents does not follow the templates of the past, it requires innovative, adaptive thinking. This article summarises the main ideas of the essay "We the People are not the Center of Gravity in an Insurgency" by Maj. Mark P. Krieger, published in Military Review No. 4, 2007. A COG could be characterized as a source of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, will to act. The definition is important namely when military planners try to identify enemy COGs. There is a single COG at the operational level; the tactical level of war has decisive points. COGs organize and direct critical capabilities, physical or psychological. An insurgency's case is its strategic COG, its organization is operational COG, and the people are a decisive point at the tactical level. The population is important in an insurgency, because the people are a tangible to target, but it is not a COG. Attacking an insurgency?s organization will weaken the strategic COG that becomes vulnerable to attack and destruction.

NSIP-NATO Security and Investment Programme presents an outstanding field of cooperation among Alliance nations and are the fundamental pillar for planning their common defence. The programme serves for securing necessary sources for investments in building, renovation and establishing air and navy bases, strategic depots, core radar systems, and the like. It also supports individual national commands. The article shortly summarizes the history of NSIP, cites examples of its implementation and formulates proposals how to better utilize common sources of this programme. The Czech Republic belongs among states that still enjoy benefits from common funds, particularly in the connection with the building backbone NATO airports. The genuine contributors are Canada, the U.S., and Belgium; at the head of benefit states are Turkey, Greece, and Portugal. It is recommended for Czech representatives at the HQ Allied Command Transformation to increase number of them in decisionmaking staff elements to prevent administrative complications with allocation of approved investments.

Officially Israel kept quiet about the 5 September 2007 air raid in northeast Syria. Reports indicated that the Israeli operation was triggered by the arrival of a North Korean cargo ship carrying suspected nuclear materials. Israel used electronic attack in air strike against Syrian mystery target. Syrian air defence infrastructure is based on for the most part aging Soviet missiles and radars. This air attack means that Israel is beginning to win cyber war battles. For several decades Israel has maintained a policy of preventing any nation in the Middle East from acquiring nuclear weapons, e.g. in 1981 Israel destroyed the nuclear reactor and thus crippled Iraq's nuclear programme. The destruction of a Syrian nuclear site is a continuation of that policy and a strong message to Iran that Israel is willing to take serious risks to maintain its stance. Based upon Jane's Defence Weekly No 39, 44/2007, Aviation Week No. 17/2007 (nas).

This article illustrates the troubles encountered with development of the NRF. The NATO Response Force is a highly ready and technologically advanced force made up of land, air, sea and special operations forces components that the Alliance can deploy quickly wherever needed. The NRF is intended to be a transformational force that will not only be able to meet the security needs of NATO in 21st century but also serve as an agent of change whereby all the member nations of NATO will be able to bring capabilities, and concepts of operations into their national forces. Undoubtedly, the NRF will not provide a basis for solving all of complex challenges. But it does offer an opportunity for experimentation and testing-the essence of military transformation-and the forging of creative solutions. The views expressed in this assessment are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of NATO or EU.

The Combined Joint Exercise was focused on the European approach to crisis management operations and involved an annual exchange of students and directing staffs between of the Higher Command and Staff Colleges from France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and Spain. The aim of this article is to provide knowledge and personal experience of its author based on his own participation in this exercise at the Escuela Superior de las Fuerzas Armadas (ESFAS) Madrid. The purpose of the exercise was to foster the understanding, mutual knowledge and dialogue among the offi cers of the aforementioned colleges through the practice of operational planning. Among general information describing the character of the exercise, the article defines some areas of the operational art, namely Operational Planning Process, Operational Design, Decisive Point Concept and Centre of Gravity Analysis.

The aim of this work was to make an analysis of current state of catering services in the forces, to define risks of possible harms, damages, losses, or another prospective disasters, in order to propose a systematic approach to the risk management. Identified risks are being completely analysed. Author's team drafted a risks catalogue to make their identification easier. Among others, upon this analysis, they compiled the chart of risks in catering process within the section of the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic. A user manual for monitoring and risk control was created, so that we can adopt suitable procurement measures for avoiding or minimizing risks, their occurrences, eventually lowering unwanted results generated by the above mentioned analysed risks.

The article presents six more or less structured analytical methods that are or could be employed in intelligence analysis. This type of analysis, one part of the intelligence cycle, is understood as "the process of evaluating data for reliability, validity, and relevance; integrating and analysing it; converting the product of this effort into a meaningful whole, which includes assessment of events and implications of the information collected". The set of presented methods includes: link analysis, opportunity analysis, analogy, linchpin analysis, analysis of competing hypothesis and alternative scenarios. The study doesn't stop with presenting those methods; it also explains which type of reasoning (inductive, deductive or abductive) is used when working with each particular method. In broad terms, the article tries to shed light on intelligence analysis and its specifics. The reader should obtain better understanding their usefulness in the daily work of intelligence analyst.

The return of Russia as a power that begins again to partake in political agenda of present-day world raises the necessity to reflect its inner developments in the background of its recent history. There are six key factors that substantionally influence the position of Russia in the world: large sources of raw materials (pipelines); outstanding military capacities (the world's second nuclear potential); high level of general education; wide scientific and research base; permanent membership in UN Security Council and in the Group of Eight (G-8); deciding influence in the near neighbourhood. The study comes to the conclusion that Russia-in the horizon of 2020-will belong among world's leading actors, together with the US, the EU, China, and Islamic world. Russia will be able to of enforce its foreign and security goals, both in post-Soviet areas and in key regions in Europe, Asia and in the Great Near East. As such, it will probably get into conflict with the US. The priority tasks of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will rest on maintaining nuclear parity with the US and building capacities for asymmetrical operations.

The proponents of Revolution in Military Affairs claim that modern military technology will lift a "fog of war". In this article the term "fog of war" is described and illustrated in a work of Carl von Clausewitz who is supposed to introduce this term, used also in the famous novel War and Peace by Leo Tolstoy. These classics show us that uncertainty and chance, in other words fogs of war, are essential to human mentality. They will be present as long as war remains within a scope human endeavour. Emphasizing that military technology is equal to lifting the "fog of war" can lead to situation in which only trained commanders are supposed be able perfectly address problems in "chessboard" of war or computer simulators, but they will unable to manage a real world full of chaos, as they not used to count with uncertainties.

The article deals with the question of unmanned aircraft generally, it doesn't discuss their individual types. Unmanned aircraft (UAVs) are designed to fly without a pilot (that is by remote control), their combat engagements are less risky and potentially less costly. Army officials say that UAVs will serve better, as they will carry more weapons and sturdier avionics, use the same fuel as other service aircraft, and could be operated by soldiers in theatre. Avionics and weapons might be controlled even by a conventional link with ground control stations. One "land pilot" can control several UAVs simultaneously. The running programmes will produce mature technologies and stable designs, making use of critical technologies, control abilities. The other critical technologies are: an engine that uses heavy fuel and an automatic take-off and landing system. As a part of coalition forces, the UAVs had proved their usefulness and serviceability in the Middle East.

As the world grows ever more urbanized, the Air Force prepares airmen to fight in cities. They are complex domains where military operations are congested by terrain and by the danger of collateral damage and the risk to non-combatants. The Air Force supports the joint force by providing valuable airspace control, command and control, communications and psychological operations support, close-air support, terminal attack control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and combat search and rescue. But Air Force capabilities in the urban are not just the supporting force for urban operations, it has ability to provide strategic attack against critical urban area. Based upon an article by Lt.Col. Brian M. Newberry in Armed Forces Journal, September 2006.

Conventional military strategists did not hold counterinsurgency (COIN) and irregular warfare with high esteem. In fact, strategists often marginalized COIN and irregular warfare, never regarding irregular warfare as worthy of strategic-level discussions. But true strategic thinking on the subject of COIN and irregular warfare consider time and space and long strategic view. Now we must consider critical areas for the global war on terrorism (GWOT), including changing nature of the threat environment. Sources: Principles, Imperatives and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency, by E. Cohen, Lt.Col. C. Crane, Lt.Col. J. Horvath, Lt.Col. J. Nagl; Strategic Aspects of Counterinsurgency by Col. J. B. Celeski in Military Review March-April 2006.

This article examines depth in the nonlinear battlefield and how planners might develop operational effects to defeat insurgencies. The former field manual stated that depth was the extension of operations in time, space and resources. This is a decidedly linear construction of the battlefield based on industrialized warfare between conventional enemies. The Global War on Terrorism operating environment is both nonlinear and non-contiguous. The enemy has no national borders or traditional infrastructure. If we understand cognitive depth, we can develop ways to paralyze the insurgent system or produce operational shock. Colonel John A. Warden III, an architect of the Persian Gulf War air campaign, introduced Five Rings Model as a methodology for successfully attacking and paralyzing a conventional enemy system in depth. An adaptation of this model depicts tangible targets that together constitute depth in the insurgent battle space. Source: Is There a Deep Fight in a Counterinsurgency by Lee K. Grubbs and Michael J. Forsyth, Military Review, July-August 2005.

The forward-thinking and respond to the challenges of today's dynamic operational environment demands as necessary: first, to attract and develop young people to become adaptative leaders possessing enhanced skills, i.e. we must align leader-development programmes for the new operating environment; second, to respond to the forces' needs in meeting the challenges of the operational environment-the forces have to undergo a transformation. Adaptability is critical to urban stability and support operations, as these operations present complex challenges to commanders for which no prescribed solutions exist. Warfare and technology are rapidly evolving; doctrine lags behind the need for ready solutions. Officers are confronted by many situations outside the doctrinal framework. No amount of technology can offset the effects of chaos theory ...169 Clearly, there is a need to quickly learn knowledge/skill sets, coupled with a new operating frame that might be radically different from the skills and knowledge developed through classical training (Military Review, January/February 2006, Tomáš Weiser, What is the Chaos? Dějiny a současnost, 5/2002).

The China's impact on world affairs is growing and will grow further in decades to come. Those years will be critical for Taiwan, and for its relationship with other states. Three related factors determine the texture of this interaction: the policies evolving in Beijing, internal developments on Taiwan, and the international environment. Beijing has offered Taipei several proposals for reunification. The proposals, including the recent "one state, two systems" proposal, allow Taipei to maintain its social and economic system, its armed forces and its unofficial ties with foreign countries. China's grand strategy is to make war while avoiding the battle. Therefore, Taiwan is to be persuaded that the acceptance of "One China" principle is vitally important for preventing the Taiwanese independence. Otherwise, People's Armed Forces will open an invasion to Taiwan by three successive attacks: (1) high precise medium-range ballistic missiles DF-21C with the aim to suppress air defence; (2) the second stroke would be massive attack with short-range precise missiles; (3) the last stroke ought to be done by cruise missiles. This essay is adapted from articles by Mary C. Fitzgerald and Eric A. McVadon, Armed Forces Journal 11/2005.

The second part of this short serial deals with the theory of the operational art focusing on the centre of gravity (COG). The article emanates from Carl von Clausewitz's ideas, doctrinal publications analysis and many study projects of the operational art theorists. The author especially aims on disunity and heterogeneity of comprehension of the centre of gravity theory in confrontation of contemporary doctrinal publications and original Clausewitz's theory. He compares operational manuals (those of U.S. and NATO), and finds similarities concerning characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a military force, nation or alliance, derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. Finally, he himself defines enemy's centre of gravity and highlights coherences that can affect fulfilling political and military objectives in current and future military operations.

The author follows the mainstream economics, i.e. leading economics of defence policy, ranging from economics of defence in the nuclear age, via economics of Iraq conflict, to current fight against terrorism. New paradigm must be drawn, taking into account source management, the distribution of economics weight of individual national economies of all countries participating in the fight against global terrorism.

The purpose of this article is to get readers acquainted with new facts that are arising in the sphere of defence and security of state and at the same time they might influence defence economics research. This recent phenomena came into existence as a consequence of new world layout and events especially tied with massive terrorist attacks after September 2001.

The authors depict the development of outsourcing methods in US armed forces, its origins, and sources. Collected data are accompanied by experiences from British and German armies. The American Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued in 1966 Circular No A-76 (lately several times revisited) to define procedures how to set rules which commercial activities are to be done within the frame of armed forces or in private sector. Backed by a number of literatures, magazines and newspapers (Air Force Journal of Logistics, Air Force Magazine, Armed Forces Journal, Defense Nationale, Washington Technology, Wehrtechnik, etc.) authors analyse several outsourcing processes. They present both positive and negative results, including open or hidden problems of A-76 policy (e.g. business process outsourcing). For the Army of the CR they recommend to overcome above mentioned problems by creating the corrective authority, similar to the British PPPU (PublicPrivate Partnership Unit).