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Military professional terminology is a special vocational vocabulary used within armed forces, usually only partially understood by outsiders. The author demonstrates several most notorious examples to draw attention of terminology specialists. They are special vocabularies of military and security affairs, such as human resources, integrated MoD, recruit, recruitment, air wing, air base, strategical/tactical levels, names of organizational military structures, battalion, company, regiment (in fact they differ from nation to nation) task force, defence planning and planning of defence, to name at least a few. In spite of several translated AAP publications, generally, those terms are used in a different way. The author calls for creating more cohesive terminology. He intentionally does not put his own proposals, he only appeals to leading military officials to enforce the unified and accurate military terminology. It is high time to solve this task, namely within the frame of a lifelong education of military personnel.

It is a point at which attacking forces are unable to continue their attack or even defend themselves, because do casualties, shortages of fuel, ammunition and rations, and sheer physical exhaustion. This sequel article deals with the theory of the operational art focusing on the culminating point operational concept. The article emanates from Carl von Clausewitz's ideas and concepts described in his book "On War", doctrinal publications analysis and study projects of the operational art theorists. It treats conditions influencing achievement of the culminating point on single levels of war-strategic, operational and tactical and highlights coherences and factors having fundamental influences on culmination. The article is accompanied by several graphs describing this theory in detail. Key words: Culmination, Culminating Point, Zeroing, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, Campaign Planning and Developing Operations.

The security environment is permanently changing. A national set of risks has increased after joining the EU and NATO and EU enlargement. The Czech Republic is obligated to integrate national security capabilities into NATO and the EU. To fulfil its responsibility, the Czech Republic ought to use the capabilities-based planning for further transformation of national security sector. This NATO concept ought to be in use not only within the MoD, but also at other ministries tied or responsible for national security. The national security sector must be planed, programmed, budgeted and transformed like a body. The article deals with the problem of unifying security concepts across Czech public administration. The author points out that our operational capabilities are influenced among others by the lack of labour force at the Czech national labour market.

This highly critical article, the author opens with a statement that 15 years of changes, implementation of rules, professional career advances do not fulfil expectations. The problem is more serious as the armed forces do not compete effectively in labour marked, with the implication of wasting public money (from defence budget). The whole situation is demonstrated on pay and career stratification of career officers and soldiers. Among others, in comparison with civil sector, military pays have low level of competitiveness. The article is supported by several graphs and tables.

In spite of the fact that it is a new concept, it presents one of key methods of international engagement in crisis areas the EU prefers. Its main components are crises prevention and securing stabilization. Security tasks are composite problems solving one of main state functions: to guard external and internal security together with principles of civil control. This essay among others aims to explain practicability of the EU's concept of preventive engagement as a tool of implementation of the European Security Strategy, further it describes European concept for crisis management missions in the field of civilian administration supporting security and justice. At the end there are some recommendations for the Czech Republic how to form capacities for EU missions and for the transformation of Czech security sectors.

The key fact is that changes in the political, economic, social, and technical spheres are making it possible for a small group bound together by a cause to use new technologies to challenge nation-states. 4GW (Fourth Generation Warfare) uses all the shifts from a mechanical to an information/electronic society to maximize the power of insurgency. Fifth-generation warfare (5GW) will result from the continued shift of political and social loyalties to causes rather than nations. It will be marked by the increasing power of smaller and smaller entities and the explosion of biotechnology. The purpose of this article is to widen the discussion on what forms 4GW may take and to offer a possible model for the next generation of war: 5GW. Adapted from Military Review, May-June 2007.

Supported by several historical examples, this article covers the past and contemporary development of both role and organizational structure of the infantry fire teams and squads. Fire team (or fireteam in British English) is an infantry grouping of four or less men (half of a section, GB); or one third of a squad (US). The fire team concept of the U.S. and British Army is shown as an example how to more effectively employ infantry in the all-volunteer military force. The author also shortly mentions Infantry Squad

Most people think that working in archives stands for activity with old documents, arranged upon bookshelves. Only few people know that archives means handling information. Today, data are not only in written form on paper, pieces of information are recorded on electronic media. Keeping archives is a part of national heritage; it has informational, scholarly and cultural functions (§ 2, Act No. 499/2004, Archives and Files Services). The author summarizes nearly 90 years of military archives, founded in 1919 by the famous Czech historian Jaroslav Werdstat, as a section of the Czech Country Archives. Very often the Military Archives have gone through difficult periods, and probably with regard to today's army priorities, we could expect uneasy progress even in the near future. This field is not in the centre of attention of army representatives, as it usually does not attract their attention.

This article deals with the EU command and control functions and provides basic information on the structure and capabilities of the EU CCS in Battle Group EU operations. The author describes political and strategical levels CCS (COREPER, GAERC, COPS, CivCom, EUMC, EUMS, BDE HQ, prospective EU FHQ). Only US, EU and E3 (Britain, France, Germany) are capable to realize integrated expeditional operations. The ACR can work only with cooperation with them. The Czech Republic as a small EU member state is actively engaged in the building of the Battle Group EU. The Czech Army is going to increase its expeditionary capabilities as demanded and be prepared for a broader range of conflicts and crises in the vital area of the EU concerns. At present, the ACR is able to carry out a self-supported, integrated expedition operation only on the edge of all its strength. The political leaders must bear this fact in mind, as the army mustn't be overburdened, otherwise it might lose its credibility. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.

In the near future, all joint deployments (activities, operations in which elements of two or more "branches of arms" participate) will be characterized as combined deployments (i.e. with forces or agencies of two or more allies). In view of those facts, Commanders (Army) Academy in Hamburg introduced a new concept of military schooling of GSOs, with regard to combined and multinational deployment and employment. Schooling and training are not mere matters of skill and proficiency. It is also the question of taking over responsibility, "action competence". GSOs must be able to react quickly, be capable to operate even in multinational agencies. This type of instruction underlines two main levels: firstly, the lessons must offer overall view not only on armed forces, but also on security, political, social development of forces, tied with their further advance. GSOs have to see problems and tasks in proper context, to "see the whole by eyes of its individual parts". This will give them a surprising sense of coherence. At the top of this schooling lies combined joint Euro-exercise, at operational level, being prepared in cooperation with military academies from allied European nations.

Since the 90's of the last century we have witnessed the discussions over extended concept of security, under which no national state is the only privileged security subject. The classical military concept is extended both "above", towards international, global and regional problems covering economy, social, environmental or humane issues and "down", in the direction of local communities, NGOs, private subjects and even individual citizens. Even though several important constitutional laws reflecting EU criteria were adopted, we still miss constituting and complete overall concept Czech security system. Of course, we have a document "Optimalization of Security System of the Czech Republic", but it is not the genuine concept, but a mere summary of practical measures dealing with temporary problems, namely after the Floods 2002. The author dares the public to open debate about priorities and goals of security politics of our country, in order to lay down, under general consensus, realistic security system, able to face the whole range of security threats and risks, explicitly in the broad international frame of NATO and EU.

Answering the commander's intelligence and decision needs is an uneasy task for any person responsible for intelligence. PIR information help the commander to keep knowledge on relevant environment during peacekeeping, stability and supporting operations, which are different from PIR in offensive and defensive operations. In combat operations, PIR focuses on enemy's military capability and intentions. Intelligence collection in stability and support operations may adjust to the people and their cultures, politics, religions, economics and related factors. The commander must have information telling on current enemy's threats, fighters, as well as on information ranging from standard of living of local population, supplies of electric power, to building a municipal school. Shortly, to have information behind the traditional scope of PIR. But the current Czech regulation MO/VZS 2003 does not explain similar situations, the only examples we can find are those in US Army Field Manual 3-07 Stability Operations and Support Operations.

In Czechoslovakia, the "labour camps" came into existence under the Act 247 of October 25, 1948. They were camps for those who had not committed any crime, but ought to have been isolated from other civilian public. The sentences: "... the said person has no positive attitude to current regime" or "shows no interest in joining the Communist Party" constituted the reasons for 10 to 24 months of imprisonment. "Offenders" were not sent to labour camps by courts, but only under the prescription issued by "prescription committee", at the level of local and regional "national authorities". A total of 23,000 people went through those camps, as a cheap labour force, taken from among "class enemies". The special position among those camps had military camp of hard labour Mírov, designated for the former commissioned and warrant officers who fought during WWII not only on western but also on eastern fronts. In 1949-1950, there were six roundups (Action D) in which the former "bourgeois" officers were arrested by mixed teams of State Security and Military Intelligence guards; in fact, many times even in the contradiction with the then effective laws and regulations.