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The idea of this enquiry into Czech Army logistics was to prove that even under hard conditions originated in permanently changing army concepts, the army logistics still keeps its high standard and responsibility. During transformation, an appropriate organization structure has been created, with working mechanism of logistics support, using motivated and rationale source exploitation. The purpose of an array of transformation in defence sector was to introduce not only new and effective army structure, compatible with NATO armies, but also to change the system of fi nancing forces. The funding ought to be more economical. The article is backed by a longterm study and observation of logistics development in defence sector.

The outcomes of battles and fighting are significantly influenced by weather conditions. Together with other important circumstances they decide a chosen combat strategy, operational art, warfare tactics, and ways of personnel and vehicles deployment; consequently the volume of losses or casualties. The authors recount the establishing of weather service within individual arms, creating fi rst weather charts, they give details on situation in pre-war republic, during WWII, in the 50s, even after the Velvet Revolution in 1989. They mention the names of eminent personalities of Czech Hydrometeorological Service to be honoured and remembered. We must also remind that our Hydrometeorological Service works not only in favour of the ACR, but also for other NATO countries.

The proponents of Revolution in Military Affairs claim that modern military technology will lift a "fog of war". In this article the term "fog of war" is described and illustrated in a work of Carl von Clausewitz who is supposed to introduce this term, used also in the famous novel War and Peace by Leo Tolstoy. These classics show us that uncertainty and chance, in other words fogs of war, are essential to human mentality. They will be present as long as war remains within a scope human endeavour. Emphasizing that military technology is equal to lifting the "fog of war" can lead to situation in which only trained commanders are supposed be able perfectly address problems in "chessboard" of war or computer simulators, but they will unable to manage a real world full of chaos, as they not used to count with uncertainties.

The Combined Joint Exercise was focused on the European approach to crisis management operations and involved an annual exchange of students and directing staffs between of the Higher Command and Staff Colleges from France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and Spain. The aim of this article is to provide knowledge and personal experience of its author based on his own participation in this exercise at the Escuela Superior de las Fuerzas Armadas (ESFAS) Madrid. The purpose of the exercise was to foster the understanding, mutual knowledge and dialogue among the offi cers of the aforementioned colleges through the practice of operational planning. Among general information describing the character of the exercise, the article defines some areas of the operational art, namely Operational Planning Process, Operational Design, Decisive Point Concept and Centre of Gravity Analysis.

The article deals with persistent problems of Czech military policy within 1993-2009, its achievements and failures. A new managerial concept, system planning, programming and budgeting, which superseded a communist central control, was not implemented fully because of governance instability. The office of Defence Minister was held by 11 persons within 1993-2009 (Czech Republic). Among others, it aroused the return of a concept of central planning in 2004, which was not successful, because it was not supported by institutions outside the MoD. The authors propose more transparency in military matters and better cooperation with academic community to prevent the repetition of concepts supporting short-term goals instead of long-term visions.

The article deals with the disintegration and erosion of originally cohesive Chechen resistance movement during the First Chechen War and following inter-war period. According to the author, the main reasons of this process are criminality and religious fundamental radicalisation. They together produced inner confl icts between fi eld commanders; some of them attacked Russian security forces in neighbouring regions (Dagestan, Ingushetia), even after war had ended. Disintegration processes were encouraged by social deprivation after the first war, by strategical position of Chechnya in relation to smuggling drugs and weapons, stealing rude oil, and fi nally activities of foreign Islamic solidarity fi ghters. All those factors signifi cantly contributed to the outbreak of the Second Chechnya War.

This study is based on a paper presented at the conference with the same heading taking place on January 8, 2009. First, the authors enumerate starting points of Czech defence and security polity together with key factors influencing their developments. The whole scale of new threats-from WMD and ballistic proliferation to cyber attack and even non intentional threats like climate change and pandemia-are to be addressed not only in NATO but also in the EU. Existing states of affairs are gradually reflected by Czech security and defence documents: Security Strategy 1999, 2001, 2003; Military Strategy 1999, 2002, 2004, 2008. In this historical context we joined NATO defence alliance and took part in peacekeeping missions abroad. Previous twenty years when we lived in peace could be regarded as a challenge to build Czech statehood. There is no time like a present. Only the future will show us whether we mastered it as much as we could.

The basic task of the post-1989 period was to formulate a security policy and a strategy ensuing from it. The strategy had to be based on a synthesis of the international policy concept, defence concept and internal security concept to ensure that defence would not be seen solely as the task of the army and the Ministry of Defence, but of the whole state and society-of every citizen. In this article his author evaluates some aspects of the armed forces transformation in process of adaptation. He assesses these changes with regard to approved strategic and conceptual documents that significantly determined this gradual transformation process. He identifies both same of its successes as well as failures. The study does not have a clearly analytical and evaluative character; rather it is a combination of factual information drawn from official sources, country's practical security policy as they appeared in contemporary Czech press, and opinions of the author.

After a short review of defence R&D history, the author concludes that our country used to reach world's level in some fields: passive warning systems, NBC protection, military surgery, explosives. After the change of political system in 1989 we began to dispose Czech military industries. The only scientific place to left is Defence University Brno, but it is an institution more or less concentrated on education. It is almost impossible to maintain pace with foreign defence industry. In the article there is an exhaustive list of military plants, institutions after 1989, together with the date of their closing down. It is followed by research orientation of defence industry, set according to time periods. The special chapter concentrates on financing defence research, the closing part deals with the period of our membership in NATO. Although there are same positive aspects, such as international cooperation, exploiting sources from abroad, strategical control declined. We see unwise reductions in personnel, abolishing accredited institutions, etc.

At that time, the base for plural societies in Eastern Europe was founded. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary joined NATO defence alliance. Serious global threats of economic, military, ecology, social, ethnic, religious, criminal characters were lasting. The important question of proliferation of mass destruction weapons was raised. The analyses of security situations in Europe and the World respectively proved that armed conflicts were mostly internal, in a form of civic wars, but demographically endangering bordering countries. Those threats were only discussed, namely nobody fully realized the threat of terrorism. Defence budgets were reduced, all people wanted to profit from the so-called peace dividends. Czech army was loyal to the state; it was not misused in inner political conflicts, which was regarded as something normal by the majority of Czech public. But there were many problems left, especially the role and engagement of the ACR in the following century.

Africa has became synonymous with conflict, increasingly violent and protracted. The continent is facing huge difficulties today and the EU is more and more involved in peace enforcement and expeditionary operations. Therefore the purpose of this article is to inform and pass knowledge of operational environment to those Czech soldiers designated to deploy overseas and abroad. It covers topics such as operational areas, understanding EU Battle Group operational Environment and Africa's operational environment. It is necessary for Czech soldiers to understand African operational environment very quickly and profoundly to avoid unfortunate misunderstanding of the local culture, customs, believes, religions, regional official and customary laws. It is a new challenge for the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic to be prepared for the CZE/SVK Battle Group. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.

Factors such as distance, destination, deployment demands, duration, represent key elements to determine logistics requirements. The EU BG concept necessitates considerable strategic air/sea lift and combat support capabilities, since EU battle groups are to be able to be deployed almost anywhere in the world, primarily in Africa. They have to deploy both troops and materiel simultaneously to its mission areas. Strategic airlift is the fastest way of deploying troops over long distance. The main challenge for the EU is therefore availability giant airplanes. A lack of suitable European transport crafts in EBalabáuropean airlift fleet is the Achilles heel to the EU BG Concept. The problem is that all aircraft available have only limited payload capacities and flying range. Although deploying by sea is more time consuming than deploying by air, EU member states have more ships available for strategic sea transport. The strict deployment deadline set down in the EU BG Concept means that ships and crews will have to be held at very high readiness.

This operation was led by Germany, and made up of elements contributed by twenty EU nations; as well as Turkey and Switzerland. The EU deployed FHQ in Kinshasa and simultaneously kept the over-the-horizon force in Gabon, in order to ensure a deterrent capacity and to avoid unnecessary heavy military presence in Kinshasa. After Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EUFOR RD Congo was a second EU largest military operation, involving a total of almost 3,000 soldiers and officers). The co-operation with MONUC was decisive in containing the potential spread of violence at a particularly sensitive moment in the election process. The operation demonstrated the EU ability to successfully conduct medium scale autonomous multinational operations within a planned time frame under the UN mandate. The views expressed in this assessment are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of EU Military Structure or the Czech Ministry of Defence. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.

Operational art is the area of military science between strategy and tactics. Operational method covers the employment of corps and divisions, while tactics apply to lower echelon units, brigades, battalions, companies and platoons. Different armies favour different operational methods which reflect national characteristics, available resources, and specific terrain conditions. Those facts are reflected in "operational thinking" of commanders. Operational thinking is one of most important prerequisites for reasonable deployment of military and non-military means to meet strategy aims. This sort of thinking should be listed in training programmes of military schools. The article is based upon the material drawn from the magazine Osterreichische Militärische Zeitschrift No. 2/2007.

New technologies influence not only social advance, but also the development of armed forces. Present-time warfare is resolute, dynamic. In the 21st century, both low and high intensity conflicts, counterterrorist or stabilization operations might take place in urbanized areas, where casualties and material damages are high. New weaponry and technology make demands on military and professional training, self-control, psychic preparedness. In advance we must set rules governing the firing of weapons and use of force namely by soldiers involved in peacekeeping and counter-insurgency situations. Mental stress, emotional, or physical strain or tension of soldiers are manifested by fanaticism, looting, killing non-combatants, desertions or going away from military units without permission (AWOLs), depressed soldiers inflict wound on themselves, they misuse drugs or alcohol. The author cites factors increasing soldiers' resistance: high cohesion of units, tough training, relaxation, courageousness, high awareness of objectives of operations and war aims.

The forward-thinking and respond to the challenges of today's dynamic operational environment demands as necessary: first, to attract and develop young people to become adaptative leaders possessing enhanced skills, i.e. we must align leader-development programmes for the new operating environment; second, to respond to the forces' needs in meeting the challenges of the operational environment-the forces have to undergo a transformation. Adaptability is critical to urban stability and support operations, as these operations present complex challenges to commanders for which no prescribed solutions exist. Warfare and technology are rapidly evolving; doctrine lags behind the need for ready solutions. Officers are confronted by many situations outside the doctrinal framework. No amount of technology can offset the effects of chaos theory ...169 Clearly, there is a need to quickly learn knowledge/skill sets, coupled with a new operating frame that might be radically different from the skills and knowledge developed through classical training (Military Review, January/February 2006, Tomáš Weiser, What is the Chaos? Dějiny a současnost, 5/2002).

It is an age-old problem, how to identify someone or something, to prevent from incidents, in which friendly forces fire on their own troops or vehicles by mistake, because of tiredness, exhaustion, psychological stress, technological defects, unforeseen circumstances, etc. Although there exists a technology carried specifically in an aircraft, combat vehicles, that utilizes coded radio signals to identify other friendly units, adopted measures are not always successful. In NATO, we have standardized systems for such identification: BTID-Battlefield Target Identification Device (for identification of vehicles and helicopters, STANAG 4579); and DSID-Dismounted Soldier Identification Device (for identification soldiers, STANAG 4630). At present, Germany (together with the United States) is in the lead of development system IFF. Systems are conceptually, technologically and tactically synthesized into ZEFF (ZielErkennung Freund-Feind), common for vehicles, helicopters, soldiers, as well as vehicles beyond the area of forces deployment. Source: Europäische Sicherheit magazine, 4/2006.

The article deals with the teaching of management at the University of Defence. Its authors are long-standing university teachers, possessing also experiences from command and staff appointments. In recent years, the emphasis in military schools has shifted more to subjects indirectly related to civilian courses of study, e.g. the theory of management. At the Defence University Brno it covers a wide range of other subjects: economy, informatics, operational investigation, etc.; other subjects are in fact only "supporting": applied mathematics, sociology, psychology, humane resource control and law. Military management, theory of military operations, staff service, and that belong to the group of applied fundamentals. At present, "military management" at the Defence University has only a limited scope of teaching units. It is read both at bachelor and master levels of studies, inevitably many themes are duplicated. So, among others, the authors recommend to shift the core of military management teaching to higher levels of studies, at master levels.

There are many items in American foreign policy the Europeans do not agree, namely its tendency towards "strong world leadership". On the other hand, the Americans would prefer stronger Europe, namely in time of world's economic crisis when US defence expenditures are practically frozen, and when pre-emptive strategy by president Bush exhausted most of American sources. Even the Europeans feel that they should profile themselves as independent, strong power, but their Common Foreign and Security Policy is still more political declaration than really military strategy. Many security experts suggest that the Lisbon Treaty excludes NATO membership as far as questions concerning defence are concerned. NATO alliance still expects new strategy that ought to be approved in December 2010. The authors predict the necessity to strengthen the so-called Second Pillar of the EU, as the United States are going to be more oriented towards cooperation with Japan, South Korea and Australia. We must bear it in mind, drawing up long-term visions of Czech Security policy.

In spite of the fact that it is a new concept, it presents one of key methods of international engagement in crisis areas the EU prefers. Its main components are crises prevention and securing stabilization. Security tasks are composite problems solving one of main state functions: to guard external and internal security together with principles of civil control. This essay among others aims to explain practicability of the EU's concept of preventive engagement as a tool of implementation of the European Security Strategy, further it describes European concept for crisis management missions in the field of civilian administration supporting security and justice. At the end there are some recommendations for the Czech Republic how to form capacities for EU missions and for the transformation of Czech security sectors.

The Czech Republic became involved in ISAF in 2002, among others we sent there both field hospital and field surgical team; later meteorological group, traffic control group with EOD team began to serve at the Kabul International Airport. In 2004, the 601st Special Force Group was engaged in Enduring Freedom operation, Czech soldiers served in German Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), positive role was played by Czech Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team. Another successful mission was establishing PRT Logar, supporting social, economical development in this province. New common features of PRT, helicopter OMLT, EUPOL mission, partly SOG is the concentration on building Afghan capacities, namely ANSF (Afghan National Security Force) and public administration. Together with their deliberate support, it has multiplying effect, as assistance and training bring more effects than mere fulfilling standard military tasks, guarding e.g. Dutch base.

The article is focused on the Czech military bases during mission abroad and introduces new term "Life Cycle of Military Base". Every system has its own successive stages through which it passes; concept that compares the cyclical nature of organizations, systems, is called life cycle. The Reach-Back concept divides lifetime of the military base into seven phases: Assignment (task, goals), Preparation, Proposal (draft), Designing, Building, Running and Cancelling. The definition and description of all phases of the Life Cycle of Military Bases is an important contribution to solving series of problems connected with designing, building, running and cancelling of military bases during mission abroad. Dividing into separate sections contributes to the well-mastered supervision of base, as it indicates factual structures of individual stages of daily routine of the base and thus it lowers the risks of neglecting some activities.

The important part of the forces transformation deals with the problem reducing in numbers of officers, namely field officers and general corps in the Czechoslovak Armed Forces and lately the Army of the Czech Republic. The main cause of this reduction was new concept of military career, as before the transformation it used to be a lifelong profession. The downsizing started in 1990 and it ought to have been finished by the end of the first period of the Czech Armed Forces Reform, as of 2008/12/31/, but it appears that downsizing is endless. The author quotes figures concerning numbers of officers; several rank charts and tablets with corresponding NATO and Czech grades respectively are used to demonstrate veracity of his statements. According to Lt.Col. Pernica, the downsizing is going to continue but no one knows how many officers for the all-volunteer Czech armed forces will be enough.

The author discusses the issues surrounding the construction of modern logistic support for the Czech Army as it transforms from a conscript to an all professional force of agile, light forces, with high reliability and low support requirements. The basic philosophy is to create comprehensive system that would offer complex service for a commander in the field of materiel, technology and medical services. The logistics reform must be supported by enhancing communication systems (Information Logistics System) and by seeking the ways of rationale savings, to reach the highest level of compatibility with logistics systems of other NATO nations. "Time Based Competition" and "Time Compression" must be accepted at all levels of logistics system both in peace and field conditions. In the future, the security problems will be managed more by civilian means than by hard force. The goals will be political, economical and cultural. Those changing threats will ask logistic support to be more flexible, mobile, integrated, compact and precise.

The author discusses the issues surrounding the construction of modern logistic support for the Czech Army as it transforms from a conscript to an all professional force of agile, light forces, with high reliability and low support requirements. The basic philosophy is to create comprehensive system that would offer complex service for a commander in the field of materiel, technology and medical services. The logistics reform must be supported by enhancing communication systems (Information Logistics System) and by seeking the ways of rationale savings, to reach the highest level of compatibility with logistics systems of other NATO nations. "Time Based Competition" and "Time Compression" must be accepted at all levels of logistics system both in peace and field conditions. In the future, the security problems will be managed more by civilian means than by hard force. The goals will be political, economical and cultural. Those changing threats will ask logistic support to be more flexible, mobile, integrated, compact and precise.

It is an information study about sociological research completed among Czech servicemen, former members of military missions abroad, under the aegis of the rector of the University of Defence. The research goal consisted in finding causal relationship between missions and breakup rates. Among others it was determined that for breakups were predispositions even before partners went to missions abroad. A total of 3 % stated they wanted to escape from family problems. Partnership after returning home broke up in 15.6 % of questioned veterans. Research should provide cornerstone data for a proposal of concrete measures for reducing divorces and partings. The stratified sample consists of 348 respondents from the ACR who took part at least in one mission abroad and were married, or lived in long-term partnership. Data collection lasted from July to October 2008.

It is evident that Barack Obama diverges from Bush's pre-emptive strategy. There are changes in style and contents. Obama begins to direct American policy more towards diplomatic negotiations instead underlining military strength. It is evident namely in proposed negotiations with Iran and in case of Russia, where he wants to overcome cooling down after Russia-Georgia clashes and gas crisis. He insists on avoiding unnecessary conflicts and puts stress on good relations with allies and building new partnerships. He is going to withdraw soldiers from Iraq and in spite of problems in Afghanistan to reduce U.S. military budget. Even though Obama wants to maintain American world's leadership, there are some signs of partial changes in American foreign policy, e.g. his orientation towards Asia suggests first signs of multilateral approach of post-American era. The author also mentions the question of "American radar" in the Czech Republic, the fate of which depends on Iran's nuclear power programme.

As a former Austrian officer he was chosen for recruiting volunteers for the so-called Czech and Slovak Army in Russia. After the WWI he became a member of the newly created Czechoslovak Army. During Nazi occupation of Czech lands, he was arrested for his resistance activities. Fortunately, in prison he suffered from typhoid fever, so he was taken into hospital and therefore he was not executed. When WW II ended, he was falsely accused of leaking important information by military counter-intelligence which was firmly in hands of oncoming communists. After interrogations he was senteced for "active fight against the Bolsheviks" in Russian civil war. The Soviet security authorities deported him together with other condemned persons to Austrinan city Baden and then to the U.S.S.R. At the age of 60 he was sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment. In 1954 he died. After the Velver Revolution he was rehablitaded and promoted to the rank of Major General.

It is a point at which attacking forces are unable to continue their attack or even defend themselves, because do casualties, shortages of fuel, ammunition and rations, and sheer physical exhaustion. This sequel article deals with the theory of the operational art focusing on the culminating point operational concept. The article emanates from Carl von Clausewitz's ideas and concepts described in his book "On War", doctrinal publications analysis and study projects of the operational art theorists. It treats conditions influencing achievement of the culminating point on single levels of war-strategic, operational and tactical and highlights coherences and factors having fundamental influences on culmination. The article is accompanied by several graphs describing this theory in detail. Key words: Culmination, Culminating Point, Zeroing, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, Campaign Planning and Developing Operations.

Like hundreds of millions of other people, Islamic terrorists and their supporters use the Internet. In many ways, the Internet is a tool tailor-made for these Islamic extremists, who use it covertly and overtly to plan attacks, raise money, and spread anti-Semitic and anti-American propaganda written in English, Arabic, and other languages. There is sufficient information to believe that in the future, terrorists may even turn the Internet itself into a weapon, using it to wreak havoc on America's critical infrastructure. Because these militants are global, rather than being located in a single geographical area (Pakistan, Indonesia, Somalia, Iraq), the Internet provides them with a new and effective way to attain their goals. It may be difficult to catch extremists planning or coordinating an attack if they are using encryption, steganography, or some other method of hiding their online activities.

It is generally known that norms of international humanitarian law are applicable for the protection of selected groups during interstate or domestic conflicts, but this paper is devoted to the chronological scope of application of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols even in time of peace. The author demonstrates that the Article 3 of the Additional Protocol I implies the peacetime applicability of certain provisions of the Conventions and Additional Protocols. Examples of such provisions of the Additional Protocol I are also brought in this article. Among others, he extents the notion of humanitarian law in peace, which is very often limited only to preparation of personnel and schooling.