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This extended essay is based upon various sources, among others on May 2010 President Obama's speech at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, where President Obama described his national security objectives. The highest priorities of U.S. national security are the safety of Americans at home and abroad and achieving a peaceful, stable world through global cooperation despite a flawed international system. The Obama's security strategy relies heavily on diplomacy and engagement, economic development and other methods of influence, along with U.S. military capabilities with global reach and unsurpassed resources. As we face multiple threats, from nations, non-state actors and failed states, America will maintain the military superiority that has secured country, and underpinned global security, for decades. The security strategy is global, and identifies an array of real or potential security challenges that include: countering violent extremism and insurgency; stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and securing nuclear materials, resolving and preventing conflict; and reducing destabilizing risks to economic interdependence.

In our country we can meet various publications on intelligence activities, nevertheless we feel the lack of expert books with wider overreach. Among those publications that fulfil such demands belongs the work by Ladislav Pokorný "Secret Agencies", Prague: Auditorium, 2012. The book covers intelligence organizations of all kinds, including military ones. In military section the reviewer cites the famous ironic sentence "Under the Czech Law, we have three intelligence services, in fact there are four of them, with five directors". The publication is of high information value and could also serve as a university textbook.

After the end of Cold War, all Europe abandons the system of obligatory conscription in time of peace. Advancing European integration changes the configuration of threats, which is reflected in changed structure of armed forces. As Charles de Gaulle said in 1934 (which is also the motto of German book Wehrpflicht oder Freiwilligenarmee? Wehrstrukturentscheidungen im europäischen Vergleich, 2006): "We should not maintain an army we are used to, but we should build the army we really need." They are the structural changes in defence sector that could provide necessary means for common security and defence policy in being. The supporters of professional/obligatory military service differ according to their political beliefs. Surprisingly, in Germany, liberal, green or communist oriented parties prefer voluntary/ professional military service. The same discussions took place in our country after 1990.

The Centres of Gravity (COG) are characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. The COG belongs among the most important operational concepts. It is the main source of power and strength. Without dermining enemy's COG we are not able to carry out any quick and resolute action, to reach ordered tasks, desired objectives. The primary purpose of this article is to offer basic information about this subject. This first part is concentrated predominantly to Carl von Clausewitz's ideas. The article especially aims on disunity and heterogeneity of comprehension of the COG theory in confrontation with contemporary doctrinal publications and original Clausewitz's theory. It highlights coherences that can affect fulfilling political and military objectives in current and future military operations.

The author of this article considers the prospective changes in the development, character, missions and tasks of the Army of the Czech Republic, Those changes are deduced from the changing security environment and long-term development trends. To meet new demands, we must continue in building interoperability and compatibility. The battlefield operations will be planned and controlled by the systems of "Network Centric Warfare" and "Reach Back Operations". It will not be necessary for a commander to be in physical contact with operational theatre. Electronical high speed intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, reconnaissance will enable the high pace of military operations (together with common analyses, integration of collected data, evaluation of enemy's intents and activities). This will enable to build a credible defence, in the frame of collective security system, hand in hand with other NATO allies.

Some of the published critiques dealing with midterm planning are not true, as they were created without detailed knowledge of practice and methods how our midterm plan was created. Nevertheless, there are some real faults in midterm planning. According to the author, they are divided into two groups: external-they depend on quality of assignment; and internal-they are connected to the application of theory. Main external fault is the absence of long-term plan. In fact, it was introduced by the Order of Defence Minister, but it has not been worked up thoroughly. We lack adjusting main goals, tasks and priorities for MoD. Next problem are unstable and lacking financial sources. Internal mistakes are as follows: absence of mechanism for balanced changes between cycles of planning; implementation of life cycle cost and level of education of staff preparing data for planning.

This book written by Alain C. Enthoven, and K. Wayne Smith, was published some forty years ago, but its leading ideas do not grow old. It is a work of enduring value and listing relevance, this book is both a classic account of the application of powerful ideas to the problem of managing the U.S. Ministry of Defence (DoD) and a cautionary history of the controversies inspired by that successful effort ...206 Defence secretary Robert S. Namara's device was a new system for allocation defence resources, the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). Most of those decisions are taken as bedrock defence policy today, and the methods have become embedded ad the DoD's approach to defining and resolving issues. According to the author of this article, this book ought to be the inspiration even for our Ministry of Defence in its effort to save restricted means and at the same time to increase Czech military capabilities.

Operations by Lt.Col. Ing. Jaroslav Moravčík. NATO's current operational experience and that from other operations indicates that purely military actions cannot resolve a complex emergency of crisis. The requirement for the military to interact with non-military actors shows a new, more comprehensive approach. In response, NATO's Effect-Based Approach to Operations was highlighted. The four functions of EBAO and their related activities are mutually supportive. The functions are carried out in a continuous, interactive, parallel process and should not be regarded as sequential steps. They are as follows: Knowledge development; Effect-based planning; Effect-based execution; and Engagement space assessment. EBAO recognizes the importance of applying the various instruments available to the Alliance to create overall effects that will lead to crisis resolution. Achieving synergies amongst NATO and non-NATO actors will enable to identify better how it may best harmonize its contribution with other actors involved in a crisis.

This article covers the EUFOR RD Congo operation preparation phase and provides information on Military Strategic Planning Process, Military Operational Planning, Collaborative Planning, EU OHQ Potsdam activation and Force Generation Process. It describes planning period to highlight a pivotal role of training and education. Operation EUFOR RD CONGO was the EU second military intervention in the RDC, following Operation Artemis in 2003. The EUFOR RD CONGO mission was to support MONUC during running election process, in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1671, authorizing the temporary deployment of an EU force in the RDC. The views expressed in this assessment are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of EU Military Structure or the Czech MoD. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.

Supported by published materials and information (LaunchingEUBattleGroups, AsecureEuropeinabetterworld), the authors analyze and evaluate some of the processes in the field of preparation and forming international crisis management. Both NATO Lisbon strategy and the Programme Declaration of the Slovak Republic open new roles and missions of Slovak Army. The Slovak Army must fulfil those commitments even in limited source frame. It concentrates on new priorities: the army is trained and prepared for missions it is going to be deployed in. Last but not least, apart of traditional missions, .the forces will be developing even non-military capabilities useful for peace missions.

There are two great interpreters of the Napoleonic experience, Jomini and Clausewitz. Both were interested in the application of military force to achieve political goals. The article familiarizes readers with Jomini's theoretical fundamentals of operational design elements, namely the lines of operations. Jomini left a great mark on the details of strategic planning: campaign planning, the selection of the theatre of operation, the base of operation, the line of operation, and decisive points. At the end of this process of selection was the final deployment for the decisive battle. Jomini's major contribution, then, was to provide the geometry of the battle space. In his investigation of the nature of war he developed several key operational concepts. As an operational art tools they help the commander and staff to visualize the arrangement of military capabilities in time, space, and purpose to accomplish the mission. The concept of operational lines is evolved in all operational functions in terms of ongoing military missions.

Topical problems of insufficient military budget, limited means are a drive force for searching unoccupied financial means to saturate set goals and ensure their unbiased reallocation and rational exploitation. The necessary prerequisite is control implementation and managerial accounting. This ought to create primary predispositions for introducing managerial accounting system, which would be oriented not towards financial, and property operations, but towards effective economy. The article describes phenomena tied with an army unit, together with the position of its commander in the process of gradual implementation of integrated informational system of state treasury, which is most manifested in the field of planning, budgeting and accounting.

The article familiarizes readers with theoretical fundamentals of the key element of operational design, i.e. decisive point that is described as "a point from which a hostile or friendly centre of gravity can be threatened". It may exist in time, space or the information environment. As a tool of operational art, it helps commander and his staff to unlock the path to the centre of gravity. The concept is further evolved via example of peace support military operation planning process. The close understanding to terms decisive points, lines of operations, centre of gravity, kinetic effects, non-kinetic operations, doctrine is for military planners fundamental. The aim of this article is therefore to explain this basic terminology, to describe connections with other element of operational planning that could be used during all steps of operational planning. Basic theoretical Jomini's implications are introduced and their doctrinal interpretations are highlighted.

The paper is a contribution to the ongoing discussion regarding training, drills and education of military personnel. It indicates a comprehensive solution of the issue both in national and international connection of the current approach to military vocations, life-long learning Vojenské rozhledy 1/2011 and expected deployment of the present-day armed forces. Using results of a research conducted within the Czech Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces, authors specify roles of individual stakeholders in the process of training and education in the military and define prerequisites of an effective military educational and training system. The authors treat this problem in context of the so-called National Qualification Framework, multinational project of EU member states Military Erasmus, activities conducted by European Security and Defence College (ESDC) and others.

The overall purpose of this paper is to describe the way the Alliance and the also the Czech Army is going to apply the leverage of powers while conducting operations in the future. The article shows in details that the relative combat power analysis requires an assessment of factors either directly or indirectly affecting the potential outcome of the operation. In order to improve military knowledge and operational thinking within the Czech Army it is recommended to improve the quality of officers' military training and personnel preparation in accordance with Czech MoD White Paper on Defence. The views expressed in this assessment are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of Alliance or the Czech Ministry of Defence.

This article deals with PMSCs as a relatively new phenomenon in warfare areas. It is open to discussion whether private military companies and the private contractors that they employ, should be treated just like any other transnational industry, or whether they should be treated like mercenaries under international law. As it happened in many countries, private companies and private contractors operate in a legal vacuum. From a strictly legal point of view individuals employed by private military companies are not to be considered as mercenaries. The private military industry offers a wide range of services. Procurement of military services by individuals and private firms has developed in a direction that had probably not been anticipated in previous years. Some military analysts say that the exclusive role of the state in the domain of defence and security is outdated and should be re-examined.

This paper analyses some of the accesses to developing modular structures of task forces, built not only on a base of combined arms, but also even the base of special units, formations, Czech Chemical Corps. The analysis is derived from documents, doctrines, at both political-strategic level and military-strategical level within state defence command. Moreover, the article offers information related to operational-tactical level of command and control. At the end, the author evaluates some possible impacts of modular structures on practical activities of forces. It is necessary to define those impacts in a framework of particular projects, dealing with the formation of modular structures.

The overall purpose of this paper is to describe the ways the Alliance and the also the Czech Army will apply the operational art tenets, conducting operations in the future. The current military problems cannot be solved without a deep understanding and knowledge of operational art. In order to improve military thinking within the Czech Army, it is recommended to study and apply operational art. The operational art forms a bridge between strategy defining the political aims of war and tactics, fighting the battles. Commanders and staff officers should study operational art seriously, systematically and with all their efforts. The author deals with current state of present operational art to inform on new developments in this field of military art. The article broadens the vision and deepens the insights of its readers. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.

The NATO Washington Summit in 1999 discussed Defence Capability Initiatives to increase Alliance defence potential together with capacities for accelerated deployability and mobility of NATO forces. This fact was underlined during Prague Summit 2002. One of Prague Capabilities Commitments is the requirement of deployability and sustainability in operations. Among others, this requirement is met by Memorandum of Understanding and bilateral agreements. The Czech Republic is involved in activities of international organizations, enumerated in this article. We support a principle of specialization, the concentration to limited, part-time scale of transport capacities operating for Czech peacekeeping missions. Active participation in the Movement Coordination Centre Europe could be the leading pattern for synergic cooperation in the field of strategic transport.

War game is a simulation of military operations intended to train military commanders or to test a proposed strategy. It is a game in which model soldiers are used to create battles, in order to study tactics. This article illustrates the importance of War Game COAs (course of action). It was tested against opposing force COAs. Such exercise will help to identify advantages and disadvantages and the key elements of execution planning for each COA. The lesson learned during OHQ CZE/SVK BG EU Staff Exercises that took place in Olomouc from January 19th, to January 23rd, and from February 16th, to February 20th, 2009 is that war-gaming (although time consuming) is something closer to "reality" than the "theory" in doctrines. The war-gaming practices teamwork, facilitates team-building and enables to share mental model COA. Commanders and their staff ought to be engaged in simulations and war games more frequently. All information and sources for this paper were drawn from unclassified materials.

The existence of the Czech Army is at state. We need to get over present cut in military budget, ill-advised savings, without searching for new appropriate financial and material sources. To save something important means always to sacrifice or to give up something. Some security and military experts wish to dissociate themselves with approved methods. They think that the White Paper doesn't express opinions on many important things. It assumed that after five years there will be need to revise this White Book. So, proposes the author, wouldn't be better for us to regard the White Book only as an analytical document containing certain proposals for the following Defence Strategy of the CR, as originally intended?

There are no military conflicts without deception, as it is among others a very cheap method how to contribute to the successful accomplishment of the assigned mission. Military deception (MILDEC) is applicable across a wide range of military operations. MILDEC can be conducted during all phases of military operations at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. It is defined as being those actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. According to he author, the operational deception is to be explained in more detail, basic rules are to be outlined, including fundamental principles and methods of deception for operational planning.

The new book by historian František Hanzlík "Without Mercy and Compassion" deals with a prominent actor of the Czechoslovak People's Army and the Communist Party. His personality unites anti-Nazi fight in Soviet Russia, communist coup d'état in February 1948, monstrous political trials. He reached the height of career when he became Deputy Defence Minister and aspired to the position of Defence Minister. But in 1950, when Czech president's son-in-law Alexej Čepička held this office, his rapid decline began. In a sense, it was the start of his end.

In the previous Military Review we introduced the article "Will Military Deception Pass Away?" by the same author. In the Army of the Czech Republic we have no manual dealing with military deception (MILDEC). The only manual concerning MILDEC was abolished without any substitute. But military art can't be further developed without similar documents. Today we take MILDEC as a complex set of provisions misleading enemy's commanders and staff, by means of false information and counterfeit data that deliberately deceive adversary decision-makers and planners. Use of MILDEC during any phase of an operation also helps to mislead adversaries as to the strength, readiness, locations, and intended missions of friendly forces. The MILDEC could contribute to the successful accomplishment of the assigned mission by many ways.

The main Alliance mission is to "safeguard the freedom and security of its member countries" and to "deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any of them". Those general tasks are tailored today to changed international security surroundings. In May this year, a report by the experts group was released, forming the basis for further negotiations over the new strategical concept of NATO. The experts produced a document of first-rate quality identifying main tasks NATO is facing today. At the same time this document redefines prospective directions the Alliance should follow in the years to come. Without a broad popular support NATO's engagements namely off European territory couldn't be vindicated and justified. The same is true as far allocation of sources for NATO missions and developing military capabilities are concerned. So, the communication with public thus becomes a further dimension of this highest strategic document.

The paper offers new looks at the system of railroad reconstruction in crisis and emergency situations. It originates from The Operational Plan of State Territory Preparation that is implemented in harmony with The Plan of Technology Protection of Railroad. This article is a free sequel to information published in this Military Revue No. 4/2005 dealing with drafting the plan of railroad technology protection. The authors´ main purpose is to give readers basic knowledge on key changes in railroad security system and main security measurements till 2013. The protection system is intended to be more flexible and economic.

Article deals with new insights into the Alliance missions for the upcoming period of five to ten years that are to be conditioned by achieving higher level of future military capabilities for provision of defence and security within the Alliance and its Partners. Some initiatives are described that are needed to be implemented to achieve the required capabilities and also necessary resources and process measures imposed to the Alliance member states and the Alliance as a whole are indicated. The new Strategic Concept aims to define NATO as a modernized Alliance and a cooperative team player in a globalized world. It gives a comprehensive framework for preserving the core ideals of NATO while transforming it into a dynamic Alliance capable of confronting the unconventional and unpredictable threats that define today's international security environment. The article refers to the ideas and thoughts mentioned in a study of the US NDU's Center for Technology and National Security Policy.

The article identifies new threats of global character influencing global security and quality of life. The inspiration is drawn from the debate over proposed updated Czech security strategy 2011, where several security scenarios were drafted. It is a free sequel to the study "Wild Cards in Future Development of World Security" published in this review in No. 2, 2008. The titles of some chapters are as follows: The Collapse of World's Monetary System and Global Economic Warfare, Crisis of Global Government, The Shortage of Key Commodities (oil, gas, coal, raw materials, water, foodstuffs), Migration, Organized Crime, European Union prior to Disintegration, The Crisis of NATO, New Religions, Will Rich People Live Longer?, etc.

When the Czech Republic joined NATO, some structural changes in the national security sector were expected. Actually, changes in national defence strategy were declared by national strategic documents, such as military and security strategies. In addition to it, since 2002 the Czech Republic has been taking part in Global War on Terrorism and, generally speaking, it implies higher expenditures spent on security purposes. Surprisingly, many things have remained the same. The strategic documents were mostly ignored, deep changes did not happen due to fiscal policy based on a traditional incremental budgeting. Proportions between expenditures for internal and external security were only fluctuating.

This concept has been preparing since the early 2009. In short, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation must be increasingly prepared to intervene far beyond its borders. In the coming decade, NATO will have four central inter-related military missions. The first requirement is to "deter, prevent and defend" against aggression, so as to ensure the political independence and territorial integrity of NATO member states. The report insists on the need to send out military missions beyond the treaty area "when required to prevent an attack on the treaty area or to protect the legal rights and other vital interests of Alliance members". Any expeditionary mission must be based on the principles of the UN charter. Another key item is to cooperate better with those partners, and others worldwide, in order to tackle the new threats posed by cyber attacks, piracy, arms proliferation and energy supply insecurity and climate change. However, in order to achieve the new goals, NATO "must halt the precipitous decline in national defence spending", and to introduce reforms to make spending more efficient.