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The essay summarizes several articles published in Vojenské rozhledy dealing with mass media and its activities during armed conflicts or peace-support operations. In fact, more attention to war information is paid by civilian press or books. The author, PhDr. Antonín Rašek (-ar-) cites e.g. English sociologist D. Hallin The 'The Uncensored War', D. Kellner The Persian Gulf TV War, and some books or reportages by Czech journalists and authors, K. Hvižďala, P. Procházková, V. Bělohradský, T. Halík, etc. The Vietnam War was the first televised war and it was largely uncensored. People saw the true horror of war on their television screens night after night, and that caused them to turn against the war. The media seems to be influencing the direction of government policy; the American military always claimed the media caused the war to be lost. But today, namely during the wars in Iraq, the media are blamed to be too subordinated to official policy, they present "a war of choice as a war of necessity". "Abedded" journalists and stringers sell war stories and information, their primary purpose is to make money. An example of the strict control of war information is Chechnya, closed for independent journalists and the only information available is released through official information's agencies, both Russian and opposing Chechen forces.

The conscription is a system of compulsory enrolment of men and women into the armed forces. Conscripts may be called to serve in time of peace in order to train for war; they may be called into uniform in time of emergency. Conscripts are distinguished from volunteers and professionals, as well as from mercenaries, who offer their service to any government solely for pay. Recent general discussion regarding reducing duties to perform military service in the Czech Republic between 2000 and 2005 has indicated that the sense of citizens' responsibility for the defence their country is limited, in public eyes, to the conscription only. In reality, the sphere of citizens' defence liabilities is much broader. The comprehensiveness of this issue comes to light particularly when we compare the practice in this area in different NATO nations. In this particular case, the article indicates one of possible solutions to these efforts, i.e. a systemizing approach.

The primary aim of the method Hazard & Impact Index (H&I Index) is to enable the commander to evaluate possible negative impacts of military exercise on environment, and quickly and in an operative way interpret whether intended military activities can be a threat to the conditions or surroundings, in which the units are employed. The authors propose several tables for the comparison of environmental groups (soils, forests, climates) with forces movements. The method still undergoes the development. The evaluated numbers are set only for a mechanized company of the Army of the Czech Republic in our local surrounding. But in the near future the authors predict its extension to all organic units of NATO stationed in European continent. The article is a sequel to the article by the same authors in Vojenské rozhledy, No 1 /2006.

The subject of this comprehensive study: the main features of global risk society can be embodied by ecology crises, global financial crises, threat of terrorism. The article is presented as a report to military community and audience, with the underlying focus on terrorism. The author is mapping the global future in the first two decades of this century. As a small country we must pay attention to the developments in the worlds leading powers: the U.S., China, Russia, last but not least, within the EU. Those themes also present individual headings of this study. He treats energy, demography, peace, security, good neighbourly relations, cooperation between states that are most desirable goals we want to reach. In a way, as the main actor of worlds security situation till 2020 is identified Islamist terrorism (radical Islamists, Al Qaeda). At the end Mr. Balabán recalls the former "Security Policy of the Czech Republic" released ten years ago, reminding us the necessity to be prepared for the worst scenarios.

Even though many activities related to intelligence and intelligence network after the end of Cold War were released and have become commonplace, classified matters are still in the centre of public's interest. In discussions, experts use various terms tied with espionage or counter-intelligence, but real differences are not too high. In the armed forces (in the frame of NATO) this question was solved by issuing the manual AJP-2, Allied Joint Intelligence, CounterIntelligence and Security Doctrine (NATO 2003). This article summarises key and basic terms used in intelligence services, including new theoretical concepts from this field. As the author writes in the introductory chapter, many experts, namely in civilian and academic fields use the same terminology, but their explanation differs. They use different definitions reflecting diverse circumstances under which they came into existence. The article was written namely as a contribution to interagency communication, among civilian and professional experts, in time when the overall security concept is changing, when military power is not the only tool to avert wide spectrum of security threats of 21st century.

This article examines depth in the nonlinear battlefield and how planners might develop operational effects to defeat insurgencies. The former field manual stated that depth was the extension of operations in time, space and resources. This is a decidedly linear construction of the battlefield based on industrialized warfare between conventional enemies. The Global War on Terrorism operating environment is both nonlinear and non-contiguous. The enemy has no national borders or traditional infrastructure. If we understand cognitive depth, we can develop ways to paralyze the insurgent system or produce operational shock. Colonel John A. Warden III, an architect of the Persian Gulf War air campaign, introduced Five Rings Model as a methodology for successfully attacking and paralyzing a conventional enemy system in depth. An adaptation of this model depicts tangible targets that together constitute depth in the insurgent battle space. Source: Is There a Deep Fight in a Counterinsurgency by Lee K. Grubbs and Michael J. Forsyth, Military Review, July-August 2005.