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It is an age-old problem, how to identify someone or something, to prevent from incidents, in which friendly forces fire on their own troops or vehicles by mistake, because of tiredness, exhaustion, psychological stress, technological defects, unforeseen circumstances, etc. Although there exists a technology carried specifically in an aircraft, combat vehicles, that utilizes coded radio signals to identify other friendly units, adopted measures are not always successful. In NATO, we have standardized systems for such identification: BTID-Battlefield Target Identification Device (for identification of vehicles and helicopters, STANAG 4579); and DSID-Dismounted Soldier Identification Device (for identification soldiers, STANAG 4630). At present, Germany (together with the United States) is in the lead of development system IFF. Systems are conceptually, technologically and tactically synthesized into ZEFF (ZielErkennung Freund-Feind), common for vehicles, helicopters, soldiers, as well as vehicles beyond the area of forces deployment. Source: Europäische Sicherheit magazine, 4/2006.

Czech MoD has to be economical with resources provided from the state budget. The article deals with the distribution and structure of state budget in relation to MoD itemized summary of expected income and expenditures. The authoress discusses several patterns used in this field, e.g. costminimization analysis, or assessing the total amount of money allocated for a specific purpose during a specified period. She also points to several unintended mistakes done by MoD officials.

Summary of Security Com174 munity Views - Part One. Despite the fact that most of the predictions made in the early 20th century did not realized, there are still plenty of arguments for drawing security prognoses as the only method assessing synthetic alternatives of future progress. The future is not unequivocally determined, as the all comprising development is strongly influenced by subjective motives. We must have scenarios upon which we can act, operate, namely in the field of security. The government ought to set clearly our security agenda, where and why we are going to make possible military engagement. All further actions are developing from those prognoses, i.e. buying tanks, helicopters, parachutes, armoured vehicles, etc. The first part of this security study covers several predictions containing even some controversial visions. They are based upon the opinion survey done among members of Czech military community. The field of investigation comprises EU, US, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Africa, Asia, even hypothetic Russia-China conflict, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and the like.

From economic point of view, the army of every nation spends immense sources from the state budget. To spent sources economically, the officers - managers economists have to be educated in economic science, i.e. they ought to acquire proper economic knowledge, systematically, during his military studies, in army college, or defence university. One of many things the ACR is missing is an economic course explaining army officials above all how to find adequate proportion between costs and incomes, not to make decision only intuitively.

In essence, the world is organizing itself in a series of interconnected networks. The information revolution will cause shifts, both in how societies may come into conflict and how their armed forces may wage war. Cyber war is coming. Its concept refers to information-related conflict both at a grand level, between nations or societies, and at low levels of international subgroups, e.g. terrorists of any kind, e.g. Al Qaeda, etc. The concept may involve public diplomacy measures, political and cultural subversion, deception or interference with local media, infiltration of computer networks and databases, and efforts to promote dissident or opposition movements across computer networks. Terrorists may build mutual connections, shape opinions in target groups, and conduct intense propaganda and psychological operations campaigns. Guerrilla warfare in cyberspace can use those networks to maximize their political, economic, and social power while minimizing the military aspects until the final offensive. The source: T. Hammes, Jane's Defence Weekly, 5/2005 (nas).

The article deals with the teaching of management at the University of Defence. Its authors are long-standing university teachers, possessing also experiences from command and staff appointments. In recent years, the emphasis in military schools has shifted more to subjects indirectly related to civilian courses of study, e.g. the theory of management. At the Defence University Brno it covers a wide range of other subjects: economy, informatics, operational investigation, etc.; other subjects are in fact only "supporting": applied mathematics, sociology, psychology, humane resource control and law. Military management, theory of military operations, staff service, and that belong to the group of applied fundamentals. At present, "military management" at the Defence University has only a limited scope of teaching units. It is read both at bachelor and master levels of studies, inevitably many themes are duplicated. So, among others, the authors recommend to shift the core of military management teaching to higher levels of studies, at master levels.

This new generation war could be characterized by an emphasis on nonstate actors, by political and psychological forms of attacks that directly influence opponents. Other characteristics are as follows: extensive refugee flows, violence, transnational criminal aspects. Several factors will impact the nature, frequency and character of "small wars" in the 21st century. Failed/failing states, urbanization, diffusion of actors, communications technology, technological diffusion, religion, and ultra-terrorism. Clausewitz's fundamental appreciation for the primacy of political objectives as the guiding object in war remains relevant to "small wars" as does to interstate conflicts. The problem for today's strategist or policy maker is determining exactly what has changed, how the various means of stratecraft need to be adapted to the specific contingency at hand (according to The Journal of Strategic Studies, 6/2005).

Since the 90's of the last century we have witnessed the discussions over extended concept of security, under which no national state is the only privileged security subject. The classical military concept is extended both "above", towards international, global and regional problems covering economy, social, environmental or humane issues and "down", in the direction of local communities, NGOs, private subjects and even individual citizens. Even though several important constitutional laws reflecting EU criteria were adopted, we still miss constituting and complete overall concept Czech security system. Of course, we have a document "Optimalization of Security System of the Czech Republic", but it is not the genuine concept, but a mere summary of practical measures dealing with temporary problems, namely after the Floods 2002. The author dares the public to open debate about priorities and goals of security politics of our country, in order to lay down, under general consensus, realistic security system, able to face the whole range of security threats and risks, explicitly in the broad international frame of NATO and EU.

The article presents the results of pedagogical experiment in shooting from smallarms at training on shooting trainers, as indispensable instruments for the preparation of military professionals in indoor and outdoor shooting. Computer-generated simulators enable to experience the practice of shooting both for beginners training, as well as for marksmen, and sharpshooters. The trainers we we've developed in our army are as follows: shooting trainer EVJ-91 (optical, infrared), EVJ-94 (advanced, computer aided), EVJ-94/M (five targets), UNIST-94 (screen 2x3 m, VCR, UNIST-97/L
(laser emitter, live shooting), optical shooting range OS-1, OS-3 (small arms practice, up to 50 m, computer-aided,
laser emitter), optical target range TOS-1 (combat fire arms practice, computer-aided evaluation), optical range POS-1 (target devices are replaced by a film screen, VCR), Minitos Duo (tested), combat video-system Dicrosec PSC (interactive), or SOT-1 (rotary targets). Even though those trainers save time and money, we must still bear in mind that live shooting can't be replaced by any trainer.

Building up a picture of adversaries in complicated operations other than war (OOTW) requires fresh thinking on the collection and analysis of intelligence material, writes Dr Dave Sloggett in Jane's Defence Weekly No 48/2005. Operations undertaken in present-day theatres include the need to arrest war criminals, defeat insurgency operations and disrupt the activities from those engaged in criminal activities that do not respect national boundaries (trafficking, drugs smuggling and the proliferation of weapons of mass effect). OOTW pose problems for the development of what is now referred to as effects-based operations, where the use of kinetic devices to destroy a target is one way to achieve an outcome. One important element of a solution is to build common definitions of terms that enable a discipline to be brought to the underlying freedom of authors compiling contact reports. Projects such as Dabinett, a multifaceted system of systems programme, can link together information contained in existing systems. Commanders able to exploit this capability, against the complex background in which OOTW are conducted, will truly take superior decisions.

Those three E are much in use both in official documents and mass media. Dozens of defence officials use them every day, but actual outputs present that they do not know the key essence of 3E, or they are not aware of how to put them into practice. This article would like to help them to make understand the practical application of basic principles of 3E in practise. The reason of this gap, according to the author, lies in insufficient ties between theoretical and executive spheres of defence sector.

Answering the commander's intelligence and decision needs is an uneasy task for any person responsible for intelligence. PIR information help the commander to keep knowledge on relevant environment during peacekeeping, stability and supporting operations, which are different from PIR in offensive and defensive operations. In combat operations, PIR focuses on enemy's military capability and intentions. Intelligence collection in stability and support operations may adjust to the people and their cultures, politics, religions, economics and related factors. The commander must have information telling on current enemy's threats, fighters, as well as on information ranging from standard of living of local population, supplies of electric power, to building a municipal school. Shortly, to have information behind the traditional scope of PIR. But the current Czech regulation MO/VZS 2003 does not explain similar situations, the only examples we can find are those in US Army Field Manual 3-07 Stability Operations and Support Operations.

This article examines depth in the nonlinear battlefield and how planners might develop operational effects to defeat insurgencies. The former field manual stated that depth was the extension of operations in time, space and resources. This is a decidedly linear construction of the battlefield based on industrialized warfare between conventional enemies. The Global War on Terrorism operating environment is both nonlinear and non-contiguous. The enemy has no national borders or traditional infrastructure. If we understand cognitive depth, we can develop ways to paralyze the insurgent system or produce operational shock. Colonel John A. Warden III, an architect of the Persian Gulf War air campaign, introduced Five Rings Model as a methodology for successfully attacking and paralyzing a conventional enemy system in depth. An adaptation of this model depicts tangible targets that together constitute depth in the insurgent battle space. Source: Is There a Deep Fight in a Counterinsurgency by Lee K. Grubbs and Michael J. Forsyth, Military Review, July-August 2005.

This article is a sequel to the previous disputes over financial management within the Czech Armed Forces. The origins of the first polemic article lay in gaining facts for research work, arranged by the Faculty of Economics and Management, Defence University, "Allocation and Management of Defence Sources of the CR and the Formation of Economic Thinking in the ACR". The system of planning, programming and budgeting (PPBS) was introduced into Czech forces several years ago, but the it did not worked in a way it was supposed. There were many deficiencies the PPB system suffered from. Unfortunately, the author lacks sufficient data to evaluate properly the performance of this system. He has to combine diverse data sources, booklets, statistics, data releases, to make accurate picture of a day-to-day financial military administration. In his opinion, the system is not transparent enough. He appeals for clear figures, released e.g. on army interned pages, to avert accusation of wasting public sources ...168

One of key attributes of the military professional is fitness. This article would like to open a discussion over women' physical potential. Are physical qualities of man and women equal? Is it possible to set those norms in military rules and tables? What about the risks factors for training-related injuries among men and women in combat training? Can we compare muscular strength of man and women? Does women's strength/power affect the occupational performance? The Committee on Women in NATO Forces (CWINF) asks to create the equal conditions for occupational performance both for men and women. The same was introduced by the Order of the Czech Minister of Defence No 29/2002, MoD Bulletin; similar annotations can be found also in US Army Field Manual 21-18. For us, it is necessary to specify unbiased profiles, entrance tests for woman soldiers, taking into account physical capacities but disregarding gender.

It is extraordinary important decisionmaking, because of fered products determine the successfulness of arranged contracts. For evaluating suppliers we use the so-called scoring model, in which we specify evaluating criteria and assign the weights. To prevent challenging accepted resolution, our decision ought to be supported by the analysis of the third party. This method is called S.P.A. - Supplier Potential Analysis.

The essay summarizes several articles published in Vojenské rozhledy dealing with mass media and its activities during armed conflicts or peace-support operations. In fact, more attention to war information is paid by civilian press or books. The author, PhDr. Antonín Rašek (-ar-) cites e.g. English sociologist D. Hallin The 'The Uncensored War', D. Kellner The Persian Gulf TV War, and some books or reportages by Czech journalists and authors, K. Hvižďala, P. Procházková, V. Bělohradský, T. Halík, etc. The Vietnam War was the first televised war and it was largely uncensored. People saw the true horror of war on their television screens night after night, and that caused them to turn against the war. The media seems to be influencing the direction of government policy; the American military always claimed the media caused the war to be lost. But today, namely during the wars in Iraq, the media are blamed to be too subordinated to official policy, they present "a war of choice as a war of necessity". "Abedded" journalists and stringers sell war stories and information, their primary purpose is to make money. An example of the strict control of war information is Chechnya, closed for independent journalists and the only information available is released through official information's agencies, both Russian and opposing Chechen forces.