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Asymmetric operations lack some linear qualifications at operational levels and split themselves into dozens of tactical warfares. This type of warfare demands quick analytical thinking tied with intelligence preparation of the battlefield, formulating specific information requirement to fill in the missing elements in information requests. As to technological potential, military intelligence is developing very fast. So, the intelligence analysts transfer the main information burden on various information systems, e.g. JSTARS (Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System), AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System), ASAS (All Source Analysis System), or JDISS (Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System). But large capacities of those systems gave rise to another logical judgement that leads to different interpretation of intelligence data, i.e. the judgements corresponding to higher levels (operational and above) of analytical thinking. Nevertheless, tactical warfare represents operations of small tactical units and this fact puts the main burden on an intelligence analyst who must very quickly cover the gaps in intelligence reports and adopt appropriate decisions.

There is a substantional difference between reformation and transformation. The latter represents a qualitative change or the re-creation; while the former is only a change, redressing, correction of errors or faults. In Czech military press, the basic principles of NATO transformation were described several times. Since 2004, when the document "Strategic Vision: The Military Vision" was published, many other documents have been released: Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG), Guidance for Military Implementation of CPG, Concept for Alliance Future Joint Operations, NATO Task List. Every operational concept has to evaluate all factors from various fields. The method is expressed by the short DOTMLPF, which stands for Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel and Facilities. The Concept Development and Experimentation is of multinational character and is the most successful transformation tool within NATO countries, namely in the U.S., Canada, Great Britain, Norway, etc. Lessons Learned system supplies feedback between national forces experiences and concepts, via DOTMLPF. The key role is played by the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre in Lisbon, Portugal.

Conventional military strategists did not hold counterinsurgency (COIN) and irregular warfare with high esteem. In fact, strategists often marginalized COIN and irregular warfare, never regarding irregular warfare as worthy of strategic-level discussions. But true strategic thinking on the subject of COIN and irregular warfare consider time and space and long strategic view. Now we must consider critical areas for the global war on terrorism (GWOT), including changing nature of the threat environment. Sources: Principles, Imperatives and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency, by E. Cohen, Lt.Col. C. Crane, Lt.Col. J. Horvath, Lt.Col. J. Nagl; Strategic Aspects of Counterinsurgency by Col. J. B. Celeski in Military Review March-April 2006.

As the world grows ever more urbanized, the Air Force prepares airmen to fight in cities. They are complex domains where military operations are congested by terrain and by the danger of collateral damage and the risk to non-combatants. The Air Force supports the joint force by providing valuable airspace control, command and control, communications and psychological operations support, close-air support, terminal attack control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and combat search and rescue. But Air Force capabilities in the urban are not just the supporting force for urban operations, it has ability to provide strategic attack against critical urban area. Based upon an article by Lt.Col. Brian M. Newberry in Armed Forces Journal, September 2006.

The article deals with the question of unmanned aircraft generally, it doesn't discuss their individual types. Unmanned aircraft (UAVs) are designed to fly without a pilot (that is by remote control), their combat engagements are less risky and potentially less costly. Army officials say that UAVs will serve better, as they will carry more weapons and sturdier avionics, use the same fuel as other service aircraft, and could be operated by soldiers in theatre. Avionics and weapons might be controlled even by a conventional link with ground control stations. One "land pilot" can control several UAVs simultaneously. The running programmes will produce mature technologies and stable designs, making use of critical technologies, control abilities. The other critical technologies are: an engine that uses heavy fuel and an automatic take-off and landing system. As a part of coalition forces, the UAVs had proved their usefulness and serviceability in the Middle East.

New technologies influence not only social advance, but also the development of armed forces. Present-time warfare is resolute, dynamic. In the 21st century, both low and high intensity conflicts, counterterrorist or stabilization operations might take place in urbanized areas, where casualties and material damages are high. New weaponry and technology make demands on military and professional training, self-control, psychic preparedness. In advance we must set rules governing the firing of weapons and use of force namely by soldiers involved in peacekeeping and counter-insurgency situations. Mental stress, emotional, or physical strain or tension of soldiers are manifested by fanaticism, looting, killing non-combatants, desertions or going away from military units without permission (AWOLs), depressed soldiers inflict wound on themselves, they misuse drugs or alcohol. The author cites factors increasing soldiers' resistance: high cohesion of units, tough training, relaxation, courageousness, high awareness of objectives of operations and war aims.

This thoroughly elaborated paper deals with the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF). Similar missions represent NATO's global interests in problems of word's security. Afghanistan is the very place where new warfare methods are tested, new ways of combat come into existence. After September 11, 2001, American administration declared the war to global terrorism - GWOT (Global War on Terror), the first theatre of GWOT became Afghanistan. From military point of view, it was unambiguous success, to a large degree, it succeeded even politically. But Afghanistan was negatively affected by the situation in Iraq. Afghanistan is far off being stabilized. Local warlords, tribal chiefs, called anti-coalition militants (ACMs), avoid regular warfare, they use raids, sabotages, acts of terror, provocations. Coalition units use e.g. PSYOP operations, as a way how to implement norms based deterrence.

This article presents the findings of the survey being done during the evaluation and assessment of EU Battle Groups, their missions, roles, tasks, stemming from the requirements set by the EU Crisis Management Concept. The paper does not discuss in detail variants EU Battle Groups, but concentrates on their historical background, basic characteristics, structure, EU political-military ambitions, scenarios, reaction time, tasks, standards, training and certification, Battle Groups commitments, concept and implementation, achievements. The article also includes recommendations for the Czech Armed Forces that are currently involved in the formation of the EU Battle Group CZE/SVK. This article aims to record progress to date and to indicate challenges ahead. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.