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Conventional military strategists did not hold counterinsurgency (COIN) and irregular warfare with high esteem. In fact, strategists often marginalized COIN and irregular warfare, never regarding irregular warfare as worthy of strategic-level discussions. But true strategic thinking on the subject of COIN and irregular warfare consider time and space and long strategic view. Now we must consider critical areas for the global war on terrorism (GWOT), including changing nature of the threat environment. Sources: Principles, Imperatives and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency, by E. Cohen, Lt.Col. C. Crane, Lt.Col. J. Horvath, Lt.Col. J. Nagl; Strategic Aspects of Counterinsurgency by Col. J. B. Celeski in Military Review March-April 2006.

This thoroughly elaborated paper deals with the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF). Similar missions represent NATO's global interests in problems of word's security. Afghanistan is the very place where new warfare methods are tested, new ways of combat come into existence. After September 11, 2001, American administration declared the war to global terrorism - GWOT (Global War on Terror), the first theatre of GWOT became Afghanistan. From military point of view, it was unambiguous success, to a large degree, it succeeded even politically. But Afghanistan was negatively affected by the situation in Iraq. Afghanistan is far off being stabilized. Local warlords, tribal chiefs, called anti-coalition militants (ACMs), avoid regular warfare, they use raids, sabotages, acts of terror, provocations. Coalition units use e.g. PSYOP operations, as a way how to implement norms based deterrence.

There is a substantional difference between reformation and transformation. The latter represents a qualitative change or the re-creation; while the former is only a change, redressing, correction of errors or faults. In Czech military press, the basic principles of NATO transformation were described several times. Since 2004, when the document "Strategic Vision: The Military Vision" was published, many other documents have been released: Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG), Guidance for Military Implementation of CPG, Concept for Alliance Future Joint Operations, NATO Task List. Every operational concept has to evaluate all factors from various fields. The method is expressed by the short DOTMLPF, which stands for Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel and Facilities. The Concept Development and Experimentation is of multinational character and is the most successful transformation tool within NATO countries, namely in the U.S., Canada, Great Britain, Norway, etc. Lessons Learned system supplies feedback between national forces experiences and concepts, via DOTMLPF. The key role is played by the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre in Lisbon, Portugal.

The term "security", originally used for the defence of state/national territory, was surpassed by "global security", ranging from world's security situation to monitoring foreign conflicts with the deployment of pre-emptive actions in places with tides of violence, instability. This article describes mentioned complexity of current and future military operational environment dilemma: generally, armed forces are affected by multifaceted circumstances that have to be taken into account and mustn't be ignored or neglected during the preparation and performance of their mission. At present, threat spectrum is characterized by three key characteristics: dynamics, complexity, and lower importance of geographical area. The socalled Long Term Vision EU describes the future military environment which is divided into three components: humane (social), cybernetic (informational, computer, communication), physical (natural, geographic) and is bridging the gap between strategy and capabilities of forces.

Asymmetric operations lack some linear qualifications at operational levels and split themselves into dozens of tactical warfares. This type of warfare demands quick analytical thinking tied with intelligence preparation of the battlefield, formulating specific information requirement to fill in the missing elements in information requests. As to technological potential, military intelligence is developing very fast. So, the intelligence analysts transfer the main information burden on various information systems, e.g. JSTARS (Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System), AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System), ASAS (All Source Analysis System), or JDISS (Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System). But large capacities of those systems gave rise to another logical judgement that leads to different interpretation of intelligence data, i.e. the judgements corresponding to higher levels (operational and above) of analytical thinking. Nevertheless, tactical warfare represents operations of small tactical units and this fact puts the main burden on an intelligence analyst who must very quickly cover the gaps in intelligence reports and adopt appropriate decisions.

New technologies influence not only social advance, but also the development of armed forces. Present-time warfare is resolute, dynamic. In the 21st century, both low and high intensity conflicts, counterterrorist or stabilization operations might take place in urbanized areas, where casualties and material damages are high. New weaponry and technology make demands on military and professional training, self-control, psychic preparedness. In advance we must set rules governing the firing of weapons and use of force namely by soldiers involved in peacekeeping and counter-insurgency situations. Mental stress, emotional, or physical strain or tension of soldiers are manifested by fanaticism, looting, killing non-combatants, desertions or going away from military units without permission (AWOLs), depressed soldiers inflict wound on themselves, they misuse drugs or alcohol. The author cites factors increasing soldiers' resistance: high cohesion of units, tough training, relaxation, courageousness, high awareness of objectives of operations and war aims.

This article contains main ideas from the essay by James J. Wirtz published in anthology Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence, Frank Cass 2003. This theory is a unifying explanation of why states, for example, attempt to surprise their opponents with diplomatic or military initiatives. Surprise often is described as a force multiplier; something that increases the effectiveness of one's forces in combat. The prospect of surprise can prompt political leaders of the weaker side to believe that they can nullify that disparity and achieve their objectives. In other words, if strong parties began to view conflict from the weaker party's perspective, while weak actors kept war's dialectic in mind, then surprise would become less likely. The theory of surprise can identify when it is likely to occur, who is likely to find the element of surprise attractive as a basis of policy or strategy, and who is likely to be its victim. The trick now lies in making operational use of the theory of surprise.

The article deals with the question of unmanned aircraft generally, it doesn't discuss their individual types. Unmanned aircraft (UAVs) are designed to fly without a pilot (that is by remote control), their combat engagements are less risky and potentially less costly. Army officials say that UAVs will serve better, as they will carry more weapons and sturdier avionics, use the same fuel as other service aircraft, and could be operated by soldiers in theatre. Avionics and weapons might be controlled even by a conventional link with ground control stations. One "land pilot" can control several UAVs simultaneously. The running programmes will produce mature technologies and stable designs, making use of critical technologies, control abilities. The other critical technologies are: an engine that uses heavy fuel and an automatic take-off and landing system. As a part of coalition forces, the UAVs had proved their usefulness and serviceability in the Middle East.