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The article is focused on issue of hybridisation of Al Qai'da in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), in North Africa, and its implications for European countries. The process of hybridisation is being conceived as growing nexus and convergence between violent non-state actors, while these processes could be in this case identified mainly in issues of use of kidnappings and secondary also reported involvement of AQIM in regional smuggling, mainly drugs, activities through Sahel and Saharan region to Europe. Regarding GSPC background, AQIM could be in long term theoretically able to re-establish its financial and supporting networks in Europe via cooperation with organized crime, which were largely disrupted after major crackdowns by security forces between 2004-2007. Event though a direct Al Qai'da attack in Europe is-according to the author-excluded, the purpose of this article to draw our attention to an eventuality of rebirth of European operation network of AQIM operational predecessor, i.e. GSPC.

The Command and Control process may be defined as an ability to determine what to do and implement effective actions. With the use of the Standard Operating Procedures, the commander must be able to realize set tasks in defined time. The C2 system must be able to monitor and collect data on the situation, to develop an understanding of the situation, to develop a course(s) of action and select one, to develop a plan to execute the selected course of action, to execute the plan, to include providing direction and leadership to subordinates, to monitor execution of the plan and adapt as necessary. The commander draws the picture of situation on the base of surveillance and data collection from various sources, classified and unclassified. The context of information is formed by means of paradigm of personal experiences of commander and his intuition.

The article is a polemical expression of authors' opinion over this problem. It is related to the orientation of society, political coalitions, and single states towards higher goals. If we admit that the sustainable development of society is the base for securing a peace and stability, then we can state that the question of security or consecutively country defence cover problems of the whole social system, subsystems and system elements. Strategical decision-making ought to be the highest priority in our society. It is indisputable that such decisionmaking deserves scientifi c support. At the end of this article the authors propose a short algorithmic program for Czech military strategy that is planned for the year 2014 and the concept of Czech army development planned for 2015.

The author summarises most common and repeated mistakes of graduated officers after leaving military schools. Junior officers are practically in the same position as young manager in civil life, so we can find some analogies in civil managerial leadership. Civil manager face practically the same problems and situations. There are various mistakes that junior officers ought to be warned. Such educational instructions and leadership should be implemented into military schools' curricula. Backed by a vast amount of studied literature, the author offers his own solution. He makes use of five myths by Linda Hill, professor at Harvard Business School. The problem is to avoid extreme leadership styles: dictatorlike and benevolent ones.

The shift from vocational military service to all-volunteer force (AVF) could be regarded and treated as any other scholarly assignment of project management, so we can get a better look at its bugs and risks. The author applied the Valentas classification of innovation upon this AVF project in the Czech Republic and demonstrates what are main risks for its sustainability. He sees the first cause and effect in the reality that this shift lacks sufficient support by social sciences and humanities. Since 2003, only six per cent of scientists/scholars employed by the Czech Ministry of Defence have been supporting this great change. It is not enough and it makes certain incompetence within defence ministry to reach the factual aim of this move and AVF produces more and more difficulties. According to the author, the professionalization of forces in our country has not meet its main purpose--to raise professional qualities of military personnel, in spite of the fact it originally used to be the prime objective of this process.

The author summarizes in several items the history of service PT both before 1990, in the 90s, and finally at the beginning of this century. What tasks are in front of us? First we must create legal basis for a new conceptual frame of service PT; secondly we must form new methods of drills and training for servicemen in special PT skills, with risk exercises, corresponding to warfare and combat situations, backed by respective legislation. The author hopes that our own practice and experiences from abroad of MoD officials will certainly help to create new alternative concepts together with indispensable recreational PT for soldiers, including appropriate forms of physical training for women in uniform.

The outcomes of battles and fighting are significantly influenced by weather conditions. Together with other important circumstances they decide a chosen combat strategy, operational art, warfare tactics, and ways of personnel and vehicles deployment; consequently the volume of losses or casualties. The authors recount the establishing of weather service within individual arms, creating fi rst weather charts, they give details on situation in pre-war republic, during WWII, in the 50s, even after the Velvet Revolution in 1989. They mention the names of eminent personalities of Czech Hydrometeorological Service to be honoured and remembered. We must also remind that our Hydrometeorological Service works not only in favour of the ACR, but also for other NATO countries.

The problem of forming military decisions lies in the very core of this article. Among others, there are a lot of highly unpredictable impact factors; there are many assessment criteria for individual variants of solving problems. Criteria of qualitative characters, and various interpretations of data information demand quality decisions; they are sometimes difficult to understand and even contradictory. The commanders and their staffs must be well educated, trained and experienced. To meet this precondition we must ensure quality of career training, supported by practical experiences. The staff work must be practiced regularly, with the use of various scenarios, supplemented by historical studies of past or recent fi ghts and battles.

The article presents six more or less structured analytical methods that are or could be employed in intelligence analysis. This type of analysis, one part of the intelligence cycle, is understood as "the process of evaluating data for reliability, validity, and relevance; integrating and analysing it; converting the product of this effort into a meaningful whole, which includes assessment of events and implications of the information collected". The set of presented methods includes: link analysis, opportunity analysis, analogy, linchpin analysis, analysis of competing hypothesis and alternative scenarios. The study doesn't stop with presenting those methods; it also explains which type of reasoning (inductive, deductive or abductive) is used when working with each particular method. In broad terms, the article tries to shed light on intelligence analysis and its specifics. The reader should obtain better understanding their usefulness in the daily work of intelligence analyst.

The proponents of Revolution in Military Affairs claim that modern military technology will lift a "fog of war". In this article the term "fog of war" is described and illustrated in a work of Carl von Clausewitz who is supposed to introduce this term, used also in the famous novel War and Peace by Leo Tolstoy. These classics show us that uncertainty and chance, in other words fogs of war, are essential to human mentality. They will be present as long as war remains within a scope human endeavour. Emphasizing that military technology is equal to lifting the "fog of war" can lead to situation in which only trained commanders are supposed be able perfectly address problems in "chessboard" of war or computer simulators, but they will unable to manage a real world full of chaos, as they not used to count with uncertainties.

The article familiarizes readers with theoretical assumptions of planning and strategical decisionmaking in Defence Department and Czech armed forces. The author finds connections and similarities among others with public sector and civilian structures tied with budget spending. The strategical level of planning is a highly complicated and expert procedure. At present, planning process in defence department, within MoD sector, is specifi ed by the Order of Defence Minister No. 33, 2004. In this document, there are highly elaborated principles and rules of planning of activities and development implemented in defence sector. The article is based upon papers and reports presented at the Defence Sources Course, MIDMC 2001-06, Resources Management Institute, USA, held at the Military Academy Brno in 2001, and documents dealing with managerial problems.

The term "hybrid war" is frequently used today within the military community, but the term does not bring something new in the view of the terminology of the stability operations, comprehensive approach or compound wars. This concept is based on the destructive threats to the military components of international community. It does not help in delimiting reasons of violent confl ict and from that point it is harmful, as it does not explain soldiers why they are fi ghting the "just war", why they should sacrifi ce their lives in confl icts far away from their homeland. We should not use terms of hybrid wars, hybrid confl icts, hybrid enemies or forces. Only "hybrid warfare" could find some legitimacy, but only when used with the correct definition of the conflict typology, backed by the political objectives of the war. Confl icts typology, as used, forms the framework for the mission analysis orientation at all command & control levels and it guides the informational support to the military decision making processes.

The new American doctrinal document called National Security Strategy (NSS 2010) was released in May 2010. Generally, NSS documents outline major national security concerns and plans. The NSS 2010 lays out a strategic approach for advancing American interests, including the security of the American people, growing U.S. economy, and international order that can address 21st century challenges. President Obama is stressing global leadership, dependent on strong and responsible American leadership directing it to ensure other nations follow. He urged Americans to revitalize their own economic, moral and innovative strength to continue to lead the world. The essay by Mr. Eichler is divided into two parts: first one deals with Bush's security policy, and second one deals with documents issued during Obama's presidency. There is a departure from Bush's security strategy that had led to two asymmetric wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. There are interesting nuances. The NSS 2010 for example declares the intention to build deeper and more effective partnerships with key centres of influence-including China, India, which represents among others Obama's retreat from policy of unilateralism.

This article illustrates the troubles encountered with development of the NRF. The NATO Response Force is a highly ready and technologically advanced force made up of land, air, sea and special operations forces components that the Alliance can deploy quickly wherever needed. The NRF is intended to be a transformational force that will not only be able to meet the security needs of NATO in 21st century but also serve as an agent of change whereby all the member nations of NATO will be able to bring capabilities, and concepts of operations into their national forces. Undoubtedly, the NRF will not provide a basis for solving all of complex challenges. But it does offer an opportunity for experimentation and testing-the essence of military transformation-and the forging of creative solutions. The views expressed in this assessment are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of NATO or EU.

After a short review of defence R&D history, the author concludes that our country used to reach world's level in some fields: passive warning systems, NBC protection, military surgery, explosives. After the change of political system in 1989 we began to dispose Czech military industries. The only scientific place to left is Defence University Brno, but it is an institution more or less concentrated on education. It is almost impossible to maintain pace with foreign defence industry. In the article there is an exhaustive list of military plants, institutions after 1989, together with the date of their closing down. It is followed by research orientation of defence industry, set according to time periods. The special chapter concentrates on financing defence research, the closing part deals with the period of our membership in NATO. Although there are same positive aspects, such as international cooperation, exploiting sources from abroad, strategical control declined. We see unwise reductions in personnel, abolishing accredited institutions, etc.

This leading article deals with the sphere of strategy and defence policy. The essay is an output of scholarly work and therefore it is summarizing and evaluating problems in question with professional recommendations. First, the author draws our attention to various concepts of security and underlines national differences backed by national histories. Security concepts have their sources in deep analyses of potential threats and corresponding scenarios, with specific bias to Czech environment. He openly expresses his critical opinions on contemporary security documents, for lack of political security directions, as politicians in general have little knowledge of security and defence problems. In his opinion, the possible outcome lies in a partnership and cooperation with academics outside military and government structures, experts and members of security community, whose expert opinions could help namely to form long-term security concepts.

The article elaborates local conditions that lead to the fundamental changes in recruitment and preparation system of new army officers. Traditionally, new career officers used to be graduates from military colleges (since 2004 University of Defence). Due to the changes aroused by the transition from conscription to all volunteer forces, Czech military is experiencing increased internal and external pressures on this traditional models of recruitment and preparation. At present, the most visible outcome of this development is severe shortage of junior officers. The combination of internal and external factors (competitive civilian job market) brings the need for expansion of the traditional recruitment models. One of the most promising ways of manning appears to be recruitment of graduates from civilian universities and their subsequent military training at Military Academy in Vyškov.

In spite of the fact that it is a new concept, it presents one of key methods of international engagement in crisis areas the EU prefers. Its main components are crises prevention and securing stabilization. Security tasks are composite problems solving one of main state functions: to guard external and internal security together with principles of civil control. This essay among others aims to explain practicability of the EU's concept of preventive engagement as a tool of implementation of the European Security Strategy, further it describes European concept for crisis management missions in the field of civilian administration supporting security and justice. At the end there are some recommendations for the Czech Republic how to form capacities for EU missions and for the transformation of Czech security sectors.

Factors such as distance, destination, deployment demands, duration, represent key elements to determine logistics requirements. The EU BG concept necessitates considerable strategic air/sea lift and combat support capabilities, since EU battle groups are to be able to be deployed almost anywhere in the world, primarily in Africa. They have to deploy both troops and materiel simultaneously to its mission areas. Strategic airlift is the fastest way of deploying troops over long distance. The main challenge for the EU is therefore availability giant airplanes. A lack of suitable European transport crafts in EBalabáuropean airlift fleet is the Achilles heel to the EU BG Concept. The problem is that all aircraft available have only limited payload capacities and flying range. Although deploying by sea is more time consuming than deploying by air, EU member states have more ships available for strategic sea transport. The strict deployment deadline set down in the EU BG Concept means that ships and crews will have to be held at very high readiness.

To fulfil Czech obligation as an EU Battle Group Framework Nation according to the regulating document EU BG Training and Certification, the Czech Army is to certify that the CZE/SVK Battle Group EU meet the standards and criteria stated in Standards and Criteria for EU BG. It is recommended that the CZE/SVK Battle Group EU certification process should be analogous with NATO Response Force (NRF) certification procedure and practical methods. Further it is suggested that the CZE/SVK Battle Group EU certification procedure is divided into several evaluation procedures: preparation planning evaluation, war-fighting evaluation, and technical evaluation. Each procedure will be developed by specialized teams with representatives in the sub-working group to ensure that the different procedures harmonize. The views expressed in this assessment are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of EU Military Structure or the Czech Ministry of Defence. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources. The written sources are listed in the matrix above.

The Czech Republic became involved in ISAF in 2002, among others we sent there both field hospital and field surgical team; later meteorological group, traffic control group with EOD team began to serve at the Kabul International Airport. In 2004, the 601st Special Force Group was engaged in Enduring Freedom operation, Czech soldiers served in German Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), positive role was played by Czech Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team. Another successful mission was establishing PRT Logar, supporting social, economical development in this province. New common features of PRT, helicopter OMLT, EUPOL mission, partly SOG is the concentration on building Afghan capacities, namely ANSF (Afghan National Security Force) and public administration. Together with their deliberate support, it has multiplying effect, as assistance and training bring more effects than mere fulfilling standard military tasks, guarding e.g. Dutch base.

The change of security situation in the world, international ties and last but not least changes in operational environment, exploitation of new technologies are reflected by changes in defence planning, military organization, forces engagement and operational assessment. Time, flexibility, cooperation in coalition operations, interoperability in technology spheres play incommutable roles together with trained personnel. Command and control (C2) is self-contained system depending on many factors provided by the so-called System of Communication and Information. At present it is the very base for information collection, decision-making process, preparing variants of operation for both commander and his staff. Among others the author writes about Network Enabled Capability system introduced into Czech armed forces. C2 programme is also a part of educational curriculum at Defence University Brno.

This study is based on a paper presented at the conference with the same heading taking place on January 8, 2009. First, the authors enumerate starting points of Czech defence and security polity together with key factors influencing their developments. The whole scale of new threats-from WMD and ballistic proliferation to cyber attack and even non intentional threats like climate change and pandemia-are to be addressed not only in NATO but also in the EU. Existing states of affairs are gradually reflected by Czech security and defence documents: Security Strategy 1999, 2001, 2003; Military Strategy 1999, 2002, 2004, 2008. In this historical context we joined NATO defence alliance and took part in peacekeeping missions abroad. Previous twenty years when we lived in peace could be regarded as a challenge to build Czech statehood. There is no time like a present. Only the future will show us whether we mastered it as much as we could.

This article is discussing the role of the Internet in the Islamic terrorist movement. It describes how the nature of the Internet provides the perfect medium for terrorism. Major terrorist organizations now have their own production capability, ranging from video capture, to video editing, to distribution, but, these organizations also have an advanced understanding of the concepts of influence, information warfare, and the power of targeted messages. This is further highlighted by the fact that among al Qaeda's original organizational structure was a committee dedicated to publicity and the media. The internet plays the role as a means of propaganda for recruitment and fund-raising, shaping public opinion in the Muslim world, terrorist training and instruction, operational planning for attacks, communication and open source information.

Like hundreds of millions of other people, Islamic terrorists and their supporters use the Internet. In many ways, the Internet is a tool tailor-made for these Islamic extremists, who use it covertly and overtly to plan attacks, raise money, and spread anti-Semitic and anti-American propaganda written in English, Arabic, and other languages. There is sufficient information to believe that in the future, terrorists may even turn the Internet itself into a weapon, using it to wreak havoc on America's critical infrastructure. Because these militants are global, rather than being located in a single geographical area (Pakistan, Indonesia, Somalia, Iraq), the Internet provides them with a new and effective way to attain their goals. It may be difficult to catch extremists planning or coordinating an attack if they are using encryption, steganography, or some other method of hiding their online activities.

The paper deals with the assessment of extremism in connection with the Czech Armed Forces. It analyses attitudes of various forms of Czech domestic extremist movements to the military sphere and possible impacts of the infiltration of extremists into the army, namely in time of danger (training militant activities, including paramilitarism, subversion, espionage, etc). The most important problem of the contemporary Czech counter-extremist policy in this area is the rise of neo-Nazi activities in the armed forces and the establishing of extreme right paramilitary units which take interest in the engagement of soldiers. Even though these activities are limited in our country, the author offers overall survey various obscure organizations, having connections to foreign groups sponsoring their Czech counterparts.

The article points out the altered role of intelligence and counterintelligence under the conditions of new security threats and relevant problems of intelligence analysis. Authors compare the theories of the orthodox and revisionist intelligence schools dealing with the detection of surprise attacks and finally outlines solutions related to the training of intelligence analytics. Orthodox views are as follows: surprising attacks are inevitable, such attacks will succeed as they are unpredictable, complex and sophisticated; reformists say that too much attention is paid to various failures, there are many cases in which intelligence prevention was successful. Threat analyses are very complicated; hints are not clear, ambiguous. New threats must be examined and eliminated with cooperation with other force branches, police, integrated rescue system, and others. Last but not least, there is indispensable role of preparation and schooling of intelligence officers.

Management by objectives (MBO), first outlined by Peter Drucker in the 1950s, is a systematic and organized approach that allows management to focus on achievable goals and to attain the best possible results from available resources. The tasks are delegated to subordinates without dictating a detailed roadmap for implementation. Everybody within the organization has a clear understanding of the aims, or objectives, as well as awareness of their own roles and responsibilities in achieving those aims. In the U. S. Army, MBO was implemented into The Army Plan FY 2000-2015, with 789 operational capabilities, divided into 1,248 operational standards, but without demonstrable success, as the system worked rather formally; it was too complicated. The same was true in the Czech Army, where e.g. The Set of Objectives till 2005 came into existence in 1991. The author tries to explain why. He concludes that MBO can be a useful management tool in the army environment, but it should not be realized without proper understanding this process.

This article deals with the present state of command and control dilemma in brigade battle groups. It outlines the resources of the rationalization of organizational structures at HQs and it shows their impact on modular design of the command posts. The gradual introduction of NATO Network Enabled Capability (NEC) into Czech armed forces (Bde TF-Brigade Task Force), requires first, changes in the structure of individual components of command and control system; secondly, initiating basic changes oriented towards optimalization command and control structures; third, the preparation of commanders and staffs in the field of information technology, so that they could achieve knowledge and control dominance. At the same time organizational changes raise modification within command chains of separate groups.

This article deals with the EU command and control functions and provides basic information on the structure and capabilities of the EU CCS in Battle Group EU operations. The author describes political and strategical levels CCS (COREPER, GAERC, COPS, CivCom, EUMC, EUMS, BDE HQ, prospective EU FHQ). Only US, EU and E3 (Britain, France, Germany) are capable to realize integrated expeditional operations. The ACR can work only with cooperation with them. The Czech Republic as a small EU member state is actively engaged in the building of the Battle Group EU. The Czech Army is going to increase its expeditionary capabilities as demanded and be prepared for a broader range of conflicts and crises in the vital area of the EU concerns. At present, the ACR is able to carry out a self-supported, integrated expedition operation only on the edge of all its strength. The political leaders must bear this fact in mind, as the army mustn't be overburdened, otherwise it might lose its credibility. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.