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One of key attributes of the military professional is fitness. This article would like to open a discussion over women' physical potential. Are physical qualities of man and women equal? Is it possible to set those norms in military rules and tables? What about the risks factors for training-related injuries among men and women in combat training? Can we compare muscular strength of man and women? Does women's strength/power affect the occupational performance? The Committee on Women in NATO Forces (CWINF) asks to create the equal conditions for occupational performance both for men and women. The same was introduced by the Order of the Czech Minister of Defence No 29/2002, MoD Bulletin; similar annotations can be found also in US Army Field Manual 21-18. For us, it is necessary to specify unbiased profiles, entrance tests for woman soldiers, taking into account physical capacities but disregarding gender.

In Czechoslovakia, the "labour camps" came into existence under the Act 247 of October 25, 1948. They were camps for those who had not committed any crime, but ought to have been isolated from other civilian public. The sentences: "... the said person has no positive attitude to current regime" or "shows no interest in joining the Communist Party" constituted the reasons for 10 to 24 months of imprisonment. "Offenders" were not sent to labour camps by courts, but only under the prescription issued by "prescription committee", at the level of local and regional "national authorities". A total of 23,000 people went through those camps, as a cheap labour force, taken from among "class enemies". The special position among those camps had military camp of hard labour Mírov, designated for the former commissioned and warrant officers who fought during WWII not only on western but also on eastern fronts. In 1949-1950, there were six roundups (Action D) in which the former "bourgeois" officers were arrested by mixed teams of State Security and Military Intelligence guards; in fact, many times even in the contradiction with the then effective laws and regulations.

The purpose of the paper is to explain some of the connections among military and public spendings and its influence on forming fiscal policy in the 90s. Security doctrines influence national military concepts, level of defence expenditures, and developments of other spheres of public spending. Defence and other items are parts of spending budget, constituting government's fiscal policy, and vice versa; the economy in respective countries influences defence policy. The author treats the question how Czech expansive fiscal policy reached the limits of its growth, how it was reflected in defence policy. The key military reform proved to be inevitable; the reform of armed forces demanded the reform of civil administration. He comes to the conclusion that in our country, government spendings are not a stimulus of economy growth, even not in a short time period, that it is economy growth that determines public spendings, so does the defence budget.

This article examines depth in the nonlinear battlefield and how planners might develop operational effects to defeat insurgencies. The former field manual stated that depth was the extension of operations in time, space and resources. This is a decidedly linear construction of the battlefield based on industrialized warfare between conventional enemies. The Global War on Terrorism operating environment is both nonlinear and non-contiguous. The enemy has no national borders or traditional infrastructure. If we understand cognitive depth, we can develop ways to paralyze the insurgent system or produce operational shock. Colonel John A. Warden III, an architect of the Persian Gulf War air campaign, introduced Five Rings Model as a methodology for successfully attacking and paralyzing a conventional enemy system in depth. An adaptation of this model depicts tangible targets that together constitute depth in the insurgent battle space. Source: Is There a Deep Fight in a Counterinsurgency by Lee K. Grubbs and Michael J. Forsyth, Military Review, July-August 2005.

In the near future, all joint deployments (activities, operations in which elements of two or more "branches of arms" participate) will be characterized as combined deployments (i.e. with forces or agencies of two or more allies). In view of those facts, Commanders (Army) Academy in Hamburg introduced a new concept of military schooling of GSOs, with regard to combined and multinational deployment and employment. Schooling and training are not mere matters of skill and proficiency. It is also the question of taking over responsibility, "action competence". GSOs must be able to react quickly, be capable to operate even in multinational agencies. This type of instruction underlines two main levels: firstly, the lessons must offer overall view not only on armed forces, but also on security, political, social development of forces, tied with their further advance. GSOs have to see problems and tasks in proper context, to "see the whole by eyes of its individual parts". This will give them a surprising sense of coherence. At the top of this schooling lies combined joint Euro-exercise, at operational level, being prepared in cooperation with military academies from allied European nations.

Briefing is a covering term for orders, instructions, detailed explanations or summaries given on the current situation, namely to subordinates, reporters, etc. Actually, there are four basic types of military briefing, varying according their purpose. They must define problem, summarise facts, from which you may draw conclusions. Next you draw up variations and analyse them. Finally you put proposals, identify consent and dissent. At the end you will solve arising discrepancies; you will newly evaluate originated variants. Always keep in mind that you have to be short, concise, careful, factual, and relevant. Proposals must be clear, unequivocal. There must be enough time for questions from the audience.

The article deals with the teaching of management at the University of Defence. Its authors are long-standing university teachers, possessing also experiences from command and staff appointments. In recent years, the emphasis in military schools has shifted more to subjects indirectly related to civilian courses of study, e.g. the theory of management. At the Defence University Brno it covers a wide range of other subjects: economy, informatics, operational investigation, etc.; other subjects are in fact only "supporting": applied mathematics, sociology, psychology, humane resource control and law. Military management, theory of military operations, staff service, and that belong to the group of applied fundamentals. At present, "military management" at the Defence University has only a limited scope of teaching units. It is read both at bachelor and master levels of studies, inevitably many themes are duplicated. So, among others, the authors recommend to shift the core of military management teaching to higher levels of studies, at master levels.

For many years we have been talking about simulators/trainers. The first phase of this process ended in 1998 by publishing "The Concept of Introducing Simulation and Trainer Technology". This year, in 2005, two simulation centres, in Brno and Vyškov, are opened. We elaborated new programmes for the preparation of mechanised and armour units. In these days the Instruction Book is printed and very soon it will be distributed into respective units and institutions of ACR. The author is a strong supporter of exploiting simulators. He knows from his own experiences that the quality of training is much better and soldier's skills grow in high speed. To understand this question better, the author enumerates several time-schedules for simulator training and recommends few time-tested procedures and methods of exercises. He believes that once you try to use simulators, you will see how advantageous this method is. The simulators can be used not only for practicing combat situations, but also for operations other than war. But this theme will be treated next time.

UAV specialists predict that within ten years, half the aircraft flying will be unmanned. They also foresee conflicts where a few soldiers will dominate stateside battlefields. The UAV Center of Excellence is going to draw the unmanned part of the Air Force, to study the best ways to use UAVs. The Air Warfare Centre at Nellis, Nevada, develops tactics for the use of aircraft and directs combat training. The UAV center would take on a whole range of issues from airspace control to various kinds of systems. Unmanned aircraft are to expect to play a key role in delivering directed-energy weapons to battlefields. Stealth will become a standard in UAV fleets just as it is in manned combat aircraft today. A number of additional improvements are expected to increase the capability of Predator squadrons. UAVs may have to specialize in strike or intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. Source: articles by David A. Fulghum, Aviation Week and Space Technology No 12, 2005.