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90s introduced the new beginning of international and economical relations. The former USSR used to be overmilitarized state that is now transforming into a democratic republic. After 2000, the RF adopted many arrangements to stabilize the fall of Russian defence industry. The poor results of Russian economy motivated the federal government towards forming five defence agencies (in 1999): Russian Aeronautic and Space Agency (aeronautics and rocket industry), Russian Agency for Command and Control Systems (avionics, electronic industry), Russian Agency for Conventional Weaponry (arms and armament industry), Russian Agency for Ordnance and Munitions, Russian Agency for Shipbuilding. Nevertheless, the ageing of redundant and unnecessary military industries demands horizontal integration that might facilitate cooperation among individual enterprises. This process could help to unify military products and concentrate on modern weaponry, to improve applied technologies, corresponding to demands of 21st century forces.

The China's impact on world affairs is growing and will grow further in decades to come. Those years will be critical for Taiwan, and for its relationship with other states. Three related factors determine the texture of this interaction: the policies evolving in Beijing, internal developments on Taiwan, and the international environment. Beijing has offered Taipei several proposals for reunification. The proposals, including the recent "one state, two systems" proposal, allow Taipei to maintain its social and economic system, its armed forces and its unofficial ties with foreign countries. China's grand strategy is to make war while avoiding the battle. Therefore, Taiwan is to be persuaded that the acceptance of "One China" principle is vitally important for preventing the Taiwanese independence. Otherwise, People's Armed Forces will open an invasion to Taiwan by three successive attacks: (1) high precise medium-range ballistic missiles DF-21C with the aim to suppress air defence; (2) the second stroke would be massive attack with short-range precise missiles; (3) the last stroke ought to be done by cruise missiles. This essay is adapted from articles by Mary C. Fitzgerald and Eric A. McVadon, Armed Forces Journal 11/2005.

China's premier intelligence services are as follows: the Ministry of Public Security (MBS), the Ministry of State Security (MSS), and the Military Intelligence Department (MDI) of the People's Liberation Army/General Staff Department. Last but not least, the central institution of the Chinese intelligence community is the Communist Party of China (CPC) having its own intelligence and security bodies. The operational methods of the China's intelligence services are nothing new to espionage. They run aggressive surveillance and recruitment programs against visiting foreign businessmen, scholars, government officials, and scientists. It is a normal to debrief the returning Chinese delegates to determine whether useful information was acquired by simple observation. However, the MSS and military intelligence services further exploit these opportunities by co-opting a number of these travellers to carry out specific operational activities. Chinese intelligence services can count on state ministries, people's friendship societies, academic institutions, and the militaryindustrial complex to support activities such as agent recruitment and information collection as well as to provide cover jobs to their operatives. Main source: Alain Rodier, Raids, No. 234/2005 (nas).

The conscription is a system of compulsory enrolment of men and women into the armed forces. Conscripts may be called to serve in time of peace in order to train for war; they may be called into uniform in time of emergency. Conscripts are distinguished from volunteers and professionals, as well as from mercenaries, who offer their service to any government solely for pay. Recent general discussion regarding reducing duties to perform military service in the Czech Republic between 2000 and 2005 has indicated that the sense of citizens' responsibility for the defence their country is limited, in public eyes, to the conscription only. In reality, the sphere of citizens' defence liabilities is much broader. The comprehensiveness of this issue comes to light particularly when we compare the practice in this area in different NATO nations. In this particular case, the article indicates one of possible solutions to these efforts, i.e. a systemizing approach.

At present, the current reform of our armed forces is oriented towards qualitative changes. The Brigade of Logistics Support is going to be the unit designated for transportation, maintenance and repair, technological control of arms and vehicles, it must be capable of fluent supplying advances positions, namely by propellants, ammunitions, and further dozens of tasks in frame of joint task groups (National Support Element) or as a HNS (Host National Support). All units will be connected by multifunctional logistics informational system. Logistics system must fulfill its tasks even in time of peace, and thus be prepared for time of crises. The operational engagement in the early 21st century will require light expeditional forces capable of easy and rapid deployment. The logistics support ought to be more mobile, more integrated, more compatible and more precise, with the quick accession to spare parts and maintenance support.

This article examines depth in the nonlinear battlefield and how planners might develop operational effects to defeat insurgencies. The former field manual stated that depth was the extension of operations in time, space and resources. This is a decidedly linear construction of the battlefield based on industrialized warfare between conventional enemies. The Global War on Terrorism operating environment is both nonlinear and non-contiguous. The enemy has no national borders or traditional infrastructure. If we understand cognitive depth, we can develop ways to paralyze the insurgent system or produce operational shock. Colonel John A. Warden III, an architect of the Persian Gulf War air campaign, introduced Five Rings Model as a methodology for successfully attacking and paralyzing a conventional enemy system in depth. An adaptation of this model depicts tangible targets that together constitute depth in the insurgent battle space. Source: Is There a Deep Fight in a Counterinsurgency by Lee K. Grubbs and Michael J. Forsyth, Military Review, July-August 2005.

The main theme of this extensive paper is ethical evaluation of the state of affairs in Iraq that would play greater role - directly or indirectly - in the decision-making of foremost politicians, more role then we might think. Although the author quotes various positive or negative attitudes towards the war, he does not intend to prove or refute presented theses. He broadly treats e.g. the so-called just-war, events when imminent threat might be a case for war, moral clarity in a time of war, situations when we consider that our aims might be achieved by peaceful means. Last but not least, he writes about attitudes of church leaders, the Holy See, lines of their reasoning. The armed forces are called upon to do their duty. The greater the threat, the grater is the risk of inaction, the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory actions. In such case, the governments make their final decisions. It is not the responsibility of church-leaders or military commanders. To obey it, it would not be in conflict with the churches teaching. In these circumstances, the troops could regard an order to go to battle as morally decent, in pursuit of a moral good purpose.

In the near future, all joint deployments (activities, operations in which elements of two or more "branches of arms" participate) will be characterized as combined deployments (i.e. with forces or agencies of two or more allies). In view of those facts, Commanders (Army) Academy in Hamburg introduced a new concept of military schooling of GSOs, with regard to combined and multinational deployment and employment. Schooling and training are not mere matters of skill and proficiency. It is also the question of taking over responsibility, "action competence". GSOs must be able to react quickly, be capable to operate even in multinational agencies. This type of instruction underlines two main levels: firstly, the lessons must offer overall view not only on armed forces, but also on security, political, social development of forces, tied with their further advance. GSOs have to see problems and tasks in proper context, to "see the whole by eyes of its individual parts". This will give them a surprising sense of coherence. At the top of this schooling lies combined joint Euro-exercise, at operational level, being prepared in cooperation with military academies from allied European nations.