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Armed Forces by František Kříž. After September 2001, in operations both in Afghanistan and Iraq, great attention is paid to terrorism throughout the war. In fact, new generation of warfare came in existence. War on terrorism is a large-scale low intensity conflict, without classical confrontations between states, without massive bulk of soldiers. For such type of warfare we can't use weapons of mass destruction, or classical types of warfare. At level of US Army brigade there were some changes in structure and scope of forces. Several new formations were established: Heavy Brigade Combat Teams, Infantry Brigade, Infantry Brigade Combat Teams, and Future Combat System Brigade Combat Teams. In operations, brigade S2 section is reinforced by an analysis and integration platoon, MI Company. The idea of augmentations and reorganizations of S2 groups is to elevate potential in the brigade system of Intelligence Battlefield Operating System. Article is based on articles form Military News, Military Intelligence, Global Security, etc.

Answering the commander's intelligence and decision needs is an uneasy task for any person responsible for intelligence. PIR information help the commander to keep knowledge on relevant environment during peacekeeping, stability and supporting operations, which are different from PIR in offensive and defensive operations. In combat operations, PIR focuses on enemy's military capability and intentions. Intelligence collection in stability and support operations may adjust to the people and their cultures, politics, religions, economics and related factors. The commander must have information telling on current enemy's threats, fighters, as well as on information ranging from standard of living of local population, supplies of electric power, to building a municipal school. Shortly, to have information behind the traditional scope of PIR. But the current Czech regulation MO/VZS 2003 does not explain similar situations, the only examples we can find are those in US Army Field Manual 3-07 Stability Operations and Support Operations.

Space warfare is combat that takes place in outer space. Technically as a distinct classification, it refers to battles where the targets themselves are in space. Space warfare therefore includes ground-to-space warfare, such as attacking satellites from the Earth, as well as space-tospace warfare, such as satellites attacking satellites. It does not include space-to-ground warfare, where orbital objects attack ground, sea or air targets directly, or the use of satellites for espionage, surveillance, or military communications. Both the Soviets and the United States developed antisatellite weaponry designed to shoot down satellites. While early efforts paralleled other space-to-space warfare concepts, the United States was able in the 1980s to develop ground-to-space laser antisatellite weapons. China tested a ballistic missilelaunched antisatellite weapon in January 2007. So, the US has to evaluate its defensive options in outer space as strategic stakes are higher than ever, as the vulnerability of commercial and military satellites of the US and its allies is now on display after China destroyed an old Chinese weather satellite using an antisatellite weapon.

The professional base for tactical and operational levels of US ground forces and German Federal Armed Forces are the following manuals: US Army Field Manual 100/5 "Operations", since 2001 being labelled as "Field Manual 3-0", and German HDv 100/100 "Truppenfuhrung 2000". Both manuals were drafted in a closed cooperation. The basic principles of German manual Truppenfuhrung 2000 were imitated and copied by the Netherlands armed forces and partly, to a certain measure, also by other NATO nations. Rules of Field Manual 3-0 were tested in peace operations, in the fight against international terrorism in Afghanistan and during the first phase of Second War in Iraq. In fact, the operations of US forces indirectly proved practicability and effectiveness of nearly identical German field rules and manuals, consequently command principles, including those of the so-called nation building. Based upon an article by MG Christian E.O. Millotat in 3/2006 Osterreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, No 3/2006.

Those three E are much in use both in official documents and mass media. Dozens of defence officials use them every day, but actual outputs present that they do not know the key essence of 3E, or they are not aware of how to put them into practice. This article would like to help them to make understand the practical application of basic principles of 3E in practise. The reason of this gap, according to the author, lies in insufficient ties between theoretical and executive spheres of defence sector.

This article examines depth in the nonlinear battlefield and how planners might develop operational effects to defeat insurgencies. The former field manual stated that depth was the extension of operations in time, space and resources. This is a decidedly linear construction of the battlefield based on industrialized warfare between conventional enemies. The Global War on Terrorism operating environment is both nonlinear and non-contiguous. The enemy has no national borders or traditional infrastructure. If we understand cognitive depth, we can develop ways to paralyze the insurgent system or produce operational shock. Colonel John A. Warden III, an architect of the Persian Gulf War air campaign, introduced Five Rings Model as a methodology for successfully attacking and paralyzing a conventional enemy system in depth. An adaptation of this model depicts tangible targets that together constitute depth in the insurgent battle space. Source: Is There a Deep Fight in a Counterinsurgency by Lee K. Grubbs and Michael J. Forsyth, Military Review, July-August 2005.

Conventional military strategists did not hold counterinsurgency (COIN) and irregular warfare with high esteem. In fact, strategists often marginalized COIN and irregular warfare, never regarding irregular warfare as worthy of strategic-level discussions. But true strategic thinking on the subject of COIN and irregular warfare consider time and space and long strategic view. Now we must consider critical areas for the global war on terrorism (GWOT), including changing nature of the threat environment. Sources: Principles, Imperatives and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency, by E. Cohen, Lt.Col. C. Crane, Lt.Col. J. Horvath, Lt.Col. J. Nagl; Strategic Aspects of Counterinsurgency by Col. J. B. Celeski in Military Review March-April 2006.

This new generation war could be characterized by an emphasis on nonstate actors, by political and psychological forms of attacks that directly influence opponents. Other characteristics are as follows: extensive refugee flows, violence, transnational criminal aspects. Several factors will impact the nature, frequency and character of "small wars" in the 21st century. Failed/failing states, urbanization, diffusion of actors, communications technology, technological diffusion, religion, and ultra-terrorism. Clausewitz's fundamental appreciation for the primacy of political objectives as the guiding object in war remains relevant to "small wars" as does to interstate conflicts. The problem for today's strategist or policy maker is determining exactly what has changed, how the various means of stratecraft need to be adapted to the specific contingency at hand (according to The Journal of Strategic Studies, 6/2005).

Since the 90's of the last century we have witnessed the discussions over extended concept of security, under which no national state is the only privileged security subject. The classical military concept is extended both "above", towards international, global and regional problems covering economy, social, environmental or humane issues and "down", in the direction of local communities, NGOs, private subjects and even individual citizens. Even though several important constitutional laws reflecting EU criteria were adopted, we still miss constituting and complete overall concept Czech security system. Of course, we have a document "Optimalization of Security System of the Czech Republic", but it is not the genuine concept, but a mere summary of practical measures dealing with temporary problems, namely after the Floods 2002. The author dares the public to open debate about priorities and goals of security politics of our country, in order to lay down, under general consensus, realistic security system, able to face the whole range of security threats and risks, explicitly in the broad international frame of NATO and EU.

The essay summarizes several articles published in Vojenské rozhledy dealing with mass media and its activities during armed conflicts or peace-support operations. In fact, more attention to war information is paid by civilian press or books. The author, PhDr. Antonín Rašek (-ar-) cites e.g. English sociologist D. Hallin The 'The Uncensored War', D. Kellner The Persian Gulf TV War, and some books or reportages by Czech journalists and authors, K. Hvižďala, P. Procházková, V. Bělohradský, T. Halík, etc. The Vietnam War was the first televised war and it was largely uncensored. People saw the true horror of war on their television screens night after night, and that caused them to turn against the war. The media seems to be influencing the direction of government policy; the American military always claimed the media caused the war to be lost. But today, namely during the wars in Iraq, the media are blamed to be too subordinated to official policy, they present "a war of choice as a war of necessity". "Abedded" journalists and stringers sell war stories and information, their primary purpose is to make money. An example of the strict control of war information is Chechnya, closed for independent journalists and the only information available is released through official information's agencies, both Russian and opposing Chechen forces.

This article presents main ideas of the document, released by the Allied Command Transformation in March 2007. Terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will be the principal threats for NATO. Further threats will come from unstable or failed states, regional crises and conflicts, growing availability of advanced conventional weapons, misuse of emerging technologies and disruption of flow of vital resources. India, China and Russia will be key players in future security environment. North Korea, Iran and Syria will present biggest threat to NATO. Following the release of the FSE Study, International Military Staff and defence planners will assess the implications for NATO forces. The purpose of this study is to offer professional views as starting point for solving prospective problems and threats.

This short information is based upon articles widely published in 2005-06 in Western military magazines and newspapers. After September 11, 2001, NATO member states are discussing the deployment of nuclear weapons at non-strategical level. Among others, this is embarrassed by the Russian attitude and general demands of some European NATO nations to update Alliance strategy. What does it mean? There are voices to remove nuclear weapons from Europe. As the alternative to American nuclear weapons they offer forming European nuclear forces, consisting mostly or exclusively of Britain and France potentials. Nevertheless, most of European states ask the US to keep nuclear weapons on European continent. NATO nuclear strategy is still valid: atomic arsenals represent an effective deterrence against the weapons of mass destruction, whoever might use them.

Developing Czech national defence system is based on long-term predictions of potential security threatsandplanningofresourcesavailablefordefence, including defence spending plans. This paper analyses the issue of current value of defence expenditures. It attempts to give an answer to the question whether defence requires a specific price index or if common civilian indicators like GDP deflator or consumer price index can be used in defence.

What is motivation? In fact, motivation is the force behind doing something, including the desire, the need, the energy, and the actual doing of it. It is a combination of various factors. Motivations vary so much. In formal descriptions of the socio-educational model of language acquisition (Gardner), we define the whole class of variables as the social milieu. Individual differences regarded as the most eminent are as follows: intelligence, aptitude to learn foreign language, last but not least, and the pressure from social surrounding. Nowadays, the concept of integrative motivation is often referred to (Dorneyi) in discussions about the learning of another language. The present-day concept is drawn from real life, from social interactions that force a man to overcome his language barrier (Finegan). Instrumental motivation means better university/working rating, better financial reward (Sansone, Harackiewicz, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation: The Search for Optimal Motivation and Performance). In spite of mentioned differences, motivation and successful acquisition of foreign language represent a complex outlet that could be tested and evaluated.

Czech MoD has to be economical with resources provided from the state budget. The article deals with the distribution and structure of state budget in relation to MoD itemized summary of expected income and expenditures. The authoress discusses several patterns used in this field, e.g. costminimization analysis, or assessing the total amount of money allocated for a specific purpose during a specified period. She also points to several unintended mistakes done by MoD officials.

The conscription is a system of compulsory enrolment of men and women into the armed forces. Conscripts may be called to serve in time of peace in order to train for war; they may be called into uniform in time of emergency. Conscripts are distinguished from volunteers and professionals, as well as from mercenaries, who offer their service to any government solely for pay. Recent general discussion regarding reducing duties to perform military service in the Czech Republic between 2000 and 2005 has indicated that the sense of citizens' responsibility for the defence their country is limited, in public eyes, to the conscription only. In reality, the sphere of citizens' defence liabilities is much broader. The comprehensiveness of this issue comes to light particularly when we compare the practice in this area in different NATO nations. In this particular case, the article indicates one of possible solutions to these efforts, i.e. a systemizing approach.

The China's impact on world affairs is growing and will grow further in decades to come. Those years will be critical for Taiwan, and for its relationship with other states. Three related factors determine the texture of this interaction: the policies evolving in Beijing, internal developments on Taiwan, and the international environment. Beijing has offered Taipei several proposals for reunification. The proposals, including the recent "one state, two systems" proposal, allow Taipei to maintain its social and economic system, its armed forces and its unofficial ties with foreign countries. China's grand strategy is to make war while avoiding the battle. Therefore, Taiwan is to be persuaded that the acceptance of "One China" principle is vitally important for preventing the Taiwanese independence. Otherwise, People's Armed Forces will open an invasion to Taiwan by three successive attacks: (1) high precise medium-range ballistic missiles DF-21C with the aim to suppress air defence; (2) the second stroke would be massive attack with short-range precise missiles; (3) the last stroke ought to be done by cruise missiles. This essay is adapted from articles by Mary C. Fitzgerald and Eric A. McVadon, Armed Forces Journal 11/2005.

His professional career was amazing. After the WWI, as a former legionnaire with war experiences, he fought in Slovakia against invading Hungarian forces. Then he decided to reenlist, he was a company commander, regiment aide, and after graduating from War College (High War School) he was appointed as the head of intelligence department of the 2nd Division Plzeň, the chief of intelligence department of Prague District Military Command, and finally the deputy chief of intelligence department of the Main Staff. At that time, the Czech Military Intelligence hired a member of German Abwehr, Paul Thummel, the famous agent A-54. After the German occupation, he and his eleven colleagues flew to Britain, with the most important documents. There he organized intelligence operations in occupied Czech and Moravian lands, in 1944 he was promoted to the rank of brigadier. Soon after the end of WWII, the Communist Party started to prepare coup d'etat. The first step was to take over defence intelligence. Brigadier Moravec was accused of many offences before the war, and although they were not proved, he was released from the army. In 1948 he fled abroad and began to run intelligence activities under American patronage. After the Velvet Revolution in 1989 he was rehabilitated and posthumously decorated by the Order of M. R. Stefanik, one of the highest Czechoslovak orders.

The return of Russia as a power that begins again to partake in political agenda of present-day world raises the necessity to reflect its inner developments in the background of its recent history. There are six key factors that substantionally influence the position of Russia in the world: large sources of raw materials (pipelines); outstanding military capacities (the world's second nuclear potential); high level of general education; wide scientific and research base; permanent membership in UN Security Council and in the Group of Eight (G-8); deciding influence in the near neighbourhood. The study comes to the conclusion that Russia-in the horizon of 2020-will belong among world's leading actors, together with the US, the EU, China, and Islamic world. Russia will be able to of enforce its foreign and security goals, both in post-Soviet areas and in key regions in Europe, Asia and in the Great Near East. As such, it will probably get into conflict with the US. The priority tasks of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will rest on maintaining nuclear parity with the US and building capacities for asymmetrical operations.

All NATO nations and their armies are looking for effective exploiting social sources for defence and security. It is clear now that effective spending of public expenses asks for changed infrastructures of forces and their activities. It is necessary to form teams of experts who will cooperate with leading defence officials while setting the most suitable variants of further advance.

Even after the Cold War, our world is full of local and international conflicts. There were dozens of wars, fringe clashes between local opposing groups in Africa, Asia and so on. Among them there were four wars of lager size, with more than thousands of deaths in each of them that could be characterized as international wars: Desert Storm 1991, Iraqi Freedom 2003, Allied Strength 1999, and Enduring Freedom 2001. Now we can look at them from a distance ...217 Problems tied with those large-scale wars have several levels: supranational (international) level and military level, being accompanied by paradoxes: international and political paradoxes and military ones. This influenced structures and methods of training and preparation of Australian, Britain and US forces. The lessons were embedded into their military concepts, rules and regulations, e.g. Complex Warfighting (Australia), Future Land Operating Concept (UK), Field Manual: Interim Counterinsurgency Operations (US). New roles of military forces, global and local implications, ought to be embedded also into the structures and concepts of the Army of the Czech Republic, concludes the author.

In the early 21st century defence research can be discussed in two ways: we can stay either within existing discipline "theory of state defence", or we can set up new academic specialization concentrating more on the notion "security" and its individual aspects, including their inner ties. In the former case, there are spheres in which civil and military experts can complement each other, whereas other spheres of studies ought to stay exclusively in the domain of military experts. Mutual cooperation between civilian and military experts can be concentrated on systematic studies of security threats, predictions of potential conflicts, analyses of security cooperation between the Czech Republic and NATO, the EU and the OSCE, economy support of state defence. On the contrary, military specialist ought to focus on e.g. major regional conflicts, low intensity conflicts, military operations other than war. As the term "security science" is not used in NATO nations, the author suggests, it would be more useful to preserve academic discipline "defence theory" to make full use of military experts.

After the communist coup détat in 1948, although formally independent, the Czechoslovak army was subordinated under the General Staff of the Soviet Army. Following the year 1960, its inner life was directed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ), in fact by the Military Commission, headed by the First Secretary KSČ. Overall militarization of Czech society was even higher than e.g. in Poland, because in case of military conflict, our territory was supposed to play the role of main European theatre of war. In time of the so-called reform movement in the late 60's, there were some trends to release close ties with the Soviet Union, but at the same time the leading political and military authorities tried to place Soviet forces in Czech territory to strengthen Russian position in arms reduction talks with the US, so that the Soviet Union could boost its units at the borders with People's China. The author compares those events with the recent ones, after November 1989, and following processes of introducing civil control in the forces, their reduction, transformation, and professionalization. He quotes names and works of authors occupied with this theme.