Fulltext search in archive

Manning Czech armed forces in peace, in time of danger or war, are backed by law regulations and DoD internal normative acts. In fact, Czech legislature is still insufficient, so the author advises its revision. Laws concerning defence ought to be timeless, further amendments beg the questions concerning their correctness. When the institute of ?Conscientious Objector? was established in 1990, the figures of soldiers in their compulsory service were reduced by 15-20 % of planned numbers. The membership in an established sect, background as an active pacifist was not required for an objector to be eligible for exemption from military service. Greece (the Hellenic Republic) is one of a few European countries still preserving the compulsory military service for all Greek young men even in time of peace. As conscientious objectors are not regarded those who served in armed forces in the past, who are legally entitled to own a deadly weapon, or were prosecuted or sentenced for an offence tied with arms. The author suggests adopting similar arrangements like in Greece.

At present, we pay great attention to alternative methods of teaching and learning foreign languages. Actually, it is difficult for language instructor to choose from among them. This article is a sort of hint to help teachers to pick up the most suitable one. Reciprocal teaching has its prominent position, namely in the field of reading with understanding. There four basic strategies: prediction, questioning, clarification, summarizing. During socio-cognitive conflict, in discussion, the language knowledge of learners (students) is pushed up and higher, learners are mutually influenced in social interaction. This learning process is sometimes recorded, monitored. The role of a teacher is multifaceted, indispensable and very demanding. New security threats ask for the transformation of NATO alliance, in the background of political Islam or the recent Russian-Georgian conflict. The contents analysis of presented papers points to main hidden problem lying behind all security questions: whether the U.S. would be able to continue in its role as a world leader, explicitly owing to American economy difficulties, e.g. today's financial and mortgage crisis.

As the military's current fight against terrorists and insurgents does not follow the templates of the past, it requires innovative, adaptive thinking. This article summarises the main ideas of the essay "We the People are not the Center of Gravity in an Insurgency" by Maj. Mark P. Krieger, published in Military Review No. 4, 2007. A COG could be characterized as a source of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, will to act. The definition is important namely when military planners try to identify enemy COGs. There is a single COG at the operational level; the tactical level of war has decisive points. COGs organize and direct critical capabilities, physical or psychological. An insurgency's case is its strategic COG, its organization is operational COG, and the people are a decisive point at the tactical level. The population is important in an insurgency, because the people are a tangible to target, but it is not a COG. Attacking an insurgency?s organization will weaken the strategic COG that becomes vulnerable to attack and destruction.

The author of this article considers the prospective changes in the development, character, missions and tasks of the Army of the Czech Republic, Those changes are deduced from the changing security environment and long-term development trends. To meet new demands, we must continue in building interoperability and compatibility. The battlefield operations will be planned and controlled by the systems of "Network Centric Warfare" and "Reach Back Operations". It will not be necessary for a commander to be in physical contact with operational theatre. Electronical high speed intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, reconnaissance will enable the high pace of military operations (together with common analyses, integration of collected data, evaluation of enemy's intents and activities). This will enable to build a credible defence, in the frame of collective security system, hand in hand with other NATO allies.

This paper discusses the methods of integrated risk management during evaluating the risk rates of military activities. Risk management is an important tool for effective implementation of secure surroundings. And vice versa, the level of security determines requirements concerning the transformation of armed forces, because this security level plays one of key roles in its implementation. The authors depict individual phases of integrated risk management that ought to be applied not only at the level of military units and groupings, but also during the whole process of security evaluation of acquisitions for missions or regions. The acceptation of subsidiarity principle means that this sort of risk management is a starting base for safeguarding global security. At the end the authors enumerate fundamental principles to be fulfilled first.

Operations by Lt.Col. Ing. Jaroslav Moravčík. NATO's current operational experience and that from other operations indicates that purely military actions cannot resolve a complex emergency of crisis. The requirement for the military to interact with non-military actors shows a new, more comprehensive approach. In response, NATO's Effect-Based Approach to Operations was highlighted. The four functions of EBAO and their related activities are mutually supportive. The functions are carried out in a continuous, interactive, parallel process and should not be regarded as sequential steps. They are as follows: Knowledge development; Effect-based planning; Effect-based execution; and Engagement space assessment. EBAO recognizes the importance of applying the various instruments available to the Alliance to create overall effects that will lead to crisis resolution. Achieving synergies amongst NATO and non-NATO actors will enable to identify better how it may best harmonize its contribution with other actors involved in a crisis.

The second part of this short serial deals with the theory of the operational art focusing on the centre of gravity (COG). The article emanates from Carl von Clausewitz's ideas, doctrinal publications analysis and many study projects of the operational art theorists. The author especially aims on disunity and heterogeneity of comprehension of the centre of gravity theory in confrontation of contemporary doctrinal publications and original Clausewitz's theory. He compares operational manuals (those of U.S. and NATO), and finds similarities concerning characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a military force, nation or alliance, derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. Finally, he himself defines enemy's centre of gravity and highlights coherences that can affect fulfilling political and military objectives in current and future military operations.

The purpose of this article is to get readers acquainted with new facts that are arising in the sphere of defence and security of state and at the same time they might influence defence economics research. This recent phenomena came into existence as a consequence of new world layout and events especially tied with massive terrorist attacks after September 2001.

In the near future, all joint deployments (activities, operations in which elements of two or more "branches of arms" participate) will be characterized as combined deployments (i.e. with forces or agencies of two or more allies). In view of those facts, Commanders (Army) Academy in Hamburg introduced a new concept of military schooling of GSOs, with regard to combined and multinational deployment and employment. Schooling and training are not mere matters of skill and proficiency. It is also the question of taking over responsibility, "action competence". GSOs must be able to react quickly, be capable to operate even in multinational agencies. This type of instruction underlines two main levels: firstly, the lessons must offer overall view not only on armed forces, but also on security, political, social development of forces, tied with their further advance. GSOs have to see problems and tasks in proper context, to "see the whole by eyes of its individual parts". This will give them a surprising sense of coherence. At the top of this schooling lies combined joint Euro-exercise, at operational level, being prepared in cooperation with military academies from allied European nations.

The practice of a company sending work to outside factories to reduce production costs is called outsourcing. Outsourcing is one of many methods that might help defence department to fulfil a number of various tasks that either can't be accomplished within the armed forces or such work or services can be obtained at low-costs in civil sector. The authors propose several practicable techniques using dynamic outsourcing model to identify prospective services to support given transformation process.

The authoress makes us acquainted with several basic methods of language drills, standardly used not only in military or state schools, but also in private educational institutions. Every described method is elaborated in detail, together with desirable educational goals, key characteristics, and representative ways of instruction. They are as follows: Audio-lingual Method, Grammar Translation Method, Direct Method (i.e. Berlitz Method) and Silent Way. Berlitz's method, although popular, was superseded by the old, classical, form-emphasizing Grammar Translation Method, which held reign until the 1950s when it was supplanted by the Audio-lingual Method (ALM), a method sometimes called "military method", based upon deep control, examination, extensive repetition. In a kind of behavioural conditioning, students do language drills, memorize set phrases and patterns, learn vocabulary in context, and focuse on correct form and the production of error-free sentences. "Silent Way", which came into existence in the 60s, covers all above mentioned methods. Learners of foreign language study the language in a similar way as they learned their own mother tongue, even with mistakes, later corrected by a teacher.

Thispaperdealswiththeareaof organization values or to say it better, by organisation culture, including its importance for overall efficiency and effectivity. It is a set of values, norms, beliefs, attitudes, assumptions. The authoresses explain those terms, cite their definitions. They underline the fact that highly motivated servicemen are the real assets for our forces. We have to do our best to recruit them, to set up such quality of military life, so that they would like to serve for longer periods.

The conscription is a system of compulsory enrolment of men and women into the armed forces. Conscripts may be called to serve in time of peace in order to train for war; they may be called into uniform in time of emergency. Conscripts are distinguished from volunteers and professionals, as well as from mercenaries, who offer their service to any government solely for pay. Recent general discussion regarding reducing duties to perform military service in the Czech Republic between 2000 and 2005 has indicated that the sense of citizens' responsibility for the defence their country is limited, in public eyes, to the conscription only. In reality, the sphere of citizens' defence liabilities is much broader. The comprehensiveness of this issue comes to light particularly when we compare the practice in this area in different NATO nations. In this particular case, the article indicates one of possible solutions to these efforts, i.e. a systemizing approach.

As the EU is conducting its third military operation, the EUMS has become a key player in the development of the European Security and Defence Policy. In order to provide political control and strategic direction in a crisis, the European Council (Nice, December 2000) decided to establish new permanent political and military structures within the Council of the European Union: PSC-Political and Security Committee, EUMC-European Union Military Committee, EUMS-European Union Military Staff. The EUMS is responsible for peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management (including peacemaking), and further tasks identified in the European Security Strategy, such as joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform. As the only permanent integrated military structure of the EU, the EUMS has become the military linchpin of the EU. (Truppendienst, Bundesheer,

The authors depict the development of outsourcing methods in US armed forces, its origins, and sources. Collected data are accompanied by experiences from British and German armies. The American Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued in 1966 Circular No A-76 (lately several times revisited) to define procedures how to set rules which commercial activities are to be done within the frame of armed forces or in private sector. Backed by a number of literatures, magazines and newspapers (Air Force Journal of Logistics, Air Force Magazine, Armed Forces Journal, Defense Nationale, Washington Technology, Wehrtechnik, etc.) authors analyse several outsourcing processes. They present both positive and negative results, including open or hidden problems of A-76 policy (e.g. business process outsourcing). For the Army of the CR they recommend to overcome above mentioned problems by creating the corrective authority, similar to the British PPPU (PublicPrivate Partnership Unit).

The forward-thinking and respond to the challenges of today's dynamic operational environment demands as necessary: first, to attract and develop young people to become adaptative leaders possessing enhanced skills, i.e. we must align leader-development programmes for the new operating environment; second, to respond to the forces' needs in meeting the challenges of the operational environment-the forces have to undergo a transformation. Adaptability is critical to urban stability and support operations, as these operations present complex challenges to commanders for which no prescribed solutions exist. Warfare and technology are rapidly evolving; doctrine lags behind the need for ready solutions. Officers are confronted by many situations outside the doctrinal framework. No amount of technology can offset the effects of chaos theory ...169 Clearly, there is a need to quickly learn knowledge/skill sets, coupled with a new operating frame that might be radically different from the skills and knowledge developed through classical training (Military Review, January/February 2006, Tomáš Weiser, What is the Chaos? Dějiny a současnost, 5/2002).

This article examines depth in the nonlinear battlefield and how planners might develop operational effects to defeat insurgencies. The former field manual stated that depth was the extension of operations in time, space and resources. This is a decidedly linear construction of the battlefield based on industrialized warfare between conventional enemies. The Global War on Terrorism operating environment is both nonlinear and non-contiguous. The enemy has no national borders or traditional infrastructure. If we understand cognitive depth, we can develop ways to paralyze the insurgent system or produce operational shock. Colonel John A. Warden III, an architect of the Persian Gulf War air campaign, introduced Five Rings Model as a methodology for successfully attacking and paralyzing a conventional enemy system in depth. An adaptation of this model depicts tangible targets that together constitute depth in the insurgent battle space. Source: Is There a Deep Fight in a Counterinsurgency by Lee K. Grubbs and Michael J. Forsyth, Military Review, July-August 2005.