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The article deals with the disintegration and erosion of originally cohesive Chechen resistance movement during the First Chechen War and following inter-war period. According to the author, the main reasons of this process are criminality and religious fundamental radicalisation. They together produced inner confl icts between fi eld commanders; some of them attacked Russian security forces in neighbouring regions (Dagestan, Ingushetia), even after war had ended. Disintegration processes were encouraged by social deprivation after the first war, by strategical position of Chechnya in relation to smuggling drugs and weapons, stealing rude oil, and fi nally activities of foreign Islamic solidarity fi ghters. All those factors signifi cantly contributed to the outbreak of the Second Chechnya War.

The Engineers are specialist soldiers trained in the construction and demolition of bridges, field fortifications, obstacles, roads, etc. Their major task is to support Czech missions abroad, as a part of multinational peacekeeping forces. This article is a preliminary study into the current state of applying the Czech Engineer units in operations other than war as a part of Joint Forces Peace Support Operations. There are mentioned some aspects, for example basic engineer support tasks, possible demanded future capabilities of the Czech Engineer Troops, engineer support to movement and force protection engineering. The purpose of this article is to initiate a debate about the topic and to start the brainstorming process in a broad military environment.

To fulfil Czech obligation as an EU Battle Group Framework Nation according to the regulating document EU BG Training and Certification, the Czech Army is to certify that the CZE/SVK Battle Group EU meet the standards and criteria stated in Standards and Criteria for EU BG. It is recommended that the CZE/SVK Battle Group EU certification process should be analogous with NATO Response Force (NRF) certification procedure and practical methods. Further it is suggested that the CZE/SVK Battle Group EU certification procedure is divided into several evaluation procedures: preparation planning evaluation, war-fighting evaluation, and technical evaluation. Each procedure will be developed by specialized teams with representatives in the sub-working group to ensure that the different procedures harmonize. The views expressed in this assessment are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of EU Military Structure or the Czech Ministry of Defence. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources. The written sources are listed in the matrix above.

Asymmetric operations lack some linear qualifications at operational levels and split themselves into dozens of tactical warfares. This type of warfare demands quick analytical thinking tied with intelligence preparation of the battlefield, formulating specific information requirement to fill in the missing elements in information requests. As to technological potential, military intelligence is developing very fast. So, the intelligence analysts transfer the main information burden on various information systems, e.g. JSTARS (Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System), AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System), ASAS (All Source Analysis System), or JDISS (Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System). But large capacities of those systems gave rise to another logical judgement that leads to different interpretation of intelligence data, i.e. the judgements corresponding to higher levels (operational and above) of analytical thinking. Nevertheless, tactical warfare represents operations of small tactical units and this fact puts the main burden on an intelligence analyst who must very quickly cover the gaps in intelligence reports and adopt appropriate decisions.

Building up a picture of adversaries in complicated operations other than war (OOTW) requires fresh thinking on the collection and analysis of intelligence material, writes Dr Dave Sloggett in Jane's Defence Weekly No 48/2005. Operations undertaken in present-day theatres include the need to arrest war criminals, defeat insurgency operations and disrupt the activities from those engaged in criminal activities that do not respect national boundaries (trafficking, drugs smuggling and the proliferation of weapons of mass effect). OOTW pose problems for the development of what is now referred to as effects-based operations, where the use of kinetic devices to destroy a target is one way to achieve an outcome. One important element of a solution is to build common definitions of terms that enable a discipline to be brought to the underlying freedom of authors compiling contact reports. Projects such as Dabinett, a multifaceted system of systems programme, can link together information contained in existing systems. Commanders able to exploit this capability, against the complex background in which OOTW are conducted, will truly take superior decisions.

This article examines depth in the nonlinear battlefield and how planners might develop operational effects to defeat insurgencies. The former field manual stated that depth was the extension of operations in time, space and resources. This is a decidedly linear construction of the battlefield based on industrialized warfare between conventional enemies. The Global War on Terrorism operating environment is both nonlinear and non-contiguous. The enemy has no national borders or traditional infrastructure. If we understand cognitive depth, we can develop ways to paralyze the insurgent system or produce operational shock. Colonel John A. Warden III, an architect of the Persian Gulf War air campaign, introduced Five Rings Model as a methodology for successfully attacking and paralyzing a conventional enemy system in depth. An adaptation of this model depicts tangible targets that together constitute depth in the insurgent battle space. Source: Is There a Deep Fight in a Counterinsurgency by Lee K. Grubbs and Michael J. Forsyth, Military Review, July-August 2005.

The core of this article is lying in general delimitation of objectives, aims, and tools of state economy principles within defence department. It is the question of optimalization, leading doctrines and tools of economy of economy support of defence. The authoress proposes the system of optimalization of economy support of defence and economy and defence policy of state, its introducing into methods and practice.

This article deals with the problem of pursuing 3E policy in Czech MoD. The article shows how helpful it can be for the management of MoD to systemize activities under MoD control to shape the defence programmes as a 3Eprogram. In our forces, even though we have introduced PPBS (Planning, Programming and Budgeting System), still we need other means to shape effectively state defence. The author recommends to organize activities and related elements into seven groups in order that we can judge the impact of functionality of those programmes and its respective 3E, taking into account specific activities realized e.g. by outsourcing or by some other kind of personal substitution. He underlines the importance of proper defence programmes for decisionmaking process in MoD.

The planning is a general term with many meanings, all of which imply an ability to scheme or arrange beforehand. In practice, planning is a highly formalized and disciplined activity through which we can induce changes, procedures for a decision-making unit, including the establishment of goals. Planning in the forces therefore involves two levels: i. operational planning (intentions and goals of forces, feedback information for setting up operational capabilities); ii. defence planning (development of armed forces, military potential). Long-term planning for 10-15 years or more ahead covers strategic analysis, strategic goals, implementation of strategic goals that are mutually connected, depended on each other, and implemented in particular surroundings which also influences the whole process. This article is based on papers presented at workshops held at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Defence University Brno and is accompanied by several schemes drawn among others from the Handbook on Long Term Defence Planning, published by NATO Research and Technology Organization, 2003.

The main Alliance mission is to "safeguard the freedom and security of its member countries" and to "deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any of them". Those general tasks are tailored today to changed international security surroundings. In May this year, a report by the experts group was released, forming the basis for further negotiations over the new strategical concept of NATO. The experts produced a document of first-rate quality identifying main tasks NATO is facing today. At the same time this document redefines prospective directions the Alliance should follow in the years to come. Without a broad popular support NATO's engagements namely off European territory couldn't be vindicated and justified. The same is true as far allocation of sources for NATO missions and developing military capabilities are concerned. So, the communication with public thus becomes a further dimension of this highest strategic document.

This concept has been preparing since the early 2009. In short, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation must be increasingly prepared to intervene far beyond its borders. In the coming decade, NATO will have four central inter-related military missions. The first requirement is to "deter, prevent and defend" against aggression, so as to ensure the political independence and territorial integrity of NATO member states. The report insists on the need to send out military missions beyond the treaty area "when required to prevent an attack on the treaty area or to protect the legal rights and other vital interests of Alliance members". Any expeditionary mission must be based on the principles of the UN charter. Another key item is to cooperate better with those partners, and others worldwide, in order to tackle the new threats posed by cyber attacks, piracy, arms proliferation and energy supply insecurity and climate change. However, in order to achieve the new goals, NATO "must halt the precipitous decline in national defence spending", and to introduce reforms to make spending more efficient.

The new American doctrinal document called National Security Strategy (NSS 2010) was released in May 2010. Generally, NSS documents outline major national security concerns and plans. The NSS 2010 lays out a strategic approach for advancing American interests, including the security of the American people, growing U.S. economy, and international order that can address 21st century challenges. President Obama is stressing global leadership, dependent on strong and responsible American leadership directing it to ensure other nations follow. He urged Americans to revitalize their own economic, moral and innovative strength to continue to lead the world. The essay by Mr. Eichler is divided into two parts: first one deals with Bush's security policy, and second one deals with documents issued during Obama's presidency. There is a departure from Bush's security strategy that had led to two asymmetric wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. There are interesting nuances. The NSS 2010 for example declares the intention to build deeper and more effective partnerships with key centres of influence-including China, India, which represents among others Obama's retreat from policy of unilateralism.

The article is focused on issue of hybridisation of Al Qai'da in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), in North Africa, and its implications for European countries. The process of hybridisation is being conceived as growing nexus and convergence between violent non-state actors, while these processes could be in this case identified mainly in issues of use of kidnappings and secondary also reported involvement of AQIM in regional smuggling, mainly drugs, activities through Sahel and Saharan region to Europe. Regarding GSPC background, AQIM could be in long term theoretically able to re-establish its financial and supporting networks in Europe via cooperation with organized crime, which were largely disrupted after major crackdowns by security forces between 2004-2007. Event though a direct Al Qai'da attack in Europe is-according to the author-excluded, the purpose of this article to draw our attention to an eventuality of rebirth of European operation network of AQIM operational predecessor, i.e. GSPC.

The shift from vocational military service to all-volunteer force (AVF) could be regarded and treated as any other scholarly assignment of project management, so we can get a better look at its bugs and risks. The author applied the Valentas classification of innovation upon this AVF project in the Czech Republic and demonstrates what are main risks for its sustainability. He sees the first cause and effect in the reality that this shift lacks sufficient support by social sciences and humanities. Since 2003, only six per cent of scientists/scholars employed by the Czech Ministry of Defence have been supporting this great change. It is not enough and it makes certain incompetence within defence ministry to reach the factual aim of this move and AVF produces more and more difficulties. According to the author, the professionalization of forces in our country has not meet its main purpose--to raise professional qualities of military personnel, in spite of the fact it originally used to be the prime objective of this process.

The deteriorating situation in the Afghanistan region poses a security threat not just to the United States, but to every single nation. It was from that remote area of the world that Al Qai'da plotted 9/11 and subsequent attacks in Europe and elsewhere. Reading news about Afghanistan today gives rise to the question why the situation in this country is such as now really is. Ordinary mass media depict the country often in a confusing manner: Afghanistan as "a country, full of terrorists and uneducated barbarians, longing to destroy western civilization and kill". The author describes bad security situation which presents problem for both coalition soldiers and local Afghanistan population. At the same time we must realize that involved soldiers are exposed every day to asymmetric enemy forces, they stand face to face to mortar danger that could be hidden in for example in every car passing by.

The artillery of the Army of the CR is indispensable part of Czech armed forces. It will take part in operational activities, in the frame of EBAO concept (Effect Based Approach to Operations), acting in contact with various task forces. To meet those objectives, it must reach highest level of modulability. The article depicts all variants of effective augmentation by artillery firepower, artillery reconnaissance, and close artillery support. It enumerates all possible combinations of this reinforcement. Backed by those acquired specifics, the authors further extrapolate demands for automated control system of artillery fire support.

The NATO's New Strategic Concept is only starting point to open discussion on a wide range of security problems. At the beginning there is a description of Czech home politics, attitudes of Czech political parties toward NATO alliance. The author explores the history of NATO's identity crisis. In recent years, different security optics of the members splintered NATO. The US wants an expeditionary alliance with a global reach, the Western Europeans hold to a vision of a regional club of liberal democracies, the Central Europeans have a wish so that Washington would stand by them when they will find themselves pressured by Russia. NATO is divided on how to reform its decision-making processes and how to fund and resource its home and away missions. In Afghanistan, the Alliance faces the most difficult operational challenge to date, with a real possibility of strategic failure. The overarching problem is how to define the core business of NATO: cyber defence, energy security, WMD proliferation, stability and reconstruction missions, out-of-area missions, territorial security, enlargement, partnership-building. The discussion over the New Strategic Concept needs to reorder the question how to define NATO's appropriate roles and go from there.

First, the author, who works at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Mons, briefly describes the contribution of Geographic Service of Czech Forces in terms of geospatial support for NATO. He also mentions current allocation of personnel in military missions and NATO/EU international structures. The article deals with tasks fulfilled by the Geospatial Section within Supreme Headquarters (SHAPE). One of the main section's responsibilities is Geospatial Data Management and Distribution, in line, with releasability conditions, and overall coordination of geo-cells within subordinate HQs. This section widely cooperates in the field of research and development, namely Core GIS project and Geospatial Standardization. Direct Geospatial Support is shortly mentioned, as well as variety smaller assignments.

NATO's Research and Technology Organization covers six panels dealing with technology. System Analysis and Studies panel drafted a long-term scientific study "Joint Operations 2030" that was performed for three years under the direction of CNAD (Conference of National Armaments Directors). This study identifies system approaches of NATO further development. Its purpose is recommend remedies for eliminating potential defects in future Alliance capabilities, in the frame of anticipated security surrounding and emerging new technologies. The work was divided into five states: evaluating previous studies, evaluating basic potential, setting priorities, new technologies and the last stage evaluated results reached by means of Multinational Exercise. The final version of this document (Final Report) will be released in next half. By joining JO2030 the Czech Republic underlined its resolution to contribute to the advance of NATO defence potential.

Nowadays, with the potential employment of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Explosives (CBRNE), terrorism poses a threat to all countries over the world, it becomes scary phenomenon at a global scale. The author introduces key agreements dealing with this subject: Chemical Weapons Convention, European Agreement concerning the international carriage of Dangerous goods by Road, European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Inland Waterways, Regulations concerning the International carriage of Dangerous Goods by rail, and so on. The main objective of the EU is to introduce such legal measures so that it would be extremely difficult for terrorist groups to legally gain CBRNE materials. The purpose of this essay is to analyse legal frame of CBRNE materials and to stress the protection against their misusing within an authority of the ACR.

International humanitarian law hinges on the principle of the distinction between combatants, whose function is to conduct hostilities during armed confl ict, and civilians, who are presumed not to be directly participating in the hostilities and, therefore, entitled to full protection from attack. They lose this protection only if, and for as long as they "directly participate in hostilities". After several years of expert discussions and research, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has published the Interpretive Guidance, which aims to clarify the meaning and consequences of direct participation in hostilities under international humanitarian law (IHL). This article is devoted to the explanation of this notion. The presented interpretation follows the Interpretative Guidance published this year.

There are three protective emblems in use: the Red Cross, the Red Crescent, and the Red Crystal. As protection symbols, they are used in armed conflicts to mark persons and objects (buildings, vehicles, etc.) which are working in compliance with the rules of the Geneva Conventions. The cross, crescent or crystal must be used alone for what is termed "protective" use, to safeguard relief workers. The article predominantly deals with the third protocol emblem also known as the Red Crystal. In short it summarizes its history. Because of the controversy over Israel's national society Magen David Adom and a number of other disputes, the introduction of an additional neutral protection symbol had been under discussion for a number of years. In fact, this symbol is quite unknown in our country.

This is another publication by Mr. Jan Eichler. It consits of three parts: the fi rst one defines nearly three dozens of basic terms in the field of security, the second one deals with wars in the 90?s, and finally third part concentrates on terrorism. The book has evidently pedagogical bias, with explanatory character. Under the influence of foremost sociologist Ulrich Beck, Jan Eichler interprets risks as ?social phenomena? derived from threats. The author also evaluates wars in Africa, Asia and Latin America, in Serbia or the Persian Gulf, which took place in 1990-2001. There were 120 armed confl icts, with 94 % victims from among civil population (compared with 50 % of WWII and 15 % WWI). In those wars bellingerent parties deployed weapons of all sorts, with the exception of WMD. As far as international terrorism is concerned, the author sees as its primary characterists the absence of warning before terrorist attacks are accomplished.

The primary purpose for NATO enlargement, covering first three countries of the so-called Visegrad Four and later Slovakia, was the necessity to fulfil "security vacuum" in Central and subsequently in Eastern Europe which came into existence after the fall of Soviet empire. Membership of those countries helped to fix criteria for admission of other states to the Alliance. Today, the NATO alliance stands in front of new important challenge: to work out a New Strategic Concept agreement in late 2010, based upon the idea saying that the security of Euro-Atlantic region is tied with and depends on the safety of the whole world. This safety concept will able to be realized only by means of global strategical governance. More then predicting expected security and defence ideas, the author reopens a broader discussion about the real meaning of NATO membership. He also repeats and enumerates risks and threats we are facing today.

The problem of forming military decisions lies in the very core of this article. Among others, there are a lot of highly unpredictable impact factors; there are many assessment criteria for individual variants of solving problems. Criteria of qualitative characters, and various interpretations of data information demand quality decisions; they are sometimes difficult to understand and even contradictory. The commanders and their staffs must be well educated, trained and experienced. To meet this precondition we must ensure quality of career training, supported by practical experiences. The staff work must be practiced regularly, with the use of various scenarios, supplemented by historical studies of past or recent fi ghts and battles.

The article is a polemical expression of authors' opinion over this problem. It is related to the orientation of society, political coalitions, and single states towards higher goals. If we admit that the sustainable development of society is the base for securing a peace and stability, then we can state that the question of security or consecutively country defence cover problems of the whole social system, subsystems and system elements. Strategical decision-making ought to be the highest priority in our society. It is indisputable that such decisionmaking deserves scientifi c support. At the end of this article the authors propose a short algorithmic program for Czech military strategy that is planned for the year 2014 and the concept of Czech army development planned for 2015.

The article depicts the methods of logistical support to combat units of the German Federal Forces (Bundeswehr), deployed in Afghanistan. Professionally trained and prepared personnel are capable to meet requirements of forces in ISAF operations. The centralizations of composite logistical services can guarantee the lowering of payments and expenses in logistics. Such arrangement makes logistic activities more economical, namely by taking over of mechanisms used in civilian economy sphere. This method is called "focused logistics". It is used for logistical support of small contingents. Its characteristic feature is interconnection of logistical data and transport technologies, rapid crisis response, and the ability of logistical support during all combat and non-combat activities.

The definitions of the geospatial support used in different NATO missions and at command levels are very similar. However, the real content varies and it is affected by particular command level and the territory supported. The article describes the structure and manning of the Geographic Section at the HQ KFOR Pristina, Kosovo, and the Geographic Cells of all KFOR Multinational Task Forces. The author discusses the changes on both the customer and request sides and their changes caused by a recent transition of KFOR to the "Deterrent Presence" operations. Our soldiers work in leading positions and specialist occupations. Since 2003 the Geographical Service (GeoSl) has been regularly occupying geographical posts at KFOR Command Pristina. Those positions are prestigious, recognized by all NATO geographical community.