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The article deals with the international context of the latent war in Ukraine. It explains the recent history of the post-Soviet area in the light of Galutng's theory of positive and negative peace. It continues by the annexation of the Crimean peninsula and its international consequences. At the same time, it examines key features of the debate in the USA as well as other NATO countries. It focuses also the debate about the livraison of arms to the Ukrainian government and explains the arguments of proponents as well of the opponents of this controversial project.

The article deals with a strategic document that currently represents understanding of trends, which form the future security and operational environment,and that sets up the vectors for building-up and development of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic. The first aim is to assess the Long Term Perspective for Defence 2030 and its significance in context of other strategic documents adopted in the Czech Republic. Another aim is to confront its contents with a structured analysis of large quantity of the state-of-the-art foresight studies,differentiated in geographical and thematic scope. The comparison allows identifying convergence and divergence between the Czech document and relevant findings from the foreign foresight documents. This approach enables the judgement whether the Long Term Perspective for Defence 2030 provides a relevant guideline for the defence sector development, and whether it does or does not miss some of the issues found significant in the foresight documents in the outer world.

The article deals with the contemporary form of terrorism, introduces selected issues and discusses the psychology of terrorism. Various forms and typologies of contemporary terrorism which occurs in different geographical and cultural areas and uses large scale of methods and tactical and strategic approaches are introduced as well.The main goal of this article is to describe psychological aspects of terrorism with the emphasis on the motivation and group dynamics of terrorist organizations. The staircase metaphor which allows thinking about the process of recruitment of terrorists is introduced as well. The article derives especially from theoretical socio-psychological and political findings.

This article contains main ideas from the essay by James J. Wirtz published in anthology Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence, Frank Cass 2003. This theory is a unifying explanation of why states, for example, attempt to surprise their opponents with diplomatic or military initiatives. Surprise often is described as a force multiplier; something that increases the effectiveness of one's forces in combat. The prospect of surprise can prompt political leaders of the weaker side to believe that they can nullify that disparity and achieve their objectives. In other words, if strong parties began to view conflict from the weaker party's perspective, while weak actors kept war's dialectic in mind, then surprise would become less likely. The theory of surprise can identify when it is likely to occur, who is likely to find the element of surprise attractive as a basis of policy or strategy, and who is likely to be its victim. The trick now lies in making operational use of the theory of surprise.

On January 11, 2013, the French army opened the military operation with the aim to halt the progress of Islamist armed groups, controlling north of Mali. The factual impulses for intervention were endangered pipelines in Algeria, Madgaz, MEG, Trans Mediterranean, and Greenstream. Generally, the intervention was justified by several UN Security Council Resolutions. Even the military units of the Army of the Czech Republic have taken part in the Operation, backed by Resolution 2071, and at the request of Mali government. The author familiarizes readers with roots of instability in this region and actual security state of affairs. Finally he presents several scenarios of subsequent possible developments.

The separatist movements at Ukraine, Crimea annexation, have fundamentally changed today's security surrounding. All that came about were in fact described in the last Russian military doctrine of February 2010, herein the Czech strategic thinking failed, leaving the nation unprepared. The Czech military documents identify threats too broadly, without setting definite opponents. One precondition failed completely, namely a gradual emergence of threats, enabling the Czech Republic to prepare itself. The author explains his own views on current security European affairs and asks to modernize and adjust both Czech defence policy and military science.

The article is in Czech Language only.
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The ability to deliver information about an incident, long time before it has happened, puts intelligence analysts into the very first line of fight against the threat of terrorism, extremism, proliferation, or activities of alien services. The article deals with some aspects of intelligence research that often influence the value of final reports, presented to their consumers. It analyses intelligence database designated for its end users. It simultaneously reflects the question of indications and warnings against opponent's surprise attacks. Last but not least, the purpose of this article is both to attract the readers´ attention to this theme and also to start debate on the methods of predictions of future threats, drawn up by analysts´ teams, as their reports are not always suitably recognized by their end users.

The purpose of this article is to inform on elements of military deception in NATO armies and overarching principles that make military deception successful. Deception Planning is an iterative process that should be considered as an inextricable part of the operational planning. The knowledge in the field of military deception in the Czech military is low; no operational deception plan has been prepared for foreign operations or any military exercise. Deception is widely appreciated as a powerful instrument of military operations, yet it is surprisingly neglected by both the Czech Army and Military Educational System. The author tries to encourage officers and members of higher staffs to study this subject.

Operation Serval (French: Opération Serval) is an ongoing French military operation in the Republic of Mali, West Africa. The aim of the operation is to oust Islamic militants in the north of Mali, who had begun a push into the centre of Mali. Operation Serval follows the Security Council Resolution 2085 of 20 December 2012. The operation is named after the medium-sized African wildcat species Serval. The author analyzes historic and geopolitical context, including activities of AQMI terrorists. The Serval Operation is of dissymmetric character. At the rear of advancing French troops some groups of rebels and terrorist stayed to make acts of sabotage. According to the author it is necessary to prevent from long-term involving into the conflict, among others, as French territory or territories of other countries might become a target of terrorist attacks.

During the past twenty years there have been many substantional changes in the field of language preparation. As more and more military professional take part in military missions abroad, we lay emphasis on language drills, so that military professionals could communicate with members of other armies. For teachers at the Centre of Language Preparation this situation constitutes necessity to find out new ways how to language schooling do more and more effective, how to motive students and learners. The article is accompanied by chart with the appraisal of language skills.

The article shows that Czech armed forces are supposed to develop planning mechanism according to the Alliance Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) to be fully interoperable in operation planning process (OPP), namely in field operations planning in the framework of the multinational missions abroad. However, some problems persist at the operational level of crisis management, such as institutional arrangements for planning and commanding crisis operations, procedures pertaining to force generation, synchronization and activities coordination. The Czech Army Operational Planning Doctrine is still being developed. The purpose of this article is to inform on current state of affairs in operational planning with subsequent consequences to the results and reform recommendations by the White Paper on Defence.

The author summarizes present-day knowledge of this problem. Worms and viruses have transformed to serious security challenges and perfect instruments of cyber espionage. They have become a tool in information warfare. Cyberattacks transformed to risks calling only for technical responses. The growing awareness of the seriousness of the cyber-threat is enhanced by incidents, e.g. the malware "Stuxnet" attacking the Iranian nuclear programme. Actually, cyber space is regarded as a fifth dimension of military deployment, apart for land, air, water, and cosmos. Some nations are already investing massively in cyber capabilities that can be used for military purposes. Most Western nations have considerably stepped up their defences in recent years and are forming special units for cyber warfare.

The purpose of this article is to deal with Course of Actions development (COA). Attention is paid to ensure a common understanding of COA process. The article broadens the vision and offers deep insights for its readers. Moreover, the war game was described as a method of refining or modifying the COA. It has also been emphasized the commander and staff consider each COA advantages and disadvantages. The Czech Army personnel training and preparation should steadily and deliberately bring improvements into the field of operational planning capability within forces´ command levels. In order to improve operational planning knowledge, it is recommended to study AJP-5 Operational Planning Doctrine and ACO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive.

Understanding the importance and role of present-day operational art is not always a matter of knowledge of relevant doctrinal publications or the use of experiences from military operations. Number of aspects of operational art had their roots deep in the history of warfare. Many of them are unknown or forgotten. This article aims to give the reader some basic information about the context that led to the awareness of the need of operational art and finally to real fulfilling the imaginary gap between strategy and tactics, which was the place for operational art. The article briefly describes the background of the emergence of operational art and the approach of two basic schools of military theory: Soviet and German that were crucial to its development.

The gravity of this article is laid down on the present-day state of affairs. China bought Spanish, Portuguese, and Greek obligations, i.e. China lent a hand to those countries (so did the European Union). In this way, China increased its influence in Europe. Stabilized Europe is necessary for Chinese export, it was not mere charity. Defence expenditures of People's China has reached 100 billions USED a year. Supposing the Chinese are intended to reach world's domination, they should stick to this kind of policy and they should not try to acquire the dominance by armed force. China behaves like an asymmetric power, knowing well that it can't surpass the U.S. by arms. China does not want to repent Russian mistake to be "over-armed" by America in futile arms race. Still, there is plenty of free space to compete with the U.S., e.g. cosmic or space competition, computer and Internet technologies.

There are no military conflicts without deception, as it is among others a very cheap method how to contribute to the successful accomplishment of the assigned mission. Military deception (MILDEC) is applicable across a wide range of military operations. MILDEC can be conducted during all phases of military operations at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. It is defined as being those actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. According to he author, the operational deception is to be explained in more detail, basic rules are to be outlined, including fundamental principles and methods of deception for operational planning.

The book consists of papers by eleven authors, members and fellow members of the Centre for Social and Economy Strategy, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University Prague. At present, we must prepare to face socially unwelcome phenomena. We must arrange preventive projects, so that we could solve prospective crises. The authors therefore pay their attention to methodology of crisis scenarios, or how they are to be prepared. Predicted nine worst-case scenarios anticipate prolonged crises, failure in education policy, rise of extremism, climate changes, energy collapse, lack of international balance, and separation of the Czech Republic from Europe.

This extended essay is based upon various sources, among others on May 2010 President Obama's speech at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, where President Obama described his national security objectives. The highest priorities of U.S. national security are the safety of Americans at home and abroad and achieving a peaceful, stable world through global cooperation despite a flawed international system. The Obama's security strategy relies heavily on diplomacy and engagement, economic development and other methods of influence, along with U.S. military capabilities with global reach and unsurpassed resources. As we face multiple threats, from nations, non-state actors and failed states, America will maintain the military superiority that has secured country, and underpinned global security, for decades. The security strategy is global, and identifies an array of real or potential security challenges that include: countering violent extremism and insurgency; stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and securing nuclear materials, resolving and preventing conflict; and reducing destabilizing risks to economic interdependence.

The overall purpose of this paper is to describe the way the Alliance and the also the Czech Army is going to apply the leverage of powers while conducting operations in the future. The article shows in details that the relative combat power analysis requires an assessment of factors either directly or indirectly affecting the potential outcome of the operation. In order to improve military knowledge and operational thinking within the Czech Army it is recommended to improve the quality of officers' military training and personnel preparation in accordance with Czech MoD White Paper on Defence. The views expressed in this assessment are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of Alliance or the Czech Ministry of Defence.

In the previous Military Review we introduced the article "Will Military Deception Pass Away?" by the same author. In the Army of the Czech Republic we have no manual dealing with military deception (MILDEC). The only manual concerning MILDEC was abolished without any substitute. But military art can't be further developed without similar documents. Today we take MILDEC as a complex set of provisions misleading enemy's commanders and staff, by means of false information and counterfeit data that deliberately deceive adversary decision-makers and planners. Use of MILDEC during any phase of an operation also helps to mislead adversaries as to the strength, readiness, locations, and intended missions of friendly forces. The MILDEC could contribute to the successful accomplishment of the assigned mission by many ways.

The term "hybrid war" is frequently used today within the military community, but the term does not bring something new in the view of the terminology of the stability operations, comprehensive approach or compound wars. This concept is based on the destructive threats to the military components of international community. It does not help in delimiting reasons of violent confl ict and from that point it is harmful, as it does not explain soldiers why they are fi ghting the "just war", why they should sacrifi ce their lives in confl icts far away from their homeland. We should not use terms of hybrid wars, hybrid confl icts, hybrid enemies or forces. Only "hybrid warfare" could find some legitimacy, but only when used with the correct definition of the conflict typology, backed by the political objectives of the war. Confl icts typology, as used, forms the framework for the mission analysis orientation at all command & control levels and it guides the informational support to the military decision making processes.

President Barack Obama came to power at a difficult time in America's history. Home and foreign policies are hard to manage, among others, as we are on the threshold of post-ethnic society, and in the war with terrorisms. Obama does not give up American leadership, but he is seeking to find the balance between security and liberty, between power and freedom in the world, broadly speaking. As the consequence, Mr. Rašek presumes emerging the new global security situation: the rise of multipolar world, divided into several new political spheres. This author's opinion is backed by comments by reputable world's political analysts. As far as Euro-Atlantic relations are concerned, or relations with Russia, there are excellent prospects, namely there is the progress with Russia on arms control-part of Obama's determination to put the world on a path toward nuclear disarmament. The author ascribes the drop in Obama's popularity to failed healthcare reform; outside the US, to the fact that Obama is not able to define clear goals and missions in Afghanistan.

This article aims at building a bridge upon a gap, which separates academic sphere and intelligence community in the issue of predictive methodology. The author tries to accomplish this objective by presenting intelligence predictive methods based on open-source literature research. First, the question of uncertainty and probability in prediction is introduced (Cynefin template). Then follows basic introduction to predictive methods in civil and military intelligences, so that the reader might grasp the fundamentals of early warning systems. The academics and above all journalists should know the risks and perils in forming intelligence forecasts, estimates, foresight and warning scenarios, e.g. the so-called Black Swan scenario, the author explains potentials failures of the Delphi method. This study ought to be regarded as an introductory to predictive intelligence concurrently done by governmental agencies for purposes of national security and defence.

War game is a simulation of military operations intended to train military commanders or to test a proposed strategy. It is a game in which model soldiers are used to create battles, in order to study tactics. This article illustrates the importance of War Game COAs (course of action). It was tested against opposing force COAs. Such exercise will help to identify advantages and disadvantages and the key elements of execution planning for each COA. The lesson learned during OHQ CZE/SVK BG EU Staff Exercises that took place in Olomouc from January 19th, to January 23rd, and from February 16th, to February 20th, 2009 is that war-gaming (although time consuming) is something closer to "reality" than the "theory" in doctrines. The war-gaming practices teamwork, facilitates team-building and enables to share mental model COA. Commanders and their staff ought to be engaged in simulations and war games more frequently. All information and sources for this paper were drawn from unclassified materials.

Relations between NATO and the Russian Federation are one of key factors influencing overall policy of the whole North Atlantic Alliance. They are complicated and sophisticated questions still predisposed by the heritage of the Cold War.But there are mutual fears, common security problems they both have to counter. NATO policy must be established upon present-day reality. It is self-evident that there are common fields of common interests in which mutual balance must be reached. There are among others: armament, preventing arms proliferation, halting proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical agents, antimissiles defence, counter-terrorism, drugs smuggling, open sea security, common peace operations. After two years the Russian-Georgia war started, military cooperation between Russia and NATO was re-established. Separate problem in midterm prospects presents the solving of conflict in Afghanistan.

The Shadow of Nucler War over Europe (19451968). In spite of general expectations, even after the end of the Cold War the world can't get rid of atomic threat. Interest in nuclear problems has increased in the last few years. Among new books dealing with this problem belongs also the monograph by Josef Fučík "The Shadow of Nucler War over Europe: The Strategy of Military Blocks, Operational Plans and the Role of the Czechoslovak People's Army in Central European Theatre in 1945-1968". In the 60's, the last century, the danger of nuclear confrontation was extremely high. The Soviet Union accumulated large atomic potential, the fact that disabled American strategy of flexible response. On the other side, this fact led the Americans to strengthen conventional forces, not welcomed by American Western Allies. Nowadays we can see similar situation, in case of unwillingness of West European nations to support American activities, e.g. in Afghanistan.

The authoress surveys recent research into how people acquire languages and considers its relevance for language teaching. She describes the most important studies and ideas about language acquisition. The method mentioned above is element. If we compare it with other language skills, i.e. reading, writing, speaking, it is above all listening that is used most. But to acquire sufficient proficiency, learners must cover a long way. Language teaches should do it for students the most pleasant as possible. Listening in language classrooms is being assessed, according to levels of students' understanding contents. The authoress familiarizes readers with several ways of teaching by principles that are in fact interactive approaches to learning foreign languages. We may use forecasts, news, listen radios, watch films in target language, be in touch with native speakers. It is reccomended to write down new word power, according to set context.

It is a point at which attacking forces are unable to continue their attack or even defend themselves, because do casualties, shortages of fuel, ammunition and rations, and sheer physical exhaustion. This sequel article deals with the theory of the operational art focusing on the culminating point operational concept. The article emanates from Carl von Clausewitz's ideas and concepts described in his book "On War", doctrinal publications analysis and study projects of the operational art theorists. It treats conditions influencing achievement of the culminating point on single levels of war-strategic, operational and tactical and highlights coherences and factors having fundamental influences on culmination. The article is accompanied by several graphs describing this theory in detail. Key words: Culmination, Culminating Point, Zeroing, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, Campaign Planning and Developing Operations.

This article deals with the EU command and control functions and provides basic information on the structure and capabilities of the EU CCS in Battle Group EU operations. The author describes political and strategical levels CCS (COREPER, GAERC, COPS, CivCom, EUMC, EUMS, BDE HQ, prospective EU FHQ). Only US, EU and E3 (Britain, France, Germany) are capable to realize integrated expeditional operations. The ACR can work only with cooperation with them. The Czech Republic as a small EU member state is actively engaged in the building of the Battle Group EU. The Czech Army is going to increase its expeditionary capabilities as demanded and be prepared for a broader range of conflicts and crises in the vital area of the EU concerns. At present, the ACR is able to carry out a self-supported, integrated expedition operation only on the edge of all its strength. The political leaders must bear this fact in mind, as the army mustn't be overburdened, otherwise it might lose its credibility. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.