Fulltext search in archive

In this article the author thinks over one of many variants the mortar units could be deployed into battalion combat task forces to support developing operations. It is a process of gradual compatibility with the units of North Atlantic Alliance and modernizing mortar weapons system with regard to prospective personnel reductions. It is important for joint commanders to be familiar with this kind of combat support, so that they could use it effectively in land operations.

The aim of the article is to provide the readers information related to the theory of fundamental elements and tools of operational art, which are for the preparation and conduct of military operations, particularly at the operational level of war, critical. The operational level of war depends on methods that will create appropriate conditions to achieve the closing state, set by a superior commander, in accordance with the complex strategy of military and non-military instruments of state power. Although the methods of application of specific operational art components rest mainly in the mind of the English Annotations and with several acts tied with civil emergency preparation.

The author summarizes present-day knowledge of this problem. Worms and viruses have transformed to serious security challenges and perfect instruments of cyber espionage. They have become a tool in information warfare. Cyberattacks transformed to risks calling only for technical responses. The growing awareness of the seriousness of the cyber-threat is enhanced by incidents, e.g. the malware "Stuxnet" attacking the Iranian nuclear programme. Actually, cyber space is regarded as a fifth dimension of military deployment, apart for land, air, water, and cosmos. Some nations are already investing massively in cyber capabilities that can be used for military purposes. Most Western nations have considerably stepped up their defences in recent years and are forming special units for cyber warfare.

Operational art is the use of creative thinking by commanders and staffs to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. This article is a sequel to the study published in a previous issue of this Military Revue. The author discusses the fundamental pillars of operational art, upon which Alliance countries build their doctrinal and defence documents concerning operational art. A separate section deals with conditions and status of operational art in the Army of the Czech Republic in the last 20 years. The author calls for the need to introduce operational art in several key areas of Czech doctrines. He recalls the necessity to implement those issues in the prepared Doctrine of the ACR.

Unlike the real state of affairs, the scenarios for Europe 2010 did not presuppose the rise of financial and economy crises. Political scientists did not perceive the series of terrorist attacks, namely in Great Britain, Spain and Russia. Security questions, home security and defence, came to the foreground more then was originally expected. There are hubs of future power blocks of divided Europe. It is impossible to incorporate all the results and consequences of our presuppositions. Since we want to look into individual, particularly interesting developments, the author recommends to create several teams for individual scenarios, instead of drawing several scenarios by one scholarly team.

The purpose of this article is to inform on elements of military deception in NATO armies and overarching principles that make military deception successful. Deception Planning is an iterative process that should be considered as an inextricable part of the operational planning. The knowledge in the field of military deception in the Czech military is low; no operational deception plan has been prepared for foreign operations or any military exercise. Deception is widely appreciated as a powerful instrument of military operations, yet it is surprisingly neglected by both the Czech Army and Military Educational System. The author tries to encourage officers and members of higher staffs to study this subject.

Armed forces, civilian employees, are extremely exposed to unwanted effects of socially undesirable behaviour, as they live and meet their assignments under difficult conditions, e.g. in mission abroad, separated from their relatives, spouses, wives. The best deterrence against socially undesirable behaviour is its prevention. Legally this problem is defined in the Defence Minister Order No 53/2010, The Prevention of Socially Undesirable Behaviour. According to the author M. Hrbata, Deputy Defence Minister for Personnel, we must deal with this problem in a multidisciplinary manner, in the frame of effective organizational structure, run by competent commanders, chiefs, directors, with natural authority.

The paper offers new looks at the system of railroad reconstruction in crisis and emergency situations. It originates from The Operational Plan of State Territory Preparation that is implemented in harmony with The Plan of Technology Protection of Railroad. This article is a free sequel to information published in this Military Revue No. 4/2005 dealing with drafting the plan of railroad technology protection. The authors´ main purpose is to give readers basic knowledge on key changes in railroad security system and main security measurements till 2013. The protection system is intended to be more flexible and economic.

One of main task while preparing new security documents is to identify, analyze and evaluate newly emerging, self-generating security threats. They menace cybernetic, economy, bank, and religious security. The special menace, as for inner security it is lobbyism. Cybernetic threat is today regarded as more dangerous than nuclear strike. The American lived through those experiences in Iraq. Another example is cyber attacks on Estonia in 2007 that swamped websites of Estonian organizations, including Estonian parliament, banks, ministries, newspapers and broadcasters.The attacks triggered a number of military organisations around the world (including NATO) to reconsider the importance of network security to modern military doctrine. There is a paradigm: the more modern country, the more risks are opened. The situation is complicated by the fact that in sophisticated society there is hard to identify attacking enemy. The author underlines that we are the last member nation in the EU that has no official CSIRT (Computer Security Incident Response Team) to react cyber /terrorist attracts.

This article deals with PMSCs as a relatively new phenomenon in warfare areas. It is open to discussion whether private military companies and the private contractors that they employ, should be treated just like any other transnational industry, or whether they should be treated like mercenaries under international law. As it happened in many countries, private companies and private contractors operate in a legal vacuum. From a strictly legal point of view individuals employed by private military companies are not to be considered as mercenaries. The private military industry offers a wide range of services. Procurement of military services by individuals and private firms has developed in a direction that had probably not been anticipated in previous years. Some military analysts say that the exclusive role of the state in the domain of defence and security is outdated and should be re-examined.

Mentioned Balanced Scoredcard-BSC is an ef f icient tool that helps to the of f icial management to transform vision and strategy into reality, by means of monitoring key efficiency indicators and their transformation into action plans: BSC covers the package of strategy maps enabling to consider mutual connections. Owning to the transparency cause-consequence relation, we can implement cohesive strategy into all level of the organization.

This year we marked the 10th anniversary of our full membership in NATO. We've verified that the nation can become a "full fledged member" in eight or ten years at earliest. Signing the treaty, you became "only" a freshman. You must learn everything, from "consensus building" to forming informal coalition. The author of this article, Deputy of the Czech Permanent Representative to NATO, summarizes the history of fulfilling the membership's prerequisites and following difficult process of implementation of fundamentals and requirements, e.g. the so-called NATO legal acquis (Status of Forces Agreement), Planning and Review Process, setting Force Goals, fixing Identification Friend or Foe on Mi-21 aircraft assigned for Air Policing, problems with developing home infrastructure for Host Nation Support. We joined common security planning, took part in NATO Security Investment Programme and Conference of National Armaments Directors. But today's organization is quite different that used to be, the role and missions have changed. We must be prepared to meet them too.

The basic question of Army transformation was the fact that it was not constituted upon the statehood principle that gives precedence to politicking individual parties. The ultimate goal of this transformation was to build forces loyal to democratic republic, but during the last ten years the top personnel at the Ministry of Defence changed several times, leaving the Army with restricted means, without precise laid down tasks and goals. Uncontrolled interventions into forces structure, reducing numbers of military personnel, lead to balance on the verge of collapse. The basic goal to develop Czech national security and defence policies did not fell short. Army was transforming itself, initially under the management of former generals and later under civilian control, especially after 1991. The division of the armed forces after the split-up of the state at the turn of 1992 went very smoothly, with good discipline. The transformation has been influenced above all by the newly adopted legislation, accession to NATO and to the European Union, participation in missions abroad and professionalization of the Czech armed forces. The whole process has been facilitated by the acceptance and implementation of a broader concept of security.

Effective operations of institutions within public sector presuppose obtain necessary knowledge how those institutions operate in the scope of their responsibility. Collected data could be used for making use in higher levels of command and control. The data might be acquired via the audit of activities of examined institution. This study tries to outline main basic steps how to accomplish the audit of institutional activities with the stress on a level of administration and management. By definition, audit is inspection and verification of the accuracy of financial records and statements. Internal audits are conducted by a company's own personnel to uncover bookkeeping errors and also to check costeffectiveness of labour. An external audit is used to give the public a true statement of an institution's financial position. The auditors inspect real estate, buildings, and other assets to see if their value is overstated.

Some of the published critiques dealing with midterm planning are not true, as they were created without detailed knowledge of practice and methods how our midterm plan was created. Nevertheless, there are some real faults in midterm planning. According to the author, they are divided into two groups: external-they depend on quality of assignment; and internal-they are connected to the application of theory. Main external fault is the absence of long-term plan. In fact, it was introduced by the Order of Defence Minister, but it has not been worked up thoroughly. We lack adjusting main goals, tasks and priorities for MoD. Next problem are unstable and lacking financial sources. Internal mistakes are as follows: absence of mechanism for balanced changes between cycles of planning; implementation of life cycle cost and level of education of staff preparing data for planning.

At present, we are going through army transformation, represented among others by lowering military expenditures. One of many questions accompanying this process is a purposeful and functional spending money for military purchases. The authoress, the former teacher at Defence University Brno, explains her method of multicriteria decisionmaking during shaping the algorithmic program eliminating non-optimal behaviour, suitable for all, military and state, officials, who are in contact with external providers (suppliers). Introduced method is transparent one and could be used namely for small public orders, explicitly during concluding contracts without legally fixed terms. The proposed method is demonstrated upon a concrete example of realized contract.

Management consists of those continuing actions of planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, and evaluating the use of men, money, materials, and facilities to accomplish missions and tasks. Management is inherent in command, so the candidate officers are trained to execute their authority and responsibility in command. Management principles are lectured both at military graduate schools and application courses. But some themes are repeated, reduplicated; the study plans at the Military University and the Military Academy must be more coordinated, was said at the professional conference on management, held in November 2007, at the Defence University. Some proposals were put forward, e.g. stress on simulation of military functions on computers. The central goal of Army transformation is to reach the decisive information prevalence and operational effectiveness backed by NEC (Network Enabled Capability), established as an accredited study subject.

As the military's current fight against terrorists and insurgents does not follow the templates of the past, it requires innovative, adaptive thinking. This article summarises the main ideas of the essay "We the People are not the Center of Gravity in an Insurgency" by Maj. Mark P. Krieger, published in Military Review No. 4, 2007. A COG could be characterized as a source of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, will to act. The definition is important namely when military planners try to identify enemy COGs. There is a single COG at the operational level; the tactical level of war has decisive points. COGs organize and direct critical capabilities, physical or psychological. An insurgency's case is its strategic COG, its organization is operational COG, and the people are a decisive point at the tactical level. The population is important in an insurgency, because the people are a tangible to target, but it is not a COG. Attacking an insurgency?s organization will weaken the strategic COG that becomes vulnerable to attack and destruction.

ACR Logistics: the 2nd Phase of Reform by Prof. Ing. Petr Hajna, CSc. In its opening part, the article enumerates a short summary of tasks that were met in 2007, in the period of the first phase of ACR reform. At the same time the author marks out the tasks for its second phase in 2008. Logistics involves obtaining, maintaining, and transporting military personnel, supplies, and equipment. Now, we lay emphasis on the preparation of a new logistics concept in frame of outsourcing system (concentrated on optimalization of the employment of civilian companies for appointed goods and services); development and reconstruction of Maintaining Material Base Štěpánov (depends on allocated financial sources); purchases of T-810 vehicles; unifying control activities in the field of material economy and the founding of Office for Economy Management, subordinated to Logistics Department of Defence Ministry.

This book written by Alain C. Enthoven, and K. Wayne Smith, was published some forty years ago, but its leading ideas do not grow old. It is a work of enduring value and listing relevance, this book is both a classic account of the application of powerful ideas to the problem of managing the U.S. Ministry of Defence (DoD) and a cautionary history of the controversies inspired by that successful effort ...206 Defence secretary Robert S. Namara's device was a new system for allocation defence resources, the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). Most of those decisions are taken as bedrock defence policy today, and the methods have become embedded ad the DoD's approach to defining and resolving issues. According to the author of this article, this book ought to be the inspiration even for our Ministry of Defence in its effort to save restricted means and at the same time to increase Czech military capabilities.

The aim of this work is to explain readers the so-called sociomapping method that is among others used in Czech peacekeeping units employed abroad, e.g. in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iraq or Afghanistan. Sociomapping came into being in 1994, when a young scientist Radovan Bahbouh came up with the idea of this special analytical-graphical method. The method reflects the description of human activities and ways in which we could (in the positive sense) affect human lives. With Sociomapping, we can even predict the most suitable staffing of the crew. Sociomapping is shown as proper instrument, which helps to determine the problem and most important areas to focus on.

This year, the Hlávka Economy Institute published a book "Professional Army in the Czech Republic: First Five Years", by Bohuslav Pernica. It is a study dealing with first five years in which the Czech Republic transformed its forces from a conscription army to all-volunteer one. The author sees the necessity to go professional in context of changed global surrounding after the end of Cold War. The subject is treated mainly from economy point of view. He pays attention to three important issues related to this transformation: recruitment /retention, training /education, and substandard soldier's pay, which is one of roots of low service competitiveness on civil labour market.

In our country we can meet various publications on intelligence activities, nevertheless we feel the lack of expert books with wider overreach. Among those publications that fulfil such demands belongs the work by Ladislav Pokorný "Secret Agencies", Prague: Auditorium, 2012. The book covers intelligence organizations of all kinds, including military ones. In military section the reviewer cites the famous ironic sentence "Under the Czech Law, we have three intelligence services, in fact there are four of them, with five directors". The publication is of high information value and could also serve as a university textbook.

Mr. Prchlík would have been ninety years this year. He started his career as a professional soldier. Among others he was Deputy Defence Minister, then he assumed the position of the director of the Main Political Directorate, and finally he was elected Member of Parliament. In 1967-68 he opposed to military coup d'etat in favour of the former Czechoslovak president Novotný. In 1968 he became a head of Administrative Section, Central Committee, Communist Party. He had under his control all military and police activities in the country. The Soviets asked to be disposed from this position and finally he was even arrested. When released from prison, till his death, he was employed as a manual worker. He took part in military section of political dissent.

The results of American foreign, security, defence and military policies are ambiguous. The war in Iraq ends, troops are going to leave both Iraq and Afghanistan. Obama was held up in Arab spring. He tried to improve relations with Russia. The centre of gravity was moved to the Pacific area, which got complicated ties with People's China. He didn't succeed in solving troubles with nuclear programme in Iran. His moderate success in foreign policy was the consequence of his concentration on home politics, health care reform, economy and financial crises. At the end the essay evaluates the Chicago summit that among others officially affirmed that NATO activities in Afghanistan would be concluded by 2014 and declared the so-called smart defence.

In conclusion of article in Military Review No 3, 2011, the authors gave notice about a sequel to this article. Today they describe military deception form another point of vies. They depict the creation of false picture, deception in the frame of operational planning. The authors accentuate that not only Asian countries, but also western ones look back to classical works on military art, e.g. Sun Tzu, The Art of War (around 2,000 years ago). Sun Tzu's philosophy recommended a strategic method to win that rarely required actual war. Spies, diplomats, deception, and a correctly organised internal structure were his main tools. If it came to war, he recommended among others to use detailed and elaborated military deception.