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The article analyzes loitering munition as a distinct category separate from traditional UAVs and examines its role in recent armed conflicts. Drawing on qualitative and quantitative analysis, it finds that these systems have become a persistent feature of modern warfare, which is also reflected in the rapid expansion of acquisition efforts within NATO countries after years of stagnation. Building on these findings, the article introduces four functional criteria defining loitering munition and provides a targeted DOTMLPFI mapping that outlines the key requirements and indicative metrics needed to achieve full operational capability. The study shows that progress across all DOTMLPFI domains is essential for effective and sustainable integration, particularly in smaller armed forces.

The article describes an approach to development of a national military capability requirements database and its relationship with reference units which will be finally used for assessing capabilities of existing force units. Outcomes from recently completed analyses lead to the conclusion that the single set of capability requirements as specified in the Bi-SC Agreed Capability Codes and Capability Statements, can be taken as a key stone for developing a national database of capability requirements. A due adaptation of this document to the Czech MOD allows getting a complex frame of capabilities which force units shall manage to achieve given operational tasks both in the context of a national or multinational task force group. Consequently such a database can be exploited for setting up a mechanism for capability assessment.

First, the author, who works at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Mons, briefly describes the contribution of Geographic Service of Czech Forces in terms of geospatial support for NATO. He also mentions current allocation of personnel in military missions and NATO/EU international structures. The article deals with tasks fulfilled by the Geospatial Section within Supreme Headquarters (SHAPE). One of the main section's responsibilities is Geospatial Data Management and Distribution, in line, with releasability conditions, and overall coordination of geo-cells within subordinate HQs. This section widely cooperates in the field of research and development, namely Core GIS project and Geospatial Standardization. Direct Geospatial Support is shortly mentioned, as well as variety smaller assignments.

The article shows that Czech armed forces are supposed to develop planning mechanism according to the Alliance Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) to be fully interoperable in operation planning process (OPP), namely in field operations planning in the framework of the multinational missions abroad. However, some problems persist at the operational level of crisis management, such as institutional arrangements for planning and commanding crisis operations, procedures pertaining to force generation, synchronization and activities coordination. The Czech Army Operational Planning Doctrine is still being developed. The purpose of this article is to inform on current state of affairs in operational planning with subsequent consequences to the results and reform recommendations by the White Paper on Defence.

Protection of the civilian population against the Gaddafi regime, it was a clear UN mandate for military intervention in Libya in 2011. Not only a new approach to leading the fight against terrorism after 11 September 2001, but also requires a change in approaches to conducting combat operations coalition forces, as shown by the recent armed conflict in Libya, inevitably required a new perspective on the concept and approach to the process of targeting as the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and responding to them in accordance with operational requirements and capabilities of units, synchronization of NATO forces, particularly with regard to collateral damage with an impact on the protection of civilians. And Unified Protector operation is a clear example.

The article brings a comparison of the approaches to the strategic defence analysis (SDA) and developing future Defence Concepts (DFDC) of the Czech Republic and Norway. The countries are in a different geopolitical situation, NOR being a country with borders that are part of the outer border of the Alliance, the Czech Republic being a country surrounded by three member countries of the Alliance and one PfP country. On the basis of the comparison of the two approaches, the authors identified differences and common points of the two. Based on the findings, the discussion provides inspiration for possible enhancements in the approach of the Czech Republic to SDA to ensure the future defence of the country. All that in context of current Security developments in Europe, that have an impact on how NATO member countries might deal with Article 3 and Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

The former warriors from opposing sides are recounting their version of events have always been important in understanding history. In studying the Cold War, The Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP) has undertaken the mission of preserving the history of the two alliances that faced each other for decades on the continent of Europe during the Cold War. It has been collecting, analyzing and interpreting previously secret government documents and making them available via their unrestricted website [www.isn.ethz.ch/php/index. htm]. Documents alone cannot define the thinking behind events, so PHP is now gathering key players from both sides to discuss their perspectives on events. The first meeting in this series took place in Sweden, in April 2006. Similar conferences should add to the historical accuracy and understanding of that very long and dangerous period when the two large groups of armies stood ready against each other. Source: Army No. 7/2006.

The heads of state and government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance met this date in Riga to face the security challenges ofthe 21st century. The summit provided a platform for interaction between the security and defence community in order to discuss the global threats, challenges to the integrity of the world's energy system. It provided a focus on the pragmatic responses to the challenges to global energy supply and system integrity, enhancing energy security across the Euro-Atlantic area. Part of the discussion focused on defining NATO's role in the field of energy security, as part of state economy security. The Czech legislation doesn't know the term of "criticalinfrastructure". But now, the basic predispositions are being laid down for creating relevant regulations in the field of crisis management. It is gratifying to see that newly approved Czech State Energy Concept is not only in harmony with the so-called the Green Paper, "A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy" of 2006, but it its visions of security, independence, and sustainable development of energetics even exceeds the limits set down by the Green Paper.

The main goal of this article is to depict the issue of intelligence information sharing within the so called principle "need to share" and highlight the differences of this current trend, which was to replace the "need to know" principle. The first chapter in reference to current global threats depicts the extent of the present national and international interrest in the intelligence field which is followed by the issue of "need to share" principle. The aim of the following chapter is briefly analyse the sfaring of intelligence information within NATO and the EU. This chapter also includes the possible sharing of SIGINT information obtained by national tactical element embedded in Task force during current day operations. The final part evaluates the intelligence information sharing and outlines certain prediction of future development in this field.

This article presents main ideas of the document, released by the Allied Command Transformation in March 2007. Terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will be the principal threats for NATO. Further threats will come from unstable or failed states, regional crises and conflicts, growing availability of advanced conventional weapons, misuse of emerging technologies and disruption of flow of vital resources. India, China and Russia will be key players in future security environment. North Korea, Iran and Syria will present biggest threat to NATO. Following the release of the FSE Study, International Military Staff and defence planners will assess the implications for NATO forces. The purpose of this study is to offer professional views as starting point for solving prospective problems and threats.

This short information is based upon articles widely published in 2005-06 in Western military magazines and newspapers. After September 11, 2001, NATO member states are discussing the deployment of nuclear weapons at non-strategical level. Among others, this is embarrassed by the Russian attitude and general demands of some European NATO nations to update Alliance strategy. What does it mean? There are voices to remove nuclear weapons from Europe. As the alternative to American nuclear weapons they offer forming European nuclear forces, consisting mostly or exclusively of Britain and France potentials. Nevertheless, most of European states ask the US to keep nuclear weapons on European continent. NATO nuclear strategy is still valid: atomic arsenals represent an effective deterrence against the weapons of mass destruction, whoever might use them.

This year we marked the 10th anniversary of our full membership in NATO. We've verified that the nation can become a "full fledged member" in eight or ten years at earliest. Signing the treaty, you became "only" a freshman. You must learn everything, from "consensus building" to forming informal coalition. The author of this article, Deputy of the Czech Permanent Representative to NATO, summarizes the history of fulfilling the membership's prerequisites and following difficult process of implementation of fundamentals and requirements, e.g. the so-called NATO legal acquis (Status of Forces Agreement), Planning and Review Process, setting Force Goals, fixing Identification Friend or Foe on Mi-21 aircraft assigned for Air Policing, problems with developing home infrastructure for Host Nation Support. We joined common security planning, took part in NATO Security Investment Programme and Conference of National Armaments Directors. But today's organization is quite different that used to be, the role and missions have changed. We must be prepared to meet them too.

The aim of the article is to present a synthesis of findings from both analyses and their application while conceiving a proposal of methodology for military capability assessment of Armed Forces of the Czech Republic. The proposed approach to capability assessment stems from principles of the NATO´s J-DARTS (Joint Defence Planning Analysis and Requirements Tool Set) and EU´s SAEP (Scrutinising, Assessing, Evaluating and Prioritising Process) when the main attention was focused on the phase of matching current capabilities of force units against capability requirements, follow-on identification of shortfalls and their prioritisation. The degree of priority should primarily qualify the level of operational risk stemming from potential engagement of force units in an operation.

This paper deals with a geospatial support at a strategic level, especially with the production of rapid map products, presenting at this level the most required product type. Backed by their own working experiences from both NATO and EU command structures, the authors describe requirements for geospatial products created at a strategy level, emphasizing the importance of respecting the general cartographic principles. The authors compare the general technology of thematic map production, making use of Geographic Information System, technology, with the technology specific to the strategic level. They also describe the specifics of production at that level, presenting examples both similarities and differences between geospatial support in NATO and the EU.

This article delves into multi-domain operations in the context of future warfighting. A multi-domain approach to operations is being progressively implemented in allied nations and within NATO, as well. It should also become a core interest for the Czech Republic, even if the sea and space domains do not represent the crucial area of potential operational engagement of the Army of the Czech Republic. The complexity of operations in a complex operating environment requires mutual interaction across all operational domains. The integration of the physical and virtual spheres of operations suggests that operations planning cannot be strictly oriented to individual operational domains. The interaction between operational domains must be perceived as a sine qua non for effective planning and conducting military operations. This is also a fundamental prerequisite for the successful activity of forces in a complex operating environment.

The objective of this article is to analyse the security and foreign policy of the Russian Federation in 2008-2012, in terms of security culture. The article is based on the assumption that the Russian security and foreign policy during Medvedev's presidency was characterized by four features: promoting multilateralism, exaggeration Russian national security threats, emphasizing the possibility of the use of nuclear deterrence, and using energy as a political tool. The article is based on three Russian strategic documents, i.e. Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020 and the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. It also examines some events of Russian internal and external policy, especially Russian-Georgian conflict, Medvedev's proposal to create new security architecture in Europe, or the security relations between Russia and the EU, NATO and the U.S.

Russia has always had a keen interest in the Western Balkans. It was historically realised in the context of geopolitical continuities of the expansion of its territory and influence. Russia has tried to gain influence in this region for political, economic, identity and strategic reasons. However, after the start of military aggression against Ukraine in 2014, Russia opted for a confrontation in the Western Balkans where it opposes the EU and NATO expansion policies and influence of the West in this region. Key Russian leverage for spreading its influence in the region is the Serbian geopolitical design of military neutrality and the convergence of strategic interests of the two countries. Russia wants to exert a strong influence on the Western Balkans, and thus on the security of the EU. On the other hand, Serbia wants to position itself as the main actor of power in the region with simultaneous support from both Russia and the West.

The article deals with the basic characteristics and tactical-technical requirements for the tactical unmanned aerial system (TUAS), which is planned to be implemented in the Czech Armed Forces in the upcoming years. Based on the results of the comparison of the Czech Armed Forces requirements with the parameters corresponding to the TUAS, the Hermes 900 and Heron systems of Israeli production appear to be the most suitable variants. Both aircrafts can represent a comprehensive solution in this area. They both have a long tradition of production, research and development and of course, they both meet the requirements for TUAS within NATO and the European traffic operations accreditation. However, the decisive selection parameter, apart from security risks and compatibility, is also the purchase price. The main goal of the article is to bring a view of the issue from a broader context and to find a possible way-out together with an evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of each of the proposed variants.

The article deals with the artillery manual gunnery in accordance with the modernization of the czech artillery. The article describes the results of research aimed at innovating manual (alternative) methods of determining the firing data so that they are applicable on the contemporary battlefield and are compatible with the nature of the data used by artillery within the NATO. The issue of the article is aimed primarily at determining the firing data by the use of meteorological techniques, while presenting the outputs of a comparative analysis of procedures used in the czech artillery with the procedures applied by the US army. The main contribution of the article is a critical evaluation of the approaches of both armies and a proposal for innovation of existing procedures so that the most beneficial requirements are applied and negatives are eliminated.

The paper outlines several recommendations for strengthening the institutional framework of the analytical support function for credible defence management. Recommendations are drawn based on the outcome of the institutional research project named Strategic Alternatives conducted by the Centre for Security and Military Strategic Studies of University of Defence (CSMSS). The multi-objective research focuses on organisational arrangement of the analytical support function within the overall ministry of defence organisational architecture of several countries (Canada, Norway, Sweden) as well as the NATO structure and management (in this case, the main focus embraces the analytical support to defence planning). Analytical support to defence decision making process in these countries enjoys a long-term tradition which goes back to the period of WWII. The way the analytical function is understood is highly relevant also for the enhancement of credible defence management in the Czech Republic and its Ministry of Defence.

The consequences of economic recession and their impact on national defence budgets can indeed heavily hamper the credibility of both NATO and the EU. A need for coping with budget restrictions and ongoing security crisis in the Ukraine re-opens the issue of common European armed forces as an effective tool for keeping security stability not only in Europe, but also around the world. However, the key issue is to what extent it is feasible to develop autonomous European armed forces operating independently of transatlantic allies, while there is a very strong NATO-EU interconnection in the area of military capability development.

The article examines the impact of recent geopolitical, economic, and security changes on logistics support capabilities in EU and NATO member states. The study analyzes the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the armed conflict in Ukraine on logistics supply chains, considering environmental, social, and security concerns. The research questions focus on identifying the main changes and assessing their implications for commercial, military, and humanitarian logistics. The prolongation of the conflict in Ukraine and the economic sanctions imposed on Russia have been found to have a significant impact on logistics capabilities, perceptions of the structure of supply chains and the risks arising from this. The impact of these events is also producing third-country poverty and dehumanizing the UN SDG goals. On the other hand, improvements in NATO troop readiness and weaponry have been noted. The study highlights the need for further research to investigate specific threats for different types of supply chains and to consider the complex and evolving nature of the issue. Ultimately, this research provides insights into the challenges and opportunities facing logistics capabilities in the context of ongoing geopolitical and environmental changes.

The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces that remain is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion. The Alliance has taken far-reaching steps to adapt its overall policy and defence posture to the new security environment. NATO?s nuclear strategy and force posture were among the first areas to be reviewed. The Alliance?s 1999 Strategic Concept set forth the essential principles for the role and characteristics of NATO?s Nuclear Forces. This article provides an account of the most significant changes to NATO?s nuclear policy. As a first major step of relaxation, the readiness posture of dual-capable aircraft was greatly reduced, in 2002, the readiness requirements for these aircraft were further reduced and are now being measured in months. The author also writes about problems discussed at informal meeting of NATO defence ministers at Taormina, Italy, 2006.

This article focuses on answering the question to what extent did the German foreign and security policy change, based on the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, especially when it comes to military deployment abroad. The author identifies and analyses the consequences associated with the German experience in Afghanistan and their influence on the current and future deployment of German armed forces abroad. The attention is given to the German strategic culture of "civilian power" and the question, if Germany still fulfills the attributes connected with this theoretical concept. The author verifies this assumption by means of the role theory concept, which helps to understand the behavior of Germany on the international level.

At the time of forming the team around a designated defence minister Alexander Vondra, in the early summer 2010, there was no doubt that we need a complex concept document, able to analyze and describe the then situation, to readjust directions and goals for defence department, so that it could stimulate the follow-up transformation of Czech Army. The author, who used to be one of the leading Defence Ministry officials, thus made use of his experiences he gained in NATO structures. He gives an apt, well-founded, and first hand description of key points of this very fresh military history.

The aim of the article is to recall the thoughts of war strategists on how to conduct military operations during the Cold War and to present the issue of operational maneuvering groups. Their use was a new conceptual framework of offensive operations led by the highly mobile military units of the Warsaw Pact in the 1970s and 1980s. Based on the analysis and comparison of historical sources, a set of information and knowledge from the field of military art is presented here as well as a more comprehensive view on the tactical, operational and strategic context of the offensive operations on the European battlefield. Their impacts were also essential in the way of training of troops and education of military officers in the former regime.

The article is based on the neorealist theory and is aimed to the analysis of the military doctrines of the USA published between 2012 - 2018. It evaluates them as the consequence of important changes after the end of the Cold War, namely the process of the enlargement of NATO. The article explains the US doctrines as a manifestation of a reinforced military self - esteem of the USA and warns that these doctrines should lead to an increase of the military tension at the Eastern frontier of the enlarged NATO.

The article is a polemic reflection over the potential concept and vision of defence and EU combined armed forces, from the military point of view. It recalls previous efforts and present activities to implement common security and defence policy in practice. It is a short analysis of conditions under which the EU is situated, and in general contours it characterizes possible advantages of common European armed forces. It expresses author's opinion that by forming "European Pillar" in NATO, the transatlantic linkage between the EU and the USA will not be weakening, but on the contrary, it will be strengthen. The author uses the terms "European army" and "common armed forces of EU" that he takes as synonyms and therefore he asks the reader to take this fact in account.

In spite of the fact that the security tensions are not so high as during the cold war, with impending nuclear conflict, the global security situation is far from ideal. Fundamental changes in a global security environment have brought except a lot of positives also many negatives, in a form of various asymmetric security threats. The rise of new military and nonmilitary dangers, under the influence of globalization and contemporary worldwide economic crisis, is directly related to the need of conflict prevention, crisis management, peace missions, law enforcement, or support to humanitarian assistance.

This article aims to reflect a digression into the history of selected strategic documents, which processed the Ministry of Defence or was in the processing involved - in connection to the planning of acquisitions. The ambition of the article is not a comprehensive evaluation process, but only the selected aspects. After many years of decreasing Czech defence budget, is here the opposite situation. In connection with the new situation it is necessary to rethink the current approach to this topic; to ensure maximal security of the Czech Republic and in a figurative sense NATO and the European Union also. The fact, that the Czech strategy document was among the best in the EU, does not mean that defence spending is automatically efficient.