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Contemporary International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is the law of armed conflict or law of war and their effects. The goal of IHL is to limit the effects of warfare on people and property and to protect particularly vulnerable persons. The IHL does not exclude war activities as it acknowledges the principle of the so-called war necessity. Humanitarian law is the branch of public international law that comprises the rules, which, in times of armed conflict, seek to protect persons who are not or are no longer taking part in the hostilities, restrict the methods and means of warfare employed, and resolve matters of humanitarian concern resulting from war. This article is intended to help to soldiers to understand better IHL rules and principles.

War game is a simulation of military operations intended to train military commanders or to test a proposed strategy. It is a game in which model soldiers are used to create battles, in order to study tactics. This article illustrates the importance of War Game COAs (course of action). It was tested against opposing force COAs. Such exercise will help to identify advantages and disadvantages and the key elements of execution planning for each COA. The lesson learned during OHQ CZE/SVK BG EU Staff Exercises that took place in Olomouc from January 19th, to January 23rd, and from February 16th, to February 20th, 2009 is that war-gaming (although time consuming) is something closer to "reality" than the "theory" in doctrines. The war-gaming practices teamwork, facilitates team-building and enables to share mental model COA. Commanders and their staff ought to be engaged in simulations and war games more frequently. All information and sources for this paper were drawn from unclassified materials.

This paper analyses some of the accesses to developing modular structures of task forces, built not only on a base of combined arms, but also even the base of special units, formations, Czech Chemical Corps. The analysis is derived from documents, doctrines, at both political-strategic level and military-strategical level within state defence command. Moreover, the article offers information related to operational-tactical level of command and control. At the end, the author evaluates some possible impacts of modular structures on practical activities of forces. It is necessary to define those impacts in a framework of particular projects, dealing with the formation of modular structures.

At that time, the base for plural societies in Eastern Europe was founded. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary joined NATO defence alliance. Serious global threats of economic, military, ecology, social, ethnic, religious, criminal characters were lasting. The important question of proliferation of mass destruction weapons was raised. The analyses of security situations in Europe and the World respectively proved that armed conflicts were mostly internal, in a form of civic wars, but demographically endangering bordering countries. Those threats were only discussed, namely nobody fully realized the threat of terrorism. Defence budgets were reduced, all people wanted to profit from the so-called peace dividends. Czech army was loyal to the state; it was not misused in inner political conflicts, which was regarded as something normal by the majority of Czech public. But there were many problems left, especially the role and engagement of the ACR in the following century.

The specification of terminology related to terms command and control (C2) is quite important for further scholarly examination of military science. The command and control area is nowadays under the constant impact of the influx of information technology, as well as it is affected by the changes in the contemporary security environment. This article is dedicated to the military, its history, and its contributions to current military operations. It provides an attempt to specify terms "command and control" in both general and military levels. Finally, it provides clarification of the terminology within command and control systems, as their terminology has been changing. In a simple way, the C2 could be characterized as the execution of authority by the commander, via communication and information systems, with the use of current standard operational procedures, under present laws and rules, to act in the interest of forces to meet assigned orders and intentions.

The term "hybrid war" is frequently used today within the military community, but the term does not bring something new in the view of the terminology of the stability operations, comprehensive approach or compound wars. This concept is based on the destructive threats to the military components of international community. It does not help in delimiting reasons of violent confl ict and from that point it is harmful, as it does not explain soldiers why they are fi ghting the "just war", why they should sacrifi ce their lives in confl icts far away from their homeland. We should not use terms of hybrid wars, hybrid confl icts, hybrid enemies or forces. Only "hybrid warfare" could find some legitimacy, but only when used with the correct definition of the conflict typology, backed by the political objectives of the war. Confl icts typology, as used, forms the framework for the mission analysis orientation at all command & control levels and it guides the informational support to the military decision making processes.

The article continues explanation basic operational terms, familiarizes readers with true theoretical fundamentals of the key element of operational design - the decisive point. Basic doctrinal interpretations are described and explained. Its introduction and utilization is visible during the operational planning process and elaboration of operational design. The concept of decisive point has a close connection to the other concepts, namely lines of operations, the centre of gravity and the end state. The concept is further evolved via example of peace support military operation planning process. Key words: decisive points, decisive conditions, lines of operations, centre of gravity, effect, kinetic, nonkinetic operations, doctrine.

There are two great interpreters of the Napoleonic experience, Jomini and Clausewitz. Both were interested in the application of military force to achieve political goals. The article familiarizes readers with Jomini's theoretical fundamentals of operational design elements, namely the lines of operations. Jomini left a great mark on the details of strategic planning: campaign planning, the selection of the theatre of operation, the base of operation, the line of operation, and decisive points. At the end of this process of selection was the final deployment for the decisive battle. Jomini's major contribution, then, was to provide the geometry of the battle space. In his investigation of the nature of war he developed several key operational concepts. As an operational art tools they help the commander and staff to visualize the arrangement of military capabilities in time, space, and purpose to accomplish the mission. The concept of operational lines is evolved in all operational functions in terms of ongoing military missions.

The article deals with the problems of current "military engineering" in Czech Army, which arose during drawing up the "Doctrine for land forces operations". The content of this article consists mainly of three parts. The first one has to characterize some doctrine development aspects from the engineer's contributor point of view. Secondly, to adduce requirements for the content of a doctrine which are consequent to NATO main military engineering documents, e.g. MC 0560, AJP-3-12(A) and ATP-52(B). Thirdly, this level has to evoke resourceful discussions on topical military engineering within military community and to contribute to the mutual opinion consensus achievement.

The article familiarizes readers with theoretical fundamentals of the key element of operational design, i.e. decisive point that is described as "a point from which a hostile or friendly centre of gravity can be threatened". It may exist in time, space or the information environment. As a tool of operational art, it helps commander and his staff to unlock the path to the centre of gravity. The concept is further evolved via example of peace support military operation planning process. The close understanding to terms decisive points, lines of operations, centre of gravity, kinetic effects, non-kinetic operations, doctrine is for military planners fundamental. The aim of this article is therefore to explain this basic terminology, to describe connections with other element of operational planning that could be used during all steps of operational planning. Basic theoretical Jomini's implications are introduced and their doctrinal interpretations are highlighted.

This article illustrates the troubles encountered with development of the NRF. The NATO Response Force is a highly ready and technologically advanced force made up of land, air, sea and special operations forces components that the Alliance can deploy quickly wherever needed. The NRF is intended to be a transformational force that will not only be able to meet the security needs of NATO in 21st century but also serve as an agent of change whereby all the member nations of NATO will be able to bring capabilities, and concepts of operations into their national forces. Undoubtedly, the NRF will not provide a basis for solving all of complex challenges. But it does offer an opportunity for experimentation and testing-the essence of military transformation-and the forging of creative solutions. The views expressed in this assessment are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of NATO or EU.

The overall purpose of this paper is to describe the way the Alliance and the also the Czech Army is going to apply the leverage of powers while conducting operations in the future. The article shows in details that the relative combat power analysis requires an assessment of factors either directly or indirectly affecting the potential outcome of the operation. In order to improve military knowledge and operational thinking within the Czech Army it is recommended to improve the quality of officers' military training and personnel preparation in accordance with Czech MoD White Paper on Defence. The views expressed in this assessment are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of Alliance or the Czech Ministry of Defence.

The exercise was a continuation of series of exercises that were conducted in previous years. Among others, participants of the CPX were representatives of Defence University Brno, National Defence Academy Vienna, Austria, and the Armed Forces Academy, Liptovský Mikuláš, Slovakia. During the exercise, in imaginary region POPRADLAND, there were practiced various basis aspects of forces preparations and engagement that focus on EU Battle Group in Area of Responsibility, explaining forming commander and staff's decision-making process at the level of Battalion Task Force, during operational planning and its engagement in action. At the end the Officer Conducting the Exercise certified that participants in the CPX fulfilled set goals and aims of this exercise sucessfully. The exercise was designated maily for members of Higher and Basic Command and Staff Courses.

The fundamentals of this concept, as they were explained in previous Military Review No 1, 2011, have stayed unchanged, up to the present. There still exist operational bases, directions, courses, lines, upon which military convoys transfer by the plan or in disorderly manner. Such picture corresponds to linear wars of first, second and third generations. The wars of fourth generation are characterized by the speed and initiative. The frontiers between war and politics are blurred, so are between civilians and combatants. They are mostly wars with and among non-state actors, counter-insurgency operations (COIN) Based on doctrinal analysis; author describes concepts philosophy in functional and logical aspects. This might help the commander and staff to visualize the arrangement of military capabilities in time, space, and purpose to accomplish the mission. The concept might be successfully applied in connection with stability and COIN operations.

President Barack Obama came to power at a difficult time in America's history. Home and foreign policies are hard to manage, among others, as we are on the threshold of post-ethnic society, and in the war with terrorisms. Obama does not give up American leadership, but he is seeking to find the balance between security and liberty, between power and freedom in the world, broadly speaking. As the consequence, Mr. Rašek presumes emerging the new global security situation: the rise of multipolar world, divided into several new political spheres. This author's opinion is backed by comments by reputable world's political analysts. As far as Euro-Atlantic relations are concerned, or relations with Russia, there are excellent prospects, namely there is the progress with Russia on arms control-part of Obama's determination to put the world on a path toward nuclear disarmament. The author ascribes the drop in Obama's popularity to failed healthcare reform; outside the US, to the fact that Obama is not able to define clear goals and missions in Afghanistan.

The overall purpose of this paper is to describe the ways the Alliance and the also the Czech Army will apply the operational art tenets, conducting operations in the future. The current military problems cannot be solved without a deep understanding and knowledge of operational art. In order to improve military thinking within the Czech Army, it is recommended to study and apply operational art. The operational art forms a bridge between strategy defining the political aims of war and tactics, fighting the battles. Commanders and staff officers should study operational art seriously, systematically and with all their efforts. The author deals with current state of present operational art to inform on new developments in this field of military art. The article broadens the vision and deepens the insights of its readers. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.

The existence of the Czech Army is at state. We need to get over present cut in military budget, ill-advised savings, without searching for new appropriate financial and material sources. To save something important means always to sacrifice or to give up something. Some security and military experts wish to dissociate themselves with approved methods. They think that the White Paper doesn't express opinions on many important things. It assumed that after five years there will be need to revise this White Book. So, proposes the author, wouldn't be better for us to regard the White Book only as an analytical document containing certain proposals for the following Defence Strategy of the CR, as originally intended?

There are no military conflicts without deception, as it is among others a very cheap method how to contribute to the successful accomplishment of the assigned mission. Military deception (MILDEC) is applicable across a wide range of military operations. MILDEC can be conducted during all phases of military operations at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. It is defined as being those actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. According to he author, the operational deception is to be explained in more detail, basic rules are to be outlined, including fundamental principles and methods of deception for operational planning.

In the previous Military Review we introduced the article "Will Military Deception Pass Away?" by the same author. In the Army of the Czech Republic we have no manual dealing with military deception (MILDEC). The only manual concerning MILDEC was abolished without any substitute. But military art can't be further developed without similar documents. Today we take MILDEC as a complex set of provisions misleading enemy's commanders and staff, by means of false information and counterfeit data that deliberately deceive adversary decision-makers and planners. Use of MILDEC during any phase of an operation also helps to mislead adversaries as to the strength, readiness, locations, and intended missions of friendly forces. The MILDEC could contribute to the successful accomplishment of the assigned mission by many ways.

The proponents of Revolution in Military Affairs claim that modern military technology will lift a "fog of war". In this article the term "fog of war" is described and illustrated in a work of Carl von Clausewitz who is supposed to introduce this term, used also in the famous novel War and Peace by Leo Tolstoy. These classics show us that uncertainty and chance, in other words fogs of war, are essential to human mentality. They will be present as long as war remains within a scope human endeavour. Emphasizing that military technology is equal to lifting the "fog of war" can lead to situation in which only trained commanders are supposed be able perfectly address problems in "chessboard" of war or computer simulators, but they will unable to manage a real world full of chaos, as they not used to count with uncertainties.

Such exercises are regular part of European exercise process that in periodical cycles examines individual capacities of solving crisis situations, conducting crisis operations under methods developed by the EU. European training process does not cover only the preparation of military units, but also those of civil elements (police, rescue teams, diplomats). Since 2007 the exercises have been ran according to a common scenario "ALISIA", with the purpose to practise crisis operations control by commanders and staffs of EU nations, without any means and elements or support by NATO. European exercise process allows to the EUMS to organize and harmonize two exercises of solving crisis situations in a year. Five members of the Czech Army took part in the exercise MILEX 09 last year. They were involved in the operational planning process at the EU OHQ Specialist Staff, CJ2, CJ4, CJ5 and CJ7 departments. The article is mostly based on the experiences of Czech offi cers at the EU OHQ LARISSA.

The article presents six more or less structured analytical methods that are or could be employed in intelligence analysis. This type of analysis, one part of the intelligence cycle, is understood as "the process of evaluating data for reliability, validity, and relevance; integrating and analysing it; converting the product of this effort into a meaningful whole, which includes assessment of events and implications of the information collected". The set of presented methods includes: link analysis, opportunity analysis, analogy, linchpin analysis, analysis of competing hypothesis and alternative scenarios. The study doesn't stop with presenting those methods; it also explains which type of reasoning (inductive, deductive or abductive) is used when working with each particular method. In broad terms, the article tries to shed light on intelligence analysis and its specifics. The reader should obtain better understanding their usefulness in the daily work of intelligence analyst.

The Engineers are specialist soldiers trained in the construction and demolition of bridges, field fortifications, obstacles, roads, etc. Their major task is to support Czech missions abroad, as a part of multinational peacekeeping forces. This article is a preliminary study into the current state of applying the Czech Engineer units in operations other than war as a part of Joint Forces Peace Support Operations. There are mentioned some aspects, for example basic engineer support tasks, possible demanded future capabilities of the Czech Engineer Troops, engineer support to movement and force protection engineering. The purpose of this article is to initiate a debate about the topic and to start the brainstorming process in a broad military environment.

The Provincial Reconstruction Team of Czech Republic operates in very complicated conditions and environment that are in fact hostile. It can't be excluded that growing scepticism, today common among Afghanistan security experts, more or less could affects even Czech members of ISAF missions. This study deals with existing knowledge end experiences of Czech PRT in Afghanistan. It is divided into two parts. The fi rst one concerns with outside and inside factors infl uencing ISAF missions. It brings in details characteristics of geographical, historic ambiances in which ISAF mission are performed. The second part concentrates on tangible experiences of Czech PRT members, both in political and military spheres. Here the authors summarize conclusions and upon them they outline challenges for the future.

The basic task of the post-1989 period was to formulate a security policy and a strategy ensuing from it. The strategy had to be based on a synthesis of the international policy concept, defence concept and internal security concept to ensure that defence would not be seen solely as the task of the army and the Ministry of Defence, but of the whole state and society-of every citizen. In this article his author evaluates some aspects of the armed forces transformation in process of adaptation. He assesses these changes with regard to approved strategic and conceptual documents that significantly determined this gradual transformation process. He identifies both same of its successes as well as failures. The study does not have a clearly analytical and evaluative character; rather it is a combination of factual information drawn from official sources, country's practical security policy as they appeared in contemporary Czech press, and opinions of the author.

The Combined Joint Exercise was focused on the European approach to crisis management operations and involved an annual exchange of students and directing staffs between of the Higher Command and Staff Colleges from France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and Spain. The aim of this article is to provide knowledge and personal experience of its author based on his own participation in this exercise at the Escuela Superior de las Fuerzas Armadas (ESFAS) Madrid. The purpose of the exercise was to foster the understanding, mutual knowledge and dialogue among the offi cers of the aforementioned colleges through the practice of operational planning. Among general information describing the character of the exercise, the article defines some areas of the operational art, namely Operational Planning Process, Operational Design, Decisive Point Concept and Centre of Gravity Analysis.

Suicide bombing represents a low-cost, low-tech weapon that is readily available, requires little training, leaves little forensic trace, and strikes fear into the general population. Almost exclusively, suicide bombers emanate from distinct ethnicities and religions; furthermore, recent history indicates that they come from the Arab/Muslim or East Asian cultures. As important as the suicide bombers are the activists and sympathizers who offer them support and comfort. These activists may recoil from committing acts of violence themselves but may sympathize with those who do, and offer moral and material support. This article explores the psychosocial aspects and methods of suicide bombers in general, but with particular focus on those operating in Palestine, Moscow (Chechen guerrillas, 2002), Singar (Iraq 2007).

This operation was led by Germany, and made up of elements contributed by twenty EU nations; as well as Turkey and Switzerland. The EU deployed FHQ in Kinshasa and simultaneously kept the over-the-horizon force in Gabon, in order to ensure a deterrent capacity and to avoid unnecessary heavy military presence in Kinshasa. After Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EUFOR RD Congo was a second EU largest military operation, involving a total of almost 3,000 soldiers and officers). The co-operation with MONUC was decisive in containing the potential spread of violence at a particularly sensitive moment in the election process. The operation demonstrated the EU ability to successfully conduct medium scale autonomous multinational operations within a planned time frame under the UN mandate. The views expressed in this assessment are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of EU Military Structure or the Czech Ministry of Defence. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.

The idea of this enquiry into Czech Army logistics was to prove that even under hard conditions originated in permanently changing army concepts, the army logistics still keeps its high standard and responsibility. During transformation, an appropriate organization structure has been created, with working mechanism of logistics support, using motivated and rationale source exploitation. The purpose of an array of transformation in defence sector was to introduce not only new and effective army structure, compatible with NATO armies, but also to change the system of fi nancing forces. The funding ought to be more economical. The article is backed by a longterm study and observation of logistics development in defence sector.

This article deals with the EU command and control functions and provides basic information on the structure and capabilities of the EU CCS in Battle Group EU operations. The author describes political and strategical levels CCS (COREPER, GAERC, COPS, CivCom, EUMC, EUMS, BDE HQ, prospective EU FHQ). Only US, EU and E3 (Britain, France, Germany) are capable to realize integrated expeditional operations. The ACR can work only with cooperation with them. The Czech Republic as a small EU member state is actively engaged in the building of the Battle Group EU. The Czech Army is going to increase its expeditionary capabilities as demanded and be prepared for a broader range of conflicts and crises in the vital area of the EU concerns. At present, the ACR is able to carry out a self-supported, integrated expedition operation only on the edge of all its strength. The political leaders must bear this fact in mind, as the army mustn't be overburdened, otherwise it might lose its credibility. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.