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Generally speaking, simulations help our soldiers to hone their skills, rehearse their missions. Such simulations are done at the Centre of Simulation and Training Technologies. It is divided into two simulation resorts that have been working for several years. It is therefore high time to summarize their practical experiences and analyse the results reached. This is also the theme of scholarly task conducted by staff members, Faculty of Economy and Management, Defence University Brno. The article presents users' opinions how introduced simulation technologies influence the process of preparations of military professionals. The data were collected by means of questionnaires in which the users expressed their own experiences with the deployment of simulation technologies in both simulation resorts. At the end the author proposes further directions of their advancements.

Supported by several historical examples, this article covers the past and contemporary development of both role and organizational structure of the infantry fire teams and squads. Fire team (or fireteam in British English) is an infantry grouping of four or less men (half of a section, GB); or one third of a squad (US). The fire team concept of the U.S. and British Army is shown as an example how to more effectively employ infantry in the all-volunteer military force. The author also shortly mentions Infantry Squad

In this article the author explores the potential roles for unmanned ground vehicles (tactical UGVs) in the modern battle space as pack mules, fighting scouts and perimeter sentries as new concepts of operation, designs and products emerge. Remote control vehicles could be also used in explosive ordnance disposal operations. Urban warfare looks set to become a particularly rich field for this sort of robots. The article discusses the challenges in developing and deploying cost-effective UGVs on the battlefield. There are still many problems, namely technological. The price for a UGV is comparable to price for four or five wheeled armoured vehicles. The article is based upon materials from RUSI Defence Systems (No. 2/2007), studies by Myron E. Mills, Kevin Ivison, James Masey. Ulf Stremmel; and Andy Simms: Robot Wars. Soldier, No. 12, 2007.

The necessary predisposition of successful meeting assigned tasks of every military contingent sent abroad lies in a high cooperation of its elements, hidden performance of all mission members. The purpose of this article is to introduce nearly invisible activities of geographic and hydro meteorological specialists of the ACR, who prepared and printed geographical maps of Logar province. It is the very first set of maps created by the method of rapid symbolization of GIS data (Geographic Information System), based upon standard Topographic Map TLM50. Vocational preparedness of military geographers is high. Technological means, advanced technology they use in Logar, are an indispensable prerequisite for successful fulfilment of their mission with honours. In fact, the Czech contingent consists of nearly 200 members, formed by soldiers of 102nd reconnaissance battalion Prostějov, 7th mech brigade Hranice, 13th arty brigade Jince, 15th rescue engineers brigade Bechyně, 103rd Centre CIMIC/PSYOPS Lipník, 22nd Air Base Náměšť and other members of Czech armed forces.

Terrorism threatens to attack and destroy the open democracy, but what is terrorism? The main aim of this essay is to formulate some proposals of a minimal operational definition tied with terrorism, as well as a definition of terrorist attack with the ambition to surpass a possibility of an ambiguous construction in the field of semantical research. Terrorism is usually described as unlawful violent activism targeted against civilians or against civilian targets with the aim of achieving political, religious, ideological and other goals. It presents wellconsidered ways of production and fructification of fear that are applied on civilian targets. A terrorist attack communicates devastatingly as a pure act of violence inside the psychosomatic structure of its recipients (victims). The new terrorism after 9/11 attacks could be characterized by fanaticism and the impending danger of arms of mass destruction. It is a culture of death.

Lowering numbers of humane resources and heavy armed vehicles, together with military materials, subsequent transition to light vehicles, with advanced technologies, being capable of quick, rapid movements-those are worldwide trends in the field of military that are reflected also in the Army of the Czech Republic. This new type of forces is able to reach high warfare effectivity-even with lowest numbers of servicemen-in combat and non-combat operations. Namely this article deals with some problem segments of the fire support of mechanized troops. The author describes individual elements of the system, their tasks and responsibilities. At the end of article he summarises the tasks we need for complex and effective fire support of mechanized troops, especially fire support to task forces.

Management by objectives (MBO), first outlined by Peter Drucker in the 1950s, is a systematic and organized approach that allows management to focus on achievable goals and to attain the best possible results from available resources. The tasks are delegated to subordinates without dictating a detailed roadmap for implementation. Everybody within the organization has a clear understanding of the aims, or objectives, as well as awareness of their own roles and responsibilities in achieving those aims. In the U. S. Army, MBO was implemented into The Army Plan FY 2000-2015, with 789 operational capabilities, divided into 1,248 operational standards, but without demonstrable success, as the system worked rather formally; it was too complicated. The same was true in the Czech Army, where e.g. The Set of Objectives till 2005 came into existence in 1991. The author tries to explain why. He concludes that MBO can be a useful management tool in the army environment, but it should not be realized without proper understanding this process.

The key fact is that changes in the political, economic, social, and technical spheres are making it possible for a small group bound together by a cause to use new technologies to challenge nation-states. 4GW (Fourth Generation Warfare) uses all the shifts from a mechanical to an information/electronic society to maximize the power of insurgency. Fifth-generation warfare (5GW) will result from the continued shift of political and social loyalties to causes rather than nations. It will be marked by the increasing power of smaller and smaller entities and the explosion of biotechnology. The purpose of this article is to widen the discussion on what forms 4GW may take and to offer a possible model for the next generation of war: 5GW. Adapted from Military Review, May-June 2007.

The second part of this short serial deals with the theory of the operational art focusing on the centre of gravity (COG). The article emanates from Carl von Clausewitz's ideas, doctrinal publications analysis and many study projects of the operational art theorists. The author especially aims on disunity and heterogeneity of comprehension of the centre of gravity theory in confrontation of contemporary doctrinal publications and original Clausewitz's theory. He compares operational manuals (those of U.S. and NATO), and finds similarities concerning characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a military force, nation or alliance, derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. Finally, he himself defines enemy's centre of gravity and highlights coherences that can affect fulfilling political and military objectives in current and future military operations.

As the military's current fight against terrorists and insurgents does not follow the templates of the past, it requires innovative, adaptive thinking. This article summarises the main ideas of the essay "We the People are not the Center of Gravity in an Insurgency" by Maj. Mark P. Krieger, published in Military Review No. 4, 2007. A COG could be characterized as a source of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, will to act. The definition is important namely when military planners try to identify enemy COGs. There is a single COG at the operational level; the tactical level of war has decisive points. COGs organize and direct critical capabilities, physical or psychological. An insurgency's case is its strategic COG, its organization is operational COG, and the people are a decisive point at the tactical level. The population is important in an insurgency, because the people are a tangible to target, but it is not a COG. Attacking an insurgency?s organization will weaken the strategic COG that becomes vulnerable to attack and destruction.

Antiballistic defence systems could be defined as a secondary defensive response to ballistic threats, against existing, projected or planned ballistic military hardware. In a way, it is a sort of deterrence weapon, because such defence discourages opponents form the development of offensive missiles. The author of this article, the former deputy defence minister, Maj-Gen. (ret), specifies three relevant antimissiles system: ALTBM-NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence; NATO MD-NATO Missile Defence; and USA MD-USA Missile Defence. The purpose of American antiballistic defence is to counterbalance potential strokes by limited numbers of ballistic missiles, blasted off from both enemy and rogue states and those launched by accident. Allegedly, the Iranians are developing ballistic missiles with the range of 4,000 km. With the reference to the fact that the distance Prague-Teheran is about 3,400 km, and such missiles could constitute an eminent danger even for the Czech Republic, not only for the continental United States, this issue is widely discussed in Czech mass media.

This essay is based upon the article by Lt.Col. Peter Zillmer, German military journal Europäische Sicherheit, No. 8/2007. The point is as follows: anti-air defence faces qualitative new tasks, this new qualitative level is constituted by the fact that anti-air defence has only few second to prepare all elements for direct firing against attacks of undirected rockets, mortar mines, launched by asymmetric enemies. It is the question of reconnaissance, and early warning, command and control of fire. NATO's programme Defence Against Terrorism results were demonstrated at air firing range in spring 2007. Coalition forces in Iraq are exposed to permanent mass rocket attacks from the part of insurgents, so they use system Phalanx LPWS, originally developed for direct ship defence. The article further enumerates other systems in use: German FüWES, Swiss Skyshield, and so on.

This article deals with the birth of a new concept in the field of the warfare-FORCE XXI, the long-terms vision that influenced all advanced militaries, among others the author introduces a list with names of programmes: USA (Land Warrior), Great Britain (FIST - Future Integrated Soldier Technology), Canada (ISSP - Integrated Soldier System Platform), Germany (IdZ - Infanterist der Zukunft), France (FELIN - Fantssin a Equipement et Liaison Intégrés), the Netherlands (SMP - Soldier Modernisation Programme), Norway (NORMANS - Norwegian Modular Artic Network Soldier), Denmark (Danish Soldier Modernisation), Belgium (BEST - Belgium Soldier Technology), Italy (Soldato Futuro), Portugal (Sodado do Futuro), Slovakia (PIBS - advanced combat individual system) Poland (Tytan). The author underlines fundamental changes within this course of study, both technical-implementation of new technologies and weaponry-and doctrinal. He also describes current situation within the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic.

This article deals with the present state of command and control dilemma in brigade battle groups. It outlines the resources of the rationalization of organizational structures at HQs and it shows their impact on modular design of the command posts. The gradual introduction of NATO Network Enabled Capability (NEC) into Czech armed forces (Bde TF-Brigade Task Force), requires first, changes in the structure of individual components of command and control system; secondly, initiating basic changes oriented towards optimalization command and control structures; third, the preparation of commanders and staffs in the field of information technology, so that they could achieve knowledge and control dominance. At the same time organizational changes raise modification within command chains of separate groups.

Professional, or Professionalized NCO Corps by CSM Dušan Rovenský. This article covers the process of transition from conscript army to entirely professional, allvolunteer force (AVF). It deals with the role and responsibilities of NCOs generally, rank and grade structure, career rules, NCOs' training and education. The author identifies the problems of a rapid professionalization, discusses the possibilities for improvement and finally suggests the possible solutions to those problems. Among others, there is some sort of misunderstanding as far as Other Ranks/Enlisted corps is concerned. The Czech translations of those ranks do not always correspond to their general positions, ranks, responsibilities, command authority, the length of service of individual non-commissioned officers (NCOs), sergeants, or warrant officers (WOs). The author, Command Sergeant Major, Support and Training Forces Command (a graduate of U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy Fort Bliss) puts forward several proposals to make those translations more precise.

The reform of the Czech armed forces is factually and timely tied with the transformation of NATO forces, both in the field of technology and that of doctrine. The covering principle of this transformation is the so-called EBAO concept, in the frame of which we define three main transformation objectives: forces must have operational superiority, they must be operationally effective, deployable, and sustainable. The effects-based approach to operations focuses on combining military and non-military actions to influence the overall behaviour and capabilities of other actors: national, trans-national, belligerent and benign, in an operational environment in order do create effects leading to the achievement of strategic objectives and a desired end-state. Its application focuses the planning, execution and assessment of operations. The cited EBAO handbook was followed by several documents (e.g. discussion papers), issued at the end of 2007 as a means to inform future doctrine reviews. Many of the concepts and documents should be validated, either through experimentation, or through specifically designed exercises.

Politicians Raise Support?) by Col. Ing. Tomáš Rak. The fact that nuclear weapons has not been employed for more over 60 years doesn't mean that they are of no use. On the contrary, they still serve as the most effective tool of determent. At present, we do not face some superpower, but a multitude of various small, namely Islamic groups. The nuclear threat has returned in the form of terrorists who, unlike Soviet Union leaders, would not hesitate to use such weapons. We face a very real possibility that the deadliest weapons ever invented could fall into dangerous hands. No treaty, no ban on such weapons, no international law will guarantee that they won't be used by the so-called "non-state actors," potential "rogue states", or messianic groups expecting the end of the world. The author recollects the case of A. Q. Khan, who sold his country's nuclear secrets, helping to increase the proliferation of nuclear technology on a wide scale.

Many years ago, in our army we commenced to build simulators and trainers for the preparation of military specialists in various fields of military skills. Mechanized and armour units have two simulations centres. In Brno, there is the simulation centre for battalion level and above, at Vyškov, there is the centre up to company level. Simulators and trainers are devices or systems that simulate specific conditions or the characteristics of a real process for the purposes military training. Today, most vocational training occurs in simulators, which save both time and money. Different simulators can faithfully simulate nearly every element of a fight. During training, soldiers and instructors meet some problems, details of which are depicted in this article. The author proposes to introduce several variants of study procedures, skills, as well as proceedings of paper work. The article is accompanied by several charts dealing with today's and prospective variants of training on simulators, respective schedules and timetables. Therefore it is necessary to discuss those problems, so that our artillery could be used in most efficient way. The article is accompanied by several charts and pictures, showing schemes and tasks of artillery forces and standardized operational procedures.

The purpose of this article is to get readers acquainted with new facts that are arising in the sphere of defence and security of state and at the same time they might influence defence economics research. This recent phenomena came into existence as a consequence of new world layout and events especially tied with massive terrorist attacks after September 2001.

UAV specialists predict that within ten years, half the aircraft flying will be unmanned. They also foresee conflicts where a few soldiers will dominate stateside battlefields. The UAV Center of Excellence is going to draw the unmanned part of the Air Force, to study the best ways to use UAVs. The Air Warfare Centre at Nellis, Nevada, develops tactics for the use of aircraft and directs combat training. The UAV center would take on a whole range of issues from airspace control to various kinds of systems. Unmanned aircraft are to expect to play a key role in delivering directed-energy weapons to battlefields. Stealth will become a standard in UAV fleets just as it is in manned combat aircraft today. A number of additional improvements are expected to increase the capability of Predator squadrons. UAVs may have to specialize in strike or intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. Source: articles by David A. Fulghum, Aviation Week and Space Technology No 12, 2005.

China's premier intelligence services are as follows: the Ministry of Public Security (MBS), the Ministry of State Security (MSS), and the Military Intelligence Department (MDI) of the People's Liberation Army/General Staff Department. Last but not least, the central institution of the Chinese intelligence community is the Communist Party of China (CPC) having its own intelligence and security bodies. The operational methods of the China's intelligence services are nothing new to espionage. They run aggressive surveillance and recruitment programs against visiting foreign businessmen, scholars, government officials, and scientists. It is a normal to debrief the returning Chinese delegates to determine whether useful information was acquired by simple observation. However, the MSS and military intelligence services further exploit these opportunities by co-opting a number of these travellers to carry out specific operational activities. Chinese intelligence services can count on state ministries, people's friendship societies, academic institutions, and the militaryindustrial complex to support activities such as agent recruitment and information collection as well as to provide cover jobs to their operatives. Main source: Alain Rodier, Raids, No. 234/2005 (nas).

The article presents the results of pedagogical experiment in shooting from smallarms at training on shooting trainers, as indispensable instruments for the preparation of military professionals in indoor and outdoor shooting. Computer-generated simulators enable to experience the practice of shooting both for beginners training, as well as for marksmen, and sharpshooters. The trainers we we've developed in our army are as follows: shooting trainer EVJ-91 (optical, infrared), EVJ-94 (advanced, computer aided), EVJ-94/M (five targets), UNIST-94 (screen 2x3 m, VCR, UNIST-97/L
(laser emitter, live shooting), optical shooting range OS-1, OS-3 (small arms practice, up to 50 m, computer-aided,
laser emitter), optical target range TOS-1 (combat fire arms practice, computer-aided evaluation), optical range POS-1 (target devices are replaced by a film screen, VCR), Minitos Duo (tested), combat video-system Dicrosec PSC (interactive), or SOT-1 (rotary targets). Even though those trainers save time and money, we must still bear in mind that live shooting can't be replaced by any trainer.

This second and closing part of this security study covers decades before the half of this century. The leading role in prevention and fight against armed conflicts will rest namely upon intelligence services. It is also expected the mass use of nonlethal weapons. The US will stay as the only leading superpower, minority expects a plurality model, i.e. the US will be only first among the equals. Some predicts the collapse of the EU. The Army of the Czech Republic ought to achieve full operational potential around the year 2012. It will take part in multinational missions. The Alliance armies should have 8 per cent of their capacities fully operable abroad. Under the preventive strategy, the regions of their prospective deployment will be in bordering countries around Europe, areas around the Eastern Mediterranean, or in the Far East. More or less, one problem remains still open: whether foreign deployments of the ACR really correspond to the interests and needs of the Czech Republic.

It is an age-old problem, how to identify someone or something, to prevent from incidents, in which friendly forces fire on their own troops or vehicles by mistake, because of tiredness, exhaustion, psychological stress, technological defects, unforeseen circumstances, etc. Although there exists a technology carried specifically in an aircraft, combat vehicles, that utilizes coded radio signals to identify other friendly units, adopted measures are not always successful. In NATO, we have standardized systems for such identification: BTID-Battlefield Target Identification Device (for identification of vehicles and helicopters, STANAG 4579); and DSID-Dismounted Soldier Identification Device (for identification soldiers, STANAG 4630). At present, Germany (together with the United States) is in the lead of development system IFF. Systems are conceptually, technologically and tactically synthesized into ZEFF (ZielErkennung Freund-Feind), common for vehicles, helicopters, soldiers, as well as vehicles beyond the area of forces deployment. Source: Europäische Sicherheit magazine, 4/2006.

This new generation war could be characterized by an emphasis on nonstate actors, by political and psychological forms of attacks that directly influence opponents. Other characteristics are as follows: extensive refugee flows, violence, transnational criminal aspects. Several factors will impact the nature, frequency and character of "small wars" in the 21st century. Failed/failing states, urbanization, diffusion of actors, communications technology, technological diffusion, religion, and ultra-terrorism. Clausewitz's fundamental appreciation for the primacy of political objectives as the guiding object in war remains relevant to "small wars" as does to interstate conflicts. The problem for today's strategist or policy maker is determining exactly what has changed, how the various means of stratecraft need to be adapted to the specific contingency at hand (according to The Journal of Strategic Studies, 6/2005).

The main theme of this extensive paper is ethical evaluation of the state of affairs in Iraq that would play greater role - directly or indirectly - in the decision-making of foremost politicians, more role then we might think. Although the author quotes various positive or negative attitudes towards the war, he does not intend to prove or refute presented theses. He broadly treats e.g. the so-called just-war, events when imminent threat might be a case for war, moral clarity in a time of war, situations when we consider that our aims might be achieved by peaceful means. Last but not least, he writes about attitudes of church leaders, the Holy See, lines of their reasoning. The armed forces are called upon to do their duty. The greater the threat, the grater is the risk of inaction, the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory actions. In such case, the governments make their final decisions. It is not the responsibility of church-leaders or military commanders. To obey it, it would not be in conflict with the churches teaching. In these circumstances, the troops could regard an order to go to battle as morally decent, in pursuit of a moral good purpose.