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The article is focused on issue of hybridisation of Al Qai'da in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), in North Africa, and its implications for European countries. The process of hybridisation is being conceived as growing nexus and convergence between violent non-state actors, while these processes could be in this case identified mainly in issues of use of kidnappings and secondary also reported involvement of AQIM in regional smuggling, mainly drugs, activities through Sahel and Saharan region to Europe. Regarding GSPC background, AQIM could be in long term theoretically able to re-establish its financial and supporting networks in Europe via cooperation with organized crime, which were largely disrupted after major crackdowns by security forces between 2004-2007. Event though a direct Al Qai'da attack in Europe is-according to the author-excluded, the purpose of this article to draw our attention to an eventuality of rebirth of European operation network of AQIM operational predecessor, i.e. GSPC.

The fundamentals of this concept, as they were explained in previous Military Review No 1, 2011, have stayed unchanged, up to the present. There still exist operational bases, directions, courses, lines, upon which military convoys transfer by the plan or in disorderly manner. Such picture corresponds to linear wars of first, second and third generations. The wars of fourth generation are characterized by the speed and initiative. The frontiers between war and politics are blurred, so are between civilians and combatants. They are mostly wars with and among non-state actors, counter-insurgency operations (COIN) Based on doctrinal analysis; author describes concepts philosophy in functional and logical aspects. This might help the commander and staff to visualize the arrangement of military capabilities in time, space, and purpose to accomplish the mission. The concept might be successfully applied in connection with stability and COIN operations.

In the previous Military Review we introduced the article "Will Military Deception Pass Away?" by the same author. In the Army of the Czech Republic we have no manual dealing with military deception (MILDEC). The only manual concerning MILDEC was abolished without any substitute. But military art can't be further developed without similar documents. Today we take MILDEC as a complex set of provisions misleading enemy's commanders and staff, by means of false information and counterfeit data that deliberately deceive adversary decision-makers and planners. Use of MILDEC during any phase of an operation also helps to mislead adversaries as to the strength, readiness, locations, and intended missions of friendly forces. The MILDEC could contribute to the successful accomplishment of the assigned mission by many ways.

This extended essay is based upon various sources, among others on May 2010 President Obama's speech at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, where President Obama described his national security objectives. The highest priorities of U.S. national security are the safety of Americans at home and abroad and achieving a peaceful, stable world through global cooperation despite a flawed international system. The Obama's security strategy relies heavily on diplomacy and engagement, economic development and other methods of influence, along with U.S. military capabilities with global reach and unsurpassed resources. As we face multiple threats, from nations, non-state actors and failed states, America will maintain the military superiority that has secured country, and underpinned global security, for decades. The security strategy is global, and identifies an array of real or potential security challenges that include: countering violent extremism and insurgency; stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and securing nuclear materials, resolving and preventing conflict; and reducing destabilizing risks to economic interdependence.

The article deals with duties of a sniper and a military observer, sharp shooting at long distances, movement at areas in which operations are being carried out. Snipers are trained marksmen who are specialized in sniping the enemy. They are usually sited away form the main force, so that they can concentrate on shooting at selected targets instead of being drawn into general firefight. They are also less likely to be affected when the main force comes under artillery fire. The modern sniper is not alone, he is usually employed in team of two. The author also describes rifles and other weapons and equipments snipers are armed. The article is supplemented by graphs and tablets.

Soldiers are trained for combat situations. But peace missions are not tied with the fight. In some measure, they remind more civil police actions: patrolling, duties at sentry points. But still they are activities done by servicemen; those who retire are called "military veterans". Peacekeepers are exposed to high level of stress situations. People who experience a high level of stress for a long time may become irritable, socially withdrawn, and emotionally unstable. Some people under intense and prolonged stress may start to suffer from extreme anxiety, depression, or other severe emotional problems. All psychological research can be divided into two groups: first dealing with actual stress symptoms, the second one dealing with inner structure of individual stress. Discussed model was formed according the pattern of American airborne units deployed in the Sinai Peninsula. Dimensions of psychological stress in peacekeeping operations are formed above all by "boredom", the real threats are in fact at the end of risk scale. More stress reactions come after the mission ends. Such drafted model can be used also in the Army of the Czech Republic, or in international missions of the Police Force of the Czech Republic ...244

The article deals with the question of unmanned aircraft generally, it doesn't discuss their individual types. Unmanned aircraft (UAVs) are designed to fly without a pilot (that is by remote control), their combat engagements are less risky and potentially less costly. Army officials say that UAVs will serve better, as they will carry more weapons and sturdier avionics, use the same fuel as other service aircraft, and could be operated by soldiers in theatre. Avionics and weapons might be controlled even by a conventional link with ground control stations. One "land pilot" can control several UAVs simultaneously. The running programmes will produce mature technologies and stable designs, making use of critical technologies, control abilities. The other critical technologies are: an engine that uses heavy fuel and an automatic take-off and landing system. As a part of coalition forces, the UAVs had proved their usefulness and serviceability in the Middle East.

This article contains main ideas from the essay by James J. Wirtz published in anthology Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence, Frank Cass 2003. This theory is a unifying explanation of why states, for example, attempt to surprise their opponents with diplomatic or military initiatives. Surprise often is described as a force multiplier; something that increases the effectiveness of one's forces in combat. The prospect of surprise can prompt political leaders of the weaker side to believe that they can nullify that disparity and achieve their objectives. In other words, if strong parties began to view conflict from the weaker party's perspective, while weak actors kept war's dialectic in mind, then surprise would become less likely. The theory of surprise can identify when it is likely to occur, who is likely to find the element of surprise attractive as a basis of policy or strategy, and who is likely to be its victim. The trick now lies in making operational use of the theory of surprise.

The purpose of this article is to explain methods of the application of artillery fire, according to the width and shape of targets by artillery regiment (without rocket battery) and by artillery battery, if components/data for effective fire are set by substitute means, without computer with respective SW. The assignment of optimal method of artillery fire and its professional implementation has a great influence on FFE (fire for effect). For the sake of economy, live firing practice is executed only to a limited extend. Most of activities are carried out only in the field of command skills, keeping documents, commanders' performance and training gun crews; their reactions to commands and orders. The article is accompanied by several tablets with data concerning application of artillery fire, variable data for aiming devices, adjusted ranges of fire, widths of target divided into several sheaves of fire (converge sheaf, sheaf for target width), their corrections.

War game is a simulation of military operations intended to train military commanders or to test a proposed strategy. It is a game in which model soldiers are used to create battles, in order to study tactics. This article illustrates the importance of War Game COAs (course of action). It was tested against opposing force COAs. Such exercise will help to identify advantages and disadvantages and the key elements of execution planning for each COA. The lesson learned during OHQ CZE/SVK BG EU Staff Exercises that took place in Olomouc from January 19th, to January 23rd, and from February 16th, to February 20th, 2009 is that war-gaming (although time consuming) is something closer to "reality" than the "theory" in doctrines. The war-gaming practices teamwork, facilitates team-building and enables to share mental model COA. Commanders and their staff ought to be engaged in simulations and war games more frequently. All information and sources for this paper were drawn from unclassified materials.

This concept has been preparing since the early 2009. In short, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation must be increasingly prepared to intervene far beyond its borders. In the coming decade, NATO will have four central inter-related military missions. The first requirement is to "deter, prevent and defend" against aggression, so as to ensure the political independence and territorial integrity of NATO member states. The report insists on the need to send out military missions beyond the treaty area "when required to prevent an attack on the treaty area or to protect the legal rights and other vital interests of Alliance members". Any expeditionary mission must be based on the principles of the UN charter. Another key item is to cooperate better with those partners, and others worldwide, in order to tackle the new threats posed by cyber attacks, piracy, arms proliferation and energy supply insecurity and climate change. However, in order to achieve the new goals, NATO "must halt the precipitous decline in national defence spending", and to introduce reforms to make spending more efficient.

The NATO's New Strategic Concept is only starting point to open discussion on a wide range of security problems. At the beginning there is a description of Czech home politics, attitudes of Czech political parties toward NATO alliance. The author explores the history of NATO's identity crisis. In recent years, different security optics of the members splintered NATO. The US wants an expeditionary alliance with a global reach, the Western Europeans hold to a vision of a regional club of liberal democracies, the Central Europeans have a wish so that Washington would stand by them when they will find themselves pressured by Russia. NATO is divided on how to reform its decision-making processes and how to fund and resource its home and away missions. In Afghanistan, the Alliance faces the most difficult operational challenge to date, with a real possibility of strategic failure. The overarching problem is how to define the core business of NATO: cyber defence, energy security, WMD proliferation, stability and reconstruction missions, out-of-area missions, territorial security, enlargement, partnership-building. The discussion over the New Strategic Concept needs to reorder the question how to define NATO's appropriate roles and go from there.

Official objectives of war on terrorism are as follows: we must face theorist threats, prevent terrorist strikes; suppress the power of terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda. War on terrorism is not a classical or conventional warfare; the term is wide-ranging, covering longterm strategies of national importance. The war on terrorism and employed means are also a source of controversy. It is a question of adequacy of used tools. It is necessary to implement the new strategy of improving conditions in Muslim countries to eliminate their background supporting negative religious and political attitudes towards democracy. Outlined ways of "smoothing edges" in economical, social spheres can noticeably change hateful attitudes of Muslim population towards values of Western democratic society.

The aim of this work was to make an analysis of current state of catering services in the forces, to define risks of possible harms, damages, losses, or another prospective disasters, in order to propose a systematic approach to the risk management. Identified risks are being completely analysed. Author's team drafted a risks catalogue to make their identification easier. Among others, upon this analysis, they compiled the chart of risks in catering process within the section of the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic. A user manual for monitoring and risk control was created, so that we can adopt suitable procurement measures for avoiding or minimizing risks, their occurrences, eventually lowering unwanted results generated by the above mentioned analysed risks.

In November 2006, there was the international conference organized by the Defence University Brno "Tactics 2006". This article is based upon several presentations held at this conference and presents main ideas in this field. They are as follows: validity of management assumptions in the 21st century (changes), new trends in management styles and their application in military science, current state of management schooling at military schools, possible directions and perspectives of management education. Military management covers not only classical managerial subjects, but comprises rich spectrum of items commanders might use, including e.g. knowledge of etiquette. Now we are familiarized with recent trends and it is only upon us to introduce them into practice, so that graduates from military schools could use them in practice.

After a short review of defence R&D history, the author concludes that our country used to reach world's level in some fields: passive warning systems, NBC protection, military surgery, explosives. After the change of political system in 1989 we began to dispose Czech military industries. The only scientific place to left is Defence University Brno, but it is an institution more or less concentrated on education. It is almost impossible to maintain pace with foreign defence industry. In the article there is an exhaustive list of military plants, institutions after 1989, together with the date of their closing down. It is followed by research orientation of defence industry, set according to time periods. The special chapter concentrates on financing defence research, the closing part deals with the period of our membership in NATO. Although there are same positive aspects, such as international cooperation, exploiting sources from abroad, strategical control declined. We see unwise reductions in personnel, abolishing accredited institutions, etc.

In spite of the fact that it is a new concept, it presents one of key methods of international engagement in crisis areas the EU prefers. Its main components are crises prevention and securing stabilization. Security tasks are composite problems solving one of main state functions: to guard external and internal security together with principles of civil control. This essay among others aims to explain practicability of the EU's concept of preventive engagement as a tool of implementation of the European Security Strategy, further it describes European concept for crisis management missions in the field of civilian administration supporting security and justice. At the end there are some recommendations for the Czech Republic how to form capacities for EU missions and for the transformation of Czech security sectors.

Factors such as distance, destination, deployment demands, duration, represent key elements to determine logistics requirements. The EU BG concept necessitates considerable strategic air/sea lift and combat support capabilities, since EU battle groups are to be able to be deployed almost anywhere in the world, primarily in Africa. They have to deploy both troops and materiel simultaneously to its mission areas. Strategic airlift is the fastest way of deploying troops over long distance. The main challenge for the EU is therefore availability giant airplanes. A lack of suitable European transport crafts in EBalabáuropean airlift fleet is the Achilles heel to the EU BG Concept. The problem is that all aircraft available have only limited payload capacities and flying range. Although deploying by sea is more time consuming than deploying by air, EU member states have more ships available for strategic sea transport. The strict deployment deadline set down in the EU BG Concept means that ships and crews will have to be held at very high readiness.

It is said that at present, all means and knowledge necessary for any terrorist attacks are aviable on Internet network. Islamists regard Internet as a university of a special sort, without territorial boundaries, suitable for schooling and preparation of "sacred war". Internet users are decentralized, which is suitable for guerrilla fighters. By studying Qur?an (Koran), people are opened to indoctrination with global jihad. The Qur'an states that those who die in this type of jihad automatically become martyrs of the faith and are awarded a special place in heaven. Islamic law alleges that all nations 174 must surrender to Islamic rule. Indoctrinated terrorists could be and are united in their beliefs via electronic Internet pages, anywhere in the world, into one global cyber space. Electronic jihadists use notebooks and small electronic cameras to view and study suicide bomb attacks. The fight against such threat is endless, marked only by partial victories. Original article by Rolf Tophoven, Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, No 2, 2008

In this article the author explores the potential roles for unmanned ground vehicles (tactical UGVs) in the modern battle space as pack mules, fighting scouts and perimeter sentries as new concepts of operation, designs and products emerge. Remote control vehicles could be also used in explosive ordnance disposal operations. Urban warfare looks set to become a particularly rich field for this sort of robots. The article discusses the challenges in developing and deploying cost-effective UGVs on the battlefield. There are still many problems, namely technological. The price for a UGV is comparable to price for four or five wheeled armoured vehicles. The article is based upon materials from RUSI Defence Systems (No. 2/2007), studies by Myron E. Mills, Kevin Ivison, James Masey. Ulf Stremmel; and Andy Simms: Robot Wars. Soldier, No. 12, 2007.

This article deals with the birth of a new concept in the field of the warfare-FORCE XXI, the long-terms vision that influenced all advanced militaries, among others the author introduces a list with names of programmes: USA (Land Warrior), Great Britain (FIST - Future Integrated Soldier Technology), Canada (ISSP - Integrated Soldier System Platform), Germany (IdZ - Infanterist der Zukunft), France (FELIN - Fantssin a Equipement et Liaison Intégrés), the Netherlands (SMP - Soldier Modernisation Programme), Norway (NORMANS - Norwegian Modular Artic Network Soldier), Denmark (Danish Soldier Modernisation), Belgium (BEST - Belgium Soldier Technology), Italy (Soldato Futuro), Portugal (Sodado do Futuro), Slovakia (PIBS - advanced combat individual system) Poland (Tytan). The author underlines fundamental changes within this course of study, both technical-implementation of new technologies and weaponry-and doctrinal. He also describes current situation within the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic.

The authoress makes us acquainted with several basic methods of language drills, standardly used not only in military or state schools, but also in private educational institutions. Every described method is elaborated in detail, together with desirable educational goals, key characteristics, and representative ways of instruction. They are as follows: Audio-lingual Method, Grammar Translation Method, Direct Method (i.e. Berlitz Method) and Silent Way. Berlitz's method, although popular, was superseded by the old, classical, form-emphasizing Grammar Translation Method, which held reign until the 1950s when it was supplanted by the Audio-lingual Method (ALM), a method sometimes called "military method", based upon deep control, examination, extensive repetition. In a kind of behavioural conditioning, students do language drills, memorize set phrases and patterns, learn vocabulary in context, and focuse on correct form and the production of error-free sentences. "Silent Way", which came into existence in the 60s, covers all above mentioned methods. Learners of foreign language study the language in a similar way as they learned their own mother tongue, even with mistakes, later corrected by a teacher.

The article deals with the teaching of management at the University of Defence. Its authors are long-standing university teachers, possessing also experiences from command and staff appointments. In recent years, the emphasis in military schools has shifted more to subjects indirectly related to civilian courses of study, e.g. the theory of management. At the Defence University Brno it covers a wide range of other subjects: economy, informatics, operational investigation, etc.; other subjects are in fact only "supporting": applied mathematics, sociology, psychology, humane resource control and law. Military management, theory of military operations, staff service, and that belong to the group of applied fundamentals. At present, "military management" at the Defence University has only a limited scope of teaching units. It is read both at bachelor and master levels of studies, inevitably many themes are duplicated. So, among others, the authors recommend to shift the core of military management teaching to higher levels of studies, at master levels.

This new generation war could be characterized by an emphasis on nonstate actors, by political and psychological forms of attacks that directly influence opponents. Other characteristics are as follows: extensive refugee flows, violence, transnational criminal aspects. Several factors will impact the nature, frequency and character of "small wars" in the 21st century. Failed/failing states, urbanization, diffusion of actors, communications technology, technological diffusion, religion, and ultra-terrorism. Clausewitz's fundamental appreciation for the primacy of political objectives as the guiding object in war remains relevant to "small wars" as does to interstate conflicts. The problem for today's strategist or policy maker is determining exactly what has changed, how the various means of stratecraft need to be adapted to the specific contingency at hand (according to The Journal of Strategic Studies, 6/2005).

In today's conflicts, such as the Global War on Terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan, the threat is more difficult to define; in fact, there are often multiple threats working against our forces concurrently. Our army lacks first-hand information from current battlefields, so that the author must make use of mediated experiences. The paper is therefore based upon articles from foreign military magazines, namely Intelligence Synchronization on a Nonlinear Battlefield (Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin 4/2004) and Intelligence in Peacekeeping Operation (International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1/1997). It is not a mere translation or compilation, but ingenious summing up of discussed ideas. In this study, the author thinks over intelligence synchronization and proposes a new way of looking at it. Methodology heads from priority intelligence requirements towards specific information requirements, via indicators, and so on. The purpose of intelligence synchronization is to focus efforts to build, refine, or clarify the commander's understanding of the battlefield and the threat.

The forward-thinking and respond to the challenges of today's dynamic operational environment demands as necessary: first, to attract and develop young people to become adaptative leaders possessing enhanced skills, i.e. we must align leader-development programmes for the new operating environment; second, to respond to the forces' needs in meeting the challenges of the operational environment-the forces have to undergo a transformation. Adaptability is critical to urban stability and support operations, as these operations present complex challenges to commanders for which no prescribed solutions exist. Warfare and technology are rapidly evolving; doctrine lags behind the need for ready solutions. Officers are confronted by many situations outside the doctrinal framework. No amount of technology can offset the effects of chaos theory ...169 Clearly, there is a need to quickly learn knowledge/skill sets, coupled with a new operating frame that might be radically different from the skills and knowledge developed through classical training (Military Review, January/February 2006, Tomáš Weiser, What is the Chaos? Dějiny a současnost, 5/2002).

This article examines depth in the nonlinear battlefield and how planners might develop operational effects to defeat insurgencies. The former field manual stated that depth was the extension of operations in time, space and resources. This is a decidedly linear construction of the battlefield based on industrialized warfare between conventional enemies. The Global War on Terrorism operating environment is both nonlinear and non-contiguous. The enemy has no national borders or traditional infrastructure. If we understand cognitive depth, we can develop ways to paralyze the insurgent system or produce operational shock. Colonel John A. Warden III, an architect of the Persian Gulf War air campaign, introduced Five Rings Model as a methodology for successfully attacking and paralyzing a conventional enemy system in depth. An adaptation of this model depicts tangible targets that together constitute depth in the insurgent battle space. Source: Is There a Deep Fight in a Counterinsurgency by Lee K. Grubbs and Michael J. Forsyth, Military Review, July-August 2005.