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The article deals with the problem of a certain militarization of a society, supposing country's military establishment is expanding its scope of activities to government or economy. From this point of view, the military and their civilian counterparts could be seen as "imperium in imperio" and such a model of military as a state within a state. There are a military-governmental complex and a military-industrial one in each state and both ought to be under civilian authorities' control, in order to prevent the democratic state from being fallen under influence of this complex. Although the notion was sketched more than fifty years ago, the military-industrial complex theory has been still living, and author gives some examples of the evolution of military-governmental and military-industrial complex.

The fundamentals of this concept, as they were explained in previous Military Review No 1, 2011, have stayed unchanged, up to the present. There still exist operational bases, directions, courses, lines, upon which military convoys transfer by the plan or in disorderly manner. Such picture corresponds to linear wars of first, second and third generations. The wars of fourth generation are characterized by the speed and initiative. The frontiers between war and politics are blurred, so are between civilians and combatants. They are mostly wars with and among non-state actors, counter-insurgency operations (COIN) Based on doctrinal analysis; author describes concepts philosophy in functional and logical aspects. This might help the commander and staff to visualize the arrangement of military capabilities in time, space, and purpose to accomplish the mission. The concept might be successfully applied in connection with stability and COIN operations.

Making use of multimedia, ICT, in a foreign language teachinglearning process is the effective way how to influence motivation and results of the educational process. Based upon the Czech-Canadian Partnership for Learning Program, the project provides synchronous communication between a native speaker and a student during language training, regardless the distance. Mutual communication is an opportunity when the students/learners can use their second language not only in professional discussions, but also in solving problem matters, relevant to their study branch, interests, current events or hobbies. The authors' experience and its analysis form also a part of this paper.

The most frequent word in language preparation is successfulness. This term could be quantified, defined, examined from the point of growth or rating decrease. Our language preparation sticks to Defence Minister Order No 1/2007 (effective from September 2010) on language training. It abolished integrated language courses, teaching units for SLP 1, 2 were decreased. The author examines the situation before and after the publication of the said order and provides possible explanations of the current state, showing slow descent. He supports his explanations with empirical data gathered in foregoing years, through surveys, statistical analyses of test results, in-class observations, and oral feedback from course learners.

Established methods of warfare are out of use in urbanized regions, western technological and arms potential must be amended by new equipments, materials and weapons of XXIst Century WarriorCity Guerrilla Fighter. Urbanized areas are divided into separated sectors with changed dimensions: dominating tall buildings, impenetrable barriers. Reinforced concrete, narrow streets, fight inside buildings prevent us from using global position systems. So, dismounted infantry are being equipped by inertial movement units, portable lasers, noctovisors, and bolometers (i.e. instruments used to measure tiny amounts of radiant energy). Bolometers in combination with low light level videos enable to identify friends of foes, to set risky targets. The socalled reconnaissance hand grenade to get image and sounds of enemy soldiers are being developed, it is anticipated the wide employment of unmanned aerial and ground vehicles. Many arrangements are done to prevent "collateral damages", unintentional killing of civilians as a result of military action.

This thoroughly elaborated paper deals with the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF). Similar missions represent NATO's global interests in problems of word's security. Afghanistan is the very place where new warfare methods are tested, new ways of combat come into existence. After September 11, 2001, American administration declared the war to global terrorism - GWOT (Global War on Terror), the first theatre of GWOT became Afghanistan. From military point of view, it was unambiguous success, to a large degree, it succeeded even politically. But Afghanistan was negatively affected by the situation in Iraq. Afghanistan is far off being stabilized. Local warlords, tribal chiefs, called anti-coalition militants (ACMs), avoid regular warfare, they use raids, sabotages, acts of terror, provocations. Coalition units use e.g. PSYOP operations, as a way how to implement norms based deterrence.

Climate change, national security and energy dependence are a related set of global challenges. They together will add to tensions even in stable regions of the world. Anticipated climate change poses a serious threat to security. It will act as a threat multiplier for instability in some of the most volatile regions of the world, Africa Asia, some of the Middle East regions. The potential consequences of climate change are so significant that the prudent course of action is to begin now to assess how these changes may potentially affect our national security, and what courses of action, if any, our nation should take. Armed forces must should limit emissions to prevent the greenhouse effect, global warming. They also must be prepared to be sent do regions disorganized by mass migration, brought about by humanitarian catastrophes tied with calamity, caused by climate change. The case was predicted by analyses drived by projection of "worst case" scenarios, something the military must train. "Threat Multiplier: Military panel deems climate-change effects as a growing national security challenge" by Frank Morning, Jr., Aviation Week & Space Technology, No. 16/2007.

What is Necessary to Consider in the Process of Organization Structures Construction, Military Forces Equipment and Training in ACR, after the Ending of "Conception" by Ing. Antonín Krásný, CSc. The very welcomed "Concept of Development of the Professional Army of the Czech Republic and the Mobilization of Armed Forces of the Czech Republic" had to be revised because of the lack financial means. This fact influenced a lot of live of our army. Additional career officers were to leave his services; military material, vehicles were further reduced. At present, we have to balance our military strength with security demands reflecting running changes in world's security surrounding. The main aim of the article is to describe development of security environment in the Central Europe. It considers decision mechanisms reform in NATO and transformations of its military forces structures. It highlights an impact of demographic, technological, institutional changes and changes in value system of defence assurance of the CR. We must still bear in mind that for us, NATO alliance, supplemented by the EU structures, is the main tool of our security.

Conventional military strategists did not hold counterinsurgency (COIN) and irregular warfare with high esteem. In fact, strategists often marginalized COIN and irregular warfare, never regarding irregular warfare as worthy of strategic-level discussions. But true strategic thinking on the subject of COIN and irregular warfare consider time and space and long strategic view. Now we must consider critical areas for the global war on terrorism (GWOT), including changing nature of the threat environment. Sources: Principles, Imperatives and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency, by E. Cohen, Lt.Col. C. Crane, Lt.Col. J. Horvath, Lt.Col. J. Nagl; Strategic Aspects of Counterinsurgency by Col. J. B. Celeski in Military Review March-April 2006.

Most adversaries of our western civilization recognize the information advantage and military superiority of the United States and Euroatlantic area. Rather than acquiesce to any potential Western military domination, they will try to circumvent or minimize US strengths and exploit perceived weaknesses. IT-driven globalization will significantly increase interaction among terrorists, narcotraffickers, weapons proliferators, and organized criminals, who in a networked world will have greater access to information, to technology, to finance, to sophisticated deception-and-denial techniques and to each other. Such asymmetric approaches-whether undertaken by states or nonstate actors-will become the dominant characteristic of most threats to both American homeland and Europe. They will be a challenge for our strategy, operations, force development, and they will require that strategy to maintain focus on traditional, low-technology threats as well as the capacity of potential adversaries to harness elements of proliferating advanced technologies. Among others, the author states 15 variations of plausible asymmetries.

There is a substantional difference between reformation and transformation. The latter represents a qualitative change or the re-creation; while the former is only a change, redressing, correction of errors or faults. In Czech military press, the basic principles of NATO transformation were described several times. Since 2004, when the document "Strategic Vision: The Military Vision" was published, many other documents have been released: Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG), Guidance for Military Implementation of CPG, Concept for Alliance Future Joint Operations, NATO Task List. Every operational concept has to evaluate all factors from various fields. The method is expressed by the short DOTMLPF, which stands for Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel and Facilities. The Concept Development and Experimentation is of multinational character and is the most successful transformation tool within NATO countries, namely in the U.S., Canada, Great Britain, Norway, etc. Lessons Learned system supplies feedback between national forces experiences and concepts, via DOTMLPF. The key role is played by the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre in Lisbon, Portugal.

We are aware of new and still increasing risks in the world, particularly in connection with the increase in terrorist activities. Broadly speaking, in building our professional army we enforce quality and efficiency, even with restricted means and sources, respecting our potential and on the basis of evaluation of interests of the Czech Republic, engagement in peace, stabilisation and other missions organised by NATO, the EU, or the UN. The author recapitulates all legislative acts, documents and papers, dealing with Czech military strategy, namely the Czech Republic's Military Strategy approved by the governmental resolution No. 578, June 9, 2004, that details principles of our defence policy. Now the author proposes to revise our military strategy in the year 2007, for-first: we successfully completed a phase called Initial Operating Capability; second, from this standard we can unroll further activities: operational engagement of brigade task force; third, in this very year we are evaluating transformation objectives for 2007-2011 (2012). Based upon this level of knowledge, we shall be able to draft new concepts of military strategy, e.g. to substitute current military strategy by defence strategy. The topic is open to discussion.

Intelligence services collect data from various sources: SIGINT (intelligence obtained by listening to the enemy's radio transmissions), HUMINT (information about the enemy obtained from people, e.g. friendly forces, agents, civilians, prisons of war), and the very latest it is the so-called OSINT - Open Sources Intelligence. Its description is not unequivocal. In the intelligence community, the term "open" refers to overt, publicly available sources, as opposed to covert or classified sources. OSINT includes a wide variety of information and sources: media, public data, observation and reporting. It is defined as produced from publicly available information that is collected, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner to an appropriate audience for the purpose of addressing a specific intelligence requirement.

The author summarizes and consequently generalizes security histories of war, peace, military, based upon the events of the last century. Recent moves towards a common European defence and security policy and European defence capabilities have sparked off considerable debate. Concerns have been voiced that this could lead to a decoupling of Europe's security from that of its other NATO allies, or a duplication of effort or capabilities. Above all, there is an urgent need for Europe to boost its capabilities, if it is not to be confined in future to a useful, but limited, reactive defence and security role. It is expected that the US, in a medium-term outlook, to say in the 2020 horizont, will be in a position of the only world's superpower; the People's China will remain only a regional power. All prognostic considerations must be therefore deduced from the position of the United States in the world. The American policy of multilateralism has proved to be most successful in history. As far as the position of our republic is concerned, to improve our defence capabilities we must use the EU as a framework ...242

This article presents the findings of the survey being done during the evaluation and assessment of EU Battle Groups, their missions, roles, tasks, stemming from the requirements set by the EU Crisis Management Concept. The paper does not discuss in detail variants EU Battle Groups, but concentrates on their historical background, basic characteristics, structure, EU political-military ambitions, scenarios, reaction time, tasks, standards, training and certification, Battle Groups commitments, concept and implementation, achievements. The article also includes recommendations for the Czech Armed Forces that are currently involved in the formation of the EU Battle Group CZE/SVK. This article aims to record progress to date and to indicate challenges ahead. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.

Space warfare is combat that takes place in outer space. Technically as a distinct classification, it refers to battles where the targets themselves are in space. Space warfare therefore includes ground-to-space warfare, such as attacking satellites from the Earth, as well as space-tospace warfare, such as satellites attacking satellites. It does not include space-to-ground warfare, where orbital objects attack ground, sea or air targets directly, or the use of satellites for espionage, surveillance, or military communications. Both the Soviets and the United States developed antisatellite weaponry designed to shoot down satellites. While early efforts paralleled other space-to-space warfare concepts, the United States was able in the 1980s to develop ground-to-space laser antisatellite weapons. China tested a ballistic missilelaunched antisatellite weapon in January 2007. So, the US has to evaluate its defensive options in outer space as strategic stakes are higher than ever, as the vulnerability of commercial and military satellites of the US and its allies is now on display after China destroyed an old Chinese weather satellite using an antisatellite weapon.

The article deals with the question of unmanned aircraft generally, it doesn't discuss their individual types. Unmanned aircraft (UAVs) are designed to fly without a pilot (that is by remote control), their combat engagements are less risky and potentially less costly. Army officials say that UAVs will serve better, as they will carry more weapons and sturdier avionics, use the same fuel as other service aircraft, and could be operated by soldiers in theatre. Avionics and weapons might be controlled even by a conventional link with ground control stations. One "land pilot" can control several UAVs simultaneously. The running programmes will produce mature technologies and stable designs, making use of critical technologies, control abilities. The other critical technologies are: an engine that uses heavy fuel and an automatic take-off and landing system. As a part of coalition forces, the UAVs had proved their usefulness and serviceability in the Middle East.

The article is focused on issue of hybridisation of Al Qai'da in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), in North Africa, and its implications for European countries. The process of hybridisation is being conceived as growing nexus and convergence between violent non-state actors, while these processes could be in this case identified mainly in issues of use of kidnappings and secondary also reported involvement of AQIM in regional smuggling, mainly drugs, activities through Sahel and Saharan region to Europe. Regarding GSPC background, AQIM could be in long term theoretically able to re-establish its financial and supporting networks in Europe via cooperation with organized crime, which were largely disrupted after major crackdowns by security forces between 2004-2007. Event though a direct Al Qai'da attack in Europe is-according to the author-excluded, the purpose of this article to draw our attention to an eventuality of rebirth of European operation network of AQIM operational predecessor, i.e. GSPC.

First, the author, who works at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Mons, briefly describes the contribution of Geographic Service of Czech Forces in terms of geospatial support for NATO. He also mentions current allocation of personnel in military missions and NATO/EU international structures. The article deals with tasks fulfilled by the Geospatial Section within Supreme Headquarters (SHAPE). One of the main section's responsibilities is Geospatial Data Management and Distribution, in line, with releasability conditions, and overall coordination of geo-cells within subordinate HQs. This section widely cooperates in the field of research and development, namely Core GIS project and Geospatial Standardization. Direct Geospatial Support is shortly mentioned, as well as variety smaller assignments.

Factors such as distance, destination, deployment demands, duration, represent key elements to determine logistics requirements. The EU BG concept necessitates considerable strategic air/sea lift and combat support capabilities, since EU battle groups are to be able to be deployed almost anywhere in the world, primarily in Africa. They have to deploy both troops and materiel simultaneously to its mission areas. Strategic airlift is the fastest way of deploying troops over long distance. The main challenge for the EU is therefore availability giant airplanes. A lack of suitable European transport crafts in EBalabáuropean airlift fleet is the Achilles heel to the EU BG Concept. The problem is that all aircraft available have only limited payload capacities and flying range. Although deploying by sea is more time consuming than deploying by air, EU member states have more ships available for strategic sea transport. The strict deployment deadline set down in the EU BG Concept means that ships and crews will have to be held at very high readiness.

The term "hybrid war" is frequently used today within the military community, but the term does not bring something new in the view of the terminology of the stability operations, comprehensive approach or compound wars. This concept is based on the destructive threats to the military components of international community. It does not help in delimiting reasons of violent confl ict and from that point it is harmful, as it does not explain soldiers why they are fi ghting the "just war", why they should sacrifi ce their lives in confl icts far away from their homeland. We should not use terms of hybrid wars, hybrid confl icts, hybrid enemies or forces. Only "hybrid warfare" could find some legitimacy, but only when used with the correct definition of the conflict typology, backed by the political objectives of the war. Confl icts typology, as used, forms the framework for the mission analysis orientation at all command & control levels and it guides the informational support to the military decision making processes.

Official objectives of war on terrorism are as follows: we must face theorist threats, prevent terrorist strikes; suppress the power of terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda. War on terrorism is not a classical or conventional warfare; the term is wide-ranging, covering longterm strategies of national importance. The war on terrorism and employed means are also a source of controversy. It is a question of adequacy of used tools. It is necessary to implement the new strategy of improving conditions in Muslim countries to eliminate their background supporting negative religious and political attitudes towards democracy. Outlined ways of "smoothing edges" in economical, social spheres can noticeably change hateful attitudes of Muslim population towards values of Western democratic society.

The world is changing, new centres of global development have come into being. BRIC stands for Brazil, Russia, India and China that have formed a bloc to challenge US dominance. The acronym BRIC was coined in 2001 by an analyst for Goldman Sachs bank who argued that, by 2050, the combined economies of the BRIC countries would eclipse the combined economies of the current richest countries. This new power politics is reflected by the team of authors Miloš Balabán and Antonín Rašek in a book mentioned above and therefore apart form the BRICK attention is paid to the Unites States and the EU respectively. The main purpose of their analysis is to predict prospective trends in global governance, they lay down four hypothetical scenarios of possible world's development.

In spite of the fact that it is a new concept, it presents one of key methods of international engagement in crisis areas the EU prefers. Its main components are crises prevention and securing stabilization. Security tasks are composite problems solving one of main state functions: to guard external and internal security together with principles of civil control. This essay among others aims to explain practicability of the EU's concept of preventive engagement as a tool of implementation of the European Security Strategy, further it describes European concept for crisis management missions in the field of civilian administration supporting security and justice. At the end there are some recommendations for the Czech Republic how to form capacities for EU missions and for the transformation of Czech security sectors.

The shift from vocational military service to all-volunteer force (AVF) could be regarded and treated as any other scholarly assignment of project management, so we can get a better look at its bugs and risks. The author applied the Valentas classification of innovation upon this AVF project in the Czech Republic and demonstrates what are main risks for its sustainability. He sees the first cause and effect in the reality that this shift lacks sufficient support by social sciences and humanities. Since 2003, only six per cent of scientists/scholars employed by the Czech Ministry of Defence have been supporting this great change. It is not enough and it makes certain incompetence within defence ministry to reach the factual aim of this move and AVF produces more and more difficulties. According to the author, the professionalization of forces in our country has not meet its main purpose--to raise professional qualities of military personnel, in spite of the fact it originally used to be the prime objective of this process.

NATO's Research and Technology Organization covers six panels dealing with technology. System Analysis and Studies panel drafted a long-term scientific study "Joint Operations 2030" that was performed for three years under the direction of CNAD (Conference of National Armaments Directors). This study identifies system approaches of NATO further development. Its purpose is recommend remedies for eliminating potential defects in future Alliance capabilities, in the frame of anticipated security surrounding and emerging new technologies. The work was divided into five states: evaluating previous studies, evaluating basic potential, setting priorities, new technologies and the last stage evaluated results reached by means of Multinational Exercise. The final version of this document (Final Report) will be released in next half. By joining JO2030 the Czech Republic underlined its resolution to contribute to the advance of NATO defence potential.

The aim of this work was to make an analysis of current state of catering services in the forces, to define risks of possible harms, damages, losses, or another prospective disasters, in order to propose a systematic approach to the risk management. Identified risks are being completely analysed. Author's team drafted a risks catalogue to make their identification easier. Among others, upon this analysis, they compiled the chart of risks in catering process within the section of the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic. A user manual for monitoring and risk control was created, so that we can adopt suitable procurement measures for avoiding or minimizing risks, their occurrences, eventually lowering unwanted results generated by the above mentioned analysed risks.

The paper deals with the assessment of extremism in connection with the Czech Armed Forces. It analyses attitudes of various forms of Czech domestic extremist movements to the military sphere and possible impacts of the infiltration of extremists into the army, namely in time of danger (training militant activities, including paramilitarism, subversion, espionage, etc). The most important problem of the contemporary Czech counter-extremist policy in this area is the rise of neo-Nazi activities in the armed forces and the establishing of extreme right paramilitary units which take interest in the engagement of soldiers. Even though these activities are limited in our country, the author offers overall survey various obscure organizations, having connections to foreign groups sponsoring their Czech counterparts.

This article deals with the EU command and control functions and provides basic information on the structure and capabilities of the EU CCS in Battle Group EU operations. The author describes political and strategical levels CCS (COREPER, GAERC, COPS, CivCom, EUMC, EUMS, BDE HQ, prospective EU FHQ). Only US, EU and E3 (Britain, France, Germany) are capable to realize integrated expeditional operations. The ACR can work only with cooperation with them. The Czech Republic as a small EU member state is actively engaged in the building of the Battle Group EU. The Czech Army is going to increase its expeditionary capabilities as demanded and be prepared for a broader range of conflicts and crises in the vital area of the EU concerns. At present, the ACR is able to carry out a self-supported, integrated expedition operation only on the edge of all its strength. The political leaders must bear this fact in mind, as the army mustn't be overburdened, otherwise it might lose its credibility. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.

The paper deals with the relation between political extremism and regular soldiers of the Czech armed forces (from the point of view of military staff). The threat of presence of extremists in the army is conceptualized in this paper. After that there are presented methodology, outcomes and interpretations of research sociological investigation, which was realized in February and March 2009 at Czech armed forces. As a risk should be assessed mostly information about contacts with extremists in the army and information about very different attitudes in relation to the importance of the issue "extremism in the army".