Fulltext search in archive

The Command and Control process may be defined as an ability to determine what to do and implement effective actions. With the use of the Standard Operating Procedures, the commander must be able to realize set tasks in defined time. The C2 system must be able to monitor and collect data on the situation, to develop an understanding of the situation, to develop a course(s) of action and select one, to develop a plan to execute the selected course of action, to execute the plan, to include providing direction and leadership to subordinates, to monitor execution of the plan and adapt as necessary. The commander draws the picture of situation on the base of surveillance and data collection from various sources, classified and unclassified. The context of information is formed by means of paradigm of personal experiences of commander and his intuition.

The key term in this article is "war economy" It is used to describe the contingencies undertaken by the state to mobilise its economy for war production. Often confused term "resource conflicts" needs explaining. First, there are raw materials, mineral resources (diamonds, precious metals). Another group of resources are critical items, water supplies, and fertile lands. This article concentrates on conflicts provoked by the abundance of natural sources, not by their insufficiency. Their driving motive is "greed-based" model (the effort to take over the control over lands, crude oils). Another model is "grievance-based" model, based upon the feeling of hate, having its roots in e.g. underprivileged position of certain part of population) tied with worsening economy). "War economy" got a new meaning. It moved far away from Clauzewitz's paradigm, the sense of such war is in itself, the war is protracted, it is war for war's sake.

The Engineers are specialist soldiers trained in the construction and demolition of bridges, field fortifications, obstacles, roads, etc. Their major task is to support Czech missions abroad, as a part of multinational peacekeeping forces. This article is a preliminary study into the current state of applying the Czech Engineer units in operations other than war as a part of Joint Forces Peace Support Operations. There are mentioned some aspects, for example basic engineer support tasks, possible demanded future capabilities of the Czech Engineer Troops, engineer support to movement and force protection engineering. The purpose of this article is to initiate a debate about the topic and to start the brainstorming process in a broad military environment.

After 1989 public opinion polls have become inseparable part of examining our society. By analysing aggregate response data over time, we can see trajectories into the future. This might help MoD officials in decision-making processes, planning long-term developments. The "Army and Public" poll is concentrated on the attitudes of Czech population to topics such as the prestige of a professional soldier, military profession, NATO membership, confidence in public administration, last but not least, the Czech missions abroad. Positive mindsets appeared namely after 1996-97, when Czech army helped during catastrophic flood. In assessing period 2006-2009 most of respondents agreed with the statement that foreign missions proved the qualities of our army, their approval with our engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq rose significantly (by 33,1 per cent), attitudes against Kosovo were unbalanced.

This study is based on a paper presented at the conference with the same heading taking place on January 8, 2009. First, the authors enumerate starting points of Czech defence and security polity together with key factors influencing their developments. The whole scale of new threats-from WMD and ballistic proliferation to cyber attack and even non intentional threats like climate change and pandemia-are to be addressed not only in NATO but also in the EU. Existing states of affairs are gradually reflected by Czech security and defence documents: Security Strategy 1999, 2001, 2003; Military Strategy 1999, 2002, 2004, 2008. In this historical context we joined NATO defence alliance and took part in peacekeeping missions abroad. Previous twenty years when we lived in peace could be regarded as a challenge to build Czech statehood. There is no time like a present. Only the future will show us whether we mastered it as much as we could.

In spite of the fact that it is a new concept, it presents one of key methods of international engagement in crisis areas the EU prefers. Its main components are crises prevention and securing stabilization. Security tasks are composite problems solving one of main state functions: to guard external and internal security together with principles of civil control. This essay among others aims to explain practicability of the EU's concept of preventive engagement as a tool of implementation of the European Security Strategy, further it describes European concept for crisis management missions in the field of civilian administration supporting security and justice. At the end there are some recommendations for the Czech Republic how to form capacities for EU missions and for the transformation of Czech security sectors.

The paper deals with the assessment of extremism in connection with the Czech Armed Forces. It analyses attitudes of various forms of Czech domestic extremist movements to the military sphere and possible impacts of the infiltration of extremists into the army, namely in time of danger (training militant activities, including paramilitarism, subversion, espionage, etc). The most important problem of the contemporary Czech counter-extremist policy in this area is the rise of neo-Nazi activities in the armed forces and the establishing of extreme right paramilitary units which take interest in the engagement of soldiers. Even though these activities are limited in our country, the author offers overall survey various obscure organizations, having connections to foreign groups sponsoring their Czech counterparts.

This leading article deals with the sphere of strategy and defence policy. The essay is an output of scholarly work and therefore it is summarizing and evaluating problems in question with professional recommendations. First, the author draws our attention to various concepts of security and underlines national differences backed by national histories. Security concepts have their sources in deep analyses of potential threats and corresponding scenarios, with specific bias to Czech environment. He openly expresses his critical opinions on contemporary security documents, for lack of political security directions, as politicians in general have little knowledge of security and defence problems. In his opinion, the possible outcome lies in a partnership and cooperation with academics outside military and government structures, experts and members of security community, whose expert opinions could help namely to form long-term security concepts.

Soldiers are trained for combat situations. But peace missions are not tied with the fight. In some measure, they remind more civil police actions: patrolling, duties at sentry points. But still they are activities done by servicemen; those who retire are called "military veterans". Peacekeepers are exposed to high level of stress situations. People who experience a high level of stress for a long time may become irritable, socially withdrawn, and emotionally unstable. Some people under intense and prolonged stress may start to suffer from extreme anxiety, depression, or other severe emotional problems. All psychological research can be divided into two groups: first dealing with actual stress symptoms, the second one dealing with inner structure of individual stress. Discussed model was formed according the pattern of American airborne units deployed in the Sinai Peninsula. Dimensions of psychological stress in peacekeeping operations are formed above all by "boredom", the real threats are in fact at the end of risk scale. More stress reactions come after the mission ends. Such drafted model can be used also in the Army of the Czech Republic, or in international missions of the Police Force of the Czech Republic ...244

The basic task of the post-1989 period was to formulate a security policy and a strategy ensuing from it. The strategy had to be based on a synthesis of the international policy concept, defence concept and internal security concept to ensure that defence would not be seen solely as the task of the army and the Ministry of Defence, but of the whole state and society-of every citizen. In this article his author evaluates some aspects of the armed forces transformation in process of adaptation. He assesses these changes with regard to approved strategic and conceptual documents that significantly determined this gradual transformation process. He identifies both same of its successes as well as failures. The study does not have a clearly analytical and evaluative character; rather it is a combination of factual information drawn from official sources, country's practical security policy as they appeared in contemporary Czech press, and opinions of the author.

The security environment is permanently changing. A national set of risks has increased after joining the EU and NATO and EU enlargement. The Czech Republic is obligated to integrate national security capabilities into NATO and the EU. To fulfil its responsibility, the Czech Republic ought to use the capabilities-based planning for further transformation of national security sector. This NATO concept ought to be in use not only within the MoD, but also at other ministries tied or responsible for national security. The national security sector must be planed, programmed, budgeted and transformed like a body. The article deals with the problem of unifying security concepts across Czech public administration. The author points out that our operational capabilities are influenced among others by the lack of labour force at the Czech national labour market.

The Czech Republic became involved in ISAF in 2002, among others we sent there both field hospital and field surgical team; later meteorological group, traffic control group with EOD team began to serve at the Kabul International Airport. In 2004, the 601st Special Force Group was engaged in Enduring Freedom operation, Czech soldiers served in German Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), positive role was played by Czech Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team. Another successful mission was establishing PRT Logar, supporting social, economical development in this province. New common features of PRT, helicopter OMLT, EUPOL mission, partly SOG is the concentration on building Afghan capacities, namely ANSF (Afghan National Security Force) and public administration. Together with their deliberate support, it has multiplying effect, as assistance and training bring more effects than mere fulfilling standard military tasks, guarding e.g. Dutch base.

It is evident that Barack Obama diverges from Bush's pre-emptive strategy. There are changes in style and contents. Obama begins to direct American policy more towards diplomatic negotiations instead underlining military strength. It is evident namely in proposed negotiations with Iran and in case of Russia, where he wants to overcome cooling down after Russia-Georgia clashes and gas crisis. He insists on avoiding unnecessary conflicts and puts stress on good relations with allies and building new partnerships. He is going to withdraw soldiers from Iraq and in spite of problems in Afghanistan to reduce U.S. military budget. Even though Obama wants to maintain American world's leadership, there are some signs of partial changes in American foreign policy, e.g. his orientation towards Asia suggests first signs of multilateral approach of post-American era. The author also mentions the question of "American radar" in the Czech Republic, the fate of which depends on Iran's nuclear power programme.

Africa has became synonymous with conflict, increasingly violent and protracted. The continent is facing huge difficulties today and the EU is more and more involved in peace enforcement and expeditionary operations. Therefore the purpose of this article is to inform and pass knowledge of operational environment to those Czech soldiers designated to deploy overseas and abroad. It covers topics such as operational areas, understanding EU Battle Group operational Environment and Africa's operational environment. It is necessary for Czech soldiers to understand African operational environment very quickly and profoundly to avoid unfortunate misunderstanding of the local culture, customs, believes, religions, regional official and customary laws. It is a new challenge for the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic to be prepared for the CZE/SVK Battle Group. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.

Many people in the world lead intolerably insecure lives. In many cases insecurity is the consequence of armed conflicts in which civilians are deliberately targeted, sometimes, their insecurity has natural causes, like earthquakes, hurricane, tsunami or disease, they suffer from famine. Security is a broader term, covering not only military threats. Human rather than nation-state security should be at the heart of European policy. Instead of defeating enemies or pacifying warring parties, EU missions should focus on protecting civilians, through law enforcement with the occasional use of force. EU member states ought to support a new framework for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The following seven principles are underlined: (i) the primacy of Human Rights, (ii) clear political authority, (iii) multilateralism, (iv) a bottom-approach, (v) regional focus; (vi) the use of legal instruments, (vii) the appropriate use of force. In fact, underlines Mr. Karaffa, humane security concept forms the very base of common European culture and identity.

Factors such as distance, destination, deployment demands, duration, represent key elements to determine logistics requirements. The EU BG concept necessitates considerable strategic air/sea lift and combat support capabilities, since EU battle groups are to be able to be deployed almost anywhere in the world, primarily in Africa. They have to deploy both troops and materiel simultaneously to its mission areas. Strategic airlift is the fastest way of deploying troops over long distance. The main challenge for the EU is therefore availability giant airplanes. A lack of suitable European transport crafts in EBalabáuropean airlift fleet is the Achilles heel to the EU BG Concept. The problem is that all aircraft available have only limited payload capacities and flying range. Although deploying by sea is more time consuming than deploying by air, EU member states have more ships available for strategic sea transport. The strict deployment deadline set down in the EU BG Concept means that ships and crews will have to be held at very high readiness.

The complex security strategy must pay attention not only to outer threats, but also to inner security risks. Social and cultural impacts of globalisation produced even to our country a rise of several extremist right-wing political groups inspired by or following the tenets of Hitler's Nazi Party, referred to as neo-Nazis, because they modify Nazi doctrine and because the original Nazi movement inspires them. Some forms of fascism are also anti-Semitic or xenophobic. On the contrary, Anarchism is a political theory opposed to all forms of government. Anarchists believe that the highest attainment of humanity is the freedom of individuals, unhindered by any form of repression or control. To accept matching strategy, we must know those theories, their international background, as those movements are usually tied with organized crime and terrorism.

This operation was led by Germany, and made up of elements contributed by twenty EU nations; as well as Turkey and Switzerland. The EU deployed FHQ in Kinshasa and simultaneously kept the over-the-horizon force in Gabon, in order to ensure a deterrent capacity and to avoid unnecessary heavy military presence in Kinshasa. After Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EUFOR RD Congo was a second EU largest military operation, involving a total of almost 3,000 soldiers and officers). The co-operation with MONUC was decisive in containing the potential spread of violence at a particularly sensitive moment in the election process. The operation demonstrated the EU ability to successfully conduct medium scale autonomous multinational operations within a planned time frame under the UN mandate. The views expressed in this assessment are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of EU Military Structure or the Czech Ministry of Defence. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.

This article deals with the present state of command and control dilemma in brigade battle groups. It outlines the resources of the rationalization of organizational structures at HQs and it shows their impact on modular design of the command posts. The gradual introduction of NATO Network Enabled Capability (NEC) into Czech armed forces (Bde TF-Brigade Task Force), requires first, changes in the structure of individual components of command and control system; secondly, initiating basic changes oriented towards optimalization command and control structures; third, the preparation of commanders and staffs in the field of information technology, so that they could achieve knowledge and control dominance. At the same time organizational changes raise modification within command chains of separate groups.

The major topic of this article is the problem of radical Islam in the context of contemporary as well as historical development in Europe. In the course of several chapters the author describes basic facts of the modern phenomenon of Islamisation, impending over Europe. His study is supported from several sources, e.g. Gadhafi M., Islam taking over Europe (2006); or reports issued by the Netherlands Security and Intelligence Service (2005); Swiss Country Report on Islamisation (2007), etc. There are over 50 million Muslims in Europe, if Turkey is added to the EU, Europe will have another 50 million Muslims. When terrorism can be considered as a danger, Islam should be considered as a risk to generate such a danger. The democratic state is fully entitled to diagnose any kind of "side effects" as a result of Islamic preaching. This is not judging the religion but its effects on the system. The solution is long-lasting: to support cultural integration, because only a few European Muslims are involved politically, or take part in terrorist attacks.

This opening study is written by two authors, members of Centre for Social and Economic Strategies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University Prague, which is an interdisciplinary research and education unit engaged in the development of theory, methodology and practice of exploring possible futures, and the application of analyses and forecasts in decision making. The authors propose to supplement prognostic scenarios by the so-called wild cards that represent something unpredictable, extra players or actors taking part in a global politics. They compare wild cards of 2001 with the present-day situation, and then predict state of affairs till 2040, among others, the islamisation of Europe and hispanisation of the United States. The purpose of this is to promote dialogues between military and security experts, politicians, civil servants, civil sector activists, as well as individual citizens.

Terrorism threatens to attack and destroy the open democracy, but what is terrorism? The main aim of this essay is to formulate some proposals of a minimal operational definition tied with terrorism, as well as a definition of terrorist attack with the ambition to surpass a possibility of an ambiguous construction in the field of semantical research. Terrorism is usually described as unlawful violent activism targeted against civilians or against civilian targets with the aim of achieving political, religious, ideological and other goals. It presents wellconsidered ways of production and fructification of fear that are applied on civilian targets. A terrorist attack communicates devastatingly as a pure act of violence inside the psychosomatic structure of its recipients (victims). The new terrorism after 9/11 attacks could be characterized by fanaticism and the impending danger of arms of mass destruction. It is a culture of death.

Intelligence activity is an essential part of psychological operations (PSYOPS). Intelligence data are collected, treated, and assessed by intelligence officers together with analytical specialists in cooperation with intelligence authorities from other services. Two basic documents are made. First, in British Army, it is called Country Area Study; in US forces it is labelled as PSYOP Basic Study. The second type of studies represents the assessment of target audience, called in British Army Basic Psychological Study, in US Special PSYOP Assessment. Gathered information are integrated into special electronic bases, e.g. SOCRATES (Special Operations Command, Research, Analysis and Threat Evaluation Data System), or POADS (Psychological Operations Automated Data System) used by the US Army. The rating of effectiveness of psychological campaigns is extremely difficult and consists of several phases. Even enemy's propaganda is analyzed. This process is of specific structure, categorized as SCAME (Source, Content, Audience, Media, and Effect). For PSYOPS operations is extreme important their precise timing. Legal Aspects of "Consciousness and Religion"

Professional, or Professionalized NCO Corps by CSM Dušan Rovenský. This article covers the process of transition from conscript army to entirely professional, allvolunteer force (AVF). It deals with the role and responsibilities of NCOs generally, rank and grade structure, career rules, NCOs' training and education. The author identifies the problems of a rapid professionalization, discusses the possibilities for improvement and finally suggests the possible solutions to those problems. Among others, there is some sort of misunderstanding as far as Other Ranks/Enlisted corps is concerned. The Czech translations of those ranks do not always correspond to their general positions, ranks, responsibilities, command authority, the length of service of individual non-commissioned officers (NCOs), sergeants, or warrant officers (WOs). The author, Command Sergeant Major, Support and Training Forces Command (a graduate of U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy Fort Bliss) puts forward several proposals to make those translations more precise.

At present, artillery problems are rather neglected. Artillery brigade, which consists of two arty battalions, can form two division task forces, up to two brigade task forces, or several battalion task forces. This presupposes establishing unified chain of command points. At present, we may form three main command points of division, brigade and battalion task force. The author depicts tasks and missions of individual levels of task forces, their composition, main elements of command and control. Special attention is paid to centres of combat support, or places of combat support at battalion level. At present, commanders of combat units do not use fully potential of artillery support. Therefore it is necessary to discuss those problems, so that our artillery could be used in most efficient way. The article is accompanied by several charts and pictures, showing schemes and tasks of artillery forces and standardized operational procedures.

This article covers the EUFOR RD Congo operation preparation phase and provides information on Military Strategic Planning Process, Military Operational Planning, Collaborative Planning, EU OHQ Potsdam activation and Force Generation Process. It describes planning period to highlight a pivotal role of training and education. Operation EUFOR RD CONGO was the EU second military intervention in the RDC, following Operation Artemis in 2003. The EUFOR RD CONGO mission was to support MONUC during running election process, in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1671, authorizing the temporary deployment of an EU force in the RDC. The views expressed in this assessment are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of EU Military Structure or the Czech MoD. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.

The so-called Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) are a relatively new concept and element in coalition operations. Those teams have been operating in Afghanistan since the end of the year 2002. The evaluation and assessment of their work is very complicated and sometimes quite unambiguous. The main purpose of this article is to show to widest military community tasks and problems of PRTs; secondly to introduce main principles of work of PRTs under different conditions. Moreover, this article refers to fundamental problems that guide their PRTs development and work in countries that have some experiences with building and activities of PRTs. The author also describes the activities of 40 Czech military personnel PRT in Afghanistan (in the frame of German PRT, Badakshan Province, Fayzabad).

Similar to the Czech Republic, all NATO nations have their own military territorial administrative authorities that both execute tasks of state administration and at the same time fulfil assignments of territory defence. Their overall numbers differ and mostly depend upon the fact whether the country has compulsory military service, alternatively military service is voluntary (professional army). Or as in the case of Greece, the scheme of Military Territorial Authorities is influenced by security situation in neighbouring areas. The author deals with Slovakia, Poland, Germany, Greece, and Spain. Those authorities have basic influence on recruitment, and manning, which is especially important in time of crisis, as the authorities have prepared manning system to increase numbers to prescribed volume.

From the point of history, at present, there is a turn in the deployment of the Czech army. The turning point lies in philosophy change concerning security and defence of our country, as well as in army build-up by itself. In the past, our armed forces used to be semi-professional army, i.e. the core of forces was formed by professional soldiers (officers, NCOs), supplemented by conscripts. In time of peace, all males were prepared and trained during their compulsory military service, after that they were trained as compulsory reserves. In war they could be immediately deployed in war organization. This deployment was planned well ahead, so was its logistical support. Upon examples the USA and Germany the author explains weak points of present organization, which-according to him-constitute a danger for wartime deployment of the ACR. The problem is in questions of mobilization, as volunteer soldiers represent only 0.6 per cent of respective population.

This essay is based upon the article by Lt.Col. Peter Zillmer, German military journal Europäische Sicherheit, No. 8/2007. The point is as follows: anti-air defence faces qualitative new tasks, this new qualitative level is constituted by the fact that anti-air defence has only few second to prepare all elements for direct firing against attacks of undirected rockets, mortar mines, launched by asymmetric enemies. It is the question of reconnaissance, and early warning, command and control of fire. NATO's programme Defence Against Terrorism results were demonstrated at air firing range in spring 2007. Coalition forces in Iraq are exposed to permanent mass rocket attacks from the part of insurgents, so they use system Phalanx LPWS, originally developed for direct ship defence. The article further enumerates other systems in use: German FüWES, Swiss Skyshield, and so on.