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The specification of terminology related to terms command and control (C2) is quite important for further scholarly examination of military science. The command and control area is nowadays under the constant impact of the influx of information technology, as well as it is affected by the changes in the contemporary security environment. This article is dedicated to the military, its history, and its contributions to current military operations. It provides an attempt to specify terms "command and control" in both general and military levels. Finally, it provides clarification of the terminology within command and control systems, as their terminology has been changing. In a simple way, the C2 could be characterized as the execution of authority by the commander, via communication and information systems, with the use of current standard operational procedures, under present laws and rules, to act in the interest of forces to meet assigned orders and intentions.

In the previous Military Review we introduced the article "Will Military Deception Pass Away?" by the same author. In the Army of the Czech Republic we have no manual dealing with military deception (MILDEC). The only manual concerning MILDEC was abolished without any substitute. But military art can't be further developed without similar documents. Today we take MILDEC as a complex set of provisions misleading enemy's commanders and staff, by means of false information and counterfeit data that deliberately deceive adversary decision-makers and planners. Use of MILDEC during any phase of an operation also helps to mislead adversaries as to the strength, readiness, locations, and intended missions of friendly forces. The MILDEC could contribute to the successful accomplishment of the assigned mission by many ways.

This article presents a formal economic framework for assessing the sustainability of prolonged attritional warfare. Using the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine as a case study, the paper models the interaction between military production and consumption (losses) to evaluate the limits of state endurance under sustained conflict. The core of the analysis is a differential function of the war economy, defined as the net capacity to sustain operations over time, which is the difference between production and losses. This function is embedded within a theoretical construct that distinguishes between sustainable and unsustainable operational regimes, marked by critical thresholds of system exhaustion. Through a combination of regression analysis and symbolic modelling, the paper demonstrates how Russia’s current attritional strategy may be approaching a structural breaking point. The findings offer a conceptual and empirical basis for evaluating wartime industrial resilience and may inform strategic policy and conflict forecasting.

The article deals with the possibilities of protecting the outer perimeter of static military facilities using ground-based unmanned systems that can complement the already existing protective elements. The conclusions reached and theoretical assumptions were experimentally verified in the field during the protection of a small base, using UGS Taros Furbo and Tactical Decision Support System calculations. The protection routes calculated by the system were then practically implemented by dismounted patrols and autonomous UGS Taros Furbo, focusing on terrain traversability and time of overcoming. The main objective of the paper is to present to the military public the current possibilities of deploying UGS Taros Furbo in the protection of static military facilities such as command posts or bases. Their use can significantly reduce the requirements for the deployment of dismounted patrols to protect the outer perimeter.

The presented study seeks to illuminate the nature and scope of Sino-Russian military cooperation following the onset of the war in Ukraine in 2022. The research question guiding this study is: In which military dimensions – such as technological collaboration, joint military exercises, or the provision of ammunition – does Sino-Russian cooperation manifest, and what underlying factors drive this engagement. The study revealed that the military cooperation between the two countries is very close and has been developing and deepening for a long time. The war in Ukraine has played a role in partially changing the nature of cooperation, but the continuity of cooperation itself was already set before the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022.  The war in Ukraine did not open a new area of military cooperation but rather deepened existing ties. It also highlighted the asymmetry of the partnership, which now tilts in favor of China, which is a shift from the situation prior to 2022.

This research examines post-2022 defence transformation among seven Eastern European NATO members, identifying patterns that nuance existing burden-sharing theories and refine understanding of regional security dynamics. Through a systematic comparative analysis incorporating quantitative spending data, procurement classifications, and geographic threat assessments (2021-2025), the study tests whether increased military expenditure translates into credible deterrence. The investigation analyzes spending-capability correlations and geographic proximity effects on response intensity, revealing that unprecedented defense budget expansion coexists with unresolved sustainability concerns. The Capacity-Capability-Credibility (CCC) framework serves as the primary analytical lens, with geography establishing baseline threat response intensity and political factors mediating response magnitude.

The article deals with the consequences of changes in society and the army after the "Velvet Revolution" in 1989 for teaching social sciences at military schools. The changes are illustrated by the example of the Military University of the Ground Forces in Vyškov, which trained most of the officers for the ground troops. The first part of the article shows the use of social science teaching at military schools to ideologically indoctrinate students in favour of the ruling Communist Party of Czechoslovakia before November 1989. The next part of the article deals with the reflection of changes in society and in the army after the abolition of the article on the leading role of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in the Constitution in the system of teaching social sciences, in their content and scope. The content of the article also shows individual milestones in the process of changes in the teaching of social sciences on the way from their use for communist indoctrination to the formation of democratic army officers.

The article deals with some military consequences of the departure of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union (Brexit). To assess the potential impacts on defence and security of EU, a structured approach involving several methods was used in the analysis, which combines a search of professional publications, factors sensitivity analysis and testing of hypotheses. Based on the analysis, it was evaluated that the departure of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the structures of the European Union will take place without significant impact in the military field and does not pose an immediate threat to the security and defence of EU member states. Nevertheless, in connection with Brexit, there is still a certain risk of negative impacts in this area.

Personnel Recovery intervenes to almost all areas of planning, preparation and implementation of military operations. One of the important areas of the personnel recovery system is the intelligence area. This article describes on the operational level the reasons and basic methods of intelligence support of Personnel Recovery during joint military operations. It introduces selected intelligence disciplines and explains the suitability of their use in the various Personnel Recovery phases. It also describes the intelligence activities related to post-reintegration phase and outlines the basic issues associated with the intelligence support of Personnel Recovery.

Since the end of the Cold War, several military reforms have been carried out in Germany so far and a new military transformation is in the process of preparation. Over the years, the definition of the Bundeswehr's main missions has gradually shifted towards crisis management operations and the structure of the armed forces has accommodated to this shift. After the 2010-2011 reform, it was entirely evident that crisis management operations have become the main task of the armed forces. At present, German military policy places the main emphasis on "restoring the capacities" for collective defence. The strengthening of the expeditionary element in the German armed forces was made possible by the most efficient use of resources and investment inherited from the Cold War era and cutting capacities tailored to territorial defence. The author comes to the conclusion, that such policy is now evidently exhausted and is no longer sustainable - if German collective defence capacities are to be truly restored.

The purpose of this article is to inform on elements of military deception in NATO armies and overarching principles that make military deception successful. Deception Planning is an iterative process that should be considered as an inextricable part of the operational planning. The knowledge in the field of military deception in the Czech military is low; no operational deception plan has been prepared for foreign operations or any military exercise. Deception is widely appreciated as a powerful instrument of military operations, yet it is surprisingly neglected by both the Czech Army and Military Educational System. The author tries to encourage officers and members of higher staffs to study this subject.

This article discusses the transformation of the information environment, which allows an adversary to exploit cyber-enabled psychological and information operations. It presents the options currently available to an adversary to exploit the vulnerability of the information environment, chiefly the cognitive vulnerabilities of target groups. Thus, hostile interests are often pursued through manipulation, using disinformation, propaganda, algorithms and artificial intelligence. In the light of these developments, the article defines a society-centric approach, in which societal and human resilience are emphasised.

The article analyses the process of the NATO enlargement after 1990. It starts by a detailed analysis of the secret negotiations which have been started just after the end of the Cold War. In the light of the institutional liberalism, the NATO enlargement is a positive process which satisfied especially new member states. But in the light of the American neorealism, this process resulted into profound changes in the balance of the security threats and into a large militarisation and tension at the new Eastern frontier of NATO in a direct neighbourhood with the Russia. New military units with the modern arms systems are deployed over there and we are witnessing a growing number of dangerous military incidents. As a result, the contemporary situation needs new political negotiations between two competitors and a shift from the contemporary negative Peace towards the positive Peace.

The article addresses the use of social media intelligence (SOCMINT) as a tool for recruiting and selecting souces by foreign intelligence services, with an emphasis on the risks it poses to students in military studies at national military universitiy. It analyzes the specific ways in which SOCMINT enables foreign intelligence agencies to effectively gather personal data and profile potential collaborators from both public and private information shared online. Research conducted among students of the University of Defense and other institutions revealed that military students share comparable types of information on social networks as their civilian peers, making them equally vulnerable to the activities of foreign intelligence services. However, military students are preparing for careers in defense and security, making them a significantly more attractive target for foreign intelligence agencies than other categories of employees.

The preparation of soldiers for future employment in the civilian labor market is a critical issue that requires attention. This research aimed to identify soldiers' preferences regarding their transition to civilian employment after their military service. A questionnaire survey was conducted with 128 active-duty soldiers from two units of the Czech Armed Forces. The majority of respondents prefer a second career in the private sector, and most would like to start preparing several months before their service ends. Many respondents expressed interest in expanding their skills to improve employability, with retraining courses being the most preferred option. Overall, interest in the offered support tools for career transition was significant, with the job portal being the most favored. Many respondents believe soldiers face difficulties in securing civilian employment after their service and assess the current system for preparing soldiers for a second career as underdeveloped.

The enforcement of mandatory military reforms in 2016 and 2018 has significantly affected the overall layout of higher education (HE) in Armenia， creating a number of challenges for different stakeholders. The current research paper makes an attempt to examine the main perceptions of teachers, students, educators, etc., of the enforcement of mandatory military service reforms on the HE system in post-Soviet Armenia. The data of the following study was obtained from four different state universities located in the Republic of Armenia. The outcomes of the research demonstrate that different stakeholders hold controversial opinions in terms of the application of these reforms. The findings illustrate that these reforms positively influenced in developing academic integrity, and equality among students with different social and geographic backgrounds, however, they have worsened the overall competitiveness of higher education creating a female-dominating educational environment.

The aim of the article is to compare foreign policy of G. W. Bush jr. and Barack Obama in terms of use of military force. Transition from ground operations to targeted killings is demonstrated on three military operations - Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Inherent Resolve. The shift from bombers to drones had several reasons, mainly changing features of the threat. Authors are asking questions why and how did change the US fight against global terrorism with respect to military technologies and how is this change reflected in US fight against the threat of Islamic state.

On the introduction, the article focuses on clarifying the place and role of counterinsurgency in current military operations. It also deals with the principles of counterinsurgency and their doctrinal comparison within some advanced armies and the NATO. The aim is to highlight some findings related to principles that should be changed,added in doctrine and incorporated into the training of the ACR troops. The result of the analysis and comparison of individual principles with own experience of the author from the mission in Afghanistan are recommendations given for the troop training in the theatre. The implementation of the proposed measures in preparation of the Czech Army units may improve the effectivenessof counterinsurgency in military operations.

The article discusses the operational adaptability, which will be needed, in accordance with US, in future armed conflicts. The capability of operational adaptability has a significant impact particularly on the operations of land forces, which are still considered as a paramount military power. One of the prerequisites for achieving operational adaptability is effective influencing the dynamics of the human environment in armed conflict. Current development and emphasizing technology over the course of armed conflict detached too fare the War from its intangible political, cultural and psychological context. Human, psychological, political and cultural dimensions of armed conflict create a lot of uncertainty, which land forces should deal with in the future military operations. A partial solution applicable for Czech Armed Forces also outlines this article.

Infomantion era could be characterized as a period of steem qualitative and quantitative information raise, aroused namely by sharp development of information and comunication technologies (ICT) . Military deception thus acquires new dimensions, wider chances to be employed in armed forces operations. This article concludes a free series of essays dealing with military deceiving. It is thinking over questions resulting from deception-information age relations, the beginnig of which could be situated into the 80s last century.

The article addresses the issue of information environment defence in the current security context, with a special focus on cognitive warfare as one of the key and rapidly developing challenges of recent years. The aim of this overview article is to place this phenomenon within a broader security-strategic framework of information environment defence and to describe how this area is conceptually and institutionally approached in the Czech Republic and in selected NATO Allies – specifically in the United Kingdom, Estonia, Finland, Sweden, and Slovakia. The article is primarily based on publicly available strategic and conceptual documents and official policies of individual countries. On this basis, the article identifies the basic common features and differences in their approaches to information environment defence, while also drawing conclusions about some future challenges in this area.

This article analyses the current state of international humanitarian law (IHL) considering the armed conflict in Ukraine. It explores the theoretical framework of IHL, the typology of the conflict, recent legal developments, and their practical impacts. Special attention is given to the failures of international law in protecting civilians, the limitations of legal enforcement, and proposals for improving the system's effectiveness. The aim is to contribute to scholarly debate on the future of legal regulation in armed conflicts.

The article aims to identify the dependence of military expenditures and selected economic determinants on the example of the V4 countries in the years 1999-2020. The following are selected as economic determinants: the size of the gross domestic product, the rate of inflation, the debt and deficit of the government sector and unemployment. Correlation analysis proved the expected relationship between the gross domestic product and the military expenditure of Hungary and especially Poland. The relationship between military spending and unemployment was confirmed for Poland, Hungary and Slovakia, the expected relationship between military spending and government debt for the Czech Republic. The linear regression model confirmed the positive effect of the gross domestic product on military expenditure in the case of Poland, the effect of the increase in military expenditure due to rising inflation in Hungary and the negative effect of increasing state indebtedness in the case of the Czech Republic. At the same time, the results did not confirm the uniformity of the factors affecting the size of the military factors in the analyzed V4 countries.

The goal of this informative article is to comprehensively describe the causes of the formation and integration of cyber forces and information operations into the structure of the Army of the Czech Republic, including other significant connotations. The intention is not to present new scientific findings, but to point out the meaning of the existence of cybernetics and information operations as a necessary separate component of the Army of the Czech Republic capable of responding to the dynamic development of the security environment and the continuous development of modern technologies. The content and main arguments of this article reflect the transition from the classical form of warfare to the new platform, represented mainly by cyber space and a hybrid combination of a wide range of power tools with an emphasis on information operations.

The article deals with the process of identification of competencies for commanders in leading units in military operations. The used methodology based on combined approach founded on selected competency rosters and its further modification seemed to be relevant and applicable in the Czech Armed Forces conditions. Military officer's profiles anchored in the EU Commission Database for Armed Forces and in the EU Sectoral Qualifications Framework for Military Officer Profession have been proven as the most relevant frameworks of competencies. Both are formulated and structured to be as generic as possible for all officers regardless of their specialization. They were established on current theories and incorporate extensive amount of entries from various national sources. The resulting list of 24 generic competencies, selected from a total of 69 competencies analyzed, represents a possible example of a set of requirements imposed on the Czech Armed Forces officers.

The purpose of this paper is to present some particularities of mission command during the conflict in Ukraine. Intended as a  framework of analysis, it describes the ways in which the involved parties manage warfighting from the perspective of practicing mission command as a method to enhance military effectiveness. Using qualitative methods, combining literature review, critical analysis of relevant resources, comparative analysis and indirect observation, the findings are related to aspects of mission command that are critical for enhancing operational and decision-making resilience, through identifying and examining various situations involving Ukrainian and Russian military forces. At the same time, the results of the study highlight some potential ways of innovating the principle

This article delves into multi-domain operations in the context of future warfighting. A multi-domain approach to operations is being progressively implemented in allied nations and within NATO, as well. It should also become a core interest for the Czech Republic, even if the sea and space domains do not represent the crucial area of potential operational engagement of the Army of the Czech Republic. The complexity of operations in a complex operating environment requires mutual interaction across all operational domains. The integration of the physical and virtual spheres of operations suggests that operations planning cannot be strictly oriented to individual operational domains. The interaction between operational domains must be perceived as a sine qua non for effective planning and conducting military operations. This is also a fundamental prerequisite for the successful activity of forces in a complex operating environment.

The article focuses on information and psychological operations as a challenge for the security and defence establishments of NATO member states. A conceptualisation of the terms 'information operations' and 'psychological operations' is discussed in the contexts of reshaping the war-and-peace dichotomy, and of resilience and deterrence. It is suggested that these terms suffer from a normative approach to the paradigm of war and peace, and to the use of non-military means. This may lead to the greater vulnerability of security and defence systems in confrontation with an adversary. Also, special attention is paid to the vulnerabilities of security and armed forces, being overlooked in concepts of resilience.

The article discusses the possibilities of joint deployment of combat unmanned ground vehicles with combat infantry units. It summarizes the deployment of these assets in past and present military operations, including the presentation of deployment experiences available from public sources, and examines the joint deployment of an infantry squad with an unmanned ground combat platform during an attack operation. Using a constructive simulation, it presents the results of the deployment of an infantry squad during an attack operation with and without the support of a combat unmanned ground vehicle. As part of the discussion, he develops the ideas necessary for the cooperation of the unit with an unmanned vehicle. The aim of the article is, among other things, to open a debate in the professional community about the possibilities of effective use of unmanned ground systems to support the activity of combat units in military operations.