Introduction

The Russian full-scale invasion prompted reactions not only in the West but also in the East.  People´s Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as China) is closely watching this conflict due to its own ambitions to conquer Taiwan and realize what Xi Jinping calls the 'Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese nation'. The war in Ukraine could give the People´s Liberation Army (hereinafter referred to as PLA) valuable lessons and implications that could help minimize casualties and damages and the effects
on China in general.

This article attempts to compare the Western view on possible implications for China and the PLA
in four separate domains, diplomatic, information, military, and economic, with the views
of Taiwanese experts and scholars from different Taiwanese organizations. The research question
of this article is “How do the Western and Taiwanese views on possible implications for China
and the PLA from Ukraine differ?”. The paper discusses not only Taiwanese views on what China possibly learns, but also what Taiwan could learn, and what China should be prepared for as well. Research on this topic and comparison of Western and Taiwanese views is important for three main reasons. First, as shown in the following text, China is not deterred by the Russian failure in Ukraine and threatens to potentially use force against Taiwan. Second, there is a record of conflicts in which China has learned a number of lessons, and thus is it likely that China is watching and learning
from the current war in Ukraine. Third, China is not deterred by the Russian failure and another war could unfold in the coming years. The West and broader international community thus should pay attention to know what to potentially expect because the war over Taiwan will almost certainly affect not only Asia but Europe and other continents as well.

Taiwanese experts and scholars are naturally more informed about the Chinese threat, and thus it is needed to compare the Western and their views and, eventually, further research in which areas
and why are the Western and Taiwanese views different or similar.

The paper is divided into three parts. The first part consists of a review of recent documents
and addresses Chinese intentions toward Taiwan and the conflict from which China learned specific lessons. The second part consists of a review of the views of the Western and Taiwanese
on the potential implications of the war in Ukraine. The third part consists of a comparison of these views. The third part is focused only on whether views are different or not and does not attempt
to explain why there are differences or similarities.

Methods, Limitations, and Data

First, the literature review is used to review the current Western knowledge and opinions on what could be the implications for China and the PLA from the war in Ukraine with respect to the Taiwan campaign. Research papers and articles from 2022 and 2023 are analyzed. The DIME (diplomatic, information, military and economic) matrix is used to divide the implications. The DIME matrix is used due to its utility for security and defense research on the strategic level. After the literature review
of the Western view, the data obtained from 13 semi-structured interviews with Taiwanese experts and scholars from the Taiwan National Defense University, Institute of Defense and Security Research, Ministry of National Defense, Prospect Foundation, Next Generation Taiwan, and National Chengchi University are presented. Semi-structured interviews were conducted from April 16 to May 18, 2023, as part of the authors’ broader research. These data are amended by a review of the literature
from original Taiwanese sources available publicly. Research papers and articles from 2022 and 2023 are analyzed. In the third part, the views mentioned above are compared and discussed to determine if and how our Western view is different from the view of various Taiwanese experts.

Due to the timing of the interviews in Taiwan, the research is rather limited to approximately the first year of the war in Ukraine, that is, the Ukrainian counteroffensive and potential implications from this summer campaign and Russian defensive operations are not analyzed.

Recent Chinese Intentions Against Taiwan

Chinese president Xi Jinping (2017, 50-51) stated in his address to the 19th National Congress
of the Chinese Communist Party in 2017 that China prefers peaceful reunification with Taiwan. Reunification is “in the fundamental interest of the Chinese nation”. On the other hand, China opposes and will defeat any activities that lead to what China calls Taiwan independence.

According to the white paper titled “China's National Defense in the New Era”, one of the Chinese's national defense objectives is “to oppose and contain Taiwan's independence”. The document also notes that China does not renounce the use of force against 'Taiwan independence separatists'
and external forces (State Council 2019).

The Chinese State Council (2022) in its white paper The Taiwan Question and China's Reunification
in the New Era notes that Taiwan has always been part of China and it is a historic mission
of the Chinese Communist Party to complete China´s reunification and solve the Taiwan problem.
A complete reunification is also an essential part of what China calls the National Rejuvenation.
The white paper further notes that “we will always be ready to respond with the use of force or other necessary means to interference by external forces or radical action by separatist elements”.

In his address to the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinping (2022, 52) once again emphasized that China “will never promise to renounce
the use of force” against the so-called Taiwanese separatist and external forces that block the national reunification.

What Does China Learn from Other Conflicts?

Although, as shown above, China signals a potential war over Taiwan, the PLA has no recent combat experience. As Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen (2011, 1) point out, the last combat experience of the PLA came in 1979. Thus, the only way the PLA could learn and modernize is
by watching other conflicts all over the world. As shown below, China was closely watching the past wars and attempted to learn lessons from those conflicts.

China closely watched the Falklands War and drew very important lessons from this conflict in terms of practised operations, development of doctrine and procured weapons platforms. Based
on observations from the Falklands War, the PLA will likely buy modern naval platforms for its “Near Seas Defense” and “Out of Area” operations. The PLA will also likely continue to strengthen command and control coordination in combined operations and seek access to a naval base far from the mainland (Yung 2011, 75-76).

Another major war from which China should observe and learn was the Gulf Wars. According to Cheng (2011, 153-154), the Gulf Wars heavily influenced the PLA, especially in the field of hi-tech, and led
to the introduction of the “informatization” of the PLA. Furthermore, observations from the Gulf Wars have put more emphasis on psychological warfare and public opinion warfare in China.

The third case of conflict that at least sparked a debate among the PLA leadership is the war
over Kosovo. Three distinct schools on potential lessons emerged among the PLA. The first school says that the PLA should match the US capabilities. The second school advocates for a more asymmetric approach by the PLA. The third school advocates the continuation of the concept of a people's war
and emphasizes the role of civilians. These three schools are rather complementary to each other (Teufel Dreyer 2011, 33-34).

The Western View on Potential Implications for China

Diplomatic Domain

Wihtol (2023) emphasizes the weaker international status of Taiwan compared to Ukraine. Taiwan
is recognized by only 12 states. However, international support for Ukraine could be concerning
for the Chinese leadership, although China invested in the diplomatic isolation of Taiwan.

Bonny Lin (2022, 3-4) argues that in the Chinese view, US support for Ukraine and NATO expansion
is similar to US efforts in Asia and Chinese experts view Western inability to sympathize with Russia´s security concerns (which mirror China´s) as demonstrating that the United States cannot and will never take into account China's security concerns. Lin also points out that the war in Ukraine strengthens
the Chinese view of US anti-China policy. China could also feel that the West is attempting to separate it from Russia, which could, from a Chinese perspective, lead to a catastrophic scenario of confronting both Russia and the United States.

Evan A. Feigenbaum and Adam Szubin (2023) argue that the most important implication
in the diplomatic domain for China from the war in Ukraine is to build a strong coalition that could help China blur the influence of the US and its allies.

Information Domain

Joel Wuthnow (2023) points out that the PLA could learn from Russian failures in the information domain and achieve information dominance not only in the civilian domain but also in the military domain, by using electronic warfare, for example. According to Wood (2023), the PLA leadership could learn from the Russian inability to shape the information battlespace and block Ukrainian communications. This means that Russian electronic warfare assets were not effectively deployed,
at least at the beginning of the invasion. Another example in the information domain could be, according to Wuthnow (2023), the deployment of Starlink terminals that, according to Fiala (2022), prompted discussion of PLA antisatellite capabilities among PLA leaders. Wuthnow (2022, 5) further argues that the PLA could learn from the Russian failure to achieve three dominances: information, air, and sea. Regarding information dominance, it is the reliance on insecure communication assets
and the inability to deploy electronic warfare assets properly.

Regarding influence operations, information warfare, or psychological warfare, Westmoreland (2023, 410-411) points out that PLA researchers could learn to frame and set the agenda of the war in Ukraine. Stories about Ghost of Kyiv or Snake Island are good examples. On the other hand, the PLA could develop countermeasures against Western framing and setting of the agenda. The Chinese researchers also emphasize the need for a China-based social media/messaging platform that is known globally, because Russia had limited access to US-based social media and limited in its narrative dissemination. PLA will also use cyberattacks as a tool to influence societies, although there is no evidence
of the effectiveness of cyberattacks during the war in Ukraine (Westmoreland 2023, 412-413).

Military Domain

In general, Lin (2022, 5) emphasizes the need to link military operations with information warfare
and the decisiveness of the Taiwan campaign. The latter was also pointed out by the US Secretary
of the Air Force, Frank Kendall (Ferran, 2023). Wuthnow (2023) adds that China needs to isolate Taiwan by kinetic and non-kinetic strikes against the US and its allies. Wihtol (2023), on the other hand, emphasizes the low level of experience from real conflict among PLA soldiers and argues
that amphibious attack is a challenging task even for experienced armed forces. Sacks (2023)
also points to a discussion of their own readiness among the PLA leadership. Wuthnow (2022, 8) further emphasizes the need to blur the indicators of the actual invasion of Taiwan.  PLA could learn from Russia's failure to conceal preparations for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The most important part of any military operation is logistics. Wuthnow (2023) and Wood (2023) point out the implications of Russian logistics failures for the PLA and possible cross-strait operations. Furthermore, Lin (2022, 5) emphasizes that the PLA has already improved its logistics by establishing the Joint Logistics Support Force in 2016. Wood (2023) argues that the Russian logistics failure provided evidence that the creation of the Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF) was the right path. Wuthnow (2022, 7) further argues that the PLA could review JLSF training.

Wuthnow (2023), Fiala (2022), and Lin (2022, 5) also argue that one of the most important implications for PLA from the war in Ukraine is the need to marshal Joint Operations (or combined arms operations). As Lin (2022, 5) points out, the Russian inability to conduct joint operations is another evidence
for the PLA that the recent reform was needed to marshal command and control. Wood (2023) suggests that the PLA may see the Russian failure in the integration of advanced communication assets
with ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) entities.

Wuthnow (2022, 3-4) identifies the perfection of joint operations as one of the strengthening lessons but argues that the PLA is already training the joint operations.

One of the most discussed implications of the war in Ukraine is the Russian nuclear sabre rattling. Wuthnow (2023) and Fiala (2022) imply that the PLA could learn from this and accelerate its nuclear buildup because, according to Sacks (2023), "nuclear weapons create more room for conventional operations."  On the other hand, Lin (2022, 5-6) argues that although nuclear weapons will play
a significant role, additional research and discussion are necessary because any change in China's
no-first-use policy could encourage non-nuclear weapon countries to acquire nuclear weapons
and could further damage China's interests.

Sadler (2023) does not provide specific lessons potentially learned by the PLA but, on the other hand, observations for naval warfare in the western Pacific. He emphasizes the role of anti-ship cruise missiles and drones that can defeat robust shipborne air defense systems such as the systems used
on the Moskva cruiser (2023, 3). However, Wuthnow (2023) argues that, according to Chinese journals, PLA Navy ships have more capable air and missile defense systems compared to the Russian Navy. Wihtol (2023) also points out that the sinking of Moskva could be worrying for the PLA Navy leadership because the Liaoning aircraft carrier was built in the Soviet era and could then be as vulnerable
as the Moskva cruiser.

Moreover, Sadler (2023, 5) mentions possible long-range rocket artillery used to target ships. Given the width of the Taiwan Strait, this could be useful. Another observation on naval warfare in Ukraine could be naval mines that could also play a key role in the western Pacific, according to Sadler. Another important lesson emphasized by Sadler (2023, 5-6) is effective control of the sea and the deployment of unmanned platforms.

According to Wood (2023), the ineffectiveness of Russian missile strikes at the beginning
of the invasion and the persistent Russian inability to gain air superiority are the most important implications for the PLA. Wood argues that this will lead PLA strategists to reconsider their capabilities for the Joint Fire Strike Campaign. Another implication and reason to reconsider is
the underperformance of Russian air platforms incorporated into the PLA Air Force.

Wuthnow (2022, 5) further emphasizes the achievement of the 'three dominances in the military domain.' Apart from the information dominance described above, there is also air and sea dominance. This, according to Wuthnow, means in the air domain that the Russian Air Force was unable to suppress Ukrainian air defense due to insufficient stockpiles of precision-guided munitions, the inability
to suppress air defense overall, and prevent the delivery of advanced air defense systems
from the West. In the naval subdomain, the Russian Navy was unable to anticipate the sinking
of the Moskva cruiser and other ships by land-based antiship missiles.

Wuthnow (2022, 6) also emphasizes the fact that Russian forces were unable to take out the Ukrainian leadership, which, in turn, was able to gain both domestic and international support. PLA might review its plans to decapitate the Taiwanese government.

Economic Domain

Economic sanctions after February 24, 2022, were the first reaction of Western countries. Wihtol (2023) emphasizes the role of economic sanctions in the Chinese calculus on Taiwan because
the Chinese economy is highly dependent on the US dollar and the SWIFT system. China also has large international reserves of dollars that could be targeted by the United States and other countries.

A similar view shared by Lin (2022, 3-4) adds that China could expand its credit card payment system as well as its financial and currency system and increase self-reliance in the IT and space supply chain. The Chinese payment system could also be a solution, according to Feigenbaum and Szubin (2023).

Sacks (2023) agrees with Wihtol on decreasing the dependence on the dollar and Lin on increasing
self-reliance, this time in the semiconductor industry. Sacks also notes that China will attempt to force other economies to increase their dependence on the Chinese economy.

Fiala (2022) emphasizes that preparations for sanctions have practically begun. According to Fiala, there was a stress test for the Chinese economy to discover vulnerabilities. Furthermore, in late April 2022, the Finance Ministry and Chinese central bank officials met with a senior bank official from major banks and discussed the vulnerabilities and results of the possible freezing of Chinese assets.

 Table 1 summarizes the implications for China of the war in Ukraine as viewed by the West.

Table 1: Summary of the Western view on the potential implications of the war in Ukraine

(Source: Authors according to the data mentioned above, 2023)

The Taiwanese View on Potential Implications for China

Diplomatic Domain

From the interview with Taiwanese experts, China learned that coalitions and diplomatic solidarity matter. China sees the international support of Ukraine and, according to Taiwanese experts, will very likely cement its international influence, consolidate its relations with partners, and attempt
to diplomatically isolate Taiwan. Therefore, China will increase cooperation with the global South, members of the BRICS, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

However, Li Guangcheng (2023) argues that from US polls, Taiwan could see that defense resolves
in peacetime and resistance during wartime could win Taiwan more international support just as it did in Ukraine. Li Yanzhang (2022, 54) agrees that the will of the Taiwanese people to resist and fight is
a key element in gaining international support.

In contrast, Chih-Yuan Hsieh (2023, 21-22) also argues that Taiwan should not give the PLA an excuse to invade, review the cross-strait relations and maintain close relations with the US simultaneously. There are four possible situations after which the PLA could attack Taiwan. These situations are:
“1. Taiwan uses military means to attack the mainland; 2. Large-scale turmoil occurs within Taiwan;
3. Taiwan resumes development of nuclear weapons development; 4. When foreign troops are deployed on Taiwan Island”. Furthermore, Taiwan, with the experience of Ukraine, must assess
the international situation pragmatically and not become the victim of a Great Power Competition.

Information domain

In the information domain, China learned that information operations/influence operations/psychological or cognitive warfare are feasible and very important because Ukraine is winning the hearts and minds of the Western audience. According to Taiwanese experts, cognitive operations against Taiwan are already underway. The main intentions are to divide the Taiwanese society and convince the population that resistance to the PLA is futile.

Chih-Yuan Hsieh (2022, 25-26) notes that the number of cognitive operations will increase over time and will be an integral part of the PLA strategy in the event of an invasion of Taiwan. Thus, as Chi-Ying Ho (2023, 18-19) argues, Taiwanese military personnel should undergo training in conducting cognitive operations and be able to execute these kinds of operations not only for a domestic audience
but also for an international one.

Furthermore, Ho (2023, 4) uses a scheme consisting of four quadrants to study the possible implications for Taiwan. The first quadrant describes the control of important economic activities,
the second quadrant the cultivation of assets within the country, the third quadrant the spread
of disagreements among the opponent's population and the last, fourth quadrant the creation
of instability.

For the first quadrant, Ho (2023, 16-17) suggests deepening Taiwanese economic activities
with as many other states as possible and researching the possibilities of using digital currency. Furthermore, Ho recommends strengthening the infrastructure with an emphasis put on satellite communications in case the undersea fiber optic cables are cut off. For the second quadrant, Ho (2023, 17-18) recommends reviewing the laws on “Foreign Agents”, finding domestic collaborators,
and punishing them.

For the third quadrant, Ho (2023, 18-19) suggests cooperating with international institutions
and partners and sharing information on Chinese cognitive operations. Moreover, it is important
to strengthen and apply the whole-of-government approach. There is also an appeal to the political and military establishment, and Ho uses the example of Ukrainian President Zelensky, who stayed
in the capital of Kyiv. Furthermore, the military should undergo training in conducting cognitive operations and be able to execute these kinds of operations not only to a domestic audience
but also to an international one.

For the fourth quadrant, Ho (2023, 20-21) suggests establishing a national early warning and control system that could warn the government and track cognitive operations in a real-time perspective. Furthermore, the government must improve what Ho calls “public media literacy skills”, which could help the larger audience identify possible cognitive operations. One of the possible tools that can help the government identify ongoing cognitive operations is artificial intelligence. During wartime, it is
also important to call out aggression, not let the opponent name it; in the Taiwanese case, for example, “reunification of the motherland”, and establish an anticognitive warfare unit to counter the cognitive operations during wartime.

Military Domain

According to Taiwanese experts, the PLA learned that it needs a swift and decisive victory if it decides to use force against Taiwan. The first strike from the air, sea and land-based missiles and long-range artillery must be precise.  PLA must also isolate Taiwan and not allow other countries to help. It will be a much easier task due to the geography of the Western Pacific. The PLA has to improve its training and deploy more troops in case it decides to attack Taiwan (compared to the Russian military).  Another important topic and lesson is the failure of the Russians to conduct joint operations. According
to Taiwanese experts, the PLA needs to train more for the potential joint operation against Taiwan.

To prepare for potential contingencies in advance, Hanzhong (2023, p. 30-32) notes that Taiwan needs to strengthen its intelligence and early warning capabilities. Besides that, to prepare for war, Taiwan needs to strengthen the will of the people to defend the country because, according to Hanzong,
if war breaks out, it is not a matter of armies but of the whole society. Wu (2023) then argues
that Taiwan needs to increase ammunition production and be prepared to increase it even more.
The hill tunnels could be used for ammunition production in cooperation with the Ministry of National Defense and the private sector. Zhidong (2022, 158-159) adds that, based on the experience
of the war in Ukraine, Taiwan should reform the mobilization system and strengthen its asymmetric warfare capabilities.

Additionally, Shu (2023) argues that Ukraine used Western weapons such as HIMARS or NASAMS
in the right way. However, these were not game-changers. The success behind its efficiency is
the support of US intelligence.

Wenhei (2023, 32-33) argues that Taiwanese artillery units could use the HIMARS long-range system to attack PLA Navy ships in case of a Taiwan invasion. Furthermore, the Taiwanese army should use precision-guided 155 mm ammunition to multiply the killing effect and HIMARS systems to possibly cut off the supply lines by destroying bridges and prevent the landing of more troops in the port
or at the airfield by destroying them. Hanzhong (2023, 32-33) then notes that, according to PLA strategic thinking, the PLA must achieve air and naval superiority. Therefore, Taiwan's military should develop the concept of active defense and acquire anti-aircraft, anti-ship missiles, and medium-
to long-range strike weapons to prevent the PLA from achieving superiority in the air and at sea. Hanzhong recommends using the Central Mountain Range to conduct sea-control operations. Hsieh (2023, 24-25) emphasizes the need for mobile and field air defense units to prevent the PLA Air Force from attaining air superiority.

Taiwanese experts also pointed out the employment of various unmanned aerial vehicles of various sizes and purposes, including loitering munition. Hanzhong (2023, 33-34) recommends developing Taiwan's cheap loitering munition similar to the US Switchblade loitering munition sent to Ukraine.

Taiwanese experts point out the important role of both anti-ship missiles (in the case of the PLA both – cruise and ballistic). Based on their observation of naval warfare in Ukraine and especially the sinking of the Moskva cruiser, antiship missiles will be an important asset for the Taiwanese military due
to the crucial role of the PLA Navy during the cross-strait operation.  Si-Fu Ou (2023, 43-44) concludes that light antiship missiles with a light warhead will be the main weapon for future anti-ship warfare. This is because a lighter warhead on the long-range antiship missile means more fuel for the missile, which could be dangerous as well, and the possibility of carrying more warheads on one ship to deal with both small boats and/or large warships.

There are also difficulties among PLA troops that make an invasion in the foreseeable future impossible. In the air domain, it is the stealth technology and engines of J-20 fighter jets. Regarding the naval domain, it is questionable that the two Soviet-era aircraft carriers will be used as a primary strike force in the potential Taiwan scenario due to the aging technology that is making them vulnerable to modern anti-ship missiles. In general, the PLA Air Force and Navy cannot achieve the air and naval dominance needed for the attack on Taiwan. There is also a lack of interaction in joint operations.

Kuo Hung Pao (2023, 43-44) emphasizes the need to create a guerrilla force in Taiwan and recommends building a guerrilla force in the coastal area that could seriously disrupt the landing of the PLA troops and further fight against them in the coastal area. Another area to form guerrilla groups is
the metropolitan area. In areas/cities such as Taipei, New Taipei, Tainan or Taoyuan, the military could establish guerilla groups for conducting urban warfare and cause heavy losses to the PLA that will be forced to deploy main forces to take the mentioned areas/cities. In the mountains and the central part of the main island of Taiwan, local guerrilla groups could form. These groups could be made up
of residents or tribal members who could take advantage of familiarity with the area and prepare obstacles to further disrupt the movement of enemy mechanized, motorized and special forces.

Regarding nuclear weapons, there is no agreement among Taiwanese experts on whether the PLA will follow the same pattern and use nuclear sabre rattling as a measure of deterrence in the case
of possible use of force against Taiwan to deter the participation of other parties. This is mainly because there are no changes in the Chinese no-first-use policy, although the PLA is rapidly building silos and acquiring additional nuclear warheads. There is also no parity between China and the United States.

Economic Domain

In the economic domain, China, according to Taiwanese experts, sees the possible sanctions and will prepare itself. It will try to harm other economies dependent on China that could try to sanction China.

China could cooperate with international partners such as Russia and Iran to maintain food, oil,
and other raw materials supplies for the Chinese economy. Moreover, as Taiwanese experts point out, China could force Russia to stop the export of critical raw materials (metals etc.) to other countries
and reroute the export to China.

China will also attempt to reduce its dependence on the US dollar and try to internationalize
its currency, the renminbi. Zheren (2022, 251-252) argues that the internationalization of the renminbi began with helping Russia to circumvent sanctions. Besides Russia, there is, for instance, Saudi Arabia which is negotiating with China to settle a transaction for oil in the renminbi. Furthermore, as Yaling (2022, 191-192) notes, this forced the Chinese government to reconsider financial ties with the West and subsequently increased the use of the cross-border interbank payment system among members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to deepen regional economic integration and reduce dependence on the US dollar.

Furthermore, China is aware of the so-called Malacca dilemma and the potential blockade of the sea lines of communication and is actively trying to solve it by building pipelines to Russia and Pakistan. What could hit China is a stoppage of food imports by sea. Therefore, Ming-Te Hung and Che-Jen Wang (2023, 48-49) argue that the war in Ukraine convinced the Chinese leadership to increase self-reliance on food and increase soybean planting.

Jyun-yi Lee (2023, 16), on the other hand, shares a pessimistic view on possible sanctions on China
in case of invasion of Taiwan and points out that the effects of sanctions on Russia are only partial. Moreover, China's interconnection with other economies around the world is much deeper than that of Russia, which means that countries will think twice before sanctioning China. Therefore, Taiwan
and the international community should not rely on sanctions to deter China from using force against Taiwan.

The following Table 2 summarizes the Taiwanese view on the potential implications of the war
in Ukraine.

Table 2: Summary of the Taiwanese view on the potential implications of the war in Ukraine

(Source: Authors according to the data mentioned above, 2023)

Comparison and Discussion

From the views mentioned above, one can see that the Western and Taiwanese views are similar.
 In the diplomatic domain, Taiwanese experts point to the will to fight and defend the country that could win international support. However, China will focus on decreasing the diplomatic
and international support for Taiwan in the foreseeable future. Regarding excuses for invaders
in Taiwan, there is a question of whether China needs an excuse even in the case of a long-term goal of conquering Taiwan.

Taiwanese experts emphasize cognitive operations as an integral part of the PLA's overall strategy
to conquer Taiwan. It should be emphasized that by “cognitive operations”, Taiwanese experts mean actions considered 'information or psychological operations or active measures' in the West.
The mention of cognitive operations as an integral part is a distinct difference from the Western view.

Regarding the military domain, both sides agree that air and naval superiority will be the priority
of the PLA in the event of an invasion of Taiwan. Additionally, the PLA must improve its joint operations. Taiwan's military could use the advantages of asymmetric warfare in a way similar
to that of the Ukrainian military. Therefore, the PLA must prepare to combat an asymmetric opponent. Furthermore, Taiwanese experts emphasize the importance of air defense and antiship missiles mainly for the Taiwanese military due to the emphasis of the PLA on air and missile strikes.

In the economic domain, the views are similar as well. Both sides point to preparations for sanctions and greater self-reliance. Taiwanese experts naturally go into detail and argue that China could turn
to other countries in the event of internationalization of its currency, greater economic integration, and food and raw material supplies.

The similarity of both sides' views is important not only because of shared interests but also because of the US prioritization of the western Pacific. Therefore, European states know what to expect
and what the potential conflict in the western Pacific could look like. European states could
also prepare their response in the DIME matrix in advance.

Conclusion

Unfortunately, China is not deterred by Russian failure in Ukraine and publicly declares its ambitions towards Taiwan. Due to the record of conflicts from which China learned valuable lessons, it is likely that China is closely watching and learning from the war in Ukraine.

The article presented a review of the literature of Western sources to create a Western view
on potential implications for China. Data collected during semi-structured interviews and a review
of the literature of Taiwanese sources followed. The final part of the article consists
of a comparison and discussion of the similarities and differences of these two views.

The comparison showed that these two views are overall similar, with mostly minor differences caused by the fact that Taiwanese experts are naturally more informed compared to Western experts.
One distinct difference is the Taiwanese emphasis on cognitive operations. Regarding Europe, the general similarity of these views is positive. We know what to expect, for example, what capabilities could be used during a potential cross-strait conflict, and thus be unavailable for the European defense.  The main similar points are as follows:

• The PRC needs more diplomatic engagement to cement coalitions and achieve diplomatic solidarity among like-minded states.
• Information / Psychological / Cognitive warfare is an important and integral part of the overall strategy.
• The PLA needs to master the joint operations and achieve air and naval superiority.
• The PRC needs to prepare for extensive economic sanctions.

There is always room for further research. The authors of this article are convinced that further research could be conducted in three main areas. First, whether China and Taiwan plan to implement at least some of the implications mentioned in this article. Second, further research could also be conducted on the next phases of the war. For example, China could learn from Ukrainian
counter-offensive and Russian defensive operations, especially from mines' employment. Third, further research could be conducted on the reasons why the Taiwanese and the Western views
are overall similar.

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