Fulltext search in archive

The article is related to the building process of Capabilities Development Concept of Military Police (MP) in Ministry of Defence environment. With regards to the specific status of MP within Ministry of defence and with regards to diversity of assigned tasks Capabilities Development Concept of MP is finally hybrid document, containing elements of concept, strategy and long-term development intent. This is positive fact based on unique status of this branch of arms. The author who is actively influencing the proces of concept building is describing his recommendations and observations which might be convenient also for those readers who are not Military Police workers.

Protection of the civilian population against the Gaddafi regime, it was a clear UN mandate for military intervention in Libya in 2011. Not only a new approach to leading the fight against terrorism after 11 September 2001, but also requires a change in approaches to conducting combat operations coalition forces, as shown by the recent armed conflict in Libya, inevitably required a new perspective on the concept and approach to the process of targeting as the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and responding to them in accordance with operational requirements and capabilities of units, synchronization of NATO forces, particularly with regard to collateral damage with an impact on the protection of civilians. And Unified Protector operation is a clear example.

The process of the Lessons Learned in the Czech Armed Forces is not ideal for several reasons. One of them is the underestimation of the process by top management. Another one is the low level of awareness of the process, institutions, possibilities and importance of the Lessons Learned Process as a whole. The aim of this article is to clarify the Lessons Learned Process as a tool to support the organization. The first part of the article deals with the process of the Lessons Learned in the Czech Armed Forces including terminology. The second part of the article describes the factual implementation of the Lessons Learned in the Czech Armed Forces. It points out achievements as well as drawbacks during its implementation. In addition to that, it introduces the current Czech military publications dealing with this topic. The conclusion presents the description of some suggestions and recommendations for further development of this process.

The aim of this article is to clarify the terminology of Peace Support Operations. This article briefly explains the evolution and history of peacekeeping operations, as well as the basic concepts and operations division of NATO Peace Support Operations. An important part of this article is the definition of Peacekeeping Operations in the doctrinal documents of the Czech Armed Forces.
Peace Support Operations are dynamic and challenging activities. The intensity and complexity of Peace Support Operations has been increasing. That is why their political and military ambitions have been increasing too. There is a reason why authors explain this issue for readers, which is the main goal of this article.

The overall purpose of this paper is to describe the way the Alliance and the also the Czech Army is going to apply the leverage of powers while conducting operations in the future. The article shows in details that the relative combat power analysis requires an assessment of factors either directly or indirectly affecting the potential outcome of the operation. In order to improve military knowledge and operational thinking within the Czech Army it is recommended to improve the quality of officers' military training and personnel preparation in accordance with Czech MoD White Paper on Defence. The views expressed in this assessment are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of Alliance or the Czech Ministry of Defence.

In the previous Military Review we introduced the article "Will Military Deception Pass Away?" by the same author. In the Army of the Czech Republic we have no manual dealing with military deception (MILDEC). The only manual concerning MILDEC was abolished without any substitute. But military art can't be further developed without similar documents. Today we take MILDEC as a complex set of provisions misleading enemy's commanders and staff, by means of false information and counterfeit data that deliberately deceive adversary decision-makers and planners. Use of MILDEC during any phase of an operation also helps to mislead adversaries as to the strength, readiness, locations, and intended missions of friendly forces. The MILDEC could contribute to the successful accomplishment of the assigned mission by many ways.

All-inclusive attitude of NATO forces assumes that conflict can't be solved only by military means. This shift from purely soldierly level to political brought around numbers of Alliance activities at Strategical and Operational Commands. The common denominator was the philosophy of complex approach in operational thinking, planning, and implementing NATO activities. As a result the operational SACEUR's directive GOP was substituted by its revised successor-the so-called Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD). It is going to be introduced in 2011 and will influence groups and military persons at all levels of warfare, dealing with operational planning and operational art for art's sake. The article familiarizes readers with this directive (COPD) as a tool for comprehensive approach to operations. The COPD offers more deliberate and inclusive planning procedures that allow for both military and non-military actors broader understanding of operational environment and better cooperation in their common effort.

There are no military conflicts without deception, as it is among others a very cheap method how to contribute to the successful accomplishment of the assigned mission. Military deception (MILDEC) is applicable across a wide range of military operations. MILDEC can be conducted during all phases of military operations at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. It is defined as being those actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. According to he author, the operational deception is to be explained in more detail, basic rules are to be outlined, including fundamental principles and methods of deception for operational planning.

The term "hybrid war" is frequently used today within the military community, but the term does not bring something new in the view of the terminology of the stability operations, comprehensive approach or compound wars. This concept is based on the destructive threats to the military components of international community. It does not help in delimiting reasons of violent confl ict and from that point it is harmful, as it does not explain soldiers why they are fi ghting the "just war", why they should sacrifi ce their lives in confl icts far away from their homeland. We should not use terms of hybrid wars, hybrid confl icts, hybrid enemies or forces. Only "hybrid warfare" could find some legitimacy, but only when used with the correct definition of the conflict typology, backed by the political objectives of the war. Confl icts typology, as used, forms the framework for the mission analysis orientation at all command & control levels and it guides the informational support to the military decision making processes.

The article presents the theory of information operations on the background of contemporary armed conflicts in Ukraine, Iraq and Syria. In the introduction, information is presented as a phenomenon and the accelerator of social development. It outlines basic information channels that deliver security information to their recipients. Furthermore, the article discusses security and operational environment and also vulnerabilities being caused by increasing dependence on information. The core of the article are information operations presented in theory with the author's commentary on real application in military practice and in terms of the Czech Armed Forces. As part of information operations are subsequently introduced psychological operations, computer network operations and electronic warfare. The article ends with real examples of information and psychological operations in modern warfare, and conditions of their management in the Czech Armed Forces. The conclusion summarizes the general idea of the security environment and information operations, and stresses the importance of information operations in current and future conflicts.

The separatist movements at Ukraine, Crimea annexation, have fundamentally changed today's security surrounding. All that came about were in fact described in the last Russian military doctrine of February 2010, herein the Czech strategic thinking failed, leaving the nation unprepared. The Czech military documents identify threats too broadly, without setting definite opponents. One precondition failed completely, namely a gradual emergence of threats, enabling the Czech Republic to prepare itself. The author explains his own views on current security European affairs and asks to modernize and adjust both Czech defence policy and military science.

The article is in Czech Language only.
PDF

The article deals with the issue of creation and realization of space policy. Space programs of individual states are closely connected to decision-making processes of the (general) state (public) policy. Therefore we can raise a question which factors influence these processes and the formulation of space policy and also if they are so unique that could be related only to one particular state. The aim of this article is to focus on one of the factors influencing space policy-strategic culture. Its influence is analysed through case studies of seven nations. Each case study is divided into two parts. First, we identify relevant characteristics of the state's strategic culture. Then, we analyse whether and how the identified characteristics of the respective strategic culture influence the space policy of a state in question. This article seeks to contribute to the growing debate about space as "the next" strategic area and highlights rather overlooked reasons of space exploration.

Russia's actions in the Ukraine have changed the security situation in the Baltic region, which makes NATO's long-term presence in Latvia essential for the Latvian Republic. The impacts of Russian actions on Latvian defence policy are discussed in the paper by Mr Janis Berzinš,Managing Director of the Centre for Security and Defence Research, National Defence Academy of Latvia, in Policy Paper, No. 2, 2014. It is a new way of intervention, new-generation warfare, without the employment of armed combats, using mostly influence and coercion, by means of covert operations. Abridged and adapted. The original English text is available at http://www.naa.mil.lv/~/media/NAA/AZPC/Publikacijas/PP%2002-2014.ashx. Even though the study came into being in April 2014, the editors regard it worthy to be published, being timeless and with general validity.

Příspěvek se zabývá vybranými bezpečnostními aspekty námořních hraničních linií Státu Izrael. V krátkosti vymezuje současnou organizaci izraelského válečného námořnictva a jeho vybavení pro zabezpečování izraelské svrchovanosti proti hrozbám přicházejícím z moře, včetně zadržovacích operací vedoucích k zabránění šíření zbraní do rukou protiizraelských teroristických organizací. V souvislosti s izraelskou námořní blokádou pásma Gazy je komentována legitimita takového kroku a mezinárodněpolitické konsekvence jejího vynucování. Ekonomické souvislosti přetrvávajících problémů stran izraelské námořní hranice jsou evidentní na příkladu sporu o právo k využití podmořských nalezišť plynu.

Changing security environment and the need to address conventional and especially asymmetric threats and risks, wherever they occur, establish clear requirements on the development of national capabilities. Armed forces are required to be fully deployable and sustainable in operations in austere conditions for an extended period of time. In NATO-led operations currently participate many nations of different sizes, force structures, equipment, training and capabilities. The only way to reach operational goals while achieving economies of scale is a mutual cooperation of all involved participants. Basic key prerequisite for such cooperation is interoperability.

Jan Eichler, Lukáš Tichý: USA a Ruská federace - komparace z pohledu bezpečnostní a strategické kultury. Kompletní analýza bezpečnostní a strategické kultury USA a Ruska v letech 1991 až 2012. Brož., 318 str., ISBN 978-80-87558-16-4.
Backed by the current history, the monograph explains different ways in which the USA and the Russian Federation use their power. A large part is devoted to the concepts of strategy and the strategic culture, militarism, mental model or smart power. The attention is focused on Obama´s vision to have a world without nuclear weapons, as well as the Prague treaty for the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, and Obama's restraint and caution in using military force for achieving political goals. The book analyses strategic and doctrinal documents that constitute a framework of Russian security and foreign policy.

Article analyses the relation between legal and internal regulations and other management acts in public administration, focusing on their own hierarchy, quantity, liability in specific areas of Czech armed forces. The first part was published in Military Review No. 4/2013; this following section focuses on the creation of internal management acts and their releasing for the recipients. The article also emphasizes the need for a stable organization, which is necessary for the effective implementation of personnel management, personnel control and the so-called internal and external legislations.

The article deals with aspects of operational art inside the operations planning process. It deals with the concepts of operational design and suggests a possible way of introducing such theory into the development process of operational approach. This paper is a free sequel to several articles published in Military Review on this theme. It introduces several professional terms in the field of operational art, up to now not officially established.

This polemics is written by Prof. Fr. Ochrana, both reader and author of the Military Review quarterly. It is a response to the article in No 4, 2013, by Vl. Karaffa, editorial board chairman. Prof. Ochrana generally supports his conclusions concerning the further survival of this Czech Military Review. According to him, the review has indispensable role in the spectrum of both civilian and military professional journals. He recommends to evaluate the problem of its existence upon the principles of cost/benefit analysis, with regard to the so-called socials costs, the key steps of which he enumerates.

The aim of the article is to present an up-to-date discussion on cyberspace as a new, fifth domain of warfare. The reader is provided with the concept of cyberspace, its current interpretation, primarily in American doctrines and military theory. The army mission is contextually mentioned as well, explicitly the limits of Czech forces capacity. The paper deals with the form of cyberspace and its characteristics in the context of military operations. It advocates the idea of cyberspace as a war domain, which is presented together with the criticism to such approach. The article concludes with the summary and evaluation of both sides' arguments, taking into account the specific role and abilities of armed forces.

The change of security situation in the world, international ties and last but not least changes in operational environment, exploitation of new technologies are reflected by changes in defence planning, military organization, forces engagement and operational assessment. Time, flexibility, cooperation in coalition operations, interoperability in technology spheres play incommutable roles together with trained personnel. Command and control (C2) is self-contained system depending on many factors provided by the so-called System of Communication and Information. At present it is the very base for information collection, decision-making process, preparing variants of operation for both commander and his staff. Among others the author writes about Network Enabled Capability system introduced into Czech armed forces. C2 programme is also a part of educational curriculum at Defence University Brno.

Many people in the world lead intolerably insecure lives. In many cases insecurity is the consequence of armed conflicts in which civilians are deliberately targeted, sometimes, their insecurity has natural causes, like earthquakes, hurricane, tsunami or disease, they suffer from famine. Security is a broader term, covering not only military threats. Human rather than nation-state security should be at the heart of European policy. Instead of defeating enemies or pacifying warring parties, EU missions should focus on protecting civilians, through law enforcement with the occasional use of force. EU member states ought to support a new framework for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The following seven principles are underlined: (i) the primacy of Human Rights, (ii) clear political authority, (iii) multilateralism, (iv) a bottom-approach, (v) regional focus; (vi) the use of legal instruments, (vii) the appropriate use of force. In fact, underlines Mr. Karaffa, humane security concept forms the very base of common European culture and identity.

It is a point at which attacking forces are unable to continue their attack or even defend themselves, because do casualties, shortages of fuel, ammunition and rations, and sheer physical exhaustion. This sequel article deals with the theory of the operational art focusing on the culminating point operational concept. The article emanates from Carl von Clausewitz's ideas and concepts described in his book "On War", doctrinal publications analysis and study projects of the operational art theorists. It treats conditions influencing achievement of the culminating point on single levels of war-strategic, operational and tactical and highlights coherences and factors having fundamental influences on culmination. The article is accompanied by several graphs describing this theory in detail. Key words: Culmination, Culminating Point, Zeroing, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, Campaign Planning and Developing Operations.

This article begins with a theoretical discussion of the culminating point, for both the attack and defence. Key definitions and related concepts provided in Carl von Clausewitz's On War, Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, and U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, are discussed in detail. These sources provide many of the factors that can cause a force to reach culmination, and serve as a basis for understanding the difficulties involved in trying to determine the time and place of culmination. Other current factors attributing to culmination are discussed, and recommendations are offered to help operational commanders and planners to zero in on this elusive point. It is of the utmost importance that one's own, and the enemy's culminating point be identified with the highest possible degree of accuracy during the planning phase of a major operation or campaign.

On the one hand, Russia is among the countries which often criticize the Western-led military intervention. On the other hand, in the last twenty years, Russia has repeatedly approved using military force by the West against an individual state, endorsed by the United National Security Council. The main purpose of this article is therefore to describe and analyse Russian position towards four Western military interventions 1999-2011. Specifically, the article is focused on two military interventions without UN Security Council mandates (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999 and Iraq in 2003), the intervention with the expanded UN Security Council resolution (Afghanistan 2001) and the military intervention that was partially approved by the UN Security Council resolutions (Libya 2011).

The article is an analysis of the further development of mechanized battalions of Czech forces (ACR). The defence department will have to take a major decision how to replace old tracked infantry combat vehicles (ICVs) BVP-2. Several years ago, it was decided to acquire those vehicles for one brigade, so the best option could be to keep this project on. The acquisition and simultaneous operations of two similar vehicles, wheeled and tracked ones, are not effective for forces of ACR size. The extra costs of operation would not produce an adequate increase in capabilities of mechanized units. The author presents dozens of arguments to support this conclusion and at the end he makes recommendations for the future acquisition strategy in Czech defence department.

Article analyzes the relation between legal and internal regulations and acts in public administration focusing on their hierarchy, quantity, liability in specific area of armed forces. There is wide range and amount of relatively autonomous service regulations and official channels (internal orders, guidelines, advices). Although any internal regulations have to be in accordance with superior sources of law, relation between legal and internal level is not clear. Article exemplary outlines, that consistent system of internal rules is based especially on running and immediate updates to meet harmony with legal code.

The article deals with particularly topical problem, the riots with ethnic background. The present situation is compared with history illustrations and with similar recent events abroad. Author's reflections and scenarios outline a variant of state failure and its institutions, with the exception of army. He identifies respective incoming risks, among others tied with the so-called Roma question. Actually, his hypothetical solutions are not backed by the current laws of the Czech Republic. The author comes to the conclusion that army deployment might be used only as an instrument of last resort, "ultima ratio".

The polemic by Mr. Luboš Dobrovský in his essay in Military Review, No. 2, 2013, is based upon a critical idea that even though the Czech government approved conclusions and goals set by the White Paper on Defence, the MoD and the General Staff began to fulfil their duties, the government did not carry out its obligations. The author came to the same conclusion same time ago. But he didn't agree with the proposition that the army in a state of emergency. Such a verdict is rather exaggerating, the author believes, as Czech defence department is still able to fulfil both its Alliance commitments, missions abroad, or home assignments, e.g. support to integrated rescue system. What's missing is a critical reflection over economical management. Data, numbers, and facts are attached.