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This paper deals with the activities of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic, under national command on its own territory, with the emphasis to the activities of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) components. It puts stress on the issue of forces operations, those of CIMIC units in particular, within the Integrated Rescue System, during crisis situations, i.e. natural disasters, environmental accidents, etc. The paper comes out from the tasks defined by the Defence White Paper. Those tasks are compared with the legislation in effect, and the authors make some inquiries about suitable measures to implement them. Unlike missions carried out abroad, the CIMIC problems and tasks in ACR operations on home territory are nearly untouched. The paper aims to open discussion over this topic, among others, because our current relevant legislation is obsolete.

The classification of a term of "decontamination" comes out not only from the Alliance norms, national military regulations and publications, but also from the documents that deal with the conception of decontamination for civilian purposes, i.e. from documents of the Fire Rescue Brigades of the Czech Republic. The study of both Alliance and national documents has proved that in many cases this term is being introduced in a different way which might cause not very homogenous interpretation and understanding to accomplished decontamination measurements and thus even overall disunity in a framework not only of Alliance, but also in selected basic and other parts of the Integrated Rescue System of the Czech Republic. The paper analyses approaches to the term of "decontamination"practically only by means of definitions in use nowadays. At the end of this document there are recommendations which ought be considered by the management of the Czech Armed Forces Chemical Corps within the area of its respective interest.

The purpose of this article is to deal with Course of Actions development (COA). Attention is paid to ensure a common understanding of COA process. The article broadens the vision and offers deep insights for its readers. Moreover, the war game was described as a method of refining or modifying the COA. It has also been emphasized the commander and staff consider each COA advantages and disadvantages. The Czech Army personnel training and preparation should steadily and deliberately bring improvements into the field of operational planning capability within forces´ command levels. In order to improve operational planning knowledge, it is recommended to study AJP-5 Operational Planning Doctrine and ACO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive.

In course of action, modern forces ought to be capable to safe living surroundings by the implementation of environmental protection into military planning and decision-making process. Traditionally it protects not only a location around military bases, training areas, but also in all operational area of deployed armed forces. This study therefore deals with methods of environmental protection and the so-called risk management to prevent damages that can't be remediated, both in the field of natural, cultural or historic sights and relicts.

During the first half of 2010, many Internet sites in the Czech Republic and abroad published a number of alarming articles about the platform, called the European Gendarmerie Force (EUROGENDFOR, EGF). Their authors refer to this unit as the basis for a new "Holy Alliance", when the gendarmerie from one member state will be going to suppress unrests in another member state - if the local task forces refuse to do so. This paper is trying to correct such speculations and summarizes available information about the respective unit.

This article aims to explain possibilities of using modern evaluation tools of operational effectiveness for managers in the ACR. Ground military vehicles operations are an important aspect of each organizational unit within the ACR. For its realization is necessary to have adequate sources. The authors reviewed current traditional approaches to evaluate the operation effectiveness of ground military equipments. They focused on the role and abilities of transport commanders and executives. This research presents the methods to identify the causes of excessive fuel consumption. The selected vehicle was analysed for exceeding the consumption norm of 270 litters. The primary cause of passing established limits were idle running vehicle's engine and unusual decrease in fuel.

The basic orientation in the field of military art demands at least elementary knowledge of military history and understanding to military strategy influence on the art of war. The questions tied to understanding military strategy and its influence on the preparation and conducting military operations are part of study programmes of all life education at the Defence University. The purpose of this article, dedicated to military strategy problems, is deeper understanding to its basic connections, understanding a direction the strategy took in a designated period and its development. I ought to explain in short its role and attitude towards the nature of military operations.

The purpose of this article is to inform on elements of military deception in NATO armies and overarching principles that make military deception successful. Deception Planning is an iterative process that should be considered as an inextricable part of the operational planning. The knowledge in the field of military deception in the Czech military is low; no operational deception plan has been prepared for foreign operations or any military exercise. Deception is widely appreciated as a powerful instrument of military operations, yet it is surprisingly neglected by both the Czech Army and Military Educational System. The author tries to encourage officers and members of higher staffs to study this subject.

The article follows the leading theme of the Czech Military Review No. 2/2013 dealing with the application White Paper on Defence 2011. Both authors are members of the Lifelong Learning Department, Defence University, Brno. Backed by long experiences in military professional education and training, they present their views on advantages and disadvantages of the current model of officers' professional preparation, particularly senior officers. The authors' aim is to arouse a constructive debate about the changes in the current model of senior officers' career education. Their views are based upon history examples and models of some selected NATO nations.

The re-election of Barrack Obama implies that the President preferring political solutions to military ones will have remained for the next four years in the White House. As far U. S. strategy culture is concerned, without doubts American armed forces are going to be prepared to be modern, strong, agile and capable to meet the U.S. National Security strategy goals whatever and wherever they might be. Simultaneously, Obama´s programme for his second term presupposes to close down several military bases all around the world, together with reductions in the size of forces, manpower. Only the most important will be preserved. The further development will be therefore predestined by necessary quantitative reductions, but at the same time by qualitative updating American armed forces, and by the stress on power projection capabilities to take an active approach to counter any threats worldwide.

The act of making up commander's mind is one of most important roles of leaders/managers. The science of managing or controlling ought to be employed even in everyday life of the military. The skilful or resourceful use of materials, time, etc. are the main characteristics of command and control. The purpose of this article is to outline connections in management theory, namely managerial posts, coupled with command. How we can use management theory in shooting drills or marksmanship theory in commander's decisionmaking. The authors explain sequential managerial functions, planning, organizing, staffing, analysis and their implementation into shooting practice. The article is accompanied by several schemes. This exercise can be also used in modelling of combat clashes, as a part of simulations in computers and as a factor of the professional preparation of servicemen.

The French "Centre de Doctrine d'Emploi des Forces" (CDEF) has published new doctrine FT-05 The Tactical Commander's Guide to Command and Control in Operations. The global action of land forces is now carried out within a strategic environment that has dramatically changed for 15 years. In this new environment, the French Army asserts and implements a double requirement: that of power and the control of force. The article presents the fundamental conclusions of this doctrine and compares them with the Czech national doctrinal documents. Author concludes that in comparison with the French doctrine, Czech doctrines are much more focused on the procedural and technological part of the Command and Control Systems than the ability of commanders to command.

The conversion of military ranks poses an enormous difficulty due to great differences in hierarchical structures between different national armies. This article written by the Director of Defence Language Institute Vyškov will give a short overview of most common troubles. The problem here is that national armies mostly represent national cultures as well. Translations of titles of high-rank military personnel are not too complicated. More problematic is finding equivalents for less-known, more specific ranks or those of other national Armed Forces. NATO has agreed upon a common standard for their translation, the norm STANAG 2116, based on NATO codes representing levels of ranks according to their duties, responsibilities, and career requirements.

The article deals with the problems of current "military engineering" in Czech Army, which arose during drawing up the "Doctrine for land forces operations". The content of this article consists mainly of three parts. The first one has to characterize some doctrine development aspects from the engineer's contributor point of view. Secondly, to adduce requirements for the content of a doctrine which are consequent to NATO main military engineering documents, e.g. MC 0560, AJP-3-12(A) and ATP-52(B). Thirdly, this level has to evoke resourceful discussions on topical military engineering within military community and to contribute to the mutual opinion consensus achievement.

War game is a simulation of military operations intended to train military commanders or to test a proposed strategy. It is a game in which model soldiers are used to create battles, in order to study tactics. This article illustrates the importance of War Game COAs (course of action). It was tested against opposing force COAs. Such exercise will help to identify advantages and disadvantages and the key elements of execution planning for each COA. The lesson learned during OHQ CZE/SVK BG EU Staff Exercises that took place in Olomouc from January 19th, to January 23rd, and from February 16th, to February 20th, 2009 is that war-gaming (although time consuming) is something closer to "reality" than the "theory" in doctrines. The war-gaming practices teamwork, facilitates team-building and enables to share mental model COA. Commanders and their staff ought to be engaged in simulations and war games more frequently. All information and sources for this paper were drawn from unclassified materials.

The aim of the article is to provide the readers information related to the theory of fundamental elements and tools of operational art, which are for the preparation and conduct of military operations, particularly at the operational level of war, critical. The operational level of war depends on methods that will create appropriate conditions to achieve the closing state, set by a superior commander, in accordance with the complex strategy of military and non-military instruments of state power. Although the methods of application of specific operational art components rest mainly in the mind of the English Annotations and with several acts tied with civil emergency preparation.

The overall purpose of this paper is to describe the ways the Alliance and the also the Czech Army will apply the operational art tenets, conducting operations in the future. The current military problems cannot be solved without a deep understanding and knowledge of operational art. In order to improve military thinking within the Czech Army, it is recommended to study and apply operational art. The operational art forms a bridge between strategy defining the political aims of war and tactics, fighting the battles. Commanders and staff officers should study operational art seriously, systematically and with all their efforts. The author deals with current state of present operational art to inform on new developments in this field of military art. The article broadens the vision and deepens the insights of its readers. All information and data for this paper were drawn from unclassified sources.

After graduating from Military Academy Hranice, Lt. Skokan was stationed in Slovakia. When the former Czechoslovakia was divided, he returned to his native Czech lands. The Czech army was dissolved, so he left for France and then he moved to England. He was transferred to Soviet Russia, to Czech Field Brigade. He took part in battles of o Kiev, Vasilkov, White Cerkev, Zhashkov, and even Dukla battlefield. He was decorated by two Czechoslovak War Crosses 1939, Bravery Medal, and the Russian Order of Patriotic War. After WWII he was excluded from Soviet military academy, mustered out, later arrested and executed. After 18 years he was partially rehabilitated, in 1998 he was promoted to the rank of Major General and granted the Medal for Courage in memoriam.

This extended essay is based upon various sources, among others on May 2010 President Obama's speech at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, where President Obama described his national security objectives. The highest priorities of U.S. national security are the safety of Americans at home and abroad and achieving a peaceful, stable world through global cooperation despite a flawed international system. The Obama's security strategy relies heavily on diplomacy and engagement, economic development and other methods of influence, along with U.S. military capabilities with global reach and unsurpassed resources. As we face multiple threats, from nations, non-state actors and failed states, America will maintain the military superiority that has secured country, and underpinned global security, for decades. The security strategy is global, and identifies an array of real or potential security challenges that include: countering violent extremism and insurgency; stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and securing nuclear materials, resolving and preventing conflict; and reducing destabilizing risks to economic interdependence.

Understanding the importance and role of present-day operational art is not always a matter of knowledge of relevant doctrinal publications or the use of experiences from military operations. Number of aspects of operational art had their roots deep in the history of warfare. Many of them are unknown or forgotten. This article aims to give the reader some basic information about the context that led to the awareness of the need of operational art and finally to real fulfilling the imaginary gap between strategy and tactics, which was the place for operational art. The article briefly describes the background of the emergence of operational art and the approach of two basic schools of military theory: Soviet and German that were crucial to its development.

In spite of the fact that the security tensions are not so high as during the cold war, with impending nuclear conflict, the global security situation is far from ideal. Fundamental changes in a global security environment have brought except a lot of positives also many negatives, in a form of various asymmetric security threats. The rise of new military and nonmilitary dangers, under the influence of globalization and contemporary worldwide economic crisis, is directly related to the need of conflict prevention, crisis management, peace missions, law enforcement, or support to humanitarian assistance.

In conclusion of article in Military Review No 3, 2011, the authors gave notice about a sequel to this article. Today they describe military deception form another point of vies. They depict the creation of false picture, deception in the frame of operational planning. The authors accentuate that not only Asian countries, but also western ones look back to classical works on military art, e.g. Sun Tzu, The Art of War (around 2,000 years ago). Sun Tzu's philosophy recommended a strategic method to win that rarely required actual war. Spies, diplomats, deception, and a correctly organised internal structure were his main tools. If it came to war, he recommended among others to use detailed and elaborated military deception.

This paper deals with problem of education in a military college on the background of military-economic reality. It shows the requirements of the Bologna Declaration in the relation to economic education. Training of military officers has four levels: qualifying (in relation to the performance of different professional roles), developing (in relation to the developing leader personality), motivational (in relation to recruitment) and accepting (in relation between public and army). The economics is of great importance here. It should be beneficial for responsible managers, for their decision-making that can lead to optimization of the results based on economic behaviour, linked to motivational factors.

The article familiarizes readers with theoretical fundamentals of the key element of operational design, i.e. decisive point that is described as "a point from which a hostile or friendly centre of gravity can be threatened". It may exist in time, space or the information environment. As a tool of operational art, it helps commander and his staff to unlock the path to the centre of gravity. The concept is further evolved via example of peace support military operation planning process. The close understanding to terms decisive points, lines of operations, centre of gravity, kinetic effects, non-kinetic operations, doctrine is for military planners fundamental. The aim of this article is therefore to explain this basic terminology, to describe connections with other element of operational planning that could be used during all steps of operational planning. Basic theoretical Jomini's implications are introduced and their doctrinal interpretations are highlighted.

There are no military conflicts without deception, as it is among others a very cheap method how to contribute to the successful accomplishment of the assigned mission. Military deception (MILDEC) is applicable across a wide range of military operations. MILDEC can be conducted during all phases of military operations at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. It is defined as being those actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. According to he author, the operational deception is to be explained in more detail, basic rules are to be outlined, including fundamental principles and methods of deception for operational planning.

The problem of obesity is most frequent metabolic disease rising from unhealthy life style of contemporary population. Cardiovascular and metabolic disorders are pressing even in the AČR, so the authors could describe monitoring the risk factors of non-infectious diseases of mass incidence and the implementation of preventive programme with excessive weight losses, using dietetic, psychological, movements and pharmacological approaches that offer real stimulant for decrease in overweight and obesity prevalence within the Czech Army and concurrently decrease in morbidity of Czech servicemen.

He was born in 1918, it means that this year he was 93 years old. He is a participant of the only armed fi ght against German invaders in 1993. The Germans did not release the data about the fallen, but it is estimated that they lost 12-18 deaths and several wounded. Corporal Šolc was discharged. Immediately he joined resistance movement. He was arrested. After the war he worked at the Ostrava Miners Directorate. Although he retires in 1976, he is still dynamic.

In the previous Military Review we introduced the article "Will Military Deception Pass Away?" by the same author. In the Army of the Czech Republic we have no manual dealing with military deception (MILDEC). The only manual concerning MILDEC was abolished without any substitute. But military art can't be further developed without similar documents. Today we take MILDEC as a complex set of provisions misleading enemy's commanders and staff, by means of false information and counterfeit data that deliberately deceive adversary decision-makers and planners. Use of MILDEC during any phase of an operation also helps to mislead adversaries as to the strength, readiness, locations, and intended missions of friendly forces. The MILDEC could contribute to the successful accomplishment of the assigned mission by many ways.