Fulltext search in archive

In fact, we have no universal method for evaluating impacts and protection of nature during military exercises and training. Establishing Environmental Training Group (NATOTraining Group/Army-Sub-Group) revolutionized the ways in which hazards were defined and analyzed to help communities protect themselves against these perils. Newly developed Training Impact Matrix/ Hazard & Impact Index methods enable truly to assess environmental dangers of military materials, vehicles, activities, energy consumption, and their impacts on important localities. Many features of above mentioned methods were introduced by Czech representatives in 2000 at Aachen (Germany). The index of environmental acceptability was further elaborated by Czech experts, among others by the authors of this article. It enables set levels of environmental dangers, their impacts, independently from organic structure of national forces, or individual countries. The article is accompanied by tables, mathematical formulas and patterns of calculation risk categories.

The primary aim of the method Hazard & Impact Index (H&I Index) is to enable the commander to evaluate possible negative impacts of military exercise on environment, and quickly and in an operative way interpret whether intended military activities can be a threat to the conditions or surroundings, in which the units are employed. The authors propose several tables for the comparison of environmental groups (soils, forests, climates) with forces movements. The method still undergoes the development. The evaluated numbers are set only for a mechanized company of the Army of the Czech Republic in our local surrounding. But in the near future the authors predict its extension to all organic units of NATO stationed in European continent. The article is a sequel to the article by the same authors in Vojenské rozhledy, No 1 /2006.

In today's conflicts, such as the Global War on Terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan, the threat is more difficult to define; in fact, there are often multiple threats working against our forces concurrently. Our army lacks first-hand information from current battlefields, so that the author must make use of mediated experiences. The paper is therefore based upon articles from foreign military magazines, namely Intelligence Synchronization on a Nonlinear Battlefield (Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin 4/2004) and Intelligence in Peacekeeping Operation (International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1/1997). It is not a mere translation or compilation, but ingenious summing up of discussed ideas. In this study, the author thinks over intelligence synchronization and proposes a new way of looking at it. Methodology heads from priority intelligence requirements towards specific information requirements, via indicators, and so on. The purpose of intelligence synchronization is to focus efforts to build, refine, or clarify the commander's understanding of the battlefield and the threat.

Mr. Koutný belonged among those who went through the fire of World War II and lately became victims of despotism of the so-called "class laws". In fact, Col. Koutný was not a soldier, but the journalist. At the beginning of war, Mr. Koutný was sent to Poland to inform about Polish practices to return Czechoslovak refugees back to the "Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia". At Poland he joined the Czechoslovak Military Group; lately he experienced Soviet labour camps. In a small city of Buzuluk, where the first Czechoslovak Field Battalion was formed, he became the chief of recruiting commission. There he met people returning from the NKVD's camps (i.e. Soviet Secret Police's detention camps). Many his reports to the Chief of Czechoslovak Military Mission Heliodor Pika were preserved in archives. Nowadays they bear witness on those fearful camps. As a press officer he laid down the foundation of the Czech army daily "Our Army in the USSR". He worked at the Czechoslovak Headquarters in Russia, as a liaison officer at the Command of the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps in the USSR, as a political and military advisor to the commander of armour brigade Lt.Col. Janko. In his liberated country he helped to establish the military publishing house Our Army (Naše vojsko). Shortly after the communist coup d'etat, in 1949, he was imprisoned. He died in a communist jail in 1960.

The professional base for tactical and operational levels of US ground forces and German Federal Armed Forces are the following manuals: US Army Field Manual 100/5 "Operations", since 2001 being labelled as "Field Manual 3-0", and German HDv 100/100 "Truppenfuhrung 2000". Both manuals were drafted in a closed cooperation. The basic principles of German manual Truppenfuhrung 2000 were imitated and copied by the Netherlands armed forces and partly, to a certain measure, also by other NATO nations. Rules of Field Manual 3-0 were tested in peace operations, in the fight against international terrorism in Afghanistan and during the first phase of Second War in Iraq. In fact, the operations of US forces indirectly proved practicability and effectiveness of nearly identical German field rules and manuals, consequently command principles, including those of the so-called nation building. Based upon an article by MG Christian E.O. Millotat in 3/2006 Osterreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, No 3/2006.

Even though many activities related to intelligence and intelligence network after the end of Cold War were released and have become commonplace, classified matters are still in the centre of public's interest. In discussions, experts use various terms tied with espionage or counter-intelligence, but real differences are not too high. In the armed forces (in the frame of NATO) this question was solved by issuing the manual AJP-2, Allied Joint Intelligence, CounterIntelligence and Security Doctrine (NATO 2003). This article summarises key and basic terms used in intelligence services, including new theoretical concepts from this field. As the author writes in the introductory chapter, many experts, namely in civilian and academic fields use the same terminology, but their explanation differs. They use different definitions reflecting diverse circumstances under which they came into existence. The article was written namely as a contribution to interagency communication, among civilian and professional experts, in time when the overall security concept is changing, when military power is not the only tool to avert wide spectrum of security threats of 21st century.

Under the definition, the present management covers leading the people, implementation of tasks, processes, so that the organization could achieve set prospective targets. Its structure in the ACR is pyramidal and it is divided into vertical and horizontal elements, so is economic management. The purpose of this article is to outline orientation in the education scheme of new professional soldiers - economic experts - to make easier to integrate them into everyday life in units and institutions of the ACR.

The forward-thinking and respond to the challenges of today's dynamic operational environment demands as necessary: first, to attract and develop young people to become adaptative leaders possessing enhanced skills, i.e. we must align leader-development programmes for the new operating environment; second, to respond to the forces' needs in meeting the challenges of the operational environment-the forces have to undergo a transformation. Adaptability is critical to urban stability and support operations, as these operations present complex challenges to commanders for which no prescribed solutions exist. Warfare and technology are rapidly evolving; doctrine lags behind the need for ready solutions. Officers are confronted by many situations outside the doctrinal framework. No amount of technology can offset the effects of chaos theory ...169 Clearly, there is a need to quickly learn knowledge/skill sets, coupled with a new operating frame that might be radically different from the skills and knowledge developed through classical training (Military Review, January/February 2006, Tomáš Weiser, What is the Chaos? Dějiny a současnost, 5/2002).

This article presents not only an non-conventional approach towards psychology of military groups, but also offers the deep insight into British way of military thinking. This article is concerned with cohesion in its broadest sense. The term cohesion is usually used to describe one of the many contributions to morale. British military doctrine says that manoeuvres approach is an approach to operation in which shattering the enemy's overall cohesion and will to fight is paramount. The cohesion in this context is being used to describe the complex interaction of the physical, moral and conceptual components of fighting. A thorough understanding of the cohesion between people would enhance their fighting power. The good leadership is the means by which an understanding of what enables cohesion can be used to bring it about. Source: Human Cohesion; Shock and Surprise on the Battlefield (D. Rowland, D. Roney, J. Storr), British Army Review No 137, 2005.